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… and the mighty multinationals have monopolized the oxygen
so it’s as easy as breathing for us all to participate 
yes they’re buying and selling off shares of air 
and you know it’s all around you 
but it’s hard to point and say “there” 
so you just sit on your hands and quietly contemplate.
                                         (Ani Di Franco, Your next bold move)
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General introduction
How do you start the introduction of a PhD on political change in the Arab World – with 
Morocco	as	a	specific	case	study	–	right	in	the	midst	of	rapidly	changing	political	evo-
lutions? Less than two months before the deadline of this study, the people of Tunisia 
hit the streets and chased away president Ben Ali. Soon after, revolutionary politics un-
folded in Egypt. Also in the rest of the Arab world, the people would not sit quietly and 
watch how everything went back to normal. “Leaders in the rest of the Arab world are 
nervous—and so they should be”, stated The Economist, “the mobile telephone, satel-
lite television and the internet all have the potential to weaken their capacity for keep-
ing their people in the dark and under their control”.1 In other words, the Tunisian and 
Egyptian upheavals were be just the beginning. The events that followed in Libya even 
turned extremely violent compared to the ‘relatively’ peaceful revolutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia.	As	such,	the	question	whether	the	Arab	World	was	(finally)	experiencing	its	
own genuine democratic transition will surely spark the debates – yet again – between 
believers and non-believers.2 The issue of democratization has dominated the study 
of political change in the Arab world over the last 20 years. Despite the wide range of 
different opinions and explanations, a bulk of the political analyses can be divided into 
two broader branches. First of all, transitologists believed that the Arab World was, 
just as elsewhere in the world, subject to a linear transition to (liberal) democracy. For 
sure,	the	current	events	will	inspire	some	of	them	to	see	a	confirmation	of	–	what	they	
consider	 to	be	–	a	global	 logic.	Already	during	the	first	days	of	 the	Egyptian	revolt,	
Amr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that “Egypt 
stands today assuredly on the threshold of transition toward democratic governance”.3 
Secondly,	and	opposed	to	the	first	branch	of	scholars,	a	growing	group	of	sceptics	be-
gan to criticize this ‘transition paradigm’ and argued that we should rather pay attention 
to “what in fact is going on” in the Arab World (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 188). Accord-
ing to these scholars, Arab authoritarianism had proven again and again its renewal, 
resilience, persistence, robustness, etc… (Ibid.). 
Evidently, the current massive upheavals will certainly re-invigorate the debates on 
democratization and authoritarian persistence and alter the actual balance between the 
different views. But are these broader traditions of Middle East scholarship capable of 
providing us with satisfying explanations to what in fact is going on in the Arab World 
today? Suddenly, in the heat of the moment, everybody talks about political change. To 
be sure, I do not wish to deny the incredible importance of what is happening at the mo-
ment. No doubt about it, the toppling of various authoritarian leaders in the Arab World 
is a huge transformation. But how do we explain this phenomenon? I can imagine 
that, at the moment of writing this sentence, many experts, scholars, students, political 
analysts,	etc…	are	glued	to	their	computers,	television	or	radio,	eager	to	find	out	if	the	
change	they	have	been	looking	for	all	those	years	is	actually	(and	finally)	occurring.	
1  http://www.economist.com/node/17959600?story_id=17959600 (accessed 01/02/2011).
2  See for example the contrast between the article of Robert Springborg “Game over: the chance for 
democracy in Egypt is lost” and the one by Parag Khanna “Getting on the right side of history”. Both ap-
peared in Foreign Policy Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/03/getting_on_the_
right_side_of_history;  http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/02/game_over_the_chance_for_de-
mocracy_in_egypt_is_lost (accessed 04/02/2011).
3  http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=42456&lang=en (accessed 02/02/2011)
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But is it not possible that precisely the fact that many of them were actually looking for 
something particular (i.e. a democratic transition or authoritarian persistence), that this 
has blinded them at the same time to see what has actually been changing for years, 
even decades? Of course, most observers agree that the recent demonstrations did not 
come out of nowhere. Over the past decade, the Arab World has seen an increase in 
social protest (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). Additionally, there is a wide-spread con-
sensus about the fact that socio-economic grievances are at the basis of current public 
discontent. But still, are there not more complex and fundamental causes that can ex-
plain what we have seen these past two months? 
According to Michel Dunne, editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin, the revolt in Tunisia 
proved – and disproved – two intriguing aspects about political change in the Arab 
World. First, Tunisia debunked the long-held analysis that only a country with a strong 
political opposition can seriously challenge and eventually overthrow an authoritarian 
regime.4 Secondly, and maybe more importantly, “Tunisia showed that the youth bulge 
about which demographers and other analysts have been fretting for two decades is 
indeed a political time bomb” (Dunne, 2011). The Tunisian uprising, she emphasised, 
was rooted in the problems of youth unemployment. These same problems occur in 
other Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco. Similarly, 
the youth bulge in these other countries could also be one of the mean reasons for the 
current political instability. Another argument that is very popular at the moment is that 
the protests, which were initially sparked by economic grievances, are primarily about 
‘bad’ Arab governance. The protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and other countries were 
part of a rising tide of popular dissatisfaction with illiberal, unreformed Arab rule.5 The 
nature of domestic political government was thus the real problem. Internal corruption 
among a small minority of elites, the lack of political freedom, the human rights abuses, 
etc. were no longer accepted by the majority of the Arab populations. 
While I do not necessarily want to deny the validity of these statements, I wonder 
whether	 these	 arguments	 are	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 the	 current	 events?	Can	 a	 critical	
explanation be reduced to mere demographic trends or ‘bad’ governance? Or, to cite 
The Economist again, are the popular uprisings the mere result of the decreasing ca-
pacity of authoritarian Arab regimes to keep “their people in the dark and under their 
control”? Or are the real dynamics behind the current uprisings more complex? And 
to understand this complex nature of the current events, shouldn’t we look at the more 
global and structural mechanisms at work and try to map the much more variegated 
forms of political agency that are involved in the making of contemporary Arab politi-
cal life? In other words, I don’t think we can attribute the reasons for massive public 
discontent, frustration and anger simply to the dissatisfaction with the politics of the 
“Arab regime” and/or the pressures of overpopulation. The rapidly evolving transfor-
4  Professor Joel Beinin argued that also in Egypt, one of the most extraordinary aspects of the revolt was 
that	there	was	no	identifiable	leadership.	See	Beinin,	J.	Egypt	at	the	tipping	point,	31	January	2011,	in	
Foreign Policy, available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/31/egypt_at_the_tipping_point 
(accessed 01/02/2011). 
5  See for example Simon Tisdall, assistant editor in the guardian: “the failure of governance in the Arab 
World, 11 January 2011, Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/11/tunisia-algeria-riots-
failure-arab-governance (accessed 02/02/2011). See also Marwan Muasher, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national peace, available at: http://carnegie-mec.org/events/?fa=3148 (accessed 02/02/2011). 
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mations everyone is speculating about today, cannot be properly understood without 
seriously and critically taking into consideration the fundamental political changes of 
the last three decades. It are these changes that are the central focus of this study. To be 
honest, I had in mind a slightly different introduction. But despite – or maybe because 
of – the current events, the main research question of this project remains prevalent: 
How do we interpret political change in the Arab world today? Or more precisely, how 
do we understand contemporary political change without falling into the ideological 
trap of seeing change as a phenomenon that is almost automatically linked to the issue 
of (and balance between) either democratization or authoritarian persistence? In other 
words, how do we avoid ideological blindness (i.e. seeing change in relation to this one 
possible narrative: a transition to liberal democracy) and look critically (i.e. from the 
perspective of critical theory) at the actual political evolutions in the Arab World?6  
Increasing global market integration has triggered radical reforms in many Arab coun-
tries over the last three decades. Approximately 30 years ago, several countries in 
the	 region	faced	severe	deficit	crises	and	were	forced	 to	adopt	structural	adjustment	
measures. These structural adjustments and the following neoliberal reforms marked 
a turning point in the processes of political change in the region. There is of course 
no shortage of critique of the ways in which neoliberal assumptions have managed to 
articulate themselves to the charisma of contemporary globalization. Yet, in spite of 
the compelling nature of this broader critique, coming from a range of disciplines and 
different traditions of critical theory (e.g. Rose, 1999; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Harvey, 
2003; Brenner, 2004; Robinson, 2004; Bayart, 2007), there is still room for more ex-
plicit case studies, especially in the developing world and more particularly in the Arab 
World, that explore the contingent formations of neoliberalism on the ground and the 
specific	ways	in	which	neoliberal	agency	has	shaped	the	possibilities	and	constraints	
of	political	life.	A	first	problem,	however,	is	that	the	political dimension of (neoliberal) 
economic reform in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region has often been 
ignored or misunderstood within the area study’s literature. My concern here is to sug-
gest	the	significance	of	these	changes	for	the	government	of	people	and	places	in	con-
temporary Morocco; and – scaling up – to think about what these changes might imply 
for mainstream accounts of Arab political life, which often remain locked in debates on 
mere endogenous trajectories of regime change, democratic transition and authoritarian 
persistence (cf. chapter 1). Moreover, I argue against the often taken for granted hy-
pothesis that ‘bad’ governance should be (or can be) just replaced by ‘good’ governance 
in order to ensure a democratic transition, general welfare, economic development and 
more (political) freedom. Contrary to this hegemonic discourse and perception, the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms did not bring forth overall economic growth and 
prosperity – not even if these reforms would be implemented properly according to the 
rules of the game (e.g. Dillman, 2002) – but leads to a inherent geography of uneven 
development in which some places are privileged over others (Harvey, 2006). What’s 
more, the reality of contemporary neoliberal capitalism leads not so much to uneven 
development between nation-states or between centre states and peripheral states as 
it produces increasing social inequality within national and regional boundaries, and 
especially within the arising mega-cities of the Global South.   
6  What I mean by ideological blindness and critique will be further elaborated in chapter 1.
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This study takes Morocco as a case study. Also in Morocco, the implementation of a 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1983 was the symbolic watershed moment 
from which the current political transformations are to be explained. In less than three 
decades, the economic landscape of the kingdom has been radically transformed. Yet, 
how do we interpret these changes? Morocco has often been considered as a more 
moderate political system compared to some of the other authoritarian regimes in the 
region. Additionally, especially since king Mohamed VI’s accession to the throne, the 
country has willingly presented itself as a model reformer to the outside world. In the 
first	years	of	his	reign,	king	Mohamed	VI	carried	out	limited	political	reforms,	substan-
tial	 social	 reforms	and	above	all	 significant	economic	 reforms.	 In	his	discourses,	he	
repeatedly stressed the importance of good governance, human rights, economic devel-
opment and citizen participation. This sudden change in style, compared with the more 
repressive image of his father Hassan II, even earned Mohamed VI the epithet of ‘king 
of the poor’. And although the optimism of a ‘Moroccan exception’ took a setback after 
the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 – the public authorities immediately 
answered with repressive measures in order to deal with the political crisis (Zemni 
& Bogaert, 2006) – many observers still praised the country’s economic openness to 
the rest of the world. Some also believed that the implementation of important social 
policies such as the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) and the Cities 
Without	Slums	Program	(VSBP)	testified	that	there	was	still	evidence	of	a	real	transi-
tion towards more political liberalization (e.g. Navez-Bouchanine, 2009; for a similar 
more general argument see also Malka & Alterman, 2006; Storm, 2007).    
I argue that the reforms of the last three decades are indeed evidence of a fundamental 
political transformation. However, this transformation cannot be understood in terms 
of mainstream assumptions linking economic liberalization and free market reform to 
democratization. Neither can it be understood as just an incomplete implementation of 
economic reform, a form of crony capitalism, in the course of which a small minority 
of domestic corrupt elites, close to the monarchy, skim off all the capital surpluses of 
that	reform.	To	the	contrary,	these	–	maybe	at	first	sight	–	plausible	explanations	ne-
glect a more profound process of political change. The changes of the last 30 years in 
Morocco,	and	by	extension	in	the	whole	Arab	world,	reflect	three	phenomena	related	to	
neoliberalism	that	are	still	not	sufficiently	understood	and	remain	understudied.	First	of	
all,	the	neoliberal	reforms	reflected	a	profound	shift	from	(some	form	of)	state-devel-
opmentalism towards intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government.7 
As a result, authoritarianism in Morocco has been transformed by the ways in which 
the interests of ruling domestic elites and (global) economic elites are increasingly in-
tertwined. This gave rise to new arrangements where “market requirements” now deter-
mine and justify the (authoritarian) modality of government. As a result, the making of 
a new political world in the Arab region was not only determined by “the regime”, or by 
internal state-society relations, but also, and increasingly, by interests and interventions 
7  Developmentalism (as the Southern variant of Fordism-Keynesianism) manifested itself of course differ-
ently across the region. Morocco, for example, has never adopted a completely state dominated economic 
sector and compared to other countries in the region, such as Egypt, the Moroccan authorities showed 
themselves particularly modest in terms of providing social security for its citizens (Najem, 2001; Catusse, 
2009a; see also chapter 2 and 3). Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that the Moroccan political economy did 
not	contain	some	specific	characteristics	of	a	developmental	state	model	before	the	structural	adjustment	of	
the early 1890s (Waterbury & Richards, 2008; Catusse, 2009a). 
General introduction 15
related to global capitalism and contemporary neoliberal globalization. Secondly, the 
introduction of neoliberal reforms and the formation of a Moroccan neoliberal project 
are	not	subject	to	a	unitary	set	of	principles.	Neoliberalism	is	not	just	this	‘one	size	fits	
all’ model. This would be to neglect the crucial implication of local political agency and 
the constitution of differentiated forms of “actually existing neoliberalism” everywhere 
in the world (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). As I will argue, the local is not just a product 
of the global. To the contrary, the local is an agent in globalization. More precisely, the 
local production of contemporary global capitalism is the result of the localization of 
wider political interests and projects that involve local, regional, national and global 
actors	who	are	assembled	through	and	within	new	political	configurations	(MP	Smith,	
1998; Massey, 2005; see also Gupta, 1995). Finally, neoliberalism is not some ideology 
or	political	rationality	immune	to	change	itself.	Through	the	elaboration	of	specific	case	
studies, I want to explore the transformative and contingent character of neoliberal 
government and neoliberal governmentality without making rash conclusions about 
an alleged evolution towards post-neoliberal forms of government (for a similar argu-
ment see Challies & Murray, 2008). The crises of the 1980s, the protests against drastic 
austerity measures, and the negative socio-economic outcomes for the majority of the 
poor population, are some of the dynamics that have set into motion the development 
of new perspectives on government, new modalities of state intervention and new ways 
of market-support which may have radically changed the modalities and rationalities of 
neoliberal government but not necessarily the balances of political (class) power.
One of the main hypotheses of this study is that the socio-economic changes of the 
last three decades resulted out of a political project that cannot be understood properly 
without taking into consideration its dialectical intertwinement with the contemporary 
project of global capitalism and global class forces. Neoliberalism in Morocco has given 
form to a particular class project that cannot only be understood in terms of endogenous 
political	legacies.	Here,	class	should	not	so	much	be	understood	as	a	defined	group	of	
actors	with	a	set	of	fixed	characteristics	(e.g.	ownership	over	the	means	of	production),	
but rather as a process of appropriation of surpluses and capital accumulation (Ruccio, 
2011; see also chapter 3). As such, I use class as a political concept and not so much as 
a sociological concept.8 The (Moroccan) state plays a crucial role in this class project. 
Or more precisely, differentiated forms of state agency and state power are engaged in 
the production of the Moroccan neoliberal project. Often, neoliberal reform and state 
authority are seen within a negative correlation, as if market-oriented reform automati-
cally reduces state sovereignty and state control. Yet, this is a misconception. State 
power has been used actively to give form to actually existing neoliberalism. What’s 
more, the success of neoliberal reform depends on state intervention. Consequently, the 
growing reliance on market-oriented policies not only entailed a process of deregula-
tion but also re-regulated political life across an increasingly variegated landscape of 
spaces to be governed. Furthermore, to the extent global class actors are now involved 
in local politics, these actors do not so much negatively affect state authority but are 
drawn within reach and become active players on the field of the state (Panitch, 1998; 
Allen & Cochrane, 2010). State power has thus not necessarily been undermined but 
rather	redefined.	Power	and	authority	are	then	not	so	much	slipping	away	from	local	au-
8  I want to thank Matthias Lievens for this particular distinction. Additionally, of course, class is here not 
used in an absolute way in the sense that it replaces all other forms of social relations. 
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thorities but are subject to renegotiation within new assemblages of state power (Allen 
& Cochrane, 2010). As a result, the state – or the Arab regime for that matter – cannot 
be perceived as this coherent entity.9 As I discuss, neoliberal reform initiated the elabo-
ration of new forms of spatially differentiated government and regulatory arrangements 
that	manifest	themselves	differently	across	space.	More	specifically,	in	this	study	I	will	
pay attention to both new modes of (indirect) state intervention and new forms of state-
institutional transformation. Therefore, we should not make the mistake of seeing the 
state as an actor in itself but focus instead on the multiple and variegated actors that use 
state power to pursue their goals and interests.   
It	is	on	the	urban	and	not	the	national	scale	that	the	scope	and	significance	of	the	con-
temporary political changes are most clearly revealed. Consequently, the city presents 
itself as the site par excellence to study the current political transformations. Neolib-
eral	policies	have	intensified	urban	disparities,	turning	cities,	especially	in	the	Global	
South, more and more into spaces of extremes (Bayat & Biekart, 2009). I will consider 
the urban politics that characterize the production and government of both ends of 
the urban extreme in Morocco. I use the concept of urban politics as it is understood 
by David Harvey, namely “in the broad sense of political processes at work within a 
fluidly	defined	but	nevertheless	explicit	space”	(Harvey,	1989a:	127).	In	this	view,	the	
urban	space	is	not	exclusively	defined	by	the	urban	territory	and	political	agency	is	not	
reduced to the local or national authorities but comprises the wide range of social com-
plexes and social power relations that are drawn within the reach of the urban or impact 
upon its constitution. It is a much broader conception of politics which includes, but 
is not reduced to, local and national state networks. Considering these urban politics, I 
will draw evidence from two particular case studies. First of all, I examine the chang-
ing modalities and rationalities implicated in the government of slums in Morocco. By 
looking at different modes of government between the early 1980s and the 2000s, I 
demonstrate	a	significant	transition	in	Moroccan	neoliberal	government.	Furthermore,	
by examining the current national Villes Sans Bidonvilles program (Cities Without 
Slums – VSBP), I explain how slum dwellers are being required to participate in the 
making	of	a	specific	political	world	in	which	the	ability	to	claim	and	articulate	political	
rights are circumscribed not only by “the Arab regime,” but also by the sanctions and 
incentives of “the free market” (Parker & Debruyne, 2011). Secondly, I elaborate on 
the political dimension of a high-end urban development scheme in the valley of the 
Bouregreg river between the twin-cities of Rabat and Salé. The Bouregreg project is 
a salient example of how the contemporary city is perceived as an economic “growth 
machine” (Molotch, 1976) and how cityscapes are redesigned and restructured to sat-
isfy the desires and interests of (global) capital. Furthermore, at the end, I connect these 
two	case	studies	by	showing	the	specific	political	logics	behind	the	neoliberal	urban	
spatial	fix.	
The	specific	choice	for	these	case	studies	was	inspired	by	the	striking	neglect	of	main-
stream	political	analyses	of	the	ways	in	which	the	Arab	city	reflects	a	hegemonic	proj-
ect (Parker, 2009). There are exceptions of course. Pioneering work such as the book 
edited by Yasser Elshestawy (2008) focuses explicitly on contemporary urban transfor-
9  I do not want to argue that the state and the Arab regime can be seen as one and the same political entity, 
only that they are subject to the same kind of imagination. I will address this matter in chapter 1.
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mation in the Arab world. It tries to bring accounts on Arab cities within the framework 
of global city theory (cf. Sassen, 1999) and demonstrate that many cities in the region 
are plagued with many problems similar to other world cities (Elshestawy, 2008: 5-6).10 
However, Elshestawy’s volume remains rather descriptive and documents above all the 
physical transformation of the urban environment, without really exploring the particu-
lar agency and the regulatory and institutional contexts that make these transformations 
possible	in	the	end	(Krijnen	&	Fawaz,	2010).	Accordingly,	a	specific	focus	on	cities	
cannot be subject to the same mistake made by many state-centred analyses by reify-
ing the city – just like the state – as an actor in itself. In this view, places like the city, 
would then be conceived quite apart from the crucial social dimensions that shape it: 
power and social class hierarchy (Molotch, 1976). Mapping out these social dimensions 
is not an easy thing to do and requires the comprehension of the intrinsically dialecti-
cal character of the process of urbanization. In the Urban Revolution the French phi-
losopher Henri Lefebvre analyzed the political and social dynamics of ever increasing 
urbanization. According to Lefebvre, the urbanization of society was a historical pro-
cess	that	reflected	the	transformation	of	contemporary	society	from	an	agrarian	over	an	
industrial	to,	finally,	an	urban	society	(Lefebvre,	2003).	As	such,	he	was	convinced	that	
we needed new methodological and theoretical tools to grasp the urban phenomenon 
not only as a production of capitalist relations but also as a producer of new conditions 
for capital accumulation. For Lefebvre, the modern city was “not the passive place of 
production or the concentration of capitals, but that of the urban intervening as such in 
production (in the means of production)” (Lefebvre, 1996: 109-110). In other words, 
those forces that shape the city are eventually also shaped by the urban space. Accord-
ing	to	Edward	Soja,	Lefebvre	was	one	of	the	first	spatial	theorists	who	pointed	out	the	
essentially dialectical character of the relationship between spatial and social structures 
(Soja, 1980).11 To a similar extent, we could argue that the area study of the Arab region 
urgently needs new methodological and theoretical tools to grasp the (urban) political 
transformations under neoliberal globalization and the inherently dialectical relation 
between local politics and global capitalism. Some new methodologies and theoretical 
perspectives will be suggested and elaborated in the following chapters.
This	study	is	subdivided	into	five	chapters.	The	first	chapter	elaborates	on	my	method-
ology	and	reflects	on	my	fieldwork.	I	begin	the	chapter	by	positioning	myself	vis-à-vis	
the debate between transitologists and post-democratization studies (Valbjørn & Bank, 
2010).	I	specifically	critique	these	perspectives	for	failing	to	understand	crucial	dynam-
ics of ‘what in fact is going on’, and argue that critical theory can offer us some new 
insights that allows us to move away from some of the prevailing frameworks of expla-
10  Another important work is the edited volume by Nadir Boumaza (2005). Yet, in contrast to the book of 
Elshestawy, the link with contemporary globalization is less explicit in Boumaza’s volume.  
11  Among Marxist critics, however, Lefebvre has been criticized for appearing to argue that spatial/territo-
rial	conflicts	were	at	least	as	important	as	class	conflicts	as	forces	for	radical	social	transformation	(Soja,	
1980).	Nevertheless,	it	was	one	of	Lefebvre’s	most	important	contributions	to	reflect	on	the	city	from	a	
Marxist perspective and bring in questions of space (space as a social product) into Marxian science. He 
was one of the most important philosophers to theorize and politicize the urban as a privileged site for the 
absorption, regulation and production of contemporary globalization and link the processes of urbaniza-
tion	to	specific	relations	of	power	in	contemporary	capitalism	(e.g.	exploitation,	domination,	etc.)	(see	
also Lefebvre, 1991; 1996). The urban problematic is thus inherently connected to the question of political 
transformation under neoliberal globalization.
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nation. Critique refers here not just to criticism, but rather to a process of understand-
ing	which	specifically	focuses	on	the	particular	conditions	and	power	structures	 that	
shape our current social reality and determine our current forms of thinking. As such, 
the practice of critique entails the continuous questioning of the status quo. I consider 
this conception of critique as a fundamental part of my methodology. The second chap-
ter deals with some of the more theoretical foundations of my project. Three broader 
themes will be addressed here. First of all, I explore the political nature of contempo-
rary	globalization.	Secondly,	I	further	elaborate	on	the	specific	role	of	the	state	and	its	
dialectical	relation	with	global	capitalism.	Two	specific	critical	perspectives	on	the	state	
will be presented and weighed up against each other: Foucauldian perspectives on state 
on the one hand, and Marxian analyses of state on the other. Both perspectives have 
different conceptions of power and highlight different emphases. The third theme that I 
want to discuss is the issue of the formation of actually existing forms of neoliberalism 
and the importance of the city in its constitution. As I will, discuss, neoliberal projects 
lead	to	a	geography	of	uneven	development	that	has	its	specific	local	characteristics,	
outcomes	and	dynamics.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	local	specificities,	neoliberal	dis-
courses and rationalities have a global reach.  
The third chapter focuses on the history of three decades of neoliberal reform in Mo-
rocco.	Furthermore,	this	chapter	discusses	the	specific	transition	within Moroccan neo-
liberal modalities of government. On a global scale, this transformation in neoliberal-
ism can be described as a transformation from a phase of “roll back neoliberalism” 
to a phase of “roll out neoliberalism” (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Since the introduction 
of a SAP in 1983, Morocco entered a phase of radical economic restructuring and re-
trenchment. “Roll back neoliberalism” refers to this destructive moment when state 
power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects. Nevertheless, 
this phase implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back 
of particular (developmentalist) state functions. Moreover, I will discuss the politics of 
“accumulation by dispossession” that coincided with this particular phase of neoliberal 
restructuring (Harvey, 2003). Yet, during the 1990s, “market failure” and increasing 
socio-economic pressures will lead to a transition in neoliberalism and bring Morocco 
into a phase of “roll out neoliberalism”. This phase is more creative and is characterized 
by	new	forms	of	institution-building,	new	modes	of	regulation	and	new	configurations	
of spatially differentiated government that transfer the ability to govern political and 
economic life from traditional to new governmental arrangements. I will argue that in 
Morocco, this phase was mainly characterized by two developments. First of all, by 
the re-invention of social policy (Catusse, 2005). The negative social impact of earlier 
structural adjustments urged public authorities to pay more attention to the question of 
(urban)	poverty	and	resulted	in	the	redefinition	of	social	policy	and	social	development.	
Secondly, by the invention and creation of new governmental arrangements – e.g. “new 
state spaces” (cf. Brenner, 2004) – that have given rise to Morocco’s urban revolution. 
Especially, since the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, Morocco’s cities are be-
ing prepared to compete with other cities in the region for foreign investments, tourism 
and outsourced industrial and commercial activities. To conclude this chapter, I engage 
in a discussion with the conception of the “state bourgeoisie”. In contrast to what some 
suggest, I think the concept of class is a valuable tool to describe contemporary political 
agency in Morocco. 
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In	the	following	two	chapters,	the	two	specific	Moroccan	developments	(the	re-inven-
tion of social policy and the formation of new state spaces) will be explored more in-
depth. In the fourth chapter, I compare different modalities of urban government during 
the phases of roll back and roll out neoliberalism in relation with the urban problematic 
of the slums. Additionally, both in the early 1980s as well as in the beginning of the 
21st century, a moment of violence has accelerated the elaboration of new modalities of 
government.	In	1981,	Casablanca	was	struck	by	the	first	“IMF-riots”	(Clément,	1992).	
Two decades later, Casablanca (again) was confronted with several suicide bombings 
on 16 May 2003. Both moments of violence involved slum dwellers. Consequently, 
after each crisis, the slums became a primary political concern for the preservation of 
stability and the securitization of the city. Moreover, as these events took place in the 
economic capital of the country, the city of Casablanca became a “ville laboratoire”, 
a test-case and model for other Moroccan cities (Catusse, e.a., 2005). This chapter 
focuses	predominantly	on	the	specific	and	changing	methods, techniques and rationali-
ties of urban government. I argue that there is an important difference in government 
between the two periods that followed each crisis. While the reforms after the riots of 
1981 targeted above all the physical environment through which people move (the ur-
ban territory), the reforms after the events of 2003 intervened foremost at the level of 
the individual slum dweller and targeted above all the slum population. The conceptual 
distinction between these two general strategies of spatial organization is embedded 
within a theoretical framework which Michel Foucault has introduced as the study of 
governmentality. It integrates his different conceptions of power, i.e. the difference be-
tween sovereign power and biopower. Departing from a Foucauldian analysis, the par-
ticular shift in Moroccan urban government can be best explained with the distinction 
made by Mariana Valverde between “sovereign city planning” and “cities of security” 
to	delineate	the	specific	methods	of	power	and	the	techniques	of	government	involved	
in the attempt to increase social control over the so-called “spaces of high-risk” (Ra-
chik, 1995). As I will also demonstrate, the intention to enhance the social control over 
the	slums,	coincides	with	specific	strategies	to	maximize	profit.	As	such,	the	re-making	
of development in Morocco was equally inspired by the exploration of new frontiers 
of capital accumulation and the exploitation of what Ananya Roy has called “poverty 
capital” (Roy, 2010). 
The	final	chapter	deals	with	the	project	of	the	Bouregreg	Valley.	This	project	is	one	of	
the	flagship	projects	of	Morocco’s	urban	 revolution.	This	chapter	deals	with	critical	
perspectives in order to rethink the nature of the Arab state, this time not so much in 
terms of its methods but rather in terms of its institutional and social character. More 
specifically,	I	want	to	draw	attention	to	the	institutional	transformation	of	the	Moroc-
can	state	and	the	specific	assemblages	of	power	and	agency	that	are	gathered	within	
new	institutional	configurations.	By	drawing	on	the	case	of	the	Bouregreg	project	this	
chapter investigates the dynamics of agency formation implicated in the creation of a 
new state space and considers what it reveals about state respatialization and the rise of 
new governmental arrangements that have been often elided in mainstream literature 
on the MENA-region. Furthermore, a project like in the Bouregreg Valley reveals the 
particular	“spatial	fix”	in	the	Moroccan	neoliberal	project.	It	also	reveals	specific	ef-
forts to redevelop the urban space that prioritize its exchange value, especially that of 
the inner-city, over and above its use value (Lefebvre, 1996). As such, the city itself, 
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its built environment and its infrastructural capacities have become important solutions 
for the worldwide “capital surplus absorption problems” (Harvey, 2010a). Additionally, 
this	spatial	fix	entails	a	process	of	“creative	destruction”.	This	refers	to	a	more	violent	
side of neoliberal urban restructuring. As David Harvey reminded us, “violence is often 
required to built the new urban geography on the wreckage of the old” (Harvey, 2010: 
176). 
With this study, I want to argue that uneven development in Morocco, and by exten-
sion elsewhere in the Arab region, is not a (temporary?) problem of some regions, 
cities or even populations that are “lagging behind” and need to “catch up” in order 
to reach our level of development (in the sense that they are “developing” and we are 
“developed”). To the contrary, uneven development is the inherent result of neoliberal 
capitalist globalization itself. Contemporary neoliberal globalization is the result of a 
political project which assembles the interests of local and global class forces and con-
trasts with the interests of the majority of the Arab populations. My two case studies 
reveal some of the essential dynamics behind this political project in Morocco. Conse-
quently, I argue that in contrast to the popular notion of globalization, usually pictured 
as some kind of unavoidable process to which we all have to adapt – and hence beyond 
the scope of national and/or local political agency – the various projects involved in its 
making are actually not so politically neutral as they appear to be (Parker, 2009: 113). 
Therefore,	I	wish	to	contribute	to	a	more	critical	reflection	about	political	change	in	the	
Arab world, without reverting to normative questions about whether there is or there 
isn’t a democratic transition (towards our model of liberal democracy), and without 
ignoring	critical	analyses	and	reflections	on	–	to	some	extent	–	similar	transformations	
in “democratic” societies in the world as a result of their interaction with and role in 
the formation of contemporary global capitalism.12 This last element opens up a whole 
new space for comparison and liberates politics in the region from their stigma of ‘Arab 
exceptionalism’. 
Before	I	continue,	I	wish	to	make	a	final	note	on	the	format	of	this	PhD.	Many	of	the	ar-
guments that are elaborated in this text, have been explored before in articles that have 
been either published (or been accepted for publication) or are currently under review. 
Nevertheless, I consciously chose not to submit a PhD based only on ready-made and 
publishable articles – despite the fact that this is now a possibility at our university.13 I 
consider	a	PhD	first	of	all	as	an	exercise.	Undoubtedly,	by	trying	to	fit	one’s	work	into	
the limited format of an article, or a series of articles, and, subsequently, by trying to 
answer to or comply with the requirements, demands and discourses of certain journals, 
an important part of the exercise risks to get lost or skipped. Some of the ideas and 
problems I wrestled with over the course of these last four years are still not ready-
made.	To	the	contrary,	they	are	reflections	of	still	ongoing	intellectual	struggles.	Yet,	
at the same time, I am convinced that is useful, even necessary, to present them at one 
point – despite the fact that a lot of these thoughts and arguments are not ready-made 
12  An interesting personal experience was that for three years in a row, students have asked me spontane-
ously whether we couldn’t see similar evolutions in Belgium after I gave my class on urban political trans-
formations in Morocco.
13		Obviously,	the	whole	idea	of	this	particular	format	reflects	a	certain	market	logic	from	which	even	the	
university as an institute doesn’t seem to be able to escape.
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(and maybe never will be) – because the motive of academic work, to my point of view, 
is not so much the presentation of ideas as it is the result of debate. Furthermore, social 
science is the practice of a craft and the outcome of intellectual craftsmanship (Mills, 
1959). But this craft needs time and space and will undoubtedly be subject to trial and 
error. Therefore, a beginning scholar needs the space and the opportunity to engage 
with	a	wide	range	of	perspectives,	struggle	with	them,	and,	in	the	end,	figure	out	which	
directions he/she wants to follow in the future. The exercise of writing the monograph 
has been such a practice for me. It represents a project, my project, that will be prefec-
tionized, reworked and probably re-invented over the years to come. As such, from a 
personal perspective, writing this monograph maybe wasn’t the most strategic option 
(in the short term), but it was certainly the most productive one (intellectually).   

 23
         Chapter 1
In Morocco only several days and I already was set up in 
a hotel, an obvious remnant of colonialism, was having 
my coffee in a garden, and had little to do but start “my” 
fieldwork. Actually, it was not exactly clear to me what that 
meant, except that I supposed I would wander around Se-
frou a bit. After all, now that I was in the field, everything 
was fieldwork (Rabinow, 2007: 11)
To be a critic by profession and to proclaim that one under-
stands nothing about existentialism or Marxism (for as it 
happens, it is these two philosophies particularly that one 
confesses to be unable to understand) is to elevate one’s 
blindness or dumbness to a universal rule of perception, 
and to reject from the world Marxism and existentialism: 
‘I don’t understand, therefore you are idiots.’ (Barthes, 
1972: 34)
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The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben starts his book on method with the following 
insight: “anyone familiar with research in the human sciences knows that, contrary to 
common	opinion,	a	reflection	on	method	usually	follows	practical	application,	rather	
than preceding it” (Agamben, 2009: 7). Not coincidentally, this chapter has been written 
once all other chapters were drafted. Over the course of my four years of research, my 
‘methods’ have evolved considerably, and not in the least, changed radically. Yet, this 
particular evolution has not been – following Agamben’s allusion – the result of a well 
thought out methodology before	my	actual	fieldwork	started.	It	was	rather	the	result	of	
a continuous struggle in	the	field.	This	(contingent)	process	of	continuously	evolving	
research methods and approaches not only profoundly altered the scope of my project, 
it also radically changed me. In that sense, this project not only represents an attempt to 
understand a particular case, it equally represents, for me at least, a journey (although 
far from completed) in the understanding of myself, my aspirations and ambitions, my 
growing	engagement	as	an	activist-scholar,	and	finally,	my	ongoing	development	and	
maturation as an academic. Before elaborating more on this process, let me start by 
situating what this study project was almost about. This project started as a study on 
democratic	transitions	in	the	MENA-region,	more	specifically	in	Morocco	and	Egypt.14 
My original goal was to investigate both the exogenous and endogenous mechanisms 
that impacted upon political transition in both countries. As a trained political scientist, 
I started my research by getting to know the mainstream debates on political change in 
the Arab World. However, in the process, I quickly got frustrated. I realized that I radi-
cally differed in opinion from some of the perspectives that were dominating the area 
study. As a consequence I started to look elsewhere and I turned to critical theory from 
both	inside	and	outside	the	area	study	to	find	some	answers	to	my	questions.
This project departs from a fundamental critique on a certain tendency within many 
mainstream accounts on Arab politics. Over the past 20 years there has been a dominant 
tendency	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	politics	in	the	region	in	relation	to	a	specific	
end stage, namely, liberal democracy. Whether current political transformations were 
perceived as a gradual evolution towards that end stage, or whether contemporary (au-
thoritarian) politics were perceived to be rather persistent and resilient in the face of 
that end stage, I argue that precisely the framing of general research questions within 
this binary logic has obfuscated or hindered our ability to see many of the actual dy-
namics and characteristics of contemporary political change in the Arab World, and 
more	specifically,	the	particular	nature	of	the	undeniable	and	decisive	impact	of	con-
temporary globalization on the processes of change. With this argument, I build on 
and situate myself within a longer history of critical theory and critical debates on the 
nature of Arab politics (cf. Heydemann, 2000; Mitchell, 2002; Catusse, 2006; Parker, 
2009), on the tensions between the area studies and the social sciences disciplines (cf. 
Tessler, 1999; Ludden, 2000; Mitchell, 2003; Biglin, 2006), on the particular position 
of a peripheral area in the capitalist world system and the relation between Third World 
politics and capitalist globalization (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980; Amin 2003; Ruccio, 2011), 
and	finally,	on	the	impact	of	imperialism	and	culturalism	on	the	study	and	imagination	
of Arab politics (cf. Amin, 1989; Said, 2003). Additionally, departing from these wider 
critiques, I want to highlight two substantial issues that, to my point of view, have been 
14  The original title of my PhD-proposal was (in Dutch): “Democratic transitions in the Middle East and 
North Africa: a comparative study between Morocco and Egypt.
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understudied and misunderstood in many contemporary political accounts, namely: the 
question of space and the role of the city. In my opinion, the urban space is probably the 
most	prominent	field	of	study	from	where	we	can	retrace	and	explain	the	contemporary	
political	transformations.	Yet,	despite	a	few	exceptions,	I	am	convinced	that	the	signifi-
cance of these two issues remains largely unrecognized. As such, by taking into account 
the	issue	of	space	and	the	role	of	the	city	as	specific	guidelines,	this	project	attempts	to	
provide alternative perspectives to understand contemporary change in the Arab World, 
and	more	specifically	in	Morocco.						
Not beyond but away from the regime paradigm: from an a-spatial to a spatial 
analysis of political transition
In the area study of the Arab region, the question of the ‘regime’ and its willingness 
and/or resilience to a ‘democratic’ transition has dominated the study of political 
change over the last 20 years. Even longer ago, in the heyday of the liberal moderniza-
tion theory, questions of regime change and democratization in the Arab region were 
already at hand, albeit in a different context. Democratization theories can be viewed 
as an offspring of modernization theory. The latter has, since the late 1950s, provided a 
popular framework of analysis of Third World politics in Western social science (Guaz-
zone & Pioppi, 2009b). The narrative of modernization theory has evolved around the 
assumption that political trajectories in the rest of the world would eventually follow 
the trajectory of the core-countries of European (and Western) modernity. Contempo-
rary narratives on globalization have the same structuring characteristics. Just as in 
the old story of modernity, Doreen Massey argues, contemporary globalization is also 
a tale of “inevitability” (Massey, 2005: 82). Therefore, ever since the end of the cold 
War and the euphoria about the so-called “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989), scholars 
on Arab politics have wondered about the exceptional position of the Middle Eastern 
region during the third wave of democratization – which actually started already in the 
1970s but really took of with the transitions in Eastern Europe during the 1990s (Hun-
tington, 1991).15 From then on, it was said, “democracy ceased being a mostly Western 
phenomenon and “went global”” (Diamond, 2010). Yet, the Arab region seemed to be 
somehow bypassed. As Larry Diamond has put it:
By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 
electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s indepen-
dent	states).	By	1995,	that	number	had	shot	up	to	117	–	three	in	every	five	states.	
By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save 
one – the Middle East. Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms 
had	become	host	to	a	significant	democratic	presence,	albeit	again	with	a	single	
exception – the Arab world. Fifteen years later, this exception still stands (Ibid.: 
93).
  
As a result, over past two decades, the authoritarian persistence and resilience of Arab 
regimes was considered both symptomatic of, and responsible for, the crisis of social, 
15  With regard to the recent social upheavals in the region, we see many commentators and political ana-
lysts making the comparison with Eastern Europe and the revolutions that started in 1989. Many observers 
are now speculating about the Arab region’s own Berlin-Wall moment. 
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political and economic development in the region (Parker, 2004). Indeed, as Parker 
notes, the resilient nature of the ‘Arab regime’ in the face of a prolonged crisis of politi-
cal legitimacy “has come to constitute a, if not the, central theme in contemporary polit-
ical sociology of the Middle East” (Ibid.: 1). Explanations ranged from an emphasis on 
culture and/or religion (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2001), to the nature of the economy 
and the dependency on rents such as oil and foreign aid (Beblawi, 1990; Luciani, 1990), 
to the involvement of foreign imperial powers (e.g. the US) who supported authoritar-
ian leaders to serve their interests (Quandt, 2001), to the internal regime survival tactics 
and domestic political structures (Brumberg, 2002; Brownlee, 2002; Ghalioun, 2004; 
Albrecht	&	Schlumberger,	2004),	and	finally,	to	the	lack	of	a	vibrant,	independent	and	
democratic civil society (Kamrava & O Mora, 1998; Hawthorne, 2004; for similar per-
spectives on Morocco, see for example Maghraoui, 2002; Cavatorta, 2005; Ottaway & 
Riley; 2006; Joffé, 2009). Additionally, some have investigated the particular charac-
teristics of authoritarian rule in the Arab monarchies (L Anderson, 2000; Ottaway & 
Dunne, 2007). Yet, despite this very broad range of explanations, the preoccupation 
with	the	nature	of	the	‘regime’	can	be	divided	into	two,	at	first	sight,	opposing	bodies	
of literature. First, especially during the 1990s, a what Morton Valbjørn and André 
Bank	typified	as	‘democrazy’ branch of Middle East scholarship emerged, character-
ized by so-called willing ‘democracy-spotters’ (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). This body of 
literature emerged in the wake of scholarship that engaged with the study of the third 
wave of democratization. Formulated on the basis of the experiences in Latin-America 
and Eastern Europe, “transitology” postulated the possibility of a linear transition from 
authoritarianism to liberal democracy, depending on the existence of structural precon-
ditions, rational choice of the ruling elites and, of course, a free market (Guazzone & 
Pioppi, 2009b: 2; see also Schmitter & Karl, 1994). The ambition for area specialists 
was to demonstrate that the Arab region was subject to the same global logics as else-
where  (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). Lise Storm, for example, has argued that contrary 
to the beliefs of many scholars at the time, Latin America succeeded in undergoing a 
transition to democracy, so why couldn’t sceptics about the MENA-region be wrong? 
As such, she argued that:
My book takes the position that the development of democracy in the MENA can-
not be categorically dismissed. Moreover, although these countries are lagging 
far behind the countries of most other regions, some democratic development 
has indeed taken place. Although it may seem to some scholars that the countries 
in this particular region are not moving towards democracy (…), I maintain that 
just because the movement has been rather limited and slow it does not mean it 
should not be studied (Storm, 2007: 5; emphasis added). 
The obvious problem with the transitologist’s representation and perception of politi-
cal change is that it is presented as a process disembodied from space. The transition 
paradigm	tells	us	a	story	about	the	inevitability	(and	glorification)	of	the	global	logics	
– read Western logics – to which the Arab region is equally – eventually – subjected. 
Consequently, the possible differences between countries and political systems around 
the globe will then be explained as if some countries and/or systems are just “behind” 
(Massey, 2005: 5). According to Doreen Massey, these kinds of political and academic 
narratives do not allow us to imagine other (non-Western) countries and political forces 
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in	the	world	to	have	their	own	specific	trajectories,	their	own	particular	histories,	and	
the potential for their own (different) futures. Within the transitologist’s perspective 
the research cases are not recognized as coeval others, but rather as cases situated on 
a logical historical timeline, arguing that those who are ‘behind’ are merely situated 
at an earlier stage. Allegedly, there is only one possible narrative on political change. 
The study of these so-called countries that are ‘lagging behind’, then comes down to 
a simple question, as for example the one Storm (2007: 163) poses herself in the case 
of	Morocco:	 “Today,	fifty	years	 after	 independence,	 how	 far	 has	Morocco	 come?”16 
The assumed unavoidability of the global logics (i.e. contemporary globalization) are 
usually framed within a simplistic and automatic association between democracy and 
the free market, and even more astonishing, accompanied by the assumption that anti-
systemic projects (e.g. communism or Islamism) are, in advance, uncritically regarded 
as non-democratic (Ibid.: 184, footnote 1, and 194, footnote 61). From a more critical 
point	of	view,	this	belief	in	capitalist	modernization	and	unification,	especially	after	the	
fall of the Berlin Wall, is inspired by what Guy Debord called, “the current ideology 
of democracy – in other words, (…) the dictatorial freedom of the Market” (Debord, 
1995: 9; see also below). Moreover, this kind of ideological perspective is what Massey 
labelled as an a-spatial perspective on politics because the cosmology of the one and 
only possible narrative obliterates the multiplicities and the contemporaneous hetero-
geneities of space (Massey, 2005). A-spatial because spatial difference is convened 
into a temporal sequence. The French philosopher Michel de Certeau warned us that by 
privileging progress (i.e. time), the conditions of its own possibility (space itself) tend 
to	be	forgotten.	Space	then	becomes	the	blind	spot	of	both	scientific	and	political	tech-
nology (De Certeau, 1984: 95; see also Lefebvre, 2003). This is exactly what happened 
with modernist theories like transitology. Different ‘places’, Massey argues, are then 
interpreted as mere different stages in a single temporal development (e.g. moderniza-
tion theory) (Massey, 2005: 68). Potential differences in political, social and economic 
trajectories are occluded and every country in the world is assumed to follow “the same 
(‘our’) path of development” (Ibid.:82).17
Still, according to Valbjørn and Bank, transitology must be credited because it nuanced 
the then prevalent neo-Orientalist presumptions about Islam’s inherently undemocratic 
nature and the problematic picture of the Middle East as an immutable region.18 How-
ever, at the turn of the new millennium, the transitologists have been met with growing 
criticism within the area study of the Middle East. With regard to the political situation, 
this region still seemed to be “the least free region of the world” (Valbjørn & Bank, 
2010: 187). Even the optimism about Morocco, long considered as an exception to 
16		To	prove	their	point,	and	make	it	more	‘scientific’,	scholars	on	transitology	often	reduce	the	complex	
question	of	democracy	to	some	quantifiable	parameters	which	can	be	measured	(e.g.	transparent	elections).	
17  Additionally Massey argues that the effect of such a narrative is very political: “because space has been 
marshalled under the sign of time, these countries have no space – precisely – to tell different stories, to fol-
low another path. They are dragooned into line behind those who designed the queue”. Ironically, Massey 
adds that – and this will also be part of my central argument in this study – “not only is their future thus 
supposedly foretold but even this is not true, for precisely their entanglement within the unequal relations 
of capitalist globalisation ensures that they do not ‘follow’. The future which is held out as inevitable is 
unlikely to be reached” (Massey, 2005: 82). 
18  Although, in the aftermath of 9/11 we have seen a strong comeback of neo-Orientalism and culturalist 
explanations of Middle East Politics (cf. Zemni, 2006a). 
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the wider authoritarian trend in the region, was shattered to pieces with the obvious 
return to authoritarian politics and the repression against the Islamist opposition after 
the violent suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 (Zemni, 2006b; Zemni & Bogaert, 
2006; Catusse, 2008). Indeed, some scholars proclaimed the “end of the transition para-
digm” and thought it was time for the “democracy-promoting community” to realize 
that the label of “transitional countries” was no longer applicable to many countries 
in the world, not in the least to the Arab countries (Carothers, 2002). This gave rise 
to a branch of Middle East scholarship that tried to bring the area study into the “era 
of post-democratization” (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). Valbjørn and Bank argue that this 
branch denounced the transitologist’s perception of “political development within a 
pseudo-universalist, teleological and normative autocracy/democracy scheme”. They 
critiqued the limited scope of these studies which was based on the question “how far a 
particular society has come in a universal democratic transition to the ‘post-historical’ 
era” (Ibid.: 187). The way out of this normative connotation, i.e. framing it as a process 
towards more democracy, was done by redirecting the focus from “something desirable 
but absent” (democracy) to a concern for “what in fact is going on” (Ibid.: 188; some 
examples are Brumberg, 2002; Brownlee, 2002; Maghraoui, 2002; Volpi, 2004; Al-
brecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Cavatorta, 2005; Joffé, 2009). Post-democratization, so 
it was said, spends more attention to the actual political developments in the particular 
countries that were at scrutiny: 
This critique derives from observations of how the Arab Middle East, after more 
than a decade of countless nominal reform initiatives, continues to be predomi-
nantly authoritarian. The natural answer from this perspective to the question 
of ‘what in fact is’ will be ‘authoritarianism’. Instead of posing questions about 
reasons for the ‘failure of democratization’ (i.e. the absence of something desir-
able) we therefore should seek to get a better understanding of the ‘success of 
authoritarianism’ (i.e. something actually present). This change of perspective 
has given rise in recent years to a major and fertile debate on Arab authoritarian-
ism, its renewal, resilience, persistence, endurance, robustness, durability and 
sustenance (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 189)    
Yet, if the seemingly more objective question of “what in fact is” is reduced to the 
seemingly simple answer “authoritarianism”, they still seem to suggest implicitly that 
Arab political systems are somehow objecting certain global forces or a global logic. 
The basic underlying question that informs both these two so-called opposing bodies of 
literature actually remains the same: what about the condition of (liberal) democracy in 
the Middle East region? Of course, Valbjørn and Bank try to put forward as convincing 
as possible that one has to make a distinction between “optimistic expectations (i.e. 
democratic transition) and the depressing reality (i.e., the persistence of authoritarian-
ism)” (Ibid.: 188). But it is exactly their framing of authoritarianism as a “depressing 
reality” which makes them not necessarily less normative than the so-called democra-
cy-spotters. As such, in the post-democratization era, the question of authoritarianism, 
whether they like it or not, is still regarded as a residual category or phenomenon – i.e. 
as the absence of democracy (Parker, 2004). A substantial problem with their approach 
is not so much their critique on theories of democratization, but rather their own uncriti-
cal stance towards (liberal) democracy itself, and above all the neglect of the underly-
Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology 29
ing forces that undermine it everywhere in the world (to use Debord’s remark: they 
are not free of the current ideological dimension of democracy either). Following up 
on Massey’s insight on single temporal perspectives and a-spatial frameworks, post-
democratization studies have the tendency to categorize ‘regimes’ in a similar way:
As the number of countries falling in between outright dictatorship and well-
established liberal democracy has swollen, political analysts have proffered an 
array	of	“qualified	democracy”	 terms	to	characterize	 them,	 including	semi-de-
mocracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-
democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual 
democracy (Carothers, 2002: 10).
Everything between the two extremes (whatever they may actually represent) is then 
situated within the “grey zone” (Ibid.). The post-democratization literature thus has a 
similar a-spatial view of political trajectories, maybe not in the sense that it focuses 
exclusively on ‘catching up’ (or why Arab regimes are not catching up), but more in the 
form of a narrative which implicitly suggests a distinction between ‘good democracy’ 
(we) and ‘bad authoritarianism’ (the depressing reality). In contrast, the spatial view 
of people like Massey and other critical thinkers, tries to intervene in or supersede this 
‘dichotomy of (Western) logic’ (authoritarian/democratic) and analyze the dynamics of 
“neither A nor B” (Agamben, 2009: 20). The same counts for my own methodology: 
to	use	Agamben’s	reasoning	again,	it	is	attested	above	all	through	the	“disidentification	
and neutralization” of the binary logic (either A or B). Yet, from an a-spatial point of 
view, the ways out of the binary logic are indiscernible since they cannot be grasped 
“by means of bivalent caesurae” (Ibid.: 20).19   
Additionally, the intrinsically interesting question posed by Valbjørn and Bank about 
“what in fact is going on” doesn’t seem to be able to break loose from an endogenous 
and regime-centred perspective on political change. The problem is not so much that 
current post-democratization or post-transition paradigms are wrong about the authori-
tarian character of politics in the Arab World, the real problem is that their own under-
standings of contemporary neoliberal globalization and of the liberal myths about free-
market democracy are actually obfuscating many of the political transformations in the 
region (thus what is really going on), and above all, neglect the complex dynamics of 
power behind these changes. For example, both transitologists and post-democratiza-
tion scholars still view “the regime” as the key to understand Arab political life. In fact, 
these approaches ultimately erected a stereotype of the “Arab regime” that actually 
got in the way of understanding the complexity of social forces that are manifesting 
themselves in the current political orders of the region (Parker, 2006: 84). Regimes are 
typically considered as power-centres that control both the state and domestic society. 
As a result, the scope of the regime’s power is than considered as something congruous 
with the cartographic boundaries of the national state.  
In Morocco, the regime is often equated with the makhzen. Literally, the word makhzen 
19  Here, I am using a particular insight of Agamben, not necessarily the general idea of his book. With the 
expression “neither A nor B” Agamben refers to the neutralization of the dichotomy between the general 
and	the	particular	through	what	he	defines	as	the	‘paradigm’.	
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– derived from the verb khazana, to hide or preserve – can be translated in English as 
“magazine” (warehouse, depot) (Claisse, 1987). It referred to the place where the sul-
tan’s taxes were stored during the period before the French Protectorate (1912-1956). 
Traditionally, the term makhzen became a synonym for the royal family, its entourage 
and the apparatus of the pre-modern state. Today, the term is still used in common par-
lance and has become a – sometimes vague and polymorphic – concept to denote cen-
tral power (the regime) in Morocco (Ibid.; Catusse, 2008: 19). Without going too much 
into detail, today, the makhzen still represents and denotes the ruling clique around the 
royal family (i.e. the royal advisors, the ulama20,	the	superior	army	officers,	the	eminent	
families, leading business men, etc.) (Claisse, 1987).21 Yet, Myriam Catusse raises the 
concern that a one-sided focus on the makhzen in order to understand the nature of 
Moroccan politics has often obstructed political analyses – both inside and outside aca-
demia – to really grasp the complexity of political forces and political transformations 
in contemporary Morocco. Moreover, the continuous and obvious political dominance 
of the monarchy and the makhzen has often created the false impression that there are 
no other sources of power and that nothing really changed in Morocco over the course 
of the last few decades (Catusse, 2008: 27; see for example Entilis, 2007).      
Additionally, the stereotype of “the regime as a black box that contained the insti-
tutional programming of a society” has also created the assumption that the regime 
controlled the state, and consequently, the Arab state has often been depicted as a coher-
ent entity that claimed the control over its territory and the society within its national 
borders (Parker, 2006: 97). In this view, regime power emerges from an institutional 
core which exerts, via direct intervention, its hegemony over subordinated institutions, 
spaces and scales. In this view, the regime is still presented as the privileged site of 
political	 formation,	 intervention	and	 inquiry	(see	more	specifically	chapter	5),	while	
Arab states are seen as bounded entities, with their own internally generated authentici-
ties,	and	defined	by	their	difference	from	other	geographical	imaginations	of	space,	that	
are obviously situated on the outside (Massey, 2005). ‘Other’ social forces that some-
how impact on regime-politics (e.g. US-support and Western imperialism, the capital-
ist market, EU-democracy promotion policies, etc.) are than often categorized as the 
external dimension(s), the external context or the international factors (cf. Cavatorta, 
2004; 2005). Insofar as the dynamics of globalization are taken into account, they are 
considered to be subordinated and subjected to endogenous political legacies of state 
building and regime consolidation (Parker, 2009). In contrast, my own approach leans 
strongly on the approach elaborated by, amongst others, Christopher Parker. The under-
lying proposition of his critique is that contemporary dynamics of (neoliberal) global-
ization have highlighted serious shortcomings in current mainstream analyses’ capacity 
to identify and study political change in the Arab region (Parker, 2004; see also Parker, 
2006; 2009; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009; Bogaert 2011; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).          
20  The ulama are the religious authorities
21  This didn’t mean that the makhzen was perceived as a static system. It evolved constantly and new 
influential	actors	were	drawn	in,	while	others	could	lose	their	prominent	status.	Allain	Claisse	notes,	for	
example, that due to economic liberalization in the 1970s and the 1980s, many emerging business elites 
worked	their	way	into	the	sphere	of	influence	of	the	monarchy.	The	same	counts	for	the	emergence	of	new	
state-technocrats (cf. chapter 3). For more detailed information on the makhzen see Waterbury (1970), 
Leveau (1985) and Claisse (1987).
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The privileging of the nation-state as the arena within or scale at which change pro-
cesses – or a lack of change – are supposedly unfolding, is something I want to avoid 
(Parker, 2004: 22). Yet, this doesn’t mean that such an approach distances itself “ex-
plicitly from both the democratization and authoritarianism ‘paradogma’ in favor of 
looking above, below and beyond the level of regime”, as Valbjørn and Bank would 
like have us to believe (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 191, italics added). With this argu-
ment,	they,	first	of	all,	draw	the	spatial	imaginary	of	‘the	regime’	again	as	somehow	
bounded and opposed to ‘outside’ forces located above, below and beyond.22 Secondly, 
by picturing these alternative approaches as a way of looking at ‘politics beyond the 
regime’	–	for	the	sake	of	categorization	and	clarification	let	me	describe	the	alternative	
approach I refer to as a critical spatial approach – they are actually including these kind 
of alternative perspectives into the vocabulary of their ‘either A or B’ scheme (included 
through its exclusion), while completely missing the point of an analysis that investi-
gates the dynamics of neither A nor B (Agamben, 2009). The obvious and expected 
critique then follows that there is “a risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ 
if the strong focus on politics beyond the regime is at the expense of an understanding 
of the dynamics of the regime” (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 191). With this critique, one 
can maybe try to save the intrinsic vocabulary of “the authoritarianism strand of the 
post-democratization trend”, but not necessarily enhance the understanding of political 
change in the Middle East (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, because of the prevalent assumption that the regime controls the state, 
theory could only explain the absence of transition in terms of a coherent state’s domi-
nation over the economy and civil society (Parker, 2006: 97). It is precisely this par-
ticular conception of the regime – and by extension of the state that is controlled by the 
regime – that resonates with what Massey has described as the billiard-ball view of the 
world (Massey, 2005: 72). In this particular view, political entities such as the regime 
or the state are seen as bounded in their full identities and through their interaction (e.g. 
through inter-state relations) a clear distinct inside and outside can be distinguished. 
Parker explains that such a conception fails to recognize the complex ways in which 
state agency became enmeshed with the social complexes of capitalist agency and capi-
tal formation (Parker, 2006: 97). In contrast, many scholars with backgrounds in politi-
cal geography have convincingly argued that purely national territorial conceptions of 
the state and state power are no longer, if indeed they were ever, able to make sense of 
the nature of the state. A state whose power, in reality, has been used in rather diffused, 
dispersed and fragmented ways can never be fully understood by focusing exclusively 
on the national scale (Allen & Cochrane, 2010; see also Abrams, 1988; Agnew, 1994; 
Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004; Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2008). 
Consequently, what this study underwrites, is not so much the attempt to study power 
located outside (supposedly above, below, or beyond) the regime, but the necessity to 
move away from both a one-sided regime centred perspective and a billiard-ball-like 
or state-centred view of politics in favour of new ways of thinking about (authoritar-
ian) modalities of government. In short, this study follows approaches that favour more 
relational thinking, considering political space as an open construction and production, 
22  Valbjørn and Bank also explicitly refer to, amongst others, Parker’s article in Political Geography 
(2009) to make this point. 
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with attention to institutional restructuring within a global market environment and 
the	specific	economic,	social	and	political	rationalities	that	underpin	these	transforma-
tions. This kind of more complex conception of political power – or what Parker has 
called the “complexes of power” that constitute the dynamics of change – attempts to 
“recombine global and local, state and market, public and private, and “traditional” 
and “modern”” to unravel the diffuse, open, relational and sometimes contingent out-
comes of political transformation behind the seemingly ubiquitous and authoritarian 
image of the “Arab regime” (Parker, 2004: 7). The continuity of authoritarian out-
comes of political government cannot be understand by making a distinction between 
the regime on the one hand, and politics located somehow outside it on the other hand, 
but by conceptualizing the dialectical interrelation between local and global agents of 
transformation. The billiard-ball view of the regime occludes the social relations and 
political practices, and their “relentless production”, within contemporary rounds of 
neoliberal globalization (Massey, 2005: 82). It occludes the “spatial reach” of dialecti-
cally intertwined power-geometries within and across national territorial boundaries 
and their momentary assemblage in particular sites, scales, spaces (Allen & Cochrane, 
2010). As long as the social, economic and political crises in the Arab world are viewed 
as the sole responsibility and outcome of internal, endogenous dynamics related to the 
authoritarian persistence of the Arab regimes and their relation with their domestic 
Arab societies, the crucial impact of neoliberal globalization, the important political 
role of local agents in the production of that kind of globalization and the production of 
uneven development will remain obfuscated. It is my dissatisfaction with this particular 
tendency to understand Arab politics that has informed and stimulated my search for 
alternative answers and perspectives. But before I elaborate on these alternative per-
spectives	on	political	transformation	in	Morocco,	let	me	first	explain	how	I	came	to	my	
results and conclusion. 
Fieldwork and critical theory
The advantage of writing a methodology chapter at the end, is that by then the project 
seems relatively logical, structured and coherent, at least from my point of view. The 
stress about ‘what the hell am I doing?’ seems long gone. The recollections of the con-
crete	details,	doubts	and	frustrations	of	my	everyday	life	in	‘the	field’	now	seem	futile.	
However,	when	I	think	back	upon	my	four	years,	I	do	realize	how	much	my	fieldwork	
has been a real struggle at certain moments. And an often chaotic one too. No doubt, 
the months that I spent in Morocco were, from a social and personal perspective, a very 
exciting and fascinating experience. I never had the feeling that I was alone and I met 
some very good friends. Nevertheless, professionally, it hasn’t always been a piece of 
cake. Regarding my research method, I had no standardized techniques, no previously 
set-up methodological scheme nor a chronological set of procedures to follow up on 
once I was in Morocco. My brother is a director and he entrusted me that, before you 
could	even	 think	about	starting	 to	shoot	a	film,	every	new	film	project	needs	a	well	
developed shooting script in which every next step is carefully worked out and calcu-
lated.	I	didn’t	have	a	shooting	script.	I	remember	taking	off	for	my	first	visit	to	Rabat	
with	 only	 two	 answered	 e-mails.	 I	 had	 absolutely	 no	 clue	 how	my	first	 five	weeks	
would evolve. My main strategy was ‘looking around’ and ‘talking to everybody I 
could	get	my	hands	on’.	So	basically,	I	just	improvised.	Luckily,	after	that	first	visit,	
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I	ended	up	with	37	interviews	(which	was	good	for	my	confidence)	and	a	list	of	valu-
able contacts to continue next time. But when I reconsider it now, I would probably 
have	done	it	completely	different.	At	a	more	profound	level	of	self-reflection,	there	are	
numerous	moments	during	fieldwork	when	you	start	questioning	yourself	and	doubt	
your	capabilities.	The	aspirations,	excitement	and	confidence	that	I	felt	when	I	had	an	
appointment with what I thought to be an important contact, were quickly ruined when 
I realized that he or she didn’t take me really serious.23 Especially, fellow academics 
can be tough. They could really give you the look of ‘what are you going to ask or tell 
me about Morocco?’. I will never forget the endless discussions with Montse, my col-
league and roommate in Rabat, at the kitchen table with coffee and cigarettes, about the 
purpose	of	it	all:	social	science,	being	a	scholar,	our	position	in	the	field,	our	relation	
to our subject, the confrontation between theory and empirical work, etc. Every time 
we had a ‘bad day’ we would cheer each other up and try to convince ourselves about 
the value of what we were doing. In contrast, a good interview, new information or 
an interesting new insight could really give you a boost as well, and encourage you to 
continue.	So,	with	its	ups	and	downs,	doing	fieldwork	is	something	that	I	learned	above	
all	during	my	fieldwork	and	not	in	textbooks.	
Despite the fact that I now reached the end of my PhD-project, I still haven’t really 
figured	out	what	 I	am	exactly.	 I	still	consider	myself	a	political	scientist,	although	I	
have found more satisfying answers and challenges in other disciplines (e.g. geography, 
anthropology, sociology and its many subdivisions). This kind of ‘identity crisis’ has 
impacted	upon	my	fieldwork	as	well.	Let	me	give	a	few	examples.	To	begin	with,	I	am	
deeply	influenced	and	fascinated	by	(political)	geography	and	the	ways	the	discipline	
reflects	upon	the	question	of	space.	However,	it	sometimes	frustrated	me	that	I	didn’t	
always thought as ‘spatial’ as for example Alejandro, an architect and good friend I met 
in Rabat. When we were strolling through the city, I was fascinated by the way he was 
able to ‘spatialize’, in a very concrete and visual manner, many of our discussions on 
urban transformation. In addition, when I tended to act too much as a geographer, my 
research adviser, Sami Zemni, quickly reminded me that I was about to lose my original 
research focus and advised me not to try to be something or somebody that I am not 
(especially in such a relatively short period of time). At the time, it was sometimes dif-
ficult	to	draw	the	lines,	but	now	I	realize	that	he	was	absolutely	right.	Another	example	
was the issue of the government of slums in Morocco. This topic informed an important 
part of my research. Although, I studied most of the literature on Moroccan slums, I had 
many doubts whether I was capable of saying something useful without really doing 
a thorough ethnography of social and political life in the slums. It frustrated me that 
I wasn’t an anthropologist or a sociologist. And even if I wanted to be, the fact that I 
wasn’t able to speak the Moroccan dialect in order to discuss seriously complicated 
things with slum dwellers, frustrated me even more.24 Finally, the rather eclectic search 
23  I think my (relatively young) age was an important factor. Especially, when I found out that people 
generally estimated me to be younger than I really was. Therefore, I noticed that during my different stays 
in Morocco, I was gradually paying more attention to the way I looked and dressed myself. 
24  The issue of the language is something that frustrates me still. Thinking that I would eventually end up 
in Egypt I started taking classes in (some kind of) Egyptian dialect in Ghent. However, realizing after two 
years that I wasn’t going to go to Egypt and noticing that my very limited and broken mixture of Egyptian 
and Middle Eastern darija wasn’t going to serve me at all in Morocco, I kind of lost my motivation to con-
tinue to study the language and change to another dialect. By then, my research was consuming most of my 
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for entry points – since the ‘regime’ wasn’t one of them – has pushed me, especially in 
the beginning, in all kinds of directions of which I eventually only appropriated a few. 
Nevertheless, the more directions I took, the more complicated the general picture be-
came. That is why I am now convinced that I eventually took the right decision to leave 
the idea of a comparative study between Morocco and Egypt behind me. I consciously 
opted for an in-depth study of just one case in order to develop new insights which 
then could be applied eventually to other cases. Luckily, my search for answers and 
new challenges over the past four years made me certain of one thing. Basically – and 
this I experienced up until my last visit in 2010 – the more answers I found, the more 
questions it raised.      
Some reflections on fieldwork
Social science research mainly entails two large dimensions: gathering data and in-
terpreting	data.	Fieldwork	obviously	plays	a	crucial	part	in	the	first	dimension	but	its	
effect	on	the	second	shouldn’t	be	underestimated	either.	Let	me	first	elaborate	on	the	
process	of	gathering	data	and	reflect	on	their	interpretation	(the	process	of	understand-
ing)	afterwards.	Before	I	can	explain	how	I	gathered	information	in	Morocco,	the	first	
question is of course: why Morocco? Maybe the more appropriate question would be: 
how did I end up in Morocco? I had done my master’s thesis on Egypt and my original 
plan was to continue working on Egypt. However, my research advisor thought it was 
tactically interesting to formulate a research proposal based on a comparative study of 
two case studies, in this case two countries. He followed Morocco more closely and 
it seemed obvious to include this country. Back then, I wasn’t really excited about the 
idea of Morocco but I realized that this ‘tactical move’ would increase my chances of 
getting funded. In any case, if we would receive the funding, I assumed I would be 
mainly focusing on Egypt anyway and deal with Morocco on the side. In the end, it 
turned out to be a completely different story. Because of the parliamentary elections in 
Morocco in September 2007 and because my advisor thought Rabat would be “a soft 
landing”	compared	to	Cairo,	I	decided	to	go	to	Morocco	first.	The	rest	is	history.	I	never	
made it to Egypt. 
Overall,	I	spent	38	weeks	(nearly	10	months)	in	Morocco	divided	over	6	fieldtrips.25 
My	first	fieldtrip	(August	and	September	2007)	was	decisive	for	the	delineation	of	the	
particular topics I would deal with during the rest of my research. By then, I still hadn’t 
a real clue what would be the particular focus. As a mentioned above, I just mainly 
looked	around	and	 improvised	during	 this	first	visit.	My	 initial	plan	was	 to	 investi-
gate the case of the partial privatization of water and electricity in the cities of Rabat 
and	Casablanca.	During	my	fieldwork	preparations,	 I	had	 read	several	news	articles	
on increasing social protest against the rising consumption prices. Although I didn’t 
continue with this particular case – one of the reasons was that the issue of ‘privatiz-
ing’ water and electricity, and social protest had been dealt with extensively by other 
authors (cf. Allain-El Mansouri, 2005; De Miras & Le Tellier, 2005; Zaki, 2005; 2008) 
time and despite several attempts to pick up the language again, I never persevered. 
25  Of course, I would have preferred to have spent more time and especially longer periods of time. The 
longest period I stayed in Morocco was almost two and a half months (in the spring of 2008). However, 
doing	fieldwork	also	implies	making	compromises	with	those	you	leave	behind.	And	in	the	end,	I	think	I	
succeeded	in	finding	a	good	compromise.		
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– some of my interviews with the people from Lydec26 eventually oriented me towards 
the question of the government of slums.27	It	was	also	during	my	first	fieldtrip	that	I	met	
Montse, a fellow colleague who worked on the particular case of the social protest of 
unemployed graduates in Morocco. Thanks to her, I had not only a place to stay but also 
a	critical	colleague	with	whom	I	could	exchange	thoughts	and	reflections	on	our	ongo-
ing research. She stirred up my interest in social protest. Although, the question of so-
cial protest didn’t became a central focus point in my own research, I worked together 
with Montse on a side-project which resulted in an article. Our work together inspired 
me to think about the particular ways in which the practices of protesters can teach us 
something about prevalent perceptions on Arab political life and more precisely, about 
the “imagination of the state” in Morocco (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). 
I ‘discovered’ my second case study – the urban development project of the Bouregreg 
Valley – after being only a few days in Rabat. I remember walking by a billboard to-
gether with my advisor. We were both immediately drawn to it. Although the Boure-
greg Valley, located between the cities of Rabat and Salé, was still an empty place, the 
billboard was a forerunner of the radical transformation the cityscape was going to 
experience. We immediately decided that we had to talk to one of the people working 
for the state agency that was responsible for the project. Not much later, we walked 
into one of the buildings of the agency, ‘hoping for the best’, asking the guard if we 
could talk to somebody, anybody. It was the following interview that convinced me 
to continue working on the Bouregreg project. The questions raised by this particular 
case	influenced	my	interest	in	the	urban	environment,	more	specifically	in	the	dialectic	
between	political	change	and	urban	transformation.	I	wanted	to	find	out	what	such	a	
project could teach me about state transformation and respatialization, the rescaling of 
politics and the ‘spatial reach’ of assemblages or complexes of power that are involved 
in its development.    
Over the course of four years (2007-2010), I conducted 169 interviews and assisted 
or participated in 6 workshops in Morocco related to my research topic.28 My intervie-
wees	included	a	wide	range	of	actors	and	‘experts’:	public	officials	from	different	state	
agencies, ministries, semi-public agencies, NGO-workers and civil society activists, 
members of political parties and social movements, journalists, academics, members 
from	private	companies	and	consultants,	and	finally,	members	from	international	de-
velopment and donor agencies (e.g. USAID, French Development Agency, European 
Commission, etc.). Some people I interviewed several times. This often led to a more 
informal relation with some of my respondents and helped me not only to gain valuable 
information but also enabled me to expand my own network based on their contacts. 
Of course, not all of my interviews were directly useful for this project. Especially dur-
ing	my	first	visit,	I	literally	interviewed	everybody	I	could	lay	my	hands	on	in	order	
to expand my social network and pick up as many interesting details and insights on 
26  Lydec is a subsidiary of the French multination Suez Environment. The company is implicated in a 
public-private partnership with the local authorities in Casablanca and works together with the authori-
ties in social development projects to provide resettled and restructured slums and other forms of informal 
housing with water and electricity. 
27		My	advisors’	specific	interest	in	the	government	of	slums	played	also	a	crucial	role	in	my	orientation	
towards the question of the slums. 
28  Besides several participations in international conferences.
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Morocco as possible. This helped me, above all, to broaden my general knowledge. 
Afterwards, especially during my last three stays, I selected my interviewees more 
purposively. I built my network mainly based on two strategies. First of all, I met a lot 
of	people	by	just	‘dropping	by’	their	organizations,	offices,	etc…	Sometimes,	I	returned	
home	empty-handed	but	often	I	was	lucky	and	I	managed	to	speak	the	official	or	per-
son I had in mind. These contacts were mainly found via newspaper articles, websites, 
policy documents and literature research. Secondly, I trusted upon my existing network 
to	find	new	informants	or	particular	experts	that	could	inform	me	about	some	particular	
aspects of my research objectives.29 
The	process	of	 interviewing	and	finding	new	 interesting	people	can	be	a	 frustrating	
activity. Especially when it is 30 degrees outside and things aren’t evolving according 
to plan. Sometimes, for example, you adjust your planning to one person you really 
want	to	meet.	But	if	that	particular	person	is	difficult	to	reach	or	cancels	earlier	made	
appointments, you can lose a lot of valuable time. Also, some informants want to be 
so kind – or they just want to be in control – to organize an interview with one of their 
contacts themselves. Again, this can mess up your schedule if things aren’t running 
smoothly.	Generally,	I	had	little	difficulty	to	get	into	contact	with	the	people	I	wished	
to see. However, there was one golden rule I quickly discovered: if you want to meet 
people, call them because they almost never answer your email! That is why I left so 
unprepared	 the	first	 time	and	why	 I	 never	made	 an	 appointment	before	 I	 arrived	 in	
Rabat	in	the	following	fieldtrips.	Even	the	few	times	I	called	in	advance,	I	usually	got	
the following answer: “ok, call me again when you arrive in Morocco”. Unfortunately 
(but also interestingly) I found out that the closer you got to people or institutions 
connected	 to	 the	Moroccan	Ministry	 of	 Interior,	 the	more	 difficult	 it	 became	 to	 ar-
range an interview.30 I even attempted once to ‘drop by’ into the Ministry of Interior 
itself.	Unfortunately	without	any	result	(didn’t	got	past	the	first	guard).	Even	when	I	
had	a	phone	number	it	remained	very	difficult.	For	example,	I	called	to	the	director	of	
Idmaj Sakan several times to try to speak with him about the VSBP.31 Yet, he was either 
busy, sick or unsuited (according to himself) to talk with me on the subject. The Urban 
Agency of Casablanca (AUC) is another example. The AUC is placed directly under 
the control of the Ministry of Interior. It is a very powerful institutional player at the 
level of Casablanca. As such, I wasted probably more than 15 phone calls and a fax for 
an appointment which eventually, when I arrived, couldn’t take place after all due to a 
rescheduling. Instead, I was directed to somebody else – someone ranked lower in the 
29		As	such,	the	specific	contact	who	gave	me	the	mobile	phone	number	of	the	director	of	the	Bouregreg	
state agency helped me in a fundamental way to advance that particular case study. Before I had tried to get 
into	contact	with	specific	officials	from	the	Bouregreg	state	agency	but	I	didn’t	seem	to	get	access	to	the	
main building. I didn’t got past the secretary who told me to send a fax which they eventually never replied. 
Once I called and spoke to the director directly on the phone, he was willing to talk to me and introduced 
me even to several of his staff members. Moreover, they felt more authorized to speak to me because they 
were contacted by the director himself or because I had introduced myself with a recommendation of the 
director.
30  The Ministry of Interior is traditionally the central locus of the monarchy’s political power. It is one of 
the so-called sovereign ministries and its head is appointed by the king regardless the results of legislative 
elections and political majority in parliament.
31  Idmaj Sakan is a public operator responsible for the resettlement of slum dwellers in Casablanca. This 
organization is placed directly under the authority of the governor of Casablanca (hence, the Ministry of 
Interior).
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bureaucratic hierarchy – who didn’t entrusted me with more than the usual ‘langue de 
bois’.32	Three	fieldtrips	later,	I	attempted	again	to	speak	to	someone	of	the	AUC.	This	
time however, I didn’t call beforehand. I decided to just drop by. I even had prepared 
myself	carefully.	I	managed	to	walk	in	with	an	‘official	request’	from	the	librarian	of	
the French research institute, Centre de Jacques Berque, to exchange documents and 
information with their documentation centre. But my hopes were up too high. I didn’t 
got past the secretary (of the AUC governor nota bene! Damn it, I was so close!) and I 
returned home with little or no useful information. She gave me a bunch of folders that 
dated back more than 10 years at least. 
As far as the content of an interview goes, it was not a surprise either that more detailed 
and	sensitive	(political)	questions	were	more	difficult	to	pose	in	interviews	with	state	
officials.	I	remember	one	experience	particularly.	It	was	during	an	interview	with	an	of-
ficial	of	Al	Omrane,	one	of	the	agencies	responsible	for	the	VSBP.	Right	at	the	moment	
when I asked her about the tense relationship between Al Omrane and Idmaj Sakan in 
Casablanca	and	the	specific	influence	of	the	Ministry	of	Interior	in	this	relationship,	she	
suddenly stood up and told me she had something urgent to do.33 She pushed me a folder 
in	my	hands	and	left	her	office	for	five	minutes.	When	she	came	back	she	started	talk-
ing about something completely different. Every attempt to come back to my previous 
question was answered very vaguely or avoided.34 It could have been a coincidence of 
course, but it felt like she had tried to break the rhythm of the interview. There was no 
indication whatsoever that could explain why she had to leave so suddenly. Neverthe-
less, this doesn’t mean that these kinds of interviews cannot be really interesting. Re-
peated discourses, small details and personal opinions can be very useful to understand 
bigger pictures of vision and change. 
I chose not to record my interview sessions but take notes instead. I do realize that a lot 
of information probably got lost this way. Nevertheless, it was a conscious choice. First 
of all, it was a matter of time. Transcribing interviews can be a very time consuming 
occupation and the particular format of my interviews made taking notes more suit-
able. The format of the interviews was semi-structured or even open. I always tried to 
prepare questions but I wanted enough space to anticipate their opinions and stories. I 
attempted above all to have a discussion with my respondents and wrote down those 
things or opinions that seemed interesting or useful. My interviews were important ad-
ditions to other sources such as literature, press articles, observations, etc., but not the 
most important source as such. Additionally, recording can have a restraining effect. I 
wanted to create a setting – as much as possible – in which my respondents felt at ease 
to discuss their issues with me without having the feeling that they were being taped 
and had to be careful about what they said (taking notes can also have that effect).35 As 
32		The	French	expression	for	‘the	official	woolly	discourse’. 
33  In contrast to Idmaj Sakan, Al Omrane is under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing, Urban-
ism and Spatial Planning (MHUAE). Rumour had it at that time that the engagement of both ministries in 
the VSBP at the urban scale of Casablanca has caused severe political tensions between both of them. Of 
course,	I	wanted	to	find	out	more	about	that.
34  Interview (Rabat – 04/06/2010).
35  There were some occasions where I wished I had taped the interview. I remember one interview with an 
official	of	the	public	Social	Development	Agency	(ADS).	It	lasted	for	almost	five	hours	and	I	didn’t	even	
manage to ask all of my questions. Also during the interview, two new members of ADS, joined us, which 
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such, I used my interview material not so much as primary sources but mainly to clarify 
certain	of	my	arguments	and	assumptions,	add	additional	details	to	ground	a	specific	
hypothesis	or	learn	more	about	the	specific	rationality	behind	certain	policies.						
Interviews	were	not	 the	only	 aspect	of	my	fieldwork	 and	my	methods.	Observation	
was also an important technique. My work on urban transformation required me to 
really	get	 to	know	and	experience	 the	 two	cities	where	 I	 did	most	of	my	fieldwork	
(Casablanca and Rabat). As a result, ‘walking in the city’ was an elementary strategy 
to experience the city. As de Certeau noticed, walking was a way of experiencing the 
urban beyond its mere panoramic view and its theoretical conceptions (De Certeau, 
1984: 93). I spent hours strolling the streets, the medina, the markets, and of course the 
Bouregreg site. I also participated in manifestations or – more comfortably – enjoyed a 
tea in front of the Balima hotel –  with its excellent view – when the unemployed gradu-
ates were protesting in front of the national parliament. The numerous people I met and 
talked to during these numerous strolls are not counted as interviews. Nevertheless, 
they often provided me with insightful information and details. Visiting different urban 
sites is really interesting to get to know the city a little bit better, but can be tough as 
well sometimes. I had the chance to visit some Moroccan slums or resettlement proj-
ects in the district of Sidi Moumen (Casablanca), Douar el Kora (Rabat), and even in 
smaller cities such as Temara and Larache. As a stranger there is a good chance that 
they see you as an intruder or a voyeur (Zaki, 2005: 29). Or even worse, they see you as 
someone who can directly and immediately ameliorate their situation (something you 
know you can never accomplish). I remember two women in Douar Tomas (Sidi Mou-
men) who asked me to note down their address (street number and the number of the 
barrack). They hoped that I would give this to ‘the organization’ I worked for (thinking 
it was an NGO). My contact had to explain them that I was just a student, but still they 
insisted. Another guy asked me, that very same day, if I could maybe watch out for a 
job. He was prepared to do any kind of job. Again, I tried to explain him that I was 
only a student and that there was little I could do. Still, he gave me his phone number. 
Without wanting to overdramatize these experiences, these were some of the moments 
where I not only studied uneven development but really experienced it. These were the 
moments that underscored my privileged position and the unequal relationship between 
me, as a researcher, and my subject.  
This brings us directly to the question of objectivity. When one thinks about ‘science’, 
one often associates it with hard evidence, objectivity (the preclusion of subjective ob-
servations	and	interpretations)	and	the	formulation	of	falsifiable	hypotheses	and	theo-
ries. The friend of my mother in law has a PhD in chemistry and during one of our many 
interesting conversations about philosophy and science, I noticed his hesitation (and 
even slight reluctance) to call me a “scientist”. After all, I wasn’t doing a PhD in natural 
or exact sciences. The human or social sciences have struggled with this stigmatization. 
Many social sciences disciplines have often tried to adopt more positivist approaches 
in order to preclude subjectivity. Political science for example, has become increasingly 
made it pretty complicated to keep track of everything that was said and take notes at the same time (Inter-
view	Temara	31/05/2010).	I	did	tape	an	interview	once	with	an	official	of	USAID	in	2007.	But	I	am	a	real	
layman when it comes to technology. When I arrived home, I noticed that the recording completely failed 
(Interview Rabat September 2007). 
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influenced	by	quantitative	empirical	approaches	(e.g.	statistics,	rational-choice	models,	
etc.) since the behaviourist revolution of the 1950s (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007). Meth-
ods and interpretations were to be reduced to that what was explicitly observable and 
calculable. Statistics are an excellent example. They are very useful propaganda for 
“objective” research because they let the “facts” speak for themselves. In reality, how-
ever, statistic data simulates an ‘objectivity’ which depends heavily on the legitimacy 
of the questions asked (Gadamer, 1989: 300). As such, social phenomena cannot be 
isolated	to	be	studied	separately	from	every	unexpected	influence.	Moreover	the	hu-
man sciences are irrefutably connected to modes of experience that lie outside ‘science’ 
(Ibid.). According to the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, a truth is communicated 
in these modes of experiences – he refers to the example of experiencing philosophy, 
history	and	art	–	that	cannot	be	verified	by	the	methodological	means	proper	to	science.	
The knowledge pursued by a ‘science of art’ can neither replace or surpass the ‘expe-
rience of art’ (Ibid.: xxi). As such, as I indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the 
relationship	between	the	scholar	and	his	field	is	not	a	passive	relationship.	Not	only	is	it	
impossible to erase the researcher’s own subjectivity towards the phenomena he or she 
studies, the study-object itself will also have its impact on the researcher. Starting from 
my	particular	experiences	of	doing	fieldwork,	I	can	now	say	that	it	has	had	a	significant	
impact	on	me	as	a	person.	The	research	field	affects	the	scholar	(and	vice	versa).36 
As a consequence, knowledge is produced by and dependent on the particular research 
questions that are being posed, the subjectivity involved and the particular situatedness 
of	the	researcher.	“Facts	are	made”,	argues	Paul	Rabinow	in	his	outspoken	reflection	on	
his	fieldwork	in	Morocco,	“and	the	facts	we	interpret	are	made	and	remade”.	As	such,	
he continues, “they cannot be collected as if they were rocks, picked up and put into 
cartons and shipped home to be analyzed in the laboratory” (Rabinow, 2007: 150). In 
contrast to positivist or quantitative research approaches, the interpretative method or 
interpretive modes of knowledge production do not falsely pretend to be able to erase 
subjectivity (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007). This particular research approach sees un-
derstanding more as a process which will inevitably be determined by the ‘interpreter’ 
and his own social, historical and cultural background. This process of understanding 
– as Gadamer describes it – contains therefore a tension between the strangeness of the 
phenomenon one tries to understand and the interpreter’s own “fore-understanding” 
(Gadamer, 1989: 294-295). This implies two things. First, the process of understand-
ing is always mediated by the positionality of the interpreter (the researcher), without 
which the information would be meaningless (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007: 26). This po-
sitionality will be determined by the researcher’s background, as well as the priorities, 
questions and prejudices he or she brings to bear in trying to understand a phenomenon 
(Ibid.). This process does not entail a one-way communication starting from the re-
searcher itself. To the contrary, it involves, what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons”. 
By horizon, he refers to the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point (the positionality of the researcher). Our attempt to 
understand	will	therefore	be	first	of	all	determined	by	the	prejudices	we	bring	with	us.	
Gadamer calls this the “the horizon of the present”. Yet, our horizon of the present is not 
36  Especially in anthropological and ethnographic studies, Rabinow refers to the dialectic process between 
reflection	and	immediacy	embedded	within	fieldwork.	Neither	the	subject	nor	the	object	remains	static	dur-
ing the process (Rabinow, 2007: 38-39; see also De Smet, 2007). 
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fixed	but	continually	in	the	process	of	being	formed	(e.g.	testing	one’s	own	prejudices)	
and	co-influenced	by	the	horizons	that	emerge	out	of	the	research.	Hence,	the	process	of	
understanding entails a tension between the researcher’s horizon of the present and the 
history and character of the phenomenon he studies. As a result, through their fusion, 
the horizon of the present will be superseded and (new) knowledge will be produced. 
Secondly,	 and	 this	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	first	 remark,	 the	 process	 of	 understand-
ing (the interpretation), involves (or has to involve) more than just the reproduction 
of an objectively observable reality. It goes beyond this stage and that is why, Gad-
amer (1989: 296) argues that “understanding is not merely a reproductive but always 
a productive activity as well.” In other words, facts are made, knowledge is produced. 
Theory will play a crucial role in this knowledge production process. Whether we like it 
or not or whether we are conscious about it or not, empirical data are always produced 
and read through the theoretical lenses we are familiar with or drawn to. With regard to 
economics, the Marxist economist David Ruccio (2011: 215) argues that “all economic 
“facts” are theoretical, in the sense that they only exist and make sense within theoreti-
cal frameworks”. As such, he continues that each different economic theory produces 
its own set of facts, and in turn, each theory will interpret and understand its facts – and 
that of other theoretical frameworks – differently, depending on the particular concepts 
that are used to produce and read them (Ibid.).37 Furthermore, we interpret the world 
through concepts, presumptions and paradigms that we acquired not only through ‘sci-
entific	training’	but	also	from	culture	more	generally.	Accordingly	–	and	inevitably	–	
within the process of understanding there hides an immanent danger for blindness, or 
what Henri Lefebvre referred to as, blind fields. Blindness can occur when we look at 
new	fields	or	phenomena	with	eyes	(concepts)	that	were	shaped	by	the	practices	and	
theories	of	other	fields	(e.g.	interpreting	neoliberal	globalization	with	the	concepts	of	
neo-Orientalism, modernization theory or transitology).38 This blindness is not innocent 
37  An obvious example is the study by Lahcen Achy (2010) of the Carnegie Middle East Centre. He 
“proves” that poverty has been reduced in Morocco and that Morocco already reached the Millenium De-
velopment Goals set for 2015 with regard to poverty. He bases his analysis partly on the proportion of the 
population living on less than $1 or $2 per day. Compared to a decade ago this proportion decreased respec-
tively from 2% to less than 1% and from 20% to 8%. Striking is that he does not really take into account 
inflation	nor	the	considerable	increase	in	prices	of	consumer	goods	in	Morocco	over	the	last	decade	(which	
was	a	cause	for	numerous	social	protests),	despite	the	fact	that	he	acknowledges	the	significant	economic	
growth and the relatively impressive per capital growth in GDP during the last decades. Furthermore, he 
underpins his argument by claiming that, overall, poverty has been reduced by 40% (from 16,2% to 9% of 
the population) on the basis of the national poverty line. Many observers have already warned us to be care-
ful	to	interpret	these	official	Moroccan	figures	as	they	tend	to	contradict	figures	released	by	the	United	Na-
tions	Development	Programme	(UNDP).	By	the	way,	the	differences	between	official	government	figures	
and data from the UN has caused a political polemic in Morocco in the summer of 2010. Following their 
own parameters, UNDP concluded that 28% of the Moroccans live under the poverty line. The Moroccan 
government accused the UN for a lack of “rigor and professionalism” (see article by former Telquel-editor 
Mohamed Benchemsi – Morocco: so what is the real poverty rate. Available at:  http://www.moroccoboard.
com/viewpoint/126/1180,	accessed	14/02/2011;	the	official	numbers	used	by	UNDP	are	available	at:	http://
www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Morocco.pdf, accessed 14/02/2011). Furthermore, while Achy ac-
knowledges the increased socio-economic inequality between 1990 and 2007, he sees this as only one of 
six pressing challenges of the future and not as the most important one, let alone that he emphasizes the 
political dimension of those mechanisms that produce and reproduce inequality in Morocco. In contrast, 
the analyses in this project will give a completely different perspective on issues such as poverty, inequality 
and economic development.     
38  The same goes the other way round of course. The process of bringing new concepts and theories into a 
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or trivial (e.g. due to a lack of intellectual capacities, lack of education, cultural differ-
ences, or by ‘just’ using the wrong concepts, etc.). As Lefebvre has put it:
Blindness, our not-seeing and not-knowing, implies an ideology. These blind 
fields	embed	themselves	in	re-presentation.	Initially,	we	are	faced	with	a	presen-
tation of the facts and groups of facts, a way of perceiving and grouping. This is 
followed by a re-presentation, an interpretation of the facts. Between these two 
moments and in each of them, there are misrepresentations, misunderstandings. 
The blinding (assumptions we accept dogmatically) and the blinded (the misun-
derstood) are complementary aspects of our blindness (Lefebvre, 2003: 30).       
However, both Lefebvre and Gadamer are arguing that despite the inevitability of blind 
fields,	and	despite	the	impossibility	of	attaining	absolute	knowledge,	or	absolute	truth,	
this doesn’t mean that all processes of understanding are equally valuable. These pro-
cesses are always ideologically embedded and consequently entrenched by power (i.e. 
the power of ideology). This is what Lefebvre refers to as the ‘blinding’: “the luminous 
source (knowledge or ideology) that projects a beam of light, that illuminates else-
where” (Ibid.: 31). Furthermore, it is also through the work of Michel Foucault and later 
Giorgio Agamben (with his conceptualization of the camp) that we gained considerable 
insight in the intimate relation between the process of knowledge production and pow-
er; between the use of power and particular practices of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. 
Foucault, 1979; 1991; 2007; Agamben, 1998).39 Although, the researcher cannot just 
dispose	himself	of	the	prejudices	and	the	fore-understanding	he	takes	to	the	field,	Gad-
amer distinguishes between those prejudices that are productive for our understanding 
and those that hinder our understanding (the misunderstanding – or the “blinded” to use 
Lefebvre’s notion) (Gadamer, 1989: 295). Consequently, it is the task of critical theory, 
not only to engage in a critical process of understanding (see below), but also to expose 
the ideological nature of those interpretations and explanations that fail to do that. In 
transition theory, for example, the ideological character of the analysis is obscured by 
the abstract generality and so-called universality of its concepts (e.g. democracy, trans-
parency, free market, etc.). No doubt, it concerns a misplaced universality dictated by 
ideological power – in contrast to the real universality of capitalism which should be 
critically analyzed – and consequently leads to misunderstanding. 
Even	a	naïve	faith	in	empiricism	(an	alleged	objective	scientific	method)	is	blinded	by	
field	which	is	subject	to	radical	changes	but	still	dominantly	interpreted	through	remnant	concepts	and	theo-
ries	from	the	past,	can	uplift	existing	blindness	(and	by	extension	introduce	new	blind	fields).
39		The	specific	conception	of	power	in	the	work	of	Foucault	and	that	of,	for	example,	Lefebvre	differs	sig-
nificantly.	Foucault	liked	to	remind	us	of	the	very	different	forms	and	structures,	in	other	words	the	concrete	
mechanisms,	through	which	power	is	manifested,	penetrates	and	governs	life.	He	did	not	want	to	fix	that	
power in any clear point or agency (“power is everywhere”) but rather consider and explain its pure and 
simple occurrence. Lefebvre, in contrast, always maintained a reference to the subjects from which power 
derives and emphasized the human (class) agency behind these forms of power (to be discussed more in 
detail in chapter 2). Agamben, who draws for a great deal on Foucault, also tries, in contrast to Foucault, to 
position (sovereign) power. Sovereign power, according to Agamben, decides on life and death and situates 
itself outside the ‘law’ (although it makes the law). For Agamben, the Homo Sacer and the concentration 
camp were ‘paradigms’ – and not just historical phenomena – through which he wanted to illustrate the 
working of sovereign power and make a broader historical-problematic context more intelligible. Through 
these paradigms he intended to explain our modernity (see also Agamben, 2009).    
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ideology.	To	give	concrete	example.	I	remember	very	well	my	first	MESA-conference	
in Montreal in November 2007.40 In one of the sessions on transition and post-democ-
ratization	theory,	a	well-known	and	established	scholar	in	the	field	started	to	talk	to	me	
about one of the presentations we had just seen. If I remember well, the discussion was 
about one of the empirical models (the prisoner’s dilemma) used in the session and its 
usefulness (or from my point of view incapability) to explain political change and/or 
conflict	in	a	particular	country	(I	think	it	was	Lebanon).	I	never	forgot	a	particular	argu-
ment he entrusted me back then: “look, if there are free and fair elections, I consider a 
country to be democratic”. He was sympathetic to my critical stance towards particular 
kinds of empirical models but he needed a way to be able to determine and measure 
‘democracy’. Herbert Marcuse has illustrated the ideological character of this kind em-
piricism in his classic work One-Dimensional Man of 1964. He gives the example of a 
study by Janowitz and Marvick that attempts to “judge the extent to which an election 
is an effective expression of the democratic process” (Marcuse, 2002: 117, quotation 
marks also in original text). Such a judgement, Marcuse argues, requires an evaluation 
of the election process in terms with the democratic requirements and as a result, it also 
requires	a	definition	of	“democratic”.	Janowitz	and	Marvick	offered	the	choice	between	
two	kinds	of	definitions:	one	according	to	the	mandate	theory	and	another	according	to	
the	competitive	theory	of	democracy.	Yet,	they	rejected	the	first	–	the	mandate	theory	
which suggests that the electorate imposes its will on the representatives – because 
they thought it was “unrealistic”. After all, it assumed a level of articulated opinion 
and ideology among the electorate not likely to be found in the US nor in any other 
democratic	country	in	the	world.	As	such,	they	chose	to	operationalize	the	second	defi-
nition “according to which a democratic election is a process “of selecting and rejecting 
candidates”	who	are	“in	competition	for	public	office””.	Their	operationalization	of	the	
definition	of	democracy	according	to	the	principles	of	competitive	theory	was	based	on	
three	specific	criteria	by	which	the	authors	claimed	to	assess	the	political	character	of	
competition.41 Without going to much into detail, Marcuse believed that these criteria 
actually described the factual state of affairs in the American elections of 1952, which 
was also, at the same time, the actual subject of analysis. As such, the criteria produced 
a certain reality which they nevertheless pretended to be measuring: 
In other words, the criteria for judging a given state of affairs are those offered 
by	(or,	since	they	are	those	of	a	well-functioning	and	firmly	established	social	
system, imposed by) the given state of affairs. The analysis is “locked”; the range 
of	judgement	is	confined	within	a	context	of	facts	which	excludes	judging	the	
context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which their meaning, 
function, and development are determined. Committed to this framework, the 
investigation	becomes	circular	and	self-validating.	If	“democratic”	is	defined	in	
the limiting but realistic terms of the actual process of election, then this process 
is democratic prior to the results of the investigation. To be sure, the operational 
framework still allows (and even calls for) distinction between consent and ma-
40  MESA stands for Middle East Study Association. The Associations holds its annual conference every 
year in November. 
41		Briefly:	the	three	criteria	were	1)	“competition	between	opposing	candidates	which	pervades	the	entire	
constituency”; 2) “engaging in equal efforts to maintain their own electorate and win independent voters”; 
and 3) “engaging in equal efforts to win the elections” (for more details see Marcuse, 2002: 118).  
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nipulation; the election can be more or less democratic according to the ascer-
tained degree of consent and manipulation. The authors arrive at the conclusion 
that the 1952 election “was characterized by a process of genuine consent to a 
greater extent than impressionistic estimates might have implied” – although it 
would be a “grave error” to overlook the “barriers” to consent and to deny that 
“manipulative pressures were present.” Beyond this hardly illuminating state-
ment the operational analysis cannot go. In other words, it cannot raise the deci-
sive question whether consent itself was not the work of manipulation – a ques-
tion	for	which	the	actual	state	of	affairs	provides	ample	justification.	The	analysis	
cannot raise it because it would transcend its terms towards transitive meaning 
– toward a concept of democracy which would reveal the democratic election as 
a rather limited democratic process (Marcuse, 2002: 119).       
What	Marcuse	identifies	as	ideological	is	precisely	the	(deliberate)	rejection	or	neglect	
of those concepts that can	go	beyond	 the	self-validating	nature	of	 the	scientific	(i.e.	
towards	a	transitive	meaning).	Equally,	in	the	area	study	of	the	Arab	World	we	can	find	
examples of similar empirical exercises to measure democracy and “electoral com-
petitiveness” (cf. Stepan & Robertson, 2004; see also Storm, 2007; Diamond, 2010). 
But a critical analysis of the ideological lenses through which the world is interpreted, 
should not only be restricted to the more rigid empirical approaches. The parallel with 
the transition paradigm that is used to describe political change in the Arab world is also 
evident, although in a kind of reversed way. The transition paradigm promotes also an 
analysis that is “locked” from the beginning, although not in a self-validating way, but 
in	the	way	that	it	doesn’t	find	validation	or	desperately	tries	to	find	validation	for	some-
thing	actually	not	 there:	democracy	(whatever	 the	prevalent	definition	may	be	–	but	
we see that the competitive theory is also the most common one). Within the so-called 
post-democratization theories, the parallel is even more striking. These analyses are 
often “locked” exactly the same way. To explain it with the argumentation of Marcuse: 
the criteria for judging the given state of affairs of authoritarianism are those offered by 
the given state of affairs in the countries that are “analyzed”. That is why the obvious 
answer “authoritarianism” to the question of “what in fact is” is actually hardly illumi-
nating (cf. Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). 
Post-democratization studies are similarly circular and self-validating. Many processes 
of understanding actually locked themselves in the black box of the regime. As a result, 
as Marcuse also observed, many of the determining and constituting facts and evolu-
tions that can actually illuminate our understanding of actual political change, remain 
outside the reach of the methodology and concepts of these mainstream accounts – 
think about for example the spatial impact of neoliberal globalization, the role of class 
power in the constitution of actually existing neoliberalism in the Arab world, etc.). 
And by virtue of this limitation the analyses of transitology and post-democratization 
theory block the apprehension of actual political transformations. They have become 
an element of the ideology that sustains the blindness (Ibid.: 122). We must bear in 
mind that paradigms both constitute and clarify a broader problematic context (Ag-
amben, 2009).42 Yet, we must equally pay attention to the ideology that impacts upon 
42  However, I doubt whether Agamben would consider the paradigms of both transitology and post-
democratization as genuine useful paradigms. Nevertheless, the objects used by these academic branches 
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and	 determines	 clarifications.	The	 specific	 paradigms	 of	 either	 transitology	 or	 post-
democratization theory are blinded by the established “truths” of hegemonic ideology. 
By proclaiming and constituting the existing social reality (hegemony) as its own norm, 
these mainstream analyses actually fortify, often unconsciously, the – what Marcuse 
calls – “faithless faith” in current reality and the ideology that underpins it. As such, 
Marcuse notes (this time citing Theodor Adorno) that these social sciences are victims 
of that ideology and submitted “to the overwhelming power of the established state of 
affairs” (Marcuse, 2002: 122-123). The analyses, which reject or ignore ‘transitive’ 
concepts (explaining the hegemony), commit themselves, according to Marcuse, to a 
false consciousness, or to use Gadamer’s terminology, a false process of understanding 
(misunderstanding). It is exactly this power of ideology which Lefebvre sees as the 
cause	for	blind	fields	to	occur.
Therefore, the positionality of the researcher (and knowing about his or her positional-
ity) is not necessarily a limitation to the process of understanding, or more generally, 
an irrevocable weakness embedded within the social sciences (compared to the exact 
sciences), but rather a necessary condition for the production of knowledge. Even if it 
were possible at all, to erase subjectivity within social science methods, it would at the 
same time erase our capacity to ‘understand’ and subsequently completely hand over 
the social sciences to hegemonic power and order. To a similar extent, we shouldn’t be 
over-romanticizing subjectivity either, and fall in the same trap on the other side of the 
objectivity-subjectivity spectre. Gadamer’s idea of positionality (one’s horizon) and 
that of others who advocate an interpretative approach should not be confused with 
the idea that our insights and interpretations are “simply reducible to our subjective 
bias” (Cerwonka & Malkii, 2007: 31). The idea behind the fusion of horizons is that 
the positionality of the researcher intertwines with the horizon of the research and the 
experience	of	fieldwork.	As	such,	the	interpretive	approach	is	not	just	a	rejection	of	all	
principles	related	to	scientific	thoroughness,	the	search	for	truth	or	the	rejection	of	the	
validity of social science methods and rules, in favour of some romantic or indulgent 
notion of subjectivism (Ibid.). This would make any version, any narrative or any con-
ception of truth and knowledge equal, and consequently, redundant. 
According to Allaine Cerwonka, the interpretive approach involves a theoretical recon-
ceptualization of objectivity, away from its very narrow (and positivist) notion. It is to 
take into account the ‘scientist’ own fore-understanding in his pursuit for knowledge, 
understanding and critique, in order to be aware of his role in the production of that 
knowledge and the fact that this production is never without interest. There is no val-
ue-free research and there are no neutral or a-political intellectuals (Robinson, 2006). 
As such, by making objectivity itself an object of inquiry, Craig Calhoun and Joseph 
Karaganis argue (drawing on Bourdieu) that social science is not so much confronted 
with	its	own	limits	but	becomes	more	scientific.	In	other	words,	capable	of	avoiding	
the theoretical distortions of (positivist) objectivity claims and capable to account for 
(democracy and/or authoritarianism) could be described as objects “that, standing equally for all others of 
the	same	class,	defines	the	intelligibility	of	the	group	of	which	it	is	a	part	and	which,	at	the	same	time	it	
constitutes”. Agamben referred to the Foucauldian paradigm of the panopticon which allowed “statements 
and discursive practices to be gathered into a new intelligible ensemble and in a new problematic context” 
(Agamben,	2009:	17-18;	for	a	definition	of	the	paradigm	as	envisioned	by	Agamben	see	Ibid.:	31).			
Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology 45
its own constitutive blindness (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001). That is why, if we return 
to Gadamer, the purpose of the hermeneutic task (the process of understanding) is not 
to	cover	up	the	tension	between	the	positionality	of	the	researcher	and	the	specific	con-
text (horizon) of his research with positivist or empiricist models and criteria, or with 
seemingly objective questions (in contrast to the normative and teleological ones of 
transitology), or with naïve propositions (e.g. so-called universal concepts like democ-
racy; the a-spatial view on transformation towards an end of history, or the in-between 
“grey zone”, etc.), but rather to consciously bring it out (Gadamer, 1989: 305). In other 
words, it is not so much necessary to develop a pre-determined procedure of under-
standing, as “to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (Ibid.: 295, 
emphasis added).43 Only by doing that we are able to take into account the power of 
ideology and indicate common misunderstandings.       
Critical theory
Henri Lefebvre argued that there is no true social science without the critique of ex-
isting reality (Lefebvre, 2009: 55). This axiom, as he saw it, strongly ascribes to the 
principles of critical thinking or critical theory. The term ‘critical theory’ is generally 
associated with the Frankfurt School. It was within the Frankfurt based Institute for 
Social Research that a group of social theorists – its most famous core-members were 
Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno and Herbert Marcuse – explored the concept of 
‘critique’ as a methodological, theoretical and political problem. They derived their 
ideas from the Enlightenment and the works of Kant, Hegel and of course Marx. As a 
concept,	critical	theory	was	launched	for	the	first	time	in	1937	by	Max	Horkheimer,	to	
distinguish his work and that of his colleagues with what he called ‘traditional philoso-
phy’, but also to distinguish the Frankfurt School from orthodox Marxism (cf. Ther-
born, 1996; Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001; Brenner, 2009). In contrast to liberal and/
or mainstream Enlightenment thinking the Frankfurt School understood the danger of 
the intellectual satisfaction embedded within European enlightenment as if it were a 
process towards universal reason or a grand, perfected and closed system of knowledge 
(today this would be the contemporary a-spatial view on “the end of history”). This 
was the essential argument of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
The contradiction they saw was simple but powerful. The dialectic entailed that the 
emancipatory	power	of	 the	 ideals	of	enlightenment,	first	 formulated	as	a	critique	on	
the power structures and forms of domination embedded in the prevailing myths of the 
18th century (e.g. religion), had replaced those myths and in the process of doing so, the 
ideals of Enlightenment became the new myths of 19th century and early 20th century 
capitalist society (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2007). Instead of leading to freedom and 
emancipation, the new institutions and processes (e.g. nation-state, the market, schools, 
prisons, etc.) that were created by the then dominant social forces (the bourgeoisie) 
actually came to dominate modern rationality. It dominated the majority of the popula-
tion in the Western capitalist societies and increasingly deprived them of their power to 
critique and challenge these institutions and processes. As such, the Frankfurt School 
tried to understand and demonstrate how the liberation (or emancipation) that might 
have attended the growth of human power and aimed at the establishment of people’s 
43  As such, authors like Gadamer and Agamben ascribe an ontological character (instead of a methodologi-
cal character) to the process of understanding or intelligibility. Interpretation (or the paradigm in Agam-
ben’s case) refers to “being” (see also De Smet, 2007).
46 Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology
sovereignty (the Enlightenment) eventually turned against itself and produced the hor-
rors of the 20th century (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001).   
In the tradition of critical theory, “critique” refers not just to criticism, but rather to a 
process of understanding and a deep examination of the conditions and power struc-
tures that shape our current social reality and determine our current forms of thinking. 
Calhoun and Karaganis derive four core dimensions out of the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School that are still valid for contemporary critical theory. First of all, critical 
theory departs from the idea that the conditions of knowledge itself are not self-evident, 
but must be examined critically. This refers to the positionality of the one that pro-
duces knowledge. Few people will of course deny that knowledge is produced and that 
“knowledge is power”. However, the crucial questions at hand for critical theory are: 
power	for	whom?;	power	exercised	by	whom?;	and	finally,	to	what	end?	(Robinson,	
2006). Consequently, critical theory sees it as a part of its task to analyze the different 
languages, concepts, ideologies and theories that are used to understand the empirical 
world. Secondly, critical analysis reveals that social reality is not simply a matter of 
surface appearances but a product of underlying causes and conditions that cannot be 
properly understood by mere empirical generalization. This is reminiscent of Marx’s 
famous claim that there would be no need for science if everything were as it appeared 
to be (Harvey, 1989a: 10; Brenner, 2009: 203). Theory was thus required to explain 
and understand why certain phenomena are what they are. Contemporary globalization 
is thus not simply a fact of human nature but the result of a historical process. One of 
the key aspects of the critical approach, Calhoun and Karaganis argue, involved the 
uncovering	of	‘reification’,	in	other	words	the	“tendency	for	products	of	human	action	
to appear as though they were ‘things’, products of nature rather than human choices” 
(Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 180). For example, it follows that the breakthrough of 
capitalism in Morocco was the result of a French colonial project and their efforts to 
promote and experiment with urbanization (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980; Rabinow, 1989; 
Wright, 1991). And as I will demonstrate in this study, the particular Moroccan integra-
tion into the processes of neoliberal globalization are the result of conscious political 
choices	and	strategies,	beneficial	for	some	but	unlikely	to	improve	the	lives	of	many.	
Thirdly, critical theory also seeks to analyse social theory itself. In this process, critical 
analyses attempt to explain why certain theories reach limits they cannot transcend, and 
unveils	why	other	theories	are	ideologically	biased.	Scientific	theory	must	thus	be	seen	
in its historical terms, not as a method to uncover timeless truth, but as a process of ana-
lyzing and understanding an ever changing world (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181). 
As a result, critical theory is never stagnant. To the contrary, it is the product of current 
social reality. It wouldn’t exist without that reality and it evolves with the evolution of 
capitalism. The theories of Marx and early Marxism were for example one of the major 
manifestations of the dialectics of modernity (Therbron, 1996). Marxism wouldn’t ex-
ist without modern capitalism. And just as the critical theory of the Frankfurt School 
was a dialectical offspring of the interbellum period and Keynesianism, contempo-
rary critical (urban) theory is a product of neoliberal globalization and contemporary 
capitalist urbanization. This argument is related directly with the fourth dimension of 
critical theory: namely that it is shaped by a critical engagement with society. This does 
not simply mean that critical theorists have preferences and opinions about society, but 
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rather that they seek to achieve a unity of theory and practice. Engagement with criti-
cal theory is thus an action in society and not some kind of external view on society 
(Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181).44 Indeed, this is what the early Frankfurt School 
theorists, following Marx, called praxis.	They	were	all	influenced	by	Marx’s	eleventh	
these on Feuerbach which states that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1992: 423). First of all, this is done 
by raising critical awareness and providing the analytical instruments to understand 
the world we live in. Critical theorists insist on the historical embeddedness of theory. 
Social science cannot be neutral (it would otherwise be irrelevant); any attempt to place 
ourselves outside history and politics would result in – at best – pseudo-sciences (e.g. 
empiricism) (Harvey, 1989a). Therefore, a critical thinker rejects the idea of theory 
presented as if it could adopt a position outside history and politics, as if theory could 
somehow explain the world and social change without itself being transformed by it 
(Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181). 
This last point contradicts with the common imaginary of the social scientist or philoso-
pher living in his ivory tower. It also contradicts with the often made caricature – even 
in my own department – and the common misunderstanding of two kinds of research-
ers. On the one hand, it is said, there are those who are drawing on extensive empirical 
knowledge,	slogging	through	the	mud	of	their	fields,	not	concerned	with	grand	theories	
but looking for what is really happening in	the	field.	On	the	other	hand,	the	caricature	
goes, there are those who are drawing on big abstract theoretical frameworks, absorbed 
by	 their	 theoretical	books,	 thinking	 they	can	figure	out	 the	world	 form	behind	 their	
desks. I am not saying that such a distinction a priori does not exist, but to make such 
a	distinction	to	position	oneself	vis-à-vis	others	is	to	deny	(or	not	be	aware	of)	the	in-
herent dialectic between critical theory and practice. More concretely, making such a 
distinction almost automatically is failing to see the whole purpose of critical theory, 
and by extension, failing to be critical. The simplistic assumption regarding what the 
anthropologist Akhil Gupta sees as the natural superiority – the assertion of authenticity 
– implicit in the knowledge claims that are generated by the fact of just “being there” 
should be seriously questioned (Gupta, 1995). Fieldwork (as simply being there) is in 
itself not enough (although absolutely necessary) to comprehend how for example the 
state, and political transformation more generally, comes to be constructed, produced 
and represented (Ibid.). What follows from the notion of praxis, is that critical theory 
does not strive for an absolute truth, but constantly questions the status quo. Critical 
theory is always contextual, embedded within the dialectics of social and historical 
change (Brenner, 2009). In other words, theory lies in the complexity of the particular 
cases one attempts to understand (Mitchell, 2002: 8). Moreover, critical theory does not 
only analyze and criticize ‘traditional’ or mainstream theory, it also constantly analyzes 
itself. Like history itself, critical theoretical enquiry remains open-ended (Calhoun & 
Karaganis, 2001). 
44  Samir Amin notes that with the decline of Marxist and Keynesian thought since the hegemony of neo-
liberal thought, critical analysis of the real world has been increasingly replaced with a theory of imaginary 
capitalism by theorists of the so-called “pure economics”. Critical thought, according to Amin, was then 
replaced by pure sorcery (Amin, 2003: 16). 
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My project relies on a critical interpretive approach. In contrast to some mainstream 
theories, which try to describe social activities and relations in a context of some nat-
ural order (e.g. contemporary globalization), this study aims to understand the very 
structures and rationalities (the hegemony) that produces the existing social reality in 
Morocco in order to explain its current transformation. Liberal and other mainstream 
theories of political change have raised little or no questions about the fact that many of 
the	existing	social	relations	are	determined	and	defined	by	the	requirements	of	contem-
porary capitalism. Instead, these theories often consider capitalism as something natu-
ral that stands above human agency (and not as something produced by it). To give a 
simple example, the world according to liberalism can be divided in ‘developed’ coun-
tries (reached some kind an end-stage) and ‘developing’ countries (lagging behind), 
thereby misunderstanding and/or completely neglecting the particular evolutions and 
co-existing dynamics of uneven development not only between North and South, but 
also within the ‘Western’ part of the world and within the countries of the global South. 
Thereby, they also neglect the fact that uneven development is both the condition and 
result of contemporary capitalism. As a result, (neo-)liberal theories and their concep-
tions	of	the	world	have	become	today’s	powerful	myths.	They	cannot	be	demystified	
by these theories themselves (because, after all, they are self-validating).45 To qualify 
my research as critical in the sense discussed above, I argue that the current existing 
social relationships of power in Morocco are both the product of historical processes 
and subject to their particular and contingent interaction with these processes. They are 
thus also the source of its particular and open-ended future. 
According to several scholars, it is incumbent upon contemporary critical theory to 
gain an understanding of the current process of globalization on the one hand, and the 
processes	of	capitalist	urbanization	on	a	world	scale	–	hence	closely	related	to	the	first	
issue – on the other hand. Critical globalization studies understand globalization as a 
(political) project rather than a given (Robinson, 2006). Its particular constellation is 
the result of strategic and political choices and actions (see chapter 2). Critical urban 
studies understand the city, its urban space, as a politically, socially and ideologically 
mediated and contested space – that is, subject to continuous (re-)constitution and out-
come	of	historically	 specific	 relations	of	 social	power	 (Brenner,	2009).	This	project	
tries to combine both approaches and focuses explicitly on the forms of actual exist-
ing	neoliberal	urbanization	in	Morocco	that	emerged	specifically	since	the	period	of	
structural adjustment at the beginning of the 1980s, in order to give new insights about 
the underlying dynamics of wider social, political, economic and cultural change in 
Morocco – and by extension the Arab World. It is striking how little attention has been 
paid in mainstream political accounts on the Arab world to urbanization and neoliberal 
globalization (and the interaction between the two). The production of urban space as 
a hegemonic project and its interrelation with processes of state-reformation have been 
either grossly neglected, underestimated or misunderstood (Parker, 2009).      
45  That doesn’t mean that liberalism has no critical potential per se. In a post-capitalist hegemonic order – 
thinking optimistically for a moment – liberalism could provide a critical source of inspiration, just as 18th 
century Enlightenment provided a critical source for the pre-capitalist hegemonic order. Although, most 
likely, completely new critical theories would emerge and be dialectically related to the new hegemonic 
order.     
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When I refer to neoliberalism as a concept, or more concretely to “actually existing 
neoliberalism” (see chapter 2), I do so in a critical manner. The notion of neoliberalism 
refers	not	to	a	pure	–	a	one	size	fits	all	–	model,	but	rather	to	a	set	of	principles,	a	form	of	
regulation, and a rationality by which contemporary government in Morocco is guided 
and	can	be	defined.	With	the	worldwide	triumph	of	capitalism	over	and	above	all	other	
social systems, especially since the 1990s, actually existing forms of neoliberal gov-
ernment can be observed in almost every part in the world. The critical analysis of the 
particular entry points I based this research on, the Bouregreg site and the Villes Sans 
Bidonville program, provide some new insights to understand and interpret neoliberal 
political transformations in Morocco. Consequently, it was not my intention, if it would 
be even possible at all, to claim to have found a new (timeless) truth about ‘the state’ or 
the ‘regime’ in Morocco. To the contrary, the one essential conclusion I draw from these 
sites	of	inquiry,	may	be,	first	of	all,	that	there	is	no	such	truth.	There	is	no	essence	to	
understand the nature of political transformation, the nature of authoritarian persistence 
or the nature of the “Arab regime”. So my intention is not so much to develop a – or 
the – prescription for understanding the regime, but to critique false thinking of what it 
really is. As I demonstrate, political transformation is for a large part a continuous and 
contingent process – strongly embedded of course in the historical context in which 
changes take place.46     
  
Critical theory rejects a disciplinary division of labour (Therborn, 1996; Brenner, 2009). 
Instead, it follows an interdisciplinary, or even more radically, a “post-disciplinary ap-
proach”	(Sayer,	1999).	Critical	analysis	is	than	identified	more	with	the	process	of	un-
derstanding itself, rather than with the laws and boundaries of the imperative questions 
posed	by	a	specific	discipline.	Thinking	outside	the	framework	of	a	single	discipline	
means adopting those conceptual tools and methodological strategies related to the 
challenges of understanding a particular social phenomenon, rather than making them 
fit	within	 the	 requirements	 of	 a	 traditional	 disciplinary	 division	 of	 labour	 (Brenner,	
2004).	The	work	of	many	critical	thinkers	have	informed	this	project,	yet	two	–	at	first	
sight	–	uncomplimentary	critical	 traditions	are	predominant	and	have	strongly	 influ-
enced my own ideas, narratives and understanding of the current political transforma-
tions in Morocco. First of all, the writings of Marxist or radical (urban) scholars of the 
post-1968 period such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and more recently thinkers like 
Neil Brenner have informed this project in fundamental way. Secondly, my work relies 
also on the insights of Michel Foucault and Foucauldian studies on governmentality 
through the work of for example scholars like Beatrice Hibou, Thomas Lemke and 
Mariana Valverde. However, Marxist and Foucauldian analyses have long been consid-
ered	as	conflicting.	Michel	Foucault	himself	gave	mixed	messages	about	his	stance	to-
wards Marxism, acknowledging at times he quotes from Marx “without feeling obliged 
to add that authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase”, while elsewhere 
he expressed his hostility towards Marx and Marxism, denouncing “the sort of entity 
constructed around a proper name, signifying at once a certain individual, the totality of 
his writings, and an immense historical process deriving from him” (cited in Marsden, 
1999: 20-21). Despite this ambiguity, Foucault’s work was an implicit critique of the 
traditional (orthodox) understanding of – and its tendency to reify – some of the main 
46  This is something Christopher Parker also discussed with me on many occasions.
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categories of Marxism: e.g. ideology, class, state and its economic top-down analysis 
of power (Marsden, 1999: 21).47 
One of the main differences between these two traditions lie in their conception of 
power.	While	Marxist	inquiries	have	always	been	concerned	with	finding	some	kind	
of ‘essential nature’ or exact location of (class) power, Foucault and scholars on ‘neo-
liberal governmentality’ were more concerned with another kind of – some would say 
more empirical – question: how and by what means is power exercised (Rose-Red-
wood, 2006)? Foucault criticized classical Marxist tendencies because they were more 
preoccupied	with	the	definition	of	class	than	with	the	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	
struggle itself (Marsden, 1999). While Marxist scholars are generally more concerned 
with	questions	of	capitalist	accumulation	and	the	specific	agencies	that	control	the	pro-
cesses of that accumulation (i.e. the political project behind contemporary globalization 
and urbanization), the concept of governmentality has helped us to understand how 
neoliberalism not only incorporates a (class-dominated) political program or a vision 
on the state, but a whole new understanding of human nature and social existence that 
has	penetrated	and	influenced	our	image	of	society	(Read,	2009).	The	governmental-
ity approach privileges the study of methods and technologies of power. Moreover, it 
directly links the process of government with the modes of thought and the political 
rationality that underpins these methods and technologies (Lemke, 2002; for a more 
detailed discussion see chapter 2). 
Therefore, according to Thomas Lemke who draws on Etienne Balibar, despite the cri-
tique that both approaches delivered upon each other, most studies on governmentality 
should not be seen as a rupture with critical Marxist theory, but as a “tactical alliance” 
(Lemke, 2002) or an unspoken dialogue (Marsden, 1999).48 On the one hand, Marxist 
critiques on neoliberalism have pointed out how and why, despite being more than just 
a political program, class agency has been involved in the spreading of the neoliberal 
project all around the world. On the other hand, governmentality informs us, how that 
very project is underpinned by a rationality (a mentality) which intervenes at the level 
of the individual, i.e. the government of the body (bio-politics). It reminds us, Lemke 
argues, that political economy relies on a political anatomy of the body (see also Fou-
cault, 2007; 2008). And within a neoliberal governmentality, not only the individual 
47  Also within the Marxian traditions there was a great dissatisfaction with the increasingly rigidifying 
orthodoxy in some Marxist interpretations. Scholars such as Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja and David Har-
vey tried to re-open some of the debates and called for the explicit incorporation of the social production of 
space. They developed a geographic dimension of Marx’s theory of capital accumulation in order to explain 
the empirical conditions of postmodernity, without abandoning Marx’s law of motion (cf. Soja, 1980; Har-
vey, 1990; Lefebvre, 1991). Marx himself would probably also have opposed this rigidity of ‘orthodox’ 
or ‘classical’ Marxism, as Richard Marsden shows by a careful re-reading of Marx’s early and later work. 
Marsden argues that Marx wrote very little on method because “he opposed in principle all a priori, precon-
stituted methods – dialectical or otherwise – and would have opposed attempts to extrapolate from his work 
a method of general applicability” (Marsden, 1999: 100). After all, even during his own life, Marx already 
rejected some of the early interpretations of his own work and famously stated that if this was Marxism, he 
was not a Marxist (Marx, 2006: 33).
48  In the literature we can retrace such tactical alliances. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have picked up 
on Foucault’s notion of biopower (i.e. the government of living beings) in their study on the functioning of 
‘Empire’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop have 
linked the notion of ‘hegemony’ to the theories of Michel Foucault and his work on discipline, power and 
governmentality (Poulantzas, 2000; Jessop, 2008).  
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body, but also collective bodies, institutions (e.g. the public administration), corpo-
rations	and	 states	have	 to	be	made	 ‘efficient’,	 ‘flexible’,	 and	 ‘autonomous’	 (Lemke,	
2002:60). Moreover, the notion of governmentality gives insight in how the project 
of neoliberalism transforms from being a mere project to become much more than 
that: namely, a universal truth. As Lemke has argued, the concept of governmentality 
construes the impact of neoliberalism. It views neoliberalism not just as an ideological 
rhetoric, as a political-economic reality, or as class strategy, but above all “as a political 
project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 
2002: 60; see also chapter 2). If globalization today is considered as a genuine natural 
order, if capitalism is considered to be a universal system without alternative (it can be 
at best only adjusted or ‘corrected’), if the role of ‘science’ is reduced to the production 
of technocratic, market-driven and market-oriented forms of knowledge (and therefore 
losing its critical potential), the explanation for this state of affairs cannot just be found 
in	class	interests	or	profit	motives,	and	maybe	not	even	in	‘consent’,	but	only	in	a	kind	
of deeply entrenched mentality, a way of thinking, a particular conscious that lies at the 
basis of what we really believe is true. 
With regard to my own project, I do not claim to answer all the questions that have 
been raised here. This is not the place either, to elaborate further on the epistemological 
nature and differences between these two rich bodies of critical literature. Nevertheless, 
as this project is further outlined over the next four chapters, the reader will notice that I 
have	been	deeply	influenced	by	these	two	branches	of	critical	theory.	Yet,	as	mentioned	
above, through my engagement with critical theory, I did not come up with a new grand 
system	of	knowledge,	perfected	in	order	to	sustain	any	new	influence,	any	thorough	cri-
tique, as if I even succeeded in ruling out my own blindness. Instead, this project offers 
an approach to improve our existing understanding of political transformation in the 
contemporary Arab world. It offers, as Calhoun and Karaganis emphasize, “epistemic 
gain”, not absolute truth. In other words, I do not necessarily want to prove something, 
only	explain	it.	Consequently,	this	project	is	not	finished	but	open-ended.	It	recognizes	
the need for radically new debates and acknowledges that all existing theories will 
need to be revised – sometimes radically changed or even rejected – in the light of new 
historical experiences (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 196).   
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         Chapter 2 
Neoliberalism seems to be everywhere. This mode of free-
market economic theory, manufactured in Chicago and 
vigorously marketed through principal sales offices in 
Washington DC, New York, and London, has become the 
dominant ideological rationalization for globalization and 
contemporary state “reform”. What began as a starkly 
utopian intellectual movement was aggressively politi-
cized by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s before acquir-
ing a more technocratic form in the self-styled “Washing-
ton Consensus” of the 1990s. Neoliberalism has provided 
a kind of operating framework or “ideological software” 
for competitive globalization, inspiring and imposing far-
reaching programs of state restructuring and rescaling 
across a wide range of national and local contexts (Peck 
& Tickell, 2002: 380).  
We have come to take the state for granted as an object 
of political practice and political analysis while remain-
ing quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is. We 
are variously urged to respect the state, or smash the state 
or study the state: but for want of clarity about the na-
ture of the state such projects remain beset with difficulties 
(Abrams, 1988: 59).
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This chapter explores the (more theoretical) foundations of new perspectives to con-
sider political change in the MENA-region. Three broader issues will be discussed. 
First of all, I want to explore the political nature of contemporary globalization. The 
phenomenon	of	globalization	has	often	been	treated	as	a	given	–	an	influential	given	
nonetheless. Yet, the impact of this process is still often perceived quite apart from 
domestic or local political society and agency, or at best, as some kind of external di-
mension. In contrast, I want to emphasize the dynamics of how local agency is not only 
affected by the global, but also participates in the production of that global. Secondly, 
I want to elaborate on the role of the state in these dynamics. But in doing so, we need 
to understand its nature and the nature of its agency. Many studies on globalization 
have	reflected	on	the	tension	between	the	nation-state	and	the	international	dimension.	
However the understanding of this tension strongly diverges. Some have argued that 
increasing globalization affected state sovereignty. In contrast to that particular per-
spective, I want to argue that the essential mechanism of this tension is not a zero-sum 
game, but rather a dialectical complexity through which both the state and the form 
of	globalization	are	modified	and	transformed.	To	fully	grasp	the	significance	of	this	
dialectic we have to renounce the imagination of the state as a coherent entity and/or a 
single actor. The state is not an actor in itself and can thus not be conceived apart from 
the crucial dimensions that shape the contemporary capitalist state: power and class 
hierarchy. Furthermore, in order to understand political change we have to look at the 
government	of	people	and	places	within	specific	contexts	and	map	out	the	particular	
implication of state agency, while recognizing at the same time the multiple and vari-
able	forms	through	which	this	agency	is	manifested.	As	such,	in	relation	to	the	specific	
local	 context,	 the	 specific	 interests	 and	 the	 specific	 political	 struggles,	 state	 agency	
and state power will manifest themselves differently across space. This bring us to our 
third	and	final	argument:	the	importance	of	the	city	in	the	constitution	of	actually	exist-
ing forms of neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The neoliberal city became 
the	key	arena	for	new	configurations	of	political,	economic	and	social	power.	It	is	the	
strategic arena in which current neoliberal forms of government are unfolding. And 
although the city has always been crucial to capitalism and capitalist expansion, the 
specific	dynamics	of	urbanization	have	changed	under	neoliberalism.	But	neoliberal-
ism	is	not	some	‘one	size	fits	all’	model,	as	if	we	could	neglect	local	agency	and	the	
social	specificity	of	local	contexts.	Neoliberal	reforms	thus	always	impact	and	depend	
on a setting of already existing institutional frameworks, social structures and political 
struggles. Consequently, neoliberal political projects are manifested – just like the state 
– differently across space. By bringing these three topics together, this chapter wants 
to demonstrate that political change in the Arab World cannot be properly understood 
without taken into consideration its relation with global capitalism.  
Neoliberalism as a political project
Contemporary narratives of globalization often present this phenomenon as a kind of 
inevitable force or inescapable process. Globalization is then pictured as an almost 
natural process, very often with little reference to (local) agency. Essential features 
and consequences such as global market integration and commercial exchanges, the 
improvement in means of transportation and communication, migration, new global 
health and ecological challenges, and last but not least, the spread of so-called universal 
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values and norms, all seem to suggest that different places all over the world are be-
coming irreversibly and ever more connected. A truly global economy is often claimed 
to have emerged beyond the reach and control of local governments and nation-states. 
This picture has mesmerized and captured the imagination of many scholars, journal-
ists, analysts and politicians. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union there 
seems no escape from it anymore. While, in a sense, this assumption is not necessarily 
untrue, it is the almost natural character of this process that is problematic. The most 
outspoken example was the famous essay The End of History? published by Francis 
Fukuyama	in	1989	(published	as	a	book	in	1992).	During	the	final	moments	of	the	Cold	
War, Fukuyama claimed that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the 
Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history 
as such”. As a liberal Hegelian, he was convinced that we now had reached “the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy	as	the	final	form	of	human	government”	(Fukuyama,	1989:	4).	Two	remarks	
should be made here. First of all, scholars working on the Arab region have criticized 
this liberal optimism from at least two different angles. Some believed, following in 
the footsteps of culturalist thinkers such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, that 
a “clash of civilizations” would now replace the left-right dichotomy that seemingly 
ended with the end of the Cold War. Others departed from a more realist perspective, 
pointing out to the authoritarian persistence of Arab regimes and therefore seriously 
questioned the possibility of a regional democratic (r)evolution in the near future.49 
However, what both of these reactions against Fukuyama’s thesis have in common, in 
contrast with the latter, is that they do not adequately take into account (or very little) 
the way in which the government of people and places not only resists, but is being 
shaped by powerful models, rationalities and principles that are derived from the cur-
rent project of globalization (Parker, 2009).50     
Secondly, and even more importantly, what both these general approaches to Arab 
politics do have in common with Fukuyama, is that they do not critically question the 
‘post-political’ vision that is embedded within the argument of the latter. The cultural-
ist approaches only reduced politics to cultural issues, while the post-democratization 
studies mainly limited their argument to the more empirical question ‘why did Fukuy-
ama’s prediction did not come out’?, ignoring thereby more fundamental questions as 
for example: what are the fundamental politics behind Fukuyama’s thesis and what is 
the nature of the political struggles that rise out of the attempts to promote the political 
project he presents? In essence, both approaches do not at all question Fukuyama’s lib-
eral ideological bias and his utter a-spatial view on politics (he sees history as a single 
temporal development), but only his supposedly naïve assumption that some ideal type 
of liberal democracy would eventually spread out around the world.51 Fukuyama him-
self partly anticipated this critique, stating that “the victory of liberalism has occurred 
primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real 
49  Not surprisingly, as I mentioned in a footnote in the introduction, the current events in Tunisia and 
Egypt are now often compared with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent revolutions in Eastern 
Europe.
50  Of course, Fukuyama’s account has an obvious ideological bias (see chapter 1).
51  My work departs above all from a fundamental critique of transitology and post-democratization studies 
(see chapter 1). My disagreement with the culturalist approaches, and above all their tendency to essential-
ize culture as separate objects, rather speaks for itself through the arguments presented in this work.
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material world”. Nevertheless he was convinced that there were powerful reasons to 
believe “that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run” (Fukuy-
ama, 1989: 4). 
As such, these mainstream critics, and especially the ones situated within the debate be-
tween transitology and post-democratization studies (cf. chapter 1), are – just as Fukuy-
ama’s thesis – embedded within or permeated by a neoliberal governmentality that has 
replaced critical attempts to understand political disagreement and the nature of (class) 
struggle with a vision on technologies of government that fuse around a consensus on 
the virtues of liberal democracy, economic liberalization and technocratic management 
(Swyngedouw, 2007; see also Mouffe, 2005). This is what both Erik Swyngedouw 
and Chantal Mouffe understand as the post-political vision. In this chapter, I want to 
elaborate on a detailed discussion of neoliberalism, highlighting its political character 
and	emphasize	the	significance	of	neoliberalism	(or	neoliberal	globalization)	for	our	
understanding of contemporary political change in Morocco. In doing so, I want to fol-
low up on the argument of authors like Massey (2005: 5), who have stressed that ‘glo-
balization’ is not so much the result of a law of nature, but a project; a political project. 
Globalization, in this view, is a process that has been reproduced and transformed by 
political agency, while at the same time it constrains that agency.52
In addition to this view, I want to distance myself from the particular understanding of 
the project of globalization as something that has been merely imposed upon a country 
like Morocco by, for example, foreign imperialist powers. Rather, I agree with David 
Harvey (2003) who considers globalization to be the result of a complex dialectic be-
tween territorial and capitalist logics of power. According to Harvey, territorial logics 
of power make up the political, diplomatic and security strategies invoked and used 
by	state	power	or	ruling	elites.	Capitalist	logics	of	power	concern	the	specific	ways	in	
which economic power intervenes through and across space, within, towards or away 
from certain territories. This happens through the daily practices of production, com-
mercial	exchange,	financial	and	technological	transfers,	labour	migration	and	so	forth	
(Ibid: 26-27). The contradictory fusion of these two logics of power, with their often 
distinct interests, make up the (sometimes very) different forms of “actually existing 
neoliberalism” across the globe. It is not my intention to elaborate in detail on the ex-
treme complexity of the current process of globalization. After all, globalization as a 
process is way too complex to be reduced to the mere expansion and metamorphosis 
of capitalism – albeit it is a dominant aspect of that process (see for example Bayart, 
2007). What I want to focus on more precisely, is the current neoliberal manifestations 
52		This	is	because	agency	is	also	subjected	to	specific	relations	and	structural	mechanisms	of	power,	domi-
nation and exploitation. Here, I am inspired by Richard Marsden who sees the relation between social struc-
ture and human agency as dialectical. He states that “understanding of this relationship has been bedeviled 
by	voluntarism,	that	is,	a	belief	that	individuals	create	social	structure,	and	reification,	that	is,	a	belief	that	
social structure determines the actions of individuals. A realist conception of social structure entails this 
alternative	to	voluntarism	and	reification:	individuals	do	not	create	social	structure	(the	error	of	volunta-
rism), because it pre-exists them, having been established by the long-since dead. Rather, they reproduce 
and occasionally transform this structure. Social structure does not determine the actions of individuals (the 
error	of	reification),	because	it	is	both	the	medium	and	effect	of	that	action.	Rather,	social	structure	both	
facilitates and constrains human action. Structure is the condition of agency, and agency is the condition 
of structure (…). Agency and structure are indivisible aspects of the same social reality” (Marsden, 1999: 
40-41).
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of global capitalism in relation to the Moroccan case and its relevance for our under-
standing of political change.
(Good) governance: a post-political perspective on reform
The lack of attention to the neoliberal context of globalization, does not mean that cur-
rent processes and aspects of global market integration or expansion are completely left 
out of mainstream and/or liberal accounts. Of course, references to the ‘global’ affect 
contemporary political discourse and scholarly analysis. They often stress the inevita-
bility	of	‘reform’,	and	–	more	specifically	–	the	necessity	of	reorganizing	national	eco-
nomic	and	political	life	to	reflect	the	demands	and	incentives	of	the	‘global	market’.	To	
give one example, in the 2007 trade and investment guide of the American Chambers 
of Commerce, Mustapha Mechahouri, the Moroccan minister of Foreign Trade at that 
time, addressed American investors in the following way (AmCham, 2007: 6): 
As economic actors and experts the users of this guide are certainly aware that the 
current intensive shift towards globalization is putting the economies of devel-
oping countries, such as Morocco, under increasing pressure and requires large 
scale reforms and structural adaptations. For this reason, the Kingdom of Mo-
rocco is now engaged in huge reforms, initiatives and restructuring programs to 
accelerate its integration into a broad free trade zone alongside Mediterranean 
countries, Arab countries, the United States of America, and other nations as part 
of the globalization process.
These kind of references are frequently made to acknowledge and legitimize the policy 
reforms that are being applied. Nevertheless, the association with inevitability and ne-
cessity	reveal	a	depoliticized	conception	of	reform,	drawing	a	definite	line	between	the	
realm of economics and politics. While contemporary globalization may be the object 
of policy, it is thought to have little to do with the process of policy-making itself (for a 
similar argument on culture and policy: see Kapoor, 2008: 19). From this perspective, 
social and economic policies responding to the dynamics of globalization are typically 
viewed as mere technical and instrumental measures. Globalization itself is somehow 
seen as located outside the scope of policy. Contemporary globalization is considered 
to affect ‘local’ and/or ‘national’ policy and not the other way around. The fact that the 
‘outside’ (the global) is presented in a-political terms, also suggests it is immune for 
critical analysis. In this view, local policy has to adapt to the global, as if the ‘global’ 
and the ‘local’ are situated within a certain hierarchy, ignoring the fact that they are 
actually	both	part	of	the	same	process	and	influence	each	other’s	constitution.				
 
Since the early 1990s, this depoliticized and technocratic perception on how to deal 
with globalization was promoted by the World Bank and other donor agencies in the 
developing countries through the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the discourse of ‘good 
governance’.53 The concept of good governance served as a general guiding principle 
and “policy metaphor” for international donor institutions who expected adherence 
from	recipient	governments	 to	put	 in	place	 the	reforms	 that	satisfied	 the	donor’s	 re-
quirements	(cf.	Doornbos	2001,	2003).	The	World	Bank	defined	good	governance	as	
53  By the end of the 1990s, good governance became above all a policy metaphor for the Post-Washington 
Consensus (see chapter 3).
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“sound development management” which referred to the “manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for develop-
ment” (World Bank, 1992: 1).54 Furthermore, the concept of good governance rests on 
two core values, namely ‘inclusiveness’ (i.e. equal participation and equal treatment) 
and ‘accountability’ (i.e. transparency and contestability) (World Bank, 2003). As such, 
the World Bank states that good governance is not only a means to ensure growth 
and social improvement, but also a “fundamental dimension of human development 
itself” (Ibid.: 15). Presented as a set of objective principles embedded within so-called 
universal values (i.e. Western values and norms), the concept of good governance has 
been detached from individual governments and their actions. Even though the World 
Bank acknowledges the fact that good governance in itself may not generate economic 
growth, it is still a prerequisite for development and growth. After all, examples of “en-
lightened leadership with poor governance” are, according to the World Bank, nothing 
more than historical accidents (Ibid.: 11; see also Zemni & Bogaert, 2006: 116). 
This disconnection between good governance as a guiding principle on the one hand, 
and the domestic affairs of individual states on the other hand – as if the good gover-
nance guidelines belong somehow to that global sphere to which local politics have to 
adapt – is obviously related to the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement which state that 
“the	Bank	and	its	officers	shall	not	interfere	in	the	political	affairs	of	any	member”.	The	
same article concludes that therefore “only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions” (IBRD Article IV section 10).55 The effect was that the concept of 
governance became complementary with an allegedly politically neutral methodology 
for economic reform. Consequently, it also meant that the more technical-sounding 
the	recommendations	and	interventions	were,	the	more	publicly	justifiable	they	would	
be (Jenkins, 2002; Kapoor, 2008). ‘Governance’ became a collective term for tech-
niques	 of	 coordination,	 efficiency,	 accountability	 and	 administrative-managerialism.	
The seemingly objective and universal undertone (also symbolized with the adjective 
‘good’) could be used to invite judgment on how a country, a region, a city or an agency 
should be governed (Doornbos, 2001). Judging by this discourse, good governance 
was no more than a form of technical assistance along the lines of the instrumental 
logic of the market. In short, it was seen as a set of principles that could be applied to 
any country anywhere in the world; a simple manual to deal with the challenges and – 
even more so – the opportunities of globalization. Consequently, there is an extensive 
body of literature on governance that takes contemporary globalization for granted, and 
subsequently, also “takes it for granted that the political and social cleavages between 
those	who	profit	from	globalization	and	those	who	do	not	can	be	bridged	by	‘modern’	
or ‘good’ governance” (Lemke, 2007: 57). In the case of Morocco, the works of Ali 
Sedjari (2008) and Mostapha Fikri (2005) are salient examples. “In this view”, Thomas 
Lemke argues, “poverty and wealth have nothing to do which each other, and economic 
growth, ecological considerations, political democracy, social solidarity, healthy living 
54  The World Bank distinguished four main areas of governance: improving public sector management (the 
institutional capacities to manage the economy and deliver public services), accountability (holding public 
officials	responsible	for	their	actions),	the	establishment	of	legal	frameworks	for	development	(i.e.	the	
rule	of	law	and	independent	judiciary),	and	finally	improving	transparency	(free	access	to	information	and	
transparency of government procedures) (Ibid, 1992; see also Kapoor, 2008).
55  Text available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagree-
ment.pdf (accessed 08/08/2010)
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etc. appear to be equally achievable – without radically changing established political 
and social structures” (Lemke, 2007: 57). 
As such, the concept of good governance fails to capture the seemingly paradoxical 
and simultaneous existence of poverty and wealth as part and result of the same order 
(i.e. the current capitalist order). It fails to think poverty and wealth together (as part 
of the same whole), which is, in contrast, an important feature of critical theory and 
dialectical thinking (Groys, 2009). David Harvey’s conception of the “geography of 
uneven development” attempts to uncover that seemingly paradoxical capitalist logic 
(Harvey, 2006).56 From his point of view, and that of many other critical thinkers, the 
relation between capital and power, and more particularly class power, helps us to un-
derstand this paradox. Yet, relations of power, exploitation and domination are totally 
absent from the good governance discourse. Instead, a governance perspective would 
argue that poor people are not rich yet.	Those	who	do	not	profit	from	globalization	are,	
in other words, just “lagging behind”. Poverty, in this view is an unfortunate phase. If 
countries, regions, cities, etc. were to seize the opportunities of globalization, the good 
governance guidelines would provide the necessary technocratic methodology to in-
crease their chances (or so it is claimed). This narrative on globalization is exactly what 
Massey describes as an a-spatial narrative. It is an important component in the continu-
ing legitimation of the view that there is only one particular model of development and 
only one path to modernization (Massey, 2005: 84). Poverty and wealth are situated as 
merely different stages on the timeline of history. The potential differences between the 
cultural, political and economic trajectories of Morocco and other ‘developing’ coun-
tries are occluded and reduced to something irrelevant when it comes to applying good 
governance. As such, the promotion of good governance has an “anti-political effect”, 
because the seemingly neutral and technocratic discourse that underpins it, does not 
allow the role of the promoter (e.g. the World Bank) to be formulated as a political one 
(Ferguson, 2006). By reducing reform to a technical problem, the concept of good gov-
ernance is a means through which the question of reform is depoliticized (Ibid.: 273; 
see	also	Lemke,	2007).	In	reality,	however,	the	final	intentions	are	very	political.	Good	
governance is a metaphor for an ideal type of Western-style liberal democracy. The key 
aim	is	to	import	specific	state-market	relationships	that	are	characteristic	for	Western	
liberal capitalists systems (Doornbos, 2003: 6). 
In addition, the concept of good governance also conveys a moralistic tone, implying 
not only that Third World countries have ‘bad’ governance, but also that other coun-
tries,	more	specifically	the	Western	countries,	are	the	model	of	good	governance.	The	
international or Western donors are then the arbitrators of what is good and bad (Ka-
poor,	2008:	30;	see	also	Rose,	1999).	And	even	if	the	use	of	the	specific	concept	of	good	
governance may be on the decline lately, the more general discourse on governance still 
carries the same stigmata (Ibid.; Doornbos 2001). Consequently, the political question 
of how to deal with globalization is pushed into the background while contemporary is-
sues of government are now played out in the “moral register” (Mouffe, 2005). Instead 
of a political struggle between ‘right- and leftwing’ visions on globalization we are now 
faced with a struggle between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, between good and bad governance. 
56  I will come back to the issue of uneven development later in this chapter.
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Politics are reduced to a moral engagement.57 This moral register is also incorporated in 
the post-political perspective. It tries to overcome pluralism and political antagonism in 
the public sphere (ibid.). The overall problem with this perspective is that it envisages 
some sort of consensus politics “beyond hegemony” and as such overlooks the fact 
that “since power relations are constitutive of the social, every order is by necessity a 
hegemonic order” (Ibid.: 106). Consequently, it is the task of critical theory to expose 
the hegemonic forces behind the project of contemporary globalization. And “neoliber-
alism” is the collective term by which these forces are often described.
Neoliberalism: a political perspective on reform
Neoliberalism, as a form of economic policy, is generally described and characterized 
by	free	trade	and	market	liberalization,	deregulation,	fiscal	discipline,	privatization	and	
commercialized social programs (Grimson, 2008). It is considered as a modern variant 
of classical liberalism centred on the belief – or at least rhetorically – that the self-reg-
ulating	capacity	of	the	market	would	entail	the	need	to	restrict	the	power	and	influence	
of state bureaucracies (Radice, 2008). But reducing the notion of neoliberalism to a nar-
row understanding of free-market policies would be to deny – similar to the rhetoric on 
good governance – the implicit political character of neoliberalism. From another point 
of view, and in contrast a very political one, anti-globalist discourses see neoliberalism 
generally as a code word for America’s overwhelming power and imperialist ambitions. 
Through its control over the World Bank and the IMF, the United States are considered 
to be dictating the rules of the game everywhere in the world. Especially in the 1980s 
and the 1990s, a lot of Third World countries were pressured to adopt new regulations 
and reforms to open up their markets for American – and by extension Western – capital 
and goods. Nowadays, so-called Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Partnership Agree-
ments are seen as the political instruments that carry out Western neo-colonialism and 
testify the latter’s continuous imperialist ambitions. Additionally, since the invasion 
of Iraq, critics pinpointed and warned us that the US would not refrain from military 
intervention in order to secure important oil reserves for its own interests and those 
of its own major oil corporations. In contrast to the above mentioned, more classical 
(free-market, minimal state) view on neoliberalism, this view relates neoliberalism very 
much to state power. Both views are true to a certain extent, but the reality is of course 
more	complex.	Before	elaborating	on	the	specific	role	of	the	state	and	the	formation	of	
actually	existing	forms	of	neoliberalism,	I	want	to	highlight	briefly	how	neoliberalism	
came	into	being	and	what	its	specific	political	character	exactly	is.								
The ascendency of neoliberalism originated out of a critique on Fordism and later 
Keynesianism through the works of Friedrich Hayek and then Milton Friedman. The 
latter taught at the University of Chicago and became the face of the notorious Chi-
cago School (Peck & Tickell, 2007; Klein, 2007). Neoliberalism can essentially be 
considered the next stage in the worldwide capitalist development. A stage in which the 
spread and the consequences of the capitalist mode of production are becoming ever 
more global and have the tendency to displace all pre- or non-capitalist social relations. 
Around the turn of this century, the vast majority of the world population had been 
integrated into the capitalist system and into capitalist production relations. William 
57  I indebted to Chris Parker for this insight. 
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Robinson	points	out	that	this	vast	process	of	increasing	commodification	of	social	rela-
tions is expansionary in a double sense (Robinson, 2004: 6-7). First of all, capitalism 
has known an “extensive enlargement”. Imperialism and colonialism have spread capi-
talism around the world in the 19th and 20th century. This process culminated with the 
end of the Cold War. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, very few countries in 
the world remained outside of the system of world capitalism. Global capitalist forces 
played a crucial role in the geographic spreading of capitalism and the integration of 
ever more countries in this global system (if necessary through war). Secondly, the 
process of commidifying social relations has also been deepened, especially during the 
last	three	decades.	Specific	sectors	and	human	activities	that	were	previously	located	
outside the space and logic of capitalist production are increasingly brought into it. For 
example, public services such as health care, transport, education, garbage collection, 
postal services and the provision of primary goods like water and electricity are being 
– fully or partly – integrated into the capitalist logic. This is what Robinson calls the 
“intensive enlargement” of capitalism.58
This intensive enlargement of capitalism involved not only the increasing marketiza-
tion of social life. It has also generated and assembled new ways of thinking and new 
methods of (self-)government into a broader art of government embedded within a 
neoliberal governmentality (cf. Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2007; Miller & Rose, 
2008).	This	particular	view	on	neoliberalism	–	to	be	elaborated	more	specifically	in	the	
fourth chapter – is based on the works of Michel Foucault and draws attention to the 
specific	processes	by	which	the	conduct	of	populations	are	not	only	governed	by	agen-
cies, institutions (e.g. the state apparatus), and so forth, but also by discourses, norms, 
identities	and	specific	 techniques	for	 the	disciplining,	 regulation	and	even	self-regu-
lation of people (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). Power is central in this perspective. Un-
derstanding neoliberal governmentality requires the understanding of the mechanisms 
and impact of power. Yet, power, in this view, should be understood more in terms of 
methods and not necessarily in terms of its institutional forms (Mitchell, 2006). Also, 
from a Foucauldian perspective, the effects of power should not only be described in 
negative terms, as if power only oppresses, punishes, excludes or censors. Power is also 
a productive force (Foucault, 1979). It produces, via different techniques, discourse 
and norms, a certain socio-spatial ordering. As such, the study of governmentality tries 
to draw attention to the productive power in the creation of calculable and governable 
subjects and spaces. It focuses on the methods and power which bring people so far as 
58  In Third World countries, governments were/are under pressure to privatize their public assets in order 
to	keep	state	budgets	and	deficit	spending	under	control.	These	reforms	often	coincided	with	considerable	
social costs. State subsidies on primary consumption goods – one of the essential features of the devel-
opmental state’s social contract in many Third World countries – had to be reduced and this affected the 
poor populations the most. In Morocco, for example, the distribution of water and electricity in the biggest 
cities was allocated to the French multinationals Suez (in Casablanca) and Veolia (in Rabat, Tangiers and 
Tetouan). This allocation has been arranged via public-private partnerships at the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s. As a result of the rising prices of water and electricity, the public-private contracts 
provoked considerable popular protest actions, especially between 2006 and 2008. The movement “contre 
la cherté de la vie” (against the expensiveness of life), for example, gained momentum in those days with 
several organized sit-ins and protest actions (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Since my last visit to Rabat in the 
spring and summer of 2010, Veolia now also provides almost all bus transportation within the city. Yet, the 
negotiations leading up to this concession were equally followed by several (more or less spontaneous) 
strike actions by disgruntled bus drivers who feared to lose their jobs.
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to eventually regulate themselves and perceive themselves as moral subjects (Kenis, 
2010).59	More	 specifically	 in	 chapter	 4,	 I	 demonstrate	 how	biopower, besides other 
forms of power (e.g. class power), was essential to the intensive enlargement of capi-
talism in Morocco, especially when it came down to the attempt to integrate the urban 
poor into the capitalist market.    
Since the turbulent 1970s and the worldwide economic recession, this double process 
of capitalist enlargement has taken on a new dimension.60 The strong recession of 1973, 
exacerbated by the oil shock and the Arab-Israeli war, demonstrated the increasing 
inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capi-
talism and capital accumulation (e.g. the contradictory power relation between capital 
and labour) (Harvey, 1990).61 Fordism-Keynesianism was a model of accumulation es-
sentially based on the (limited) re-distribution of wealth and a national state-super-
vised class compromise between the capitalists and the labour force (Robinson, 2004). 
This compromise between capital and labour was the result of the early 20th century 
class struggles and was based upon the premise that national governments would try 
to overcome crises, assure long-term growth and development, and stabilize capitalist 
production	by	 intervening	 in	 the	processes	of	production	and	distribution	via	deficit	
spending, regulation, taxation and re-distribution. As such, it gave individual states 
extensive	control	over	capital	outflows	and	considerable	liberty	to	determine	their	fiscal	
and monetary policies (Harvey, 2003). This has lead to the rise of the social-democratic 
welfare state in Western countries and the developmentalist and populist states (based 
on import-substituting industrialization) in the Third World (see also Amin, 2003). The 
emergence of the latter was the result of the wave of de-colonization after World War 
II and the colonial and post-colonial class struggles. The ascendency of Arab socialism 
in the 1950s and the 1960s was the dominant equivalent of developmentalism in the 
MENA-region	and	it	constituted	the	ideological	basis	of	important	and	influential	po-
litical forces such as Nasserism in Egypt and the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq. 
The world economic crisis of the 1970s marked the beginning of the end of the po-
litical hegemony of Fordist-style regimes of production. One of the problems back 
then	–	from	the	perspective	of	capital	and	besides	the	fiscal	crisis	of	the	development	
state – was the excessive power of the labour force within the Fordist and Keynesianist 
regimes of production (cf. Harvey, 2003; 2006; 2010a; Amin, 2003; Robinson 2004). 
The pre-neoliberal context, in which the capitalist mode of production was still very 
much bounded within national economies, gave considerable powers and possibilities 
to organized labour to pressure the capitalist class to compromise. The social living 
59  Although, both traditions come from a completely different background, the governmentality studies 
relate in many ways to the Gramscian analyses of hegemony and consent to coercion (on the latter topic see 
Harvey, 2003; Morton, 2007). 
60  What follows is a brief discussion on the ascendance of neoliberalism. For an extensive and more de-
tailed discussion on neoliberalism and the transition away from its predecessor, Fordism-Keynesianism, I 
suggest further reading of the works of David Harvey (1990; 2003; 2006; 2010a), Samir Amin (2003) and 
William Robinson (2004). 
61  This crisis of capitalism actually started already at the end of the 1960s when the fading development 
potential	was	marked	by	a	general	drop	in	private	profit	rates	(over-accumulation).	This	has	prompted	
those in possession of capital to either delay further investment decisions or favour those investments that 
boosted their competitiveness that not necessarily corresponded to the expansion of productive capacities 
(Amin, 2003: 45). 
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conditions of individual workers was an important object of struggle and during the 
first	three	quarters	of	the	20th century organized labour won several victories over wage 
levels and living standards worldwide. Consequently, neoliberalism can be seen as a 
reaction against this political economic order. Two of the most important effects of 
neoliberal policy were the disciplining of labour and the liberation of capital from the 
constraints imposed by Fordism-Keynesianism. As such, the crisis of the 1970s marked 
the beginning of a period of radical restructurings in the capitalist system and the search 
for new modes of capital accumulation. First of all, the abandoning of the gold standard 
as the material basis for money values – resulting in the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement	in	the	early	1970s	–	gave	way	to	the	formation	of	a	new	global	financial	ar-
chitecture	which	liberated	finance	capital	from	excessive	state	control	(Harvey,	2003).	
This	gave	much	more	autonomy	to	the	financial	and	the	banking	system.	This	transi-
tion	to	a	new	regime	of	“flexible	accumulation”	gradually	finished	with	the	rigidities	
of	Fordism	and	rested	on	increased	flexibility	within	labour	processes,	labour	markets,	
production processes and patterns of consumption (Harvey, 1990: 141-172). Flexible 
accumulation	privileged	finance	or	 investment	capital	over	productive	capital	as	 the	
coordinating power of the capitalist system. Moreover, this shift was facilitated by new 
technological and organizational innovations (e.g. the emergence of the internet, the 
mobile phone and improved means of transportation, outsourcing, industrial delocal-
ization, etc.). As in previous epochs of capitalism, the structural crisis and the following 
(neoliberal) restructuring coincided with a technological revolution that transformed 
the	organizational	models	of	labour	and	eroded	the	efficacy,	even	the	legitimacy,	of	ex-
isting forms of working-class or popular struggle and organization both in the capitalist 
West as in many Third World developmental states (Amin, 2003: 16). 
Politically, neoliberal policies really gained their momentum in the 1980s with the com-
ing to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the 
US. Notions as ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’ became synonyms for the neoliberal 
restructurings in their respective countries. To a lesser extent, similar market-oriented 
restructurings were pursued in other European countries and up until today the achieve-
ments of the social-democratic welfare states are under severe pressure to be liberalized 
and privatized. In the Global South neoliberal restructurings were pushed through by 
the World Bank and the IMF via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As such, 
neoliberalism formed an attack on ‘big government’ in the West and pressured devel-
oping countries to open their markets for capitalist interests. The hegemony of neolib-
eralism symbolically replaced that of Fordism-Keynesianism with the adoption of the 
so-called	 ‘Washington	Consensus’	 in	 the	mid-1990s.	This	defined	and	promoted	 the	
US- and UK-models of neoliberal government as the answer to the global economic 
problems (Harvey, 2006: 33). The term ‘Washington Consensus’ – pay attention to the 
anti-political emphasis on consensus	–	was	used	for	the	first	time	by	the	economist	John	
Williamson. It referred to a set of reforms that were broadly supported by Washington-
based institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the US government and the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Mestrum, 2005). From then on, these institutions openly promoted the 
neoliberal	recipe:	i.e.	the	promotion	of	export-oriented	growth;	the	deregulation	of	fi-
nancial markets in order to allow capital to move freely across the globe; the liberaliza-
tion of trade to break down trade barriers that were put in place by most Third World 
countries	to	protect	their	industries;	and,	finally,	the	recommendation	to	privatize	public	
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assets in order to provide new outlets for capital investment.62 Although John William-
son and the World Bank have tried, each in their own way, to answer the criticisms on 
this highly controversial concept, the main message, namely that development must 
be market-based in order to alleviate poverty and generate wealth, has endured (cf. 
Burki & Perry, 1998).63 Countries who do not follow these enduring messages of the 
Washington Consensus do so, according to the World Bank, “at their own peril” (World 
Bank, 2010a).64        
Institutionally, the neoliberal hegemony was established on the world stage through the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Harvey, 2003). In the end, all these 
events (SAPs, the Washington Consensus and the establishment of the WTO) put pres-
sure on the rest of the world to follow the path down the neoliberal road. This radically 
altered the process of globalization itself. It is therefore fair to claim that neoliberal glo-
balization differed radically from earlier forms of globalization. In an answer to more 
sceptical views on globalization, questioning the so-called ‘newness’ of the current dy-
namics  (e.g. Hirst and Thompson, 1996), William Robinson stressed that these sceptics 
fail to see what is qualitatively new about contemporary globalization.65 Departing from 
a	Marxist	definition	of	capitalism,	viewing	the	capitalist	system	essentially	as	a	pro-
duction relation, Robinson argues that although the total amount of trade relations may 
have stayed relatively stable compared to the post-World War II period or even the pre-
World War I period, the real changes have occurred within the modalities of production. 
Therefore, Robinson makes a distinction between the “world economy” of the Bretton 
Woods era and the “global economy” of the neoliberal era (Robinson, 2004: 6-16; see 
also Castells, 1994). The transition from a world to a global economy implicated an im-
portant change in the capitalist mode of production. In a world economy, the production 
processes	were	still	largely	confined	to	each	country’s	national	economy	(i.e.	due	to	the	
state’s	power	to	control	capital	outflow).	These	national	economies	were	then	linked	to	
one	another	through	trade	and	finance	in	an	integrated	international	market.	In	contrast,	
the current global economy is characterized by the increase of capital mobility and the 
62  Williamson himself rejected the perversion of the term ‘Washington Consensus’ as a synonym for neo-
liberalism or market fundamentalism (Roy, 2010: 15). 
63  For an insight in Williamson’s response to his critics, I refer to an overview of his writings on the web-
site of the Peterson Institute for International Economics: http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_
id=15 
64  This didn’t mean that the World Bank did not change its discourse in fundamental ways. Since the late 
1990s the Bank adapted its discourse of economic orthodoxy (materialized with the SAPs) and progressed 
to what some observers called the ‘post-Washington consensus’. Through this shift the World Bank stressed 
for instance the importance of institutions and institutional reform. This would also be the main argument 
of the good governance discourse. However, this new focus would not undermine neoliberalism as such, 
but only demonstrate its transformative character. Critical theory has argued therefore many times that 
neoliberalism should not only be equated with the roll back of particular forms of institutional control 
(mainly state forms of control), but also with the support or roll out of important institutions and forms of 
regulation (e.g. the state and state (re-)regulation) to ensure market-oriented development and protect capi-
talist interests (see for example Peck & Tickell, 2002). This transformative character of neoliberalism will 
be discussed more in detail in chapter 3.    
65  Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argue that the world economy was not more open in terms of total 
trade	and	worldwide	capital	flow	compared	to	the	period	of	the	Bretton	Woods	agreement	and	the	period	
before	the	first	World	War.	Put	simply,	you	could	say	they	didn’t	really	see	any	quantitative	changes	in	the	
current phase of globalization compared to the pre-neoliberal era. This doesn’t mean, however, that they 
failed to recognize some substantial changes at all (cf. Hirst & Thompson, 1996). 
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liberation of processes of production from nation-state boundaries. In other words, the 
emergence of the global economy entailed the ‘globalization’ of production processes. 
As a result, production systems are now surpassing national boundaries on a consider-
ably much larger scale to become integrated into global circuits – e.g. the manufactur-
ing of individual parts in one country, the assembly in another and the management in 
a yet another country. Additionally, the increased liberty and mobility of capital has 
allowed it to search for the most favourable conditions everywhere in the world – e.g. 
with respect to labour costs, institutional environment, political stability, tax and legal 
regimes, etc. This has resulted in arrangements such as outsourcing, subcontracting and 
increased business networks and relations. Morocco, for example, is keen to develop 
its off-shoring sector to strengthen the country’s position as a potential destination for 
foreign businesses (mainly targeting Spanish and French capital).66 By improving the 
country’s attractiveness and competitiveness in terms of infrastructure, quality of ser-
vices, human resources and tax legislations, Moroccan policy makers aim to develop 
offshore zones in cities as Casablanca, Fez, Rabat, Tangiers and Marrakesh. According 
to the Moroccan authorities, this is supposed to boost Morocco’s GDP by approxi-
mately 100 billion Moroccan dirham (MAD) and create 100.000 new jobs by the year 
2015.67 Current prime Minister Abbas El Fassi wants Morocco to become “a magnet 
for many companies who want to relocate”.68 The increased mobility of capital also 
significantly	increased	both	the	weight	of	international	financial	activity	and	the	emer-
gence and autonomy of multinational corporations has during the post-Bretton Woods 
era (Peck & Tickell, 2007). In short, what is important for our understanding of the po-
litical transformations under neoliberalism is not so much the degree of globalization, 
which is the dominant focus of some of the more sceptic views, but rather the form of 
globalization (Massey, 2005: 85).   
In his editorial for the renewed New Left Review, Perry Anderson writes that “whatever 
limitations persist to its practice, neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided 
across the globe: the most successful ideology in world history” (P Anderson, 2000: 
13). In the TV-program ‘Conversations with History’, he continues to argue in an in-
terview with Harry Kreisler from the Institute of International Studies at the University 
of California, that neoliberalism “has a universality as a core doctrine”. According to 
Anderson,	we	can	find	adepts	of	this	doctrine	in	every	corner	of	the	world.69 Conse-
quently, despite the fact that neoliberalism is much more than a doctrine, that it is also 
a	technique	of	government	(Ong,	2006),	a	hegemonic	signifier	for	‘best	practice’	gov-
ernance (Leitner, e.a., 2007), or a general restructuring strategy (Peck & Tickell, 2007), 
that manifests itself differently across space (Hackworth, 2007), it is still important to 
understand the scale of neoliberalism as a global political project. With regard to the 
Arab region, Aggestam, e.a. (2009) argue that due to neoliberal reforms the political 
trajectories of Arab political systems are now more alike than ever. Despite the fact 
66  www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2008/03/21/news-
brief-06 (Magharebia news agency, accessed 16/08/2010).
67  1 euro is 11,2 dirham (rate of 16/08/2010).
68  Morocco plans training project in bid to lure offshore investors, article Available at: 
www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2008/03/28/feature-01, (accessed 
28/03/08).
69  See website of UCTV: http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=7123 (last accessed 17/08/2010).
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how	important	it	may	be	to	point	out	and	nuance	the	specific	local	differences,	neolib-
eralism, as a set of principles of how the market should regulate socio-economic life, 
risks of being occulted and depoliticized behind so-called ‘softer’ or ‘moderate’ ver-
sions of market fundamentalism. Here, Anderson warns us that: “In this sense, adapting 
Lenin’s maxim that ‘the democratic republic is the ideal political shell of capitalism’, 
we could say that the Third Way is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today” (P 
Anderson, 2000: 7).70 Moreover, it are the scholars on neoliberal governmentality who 
convincingly show how neoliberal principles are deeply entrenched in our everyday 
practices and beliefs and how its political rationality radically breaks with “welfarism” 
at the level of moralities, explanations, vocabularies and governing methods, even be-
yond the popular understanding of left and right (Rose & Miller, 1992). Whether in 
Morocco, Belgium, the UK or many other countries in the world, political actors of the 
so-called social democratic left contributed to the propagation and implementation of 
neoliberal policies.
From a critical perspective, in order to fully grasp the political nature of neoliberal-
ism, Harvey’s description of neoliberalism is very insightful. He sees neoliberalism 
above all as a class strategy. The neoliberal phase of world capitalism should be seen 
as a period of the “restoration of class power” (Harvey, 2006; see also Amin, 2003). 
A comprehensive understanding of the notion of class is not that straightforward as it 
may seem (see also chapter 3). Class is a concept that has been approached from within 
very different disciplines departing from different traditions. Erik Olin Wright distin-
guishes three broad traditions which should be integrated together into a more broader 
understanding	of	class.	First	of	all,	within	the	“stratification	approach”,	which	is	also	
the most common and popular understanding, class is principally perceived in terms of 
individual	attributes	and	living	conditions.	Somebody	living	in	a	five	bedroom	mansion	
in the expensive neighbourhood of Souissi in Rabat would then obviously be catego-
rized within a different class than the modest shopkeeper living in the more popular 
neighbourhoods	of	Yacoub	al	Mansour	or	Al	Akkari.	But	 the	 stratification	approach	
comprises more than that. Generally, attributes such as sex, ethnicity, education, social 
income, religion, geographical location (e.g. the urban-rural distinction), and so on, are 
also considered factors that can explain certain patterns of behaviour and living condi-
tions. However, what is missing from this approach, is any causal relation between the 
social conditions of the different classes. In other words, there is no causal connection 
between the conditions of poverty and wealth.71 
A second approach, which Wright calls the “opportunity hoarding approach” (also con-
sidered	the	Weberian	perspective),	defines	classes	by	their	specific	access to and exclu-
sion from certain socio-economic opportunities. For example, access to education (the 
difference between public and private schools) can be explanatory as to why certain 
social groups have access to higher income jobs than others. The critical difference 
with	the	first	approach	is	that	the	latter	sees	a	causal	relation	between	the	economic	ad-
vantages of one class and the disadvantages of another. For example, higher education 
70  For an excellent discussion on the Third Way ideologues and the depoliticized effect of their consensus 
thinking, see Mouffe (2005). 
71		In	this	approach	classes	can	be	ranged	from	upper	classes,	to	middle	classes,	to	lower	classes	and	finally	
the underclass (those peoples who’s living conditions are not secure with respect to their most basic needs)
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would lose its ‘competitive advantage’ if everyone would have access, so the privilege 
of	having	access	 to	higher	education,	depends	 to	a	 significant	extent	on	 its	 scarcity.	
Within this approach class differences can be divided into three broad categories: the 
capitalists (privileged access to the means of production), the middle class (privileged 
access	to	higher	education	and	the	acquisition	of	specific	skills),	and	finally	the	work-
ing class (excluded from either higher education, the acquisition of skills and capital). 
Here, in the opportunity hoarding approach, relations of power enter in the analysis to 
explain the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. However, the approach still neglects 
the relations of power within the activities of the included and excluded. 
The third approach distinguished by Wright, associated with the Marxist tradition, inte-
grates mechanisms of domination and exploitation. Marxist understandings of class are 
therefore relational in both senses, drawing attention to the structuring effect of domi-
nation and exploitation on both the conditions and activities of different class actors 
(E.O Wright, 2009). As a result, (traditional) Marxist perspectives basically make the 
distinction between two broad categories: those who control the means of production 
or share a common relationship to the processes of production, and those who have no 
means of production but sell their labour and produce for the capitalist class. Therefore, 
classes are constituted on the basis of their polar relationship, which means that one end 
of the pole is only possible in relationship to the other (Robinson, 2004: 37). In other 
words, there are no capitalist without workers, just as there were no slave owners with-
out slaves, or lords without vassals in pre-capitalist modes of production. Within this 
boarder framework, the concept of class can also be used to analyze different groups 
and	their	social	conflicts	within	the	same	class.	These	class fractions distinguish be-
tween	 different	 fractional	 interests.	 For	 example:	 industrial	 capital,	 financial	 capital	
and commercial capital. Additionally, within a global economy we could also make a 
distinction between national and transnational fractions of classes (Ibid.).72          
By following a more integral conception of class strategies, crucial for our understand-
ing of neoliberal politics is its exploitative character and the concomitant relations 
of power embedded within class relations. Neoliberal reform, whether in Morocco or 
elsewhere, entailed the increase of capitalist class power over subaltern classes and 
their social interests – this did not imply, however, that class relations of power replaced 
all other social relations of power. Additionally, this perspective on neoliberal reform 
is closely related with a more dialectical understanding of economic development and 
underdevelopment. As mentioned above both poverty and wealth are interdependent 
(they are produced and reproduced by the same order) and the result of the same overall 
logic of power, also in Morocco. This opens up, for example, a radically different per-
spective on newly launched social development projects such as the Villes Sans Bidon-
villes Program (VSBP) and the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH). 
As I demonstrate in the following chapters, a program like VSBP is not just any social 
program	to	alleviate	poverty.	To	the	contrary,	it	is	a	particular	project	that	fits	perfectly	
72  In chapter 3, I will continue the debate on class by adding another perspective, one that does not look 
at class from a perspective of mere property control (or even more limited: property ownership), but more 
broadly as the process of appropriating surpluses. As such, I want to contradict certain perspectives that 
suggest that a class analysis is not entirely suited to understand the political transformations of the Moroc-
can	case.	For	now,	it	suffices	to	stick	to	the	argument	of	Erik	Olin	Wright	and	William	Robinson.
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within a neoliberal rationality and, as a result, incorporates exploitative class relations. 
As	a	consequence,	programs	like	VSBP	fundamentally	redefine	social	policy	in	Mo-
rocco according to free market requirements and should therefore be viewed rather as 
new frontiers of capital accumulation, than as real sustainable solutions to the pressing 
socio-economic problems of Morocco (Roy, 2010; see also chapter 4). As a result, these 
kind of programs are more likely to reproduce social inequality instead of alleviating 
poverty.	Moreover,	the	specific	neoliberal	rationality	behind	a	program	such	as	VSBP	
enables	us	to	link	these	development	projects	with	other	kinds	of	projects,	who	–	at	first	
sight – seem to have a completely different logic. This is what I tried to do by consider-
ing the broader political transformations that are represented by both the VSBP and a 
high-end urban development project such as the one in the Bouregreg Valley. These two 
different projects represent two different extremes of a more general project of change. 
By taking into account the neoliberal logic and the class relations of power that are em-
bedded within these kinds of projects, we can tell a radically different story compared 
to the dominant a-spatial and ideologically biased narrative of globalization. 
The question is then raised by Wright, whether the focus on exploitation and domina-
tion	doesn’t	imply	a	moral	judgment,	in	contrast	to	a	more	neutral	‘scientific’	descrip-
tion (EO Wright, 2009: 107). Wright argues that concepts as exploitation and domina-
tion are important because they accurately identify certain key issues in understanding 
class. I would like to add that not taking into account the neoliberal dynamics of ex-
ploitation and domination within the current processes of political change would be 
–	at	the	least	–	equally	subjective,	uncritical	or	even	worse,	scientifically	incomplete.	
Furthermore, many accounts on political change in the Arab region have always put 
emphasis on forms of domination and exploitation outside the capitalist logic: for ex-
ample, relations of kinship, clientilism, neo-patrimonialism and co-optation. However, 
especially since the opening of domestic markets for global capital through structural 
adjustment,	 these	specific	types	of	networks	and	power	relations	are	more	and	more	
intertwined with processes of class formation (cf. chapter 3). Therefore, those con-
temporary studies that focus on mere endogenous networks and structures of power to 
explain political change or the lack thereof, are missing an important point. By drawing 
the particular connections and class relations between the project of neoliberal global-
ization and domestic processes of political transformation, we can sketch a much more 
complete and integrated picture of the political mechanisms of exploitation, domination 
and socio-economic inequality.73     
Of course, Harvey’s description of neoliberalism as the “restoration of class power” 
may have the advantage of bringing political power and agency into our understanding 
of contemporary globalization, but it also narrows the focus down almost exclusively 
to the European and North American context. It is obvious that the neoliberal vanguard 
regimes headed by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US were 
important	to	construct,	in	the	name	of	economic	liberalization,	specific	capital-centric	
regimes	 that	were	beneficial	 for	an	exclusive	and	very	 rich	minority	of	 the	Western	
73  There are some insightful analyses which try to bring in “an external dimension” in their analysis of 
domestic	politics	(e.g.	Cavatorta,	2004;	2005).	However,	the	picturing	of	some	kind	of	‘external’	influence	
neglects the complex interdependency and fusion of class relations beyond national boundaries. Global 
class relations risk of being pictured still too much as some outside factor that forces itself upon Morocco. 
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population (Peck & Tickell, 2007). It was also obvious, that these political attacks were 
meant to break the class compromise of the Keynesian welfare state. Yet, the same 
form of class power did not needed to be ‘restored’ in non-Western countries such as 
Morocco. Structural adjustment was not a deliberately chosen option by many political 
leaders in the Arab region. However, despite the fact that the implementation of neo-
liberal policies wasn’t a deliberate political choice, Myriam Catusse argues that struc-
tural adjustment hasn’t necessarily affected the dominant position of political elites in 
Morocco:
The social structures of the ancient regime have not been weakened by the struc-
tural adjustment but have shown themselves capable of adjustment and, in certain 
ways, have consolidated themselves. The heirs of the great families of the Souss 
region and of the city of Fez have been able to modernize their activities. Return-
ing from studies abroad in Europe and increasingly in the United States, they are 
the “golden boys” of a rapidly evolving capitalism who do not hide their success 
(Catusse, 2009a: 211).
Structural adjustment has not really affected ruling coalitions in many Arab states. 
The ruling elites in Morocco have adapted to a new reality. What’s more, they helped 
constructing that new reality. And this was not just a necessary “survival strategy” 
(Dillman, 2001). As the Moroccan state sold off its economic assets at bargain prices 
and adopted neoliberal policies, the future of the Moroccan bourgeoisie was well as-
sured (Clément, 1986). Moreover, structural adjustment didn’t affect state power and 
state control in such a way that it threatened the position of the ruling elites. Quite the 
reverse, we could speak of a rather smooth synergy between neoliberal restructuring 
and	the	more	particularly	Moroccan	institutional	configurations	and	domestic	political	
style of economic exploitation; namely the rule of the makhzen (Bayart, 2007: 41-42). 
Nevertheless, neoliberal reform did create or extend the conditions for capitalist class 
formation alongside older neo-patrimonial and clientilistic formations of power.74 It 
was thanks to the control over the state apparatus and eventually the reformation of that 
apparatus that these political elites manifested and reproduced their power. At the same 
time, they gave form to the current process of globalization in Morocco. 
 
Neoliberal globalization and the state
Discussions on political change in a globalized world cannot avoid the issue of the state 
and the conditions of state (re-)formation. Much has been written, of course, on the 
role and the nature of the state in contemporary globalization. Within critical theory, 
various authors have dealt with the question of the state and state theory. First of all, 
various Marxist thinkers have tried to capture some essence of the state in relation to 
class power. They tried to study the spatial and/or institutional transformation of the 
state in a globalizing world through the changing relations and constellations of class 
forces (cf. Poulantzas, 2000; Robinson, 2004; Morton, 2007; Jessop, 2008; Lefebvre, 
2009). Secondly, scholars on governmentality, following a more Foucauldian approach, 
74  This point is also mentioned by Harvey (2006: 42). In addition we have to remark that Morocco had 
already some sort of market-based economy before the implementation of a SAP in 1983. So some kind 
of class formation was already established, especially during the 1970s with the Moroccanization of the 
economy. This will be discussed more in detail in chapter 3.
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have tried to de-essentialize the state as an apparent coherent entity and a-historical 
actor. They depart from an analytics of government which directs the focus away from 
specific	state	institutional	forms	towards	particular	techniques,	effects	and	methods	of	
power (cf. Rose & Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999; Mitchell, 2006; Ferguson, 2006; Lemke, 
2007; Foucault, 2007; 2008). Finally, critical anthropologists and ethnographers have 
tried to retrace the state by looking at its multiple, mundane and variegated everyday 
practices on the ground and the way these practices are being imagined (cf. Gupta, 
1995; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Yang, 2005; Ismail, 2006). I am not going to try to 
match these different perspectives or give my own general theory of the state. Parts 
of	their	theoretical	arguments	will	be	reflected	in	the	discussion	of	the	particular	case	
studies in chapter 4 and 5. However, what I derive in this chapter from, amongst oth-
ers, the authors mentioned above, is the particular synergy between globalization and 
state reformation, and subsequently, since neoliberal globalization is a class project, the 
close connection between the state and class power. 
Many studies on globalization and the political history of modern age can be seen as 
reflections	on	the	tension	between	the	nation-state	and	the	international	dimension	(Hi-
bou, 2004a). A very popular perspective, especially in the 1990s, argued that increased 
globalization implicated a challenge to the sovereignty of the state. This challenge, it 
was said, would decrease the economic, political and cultural importance of the state. 
It’s central role would be hollowed out and implicate it’s decline (cf. Strange, 1995; 
1996; Cable, 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Schmidt, 1995; Clapham, 2002). This, however, is a 
misconception. Contemporary globalization has not necessarily led to a reduced sov-
ereignty of the state. A good number of critical scholars have come up with powerful 
counterarguments. They see the tension between the state and globalization more as 
a phenomenon of entanglement (Hibou, 2004a.). David Harvey, for example, points 
attention to the complex dialectic between territorial and capitalist logics of power 
(Harvey, 2003). Jean François Bayart argues that the state is largely a product of glo-
balization (Bayart, 2007). Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell have emphasized the various 
ways	in	which	the	state	has	been	first	rolled	back	but	 then	rolled	out	again	(Peck	&	
Tickell,	2002;	2007).	Béatrice	Hibou,	finally,	refers	to	the	“privatization	of	the	state”	to	
highlight this entanglement (Hibou, 2004a; 2004b). In the end, all these authors reject 
in some way or another the simple fact that the autonomy of the state somehow de-
creased in recent decades due to globalization. Or, in other words, that the state would 
be in some kind of crisis today. In contrast, they argue that what we observe in many – if 
not almost all – countries of the world, is not so much a crisis of the state, but rather a 
radical	transformation	of	the	specific	modes	of	state	intervention.		
In	order	to	fully	grasp	the	significance	of	this	dialectic	relation	between	state	and	glo-
balization, it is important to step away from the image of the state as a coherent entity 
and a single actor (Hansen & Stepputtat, 2001). Although, the state may still be the 
most important political entity, this doesn’t mean we should treat it as a unity, static 
through time and space. As I already mentioned in chapter 1, we should move away 
from the tendency to consider the Arab regime as an endogenous political force or con-
tainer (black box), supposedly in control of the state, in order to understand political 
change. Change will be more likely detected by looking at the government of people 
and	places	within	specific	contexts.	After	all,	as	I	will	demonstrate	more	in	detail	 in	
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chapter 5, local places can be agents in globalization (Massey, 2005: 101, see also be-
low).	The	specific	dynamics	in	these	locales	have	their	own	specificity	and	the	state	is	
involved in differentiated ways. As a result, different locales can give a different image 
of the state and the particular modes by which state power is used by political forces. 
In	paying	attention	to	the	specific	ways	in	which	the	local	produces	the	global,	we	can	
also differentiate the various and continuously transforming methods and institutions 
through	which	the	state	is	(re-)configured.	There	are	different	manifestations	of	state	
power that all tell a story of how and why the government of people and places has been 
transformed. The government of the Bouregreg Valley is not exactly the same context 
in which slums are governed. The state – like neoliberalism – manifests itself different-
ly across space. Therefore, to really see the political changes of the last three decades in 
Morocco,	it	is	probably	more	opportune	to	look	at	specific	methods	of	governmental	in-
tervention	and	specific	manifestations	of	institutional	power	and	control.	Through	this	
approach,	the	fluidity	and	constant	changeability	of	state	power	(and	power	relations	
in general), state methods and state institutions can be demonstrated in order to refute 
rash and false conclusions such as for example the claim that “the reality of power and 
politics in the Magrheb region [has remained] as it has been since the independence” 
(Entilis, 2007: 23).
Rethinking the neoliberal state
A common misconception about neoliberal capitalist globalization is that it negatively 
affects the sovereignty of the nation-state. Especially since the end of the Cold War and 
the pronouncement of the so-called end of history, the question of what would happen 
to the state under globalization, gained increasing attention.75 Many scholars predicted 
a crisis of the state, and some even announced its apparent end (e.g. Ohmae, 1995). 
Bayart distinguished three broad explanations that underpinned the beliefs of the doom 
mongers of the state: trade and economic liberalization, the increasing regionalization 
of the international system and the increasing numbers of civil wars and ethnic con-
flicts	(Bayart,	2007).76	A	well-known	study	that	underlines	the	first	premise,	is	Susan	
Strange’s book The retreat of the state. She based her arguments on a perception of a 
clear zero-sum game in which processes of increasing globalization and increasing 
state power are mutually exclusive. From the 1970s onwards, Strange argued, the ter-
ritorial boundaries of states no longer coincided with the political authority over econo-
my and society. She argues that both the accelerating pace of technological change and 
the changing market relations have contributed to the decline of state power and the 
supremacy of markets over states. This supremacy is the result of the power “exercised 
impersonally by markets and often unintentionally by those who buy and sell and deal 
in markets” (Strange, 1996: 13). 
In contrast, Harvey argues that the struggle for market shares and foreign investments 
are not necessarily a sign of state decline – i.e. picturing the subordination of the state 
75  Bayart notes that even before the end of the Cold War and the worldwide turn to neoliberalism in the 
1980s, the “logic of blocs” during the Cold War had its own impact on the perception of state sovereignty 
(Bayart, 2007: 47).  
76		I	am	going	to	focus	essentially	on	the	first	dynamic	(trade	and	economic	liberalization)	because	the	
other two dynamics are not really applicable to the Moroccan case (for a further discussion see Bayart, 
2007: 29-82).
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to some inevitable force of globalization – but rather the proof that state power has been 
used to improve the conditions for the capitalist class (Harvey, 2006). The struggle for 
markets has made the rich even richer and the state played a key role in these neoliberal 
class projects. Reducing these manifestations of class power to the “impersonal power 
of the market”, not only depoliticizes but also utterly ignores the agency behind the cre-
ation	and	reconfiguration	of	markets.	The	specific	solutions	to	the	worldwide	crisis	in	
the 1970s were not the result of some natural or invisible hand, but the result of political 
choices. Interestingly, the retreat of the state thesis has been questioned by some schol-
ars of Arab politics, but not from the same point of view. In contrast, they speculated 
whether economic liberalization would weaken the power of the ruling elites and con-
cluded that market liberalization has not affected the authoritarian durability of Arab 
regimes (cf. Dillman, 2001; 2002; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004). As such, they also 
questioned the hypothesis that structural adjustment or economic liberalization would 
automatically lead to a state’s retreat and a loss of state control.77 However, in the end, 
they did not necessarily scrutinize the underlying theoretical premises (i.e. the hypoth-
esis of state decline under globalization), but argued instead that in the Arab region, it 
was often not the “impersonal competitive market” that determined the allocation of 
resources but the particular networks and personal relations between political elites 
(e.g. through clientilism, co-optation, etc.): “The new “rules” [were] either not known, 
not followed, or [were] bent in order the preserve rents and tap new ones” (Dillman, 
2001: 201). Dillman stated that neoliberal economic reforms promoted by the EU could 
be	beneficial	over	the	long	term.	It	was	only	the	current	“incomplete	implementation”	
of these reforms that allowed for the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of 
a few and the continuous domination of the state over the market (Dillman, 2002: 82). 
Several critical scholars have tried to give a more nuanced and complex picture of 
the tension between the state and neoliberal globalization. They didn’t go as far as to 
predict a retreat of the state, but did distinguish some real challenges to the power and 
influence	of	the	state	as	the	dominant	regulator	of	capitalist	development.	They	empha-
sized that globalization was now increasingly regulated by either ‘world’ or ‘global’ 
cities (Friedmann, 1995; Sassen, 1999; 2003), ‘global networks’ (Castells, 2005; 2007), 
transnational capitalist classes (Sklair & Robbins, 2002; Robinson, 2004) or even a new 
global form sovereign power proper to ‘Empire’ that governs the entire world (Hardt 
& Negri, 2000). While I do not want to discredit the numerous insightful and critical 
arguments made by these authors on the changing geography of capitalist globalization, 
they all tend to propose a shift away from the state as the key locus for the regulation of 
globalization.78	More	specifically,	they	tend	to	see	globalization	as	a	process	that	above	
all confronts and reduces the political autonomy of the traditional nation-state.79 How-
ever, the various processes of globalization described by these authors (e.g. multiplica-
tion of global actors, the increasing multi-scalar nature of the contemporary globaliza-
77		Most	of	the	studies	do	not	specifically	focus	on	the	arguments	of	Susan	Strange	but	on	the	more	broader	
theoretical connection made between democratization and trade liberalization. 
78  For a more state-centric and detailed critique on these different perspectives see: on the global cities 
literature (MP Smith, 1998; Brenner, 1998); on global networks (Hirst, 2005: 21-24); on Empire (Mouffe, 
2005: 107-115). 
79  Of course, I do not want to assert that every state is equally powerful or that there are no pressures on 
states or state elites to imply certain restructurings and reforms (e.g. the pressure of institutions as the World 
Bank and the IMF for structural adjustment). 
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tion, the emergence of new kinds of transnational networks, etc..) do not necessarily 
reduce the state’s power but changes the state’s modes of intervention. The extent to 
which state power is still one of the main authors and enforcers of globalization, rather 
than being just a passive victim, has been underestimated in most of these accounts 
(Panitch & Gindin, 2005: 101).  
Leo	Panitch	(1998)	gives	five	reasons	why	we	should	not	rush	into	any	rash	conclu-
sions. First of all, states and state elites do not necessarily lose authority to global or 
transnational capitalists, but draw them within reach (see also Allen & Cochrane, 2010; 
to be elaborated more in chapter 5). Secondly, state power is still largely necessary to 
establish essential infrastructures and juridical conditions of markets and private prop-
erty. Third, the explicit rules that installed the global neoliberal order, in other words, 
the rules in terms of capital movements, trade, investment climates, and currency ex-
change, are still dependent on state regulation. Fourth, in the process of making this 
neoliberal order, states haven’t withdrawn from the economy, just restructured their 
relation	to	it	(see	below).	And	finally,	Panitch	argues	that	the	international	(trade)	agree-
ments, international treaties, and the establishment of the frameworks and rules through 
which international agencies and institutions govern, are still forged via inter-state re-
lations. Consequently, the capitalist state, according to Panitch and Gindin (2005), is 
relatively autonomous, in the sense that capitalist state agencies and state institutions 
still have the capacities to act on behalf of the system as a whole, while, at the same 
time, they also depend on the success of capital accumulation for their own legitimacy 
and reproduction.      
The relation between processes of globalization and state formation should thus be seen 
more as a process of entanglement. In contrast to the argument that the globalization, 
and	more	specifically	the	global	flow	of	goods,	capital	and	technological	know-how,	
would challenge and reduce the political autonomy of the state, Bayart argues that glo-
balization itself is actually the motor behind state (re-)formation. And this was not only 
true for the post-Bretton woods era. He reminds us, for example, that it was:
well and truly our foundational nineteenth century that implanted the state south 
of the Sahara as a system of territorial sovereignty that made politics autono-
mous. Globalization demanded it: the European powers, the United Kingdom 
first	and	foremost,	passed	from	an	‘imperialism	of	intention’	to	an	‘imperialism	
of result’ as soon as they discerned in the absence of centralized political forma-
tions one of the main obstacles to investment and occupied by force of arms the 
regions they had not managed to penetrate economically as much as they would 
have desired (Ibid.: 76-77). 
Consequently, in contrast to the context of the rise of the modern state in Europe, which 
was associated with the rise of capitalism and could be considered as an organic out-
growth of the processes of social and economic development at that time, the modern 
Third World state was “not an outgrowth of the society as such, but an imposition upon 
it from outside, by the colonial powers or other international processes and conjunc-
tures” (Zubaida, 2009: 125-126). Morocco was no exception. To the contrary, the cur-
rent Moroccan state apparatus originated out of the colonial heritage. Furthermore, in 
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order to understand Morocco’s current processes of capitalist urbanization and the im-
plication of state power in these processes, some answers can be found in the colonial 
efforts to urbanize the country. Since the beginning of the French Protectorate in 1912, 
the	first	resident	general	Hubert	Lyautey	installed	a	strong	centralized	bureaucratic	state	
apparatus. But this state apparatus and the concomitant French ambitions also required 
urban infrastructure. Consequently, Lyautey then further embarked upon an ambitious 
urban project to foresee the country with the necessary infrastructure for its integration 
in the economic realm of the colonial system. The impact of this urban project is still 
discernible today and accounts for many of the contemporary social problems. 
Lyautey gathered around him a group of young architects and urbanists, under the di-
rection	of	Henri	Prost,	to	work	out	a	specific	urban	design	and	prepare	the	country’s	
integration	in	the	(French)	capitalist	sphere	of	influence.	The	French	had	basically	an	
open	field	to	pursue	their	plans.	Before	the	Protectorate,	only	around	8%	of	the	Mo-
roccan population lived in the original cities, the medinas (Catusse, e.a., 2005).80 The 
newly created colonial cities served as urban laboratories to experiment with new forms 
of urban government that eventually could serve the home country (Rabinow, 1989; 
Abouhani, 2005). Especially cities as Casablanca and Rabat were subject to the French 
experiments with avant-garde urbanism (Rivet, 2004: 224). This resulted in the con-
struction of the European city or the ‘ville nouvelle’ next to the historical medinas. The 
French administration considered the latter unsuitable for proper economic integration. 
As	such,	during	the	colonial	period,	the	subsequent	periods	of	urban	planning	–	first	un-
der	Prost	and	later	under	that	other	influential	French	architect	and	urban	planner,	Mi-
chel	Ecochard	–	were	first	and	foremost	driven	by	economic	interests	(Rachik,	1994).	
Planning anticipated the circulation of the automobile and the instalment of industrial 
complexes (e.g. the port of Casablanca). In addition, the French built railroads and all-
weather roads in order to improve the mobility and the transport of goods. Today, by 
taking a walk through the Moroccan city-centres of Casablanca, Rabat or Fez, one can 
still clearly see the contrast between the dense medina with its small narrow streets and 
the European part of the city with its large boulevards, open squares and parks.81 
The emergence and growth of the Moroccan cities can, on the one hand, be subscribed 
80  Today’s urbanization rate is estimated at 55,1% of the total population (numbers of 2004) according to 
the Moroccan Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP) (see: http://www.hcp.ma – accessed 20/08/2010). 
81  During the Protectorate, the French urban project gave rise to a system of social and spatial segregation, 
separating the European immigrant population, who were living predominantly in the ville nouvelle, from 
the indigenous population who lived in the medinas. Janet Abu Lughod (1980) described this system of 
social and spatial segregation as “urban Apartheid”, referring above all to its ethnic dimension. Despite the 
fact that this concept has been criticized – because in contrast to South Africa the separation in Morocco 
was never really absolute and never legally imposed (cf. Rabinow, 1989; Rivet, 2004; Holden, 2007) – 
Mike Davis (2006a: 139) argues that the problems of many Third World cities today are rooted in colonial 
urbanism and the projects of ethnic class division. As he stated: “the European empires generally refused 
to provide modern sanitation and water infrastructures in native neighbourhoods, preferring instead to 
use racial zoning and cordon sanitaires to segregate garrisons and white suburbs from epidemic disease”. 
Besides political and economic reasons, demographic, hygienic and cultural arguments were also the basic 
arguments for this segregation in Morocco. As Prost himself argued: “[Lyautey’s vision on urban planning] 
included one essential condition: the complete separation of European agglomerations from native agglom-
erations. The European population centres must be separated from those of the indigenous populations for 
political, economic, sanitary, and aesthetic reasons, as well as for town planning purposes” (Abu Lughod, 
1980: 131).
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to abstract global processes (e.g. colonization, the search for new markets). On the 
other hand, the continuous production and transformation of its urban space, and by 
extension any other urban space, can also be understood in relation to profound trans-
formations in the mode of production and in relation to class and property (Lefebvre, 
1996). As such, Lefebvre emphasized that the city cannot be fully understood without 
considering the institutions that gave rise to the city and, at the same time, emerged 
from it. The most important one, of course, being the state apparatus. Hence, it is im-
portant to study the processes of globalization in relation to the institutional contexts 
from which they emerge. In this regard, the Moroccan urban project must thus above 
all be understood as a colonial state project in a context of increasing globalization. It 
was through the institutions and technologies of French administrative power, through 
the colonial state apparatus, that the Moroccan (peripheral) integration in the capitalist 
market was realized. Eventually, once the French left the country in 1956, this state ap-
paratus was inherited by the Moroccan elites and the entourage of King Mohamed V.
After the independence in 1956, the French had left a strong state apparatus. The nec-
essary infrastructural and institutional means were available for the centralization of 
state power under Moroccan rule. Moroccan urban and rural elites took over the piv-
otal positions left by the French, thereby securing economic and political power in the 
hands of a wealthy domestic minority.82 The monarchy, eager to commit the elites to 
the new political regime, allowed them to indulge their appetite for wealth accumula-
tion and within a decade, a privileged class had developed with close ties to the throne. 
Moreover, commercial ties with Europe during the decades before the Protectorate had 
helped establishing a domestic economic class that had changed their modes of ac-
cumulation according to more capitalist principles (Waterbury, 1970: 160-161). This 
merchant-capitalist class, foremost located in the cities, didn’t rely anymore on war 
and plundering for the accumulation of their wealth but on commercial activities. Ad-
ditionally, they relied on the one institution or set of institutions which was capable of 
serving their interests: the state. The French from their part had great interest in keeping 
this transition to a post-colonial Morocco as smooth and peaceful as possible. In keep-
ing good relations with the Moroccan elites, the country’s economic dependency from 
France could be preserved. Frantz Fanon has reminded us that the European powers 
had every interest in a peaceful transition towards decolonization in order to preserve 
the	economic	and	political	dependence	of	the	Maghreb	states	vis-à-vis	the	European	
powers (Fanon, 1967). 
As such, the new independent states and their institutional frameworks remained cru-
cial	to	determine	the	level	and	the	specific	ways	of	economic	integration.	And	this	re-
mained	true	during	the	subsequent	period	of	economic	and	financial	liberalization	(Ba-
yart, 2007). Only a few decades later, during the economic crises of the 1970s and the 
1980s, SAPs were negotiated bilaterally between the Third World state governments 
82  This was also visible in the way residential space in the Moroccan city, especially Rabat, maintained a 
dualistic structure after the Protectorate. The modern centre, left vacant by the departure of many French of-
ficials,	was	taken	over	by	Moroccan	urban	elites	who	had	lived	in	other	high	status	urban	areas.	In	the	spe-
cific	case	of	Rabat,	many	of	the	residential	spaces	in	the	modern	centre	ware	taken	over	by	the	traditional	
bourgeois from Fez. As such, we can conclude that the socio-spatial segregation of the city was maintained 
after the independence, although this was rather based on class relations rather than ethnic ones (Findlay, 
Findlay & Paddison, 1984; see also Abu Lughod, 1980).
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and the international donors. These SAPs were the beginning of a radical transforma-
tion of the state and again, globalization – this time in its dominant neoliberal form – 
was the motor behind it. This transition towards more liberalized capitalist economies, 
via privatization and structural adjustment, was again above all a public policy in order 
to	overcome	the	financial	crisis	of	the	Arab	state.	Free	market	reform	should	therefore	
not simply be understood as the result of (outside) pressures undermining state policy. 
In contrast, the reforms that intended economic liberalization should be considered a 
set of measures “initiated by the state (sometimes in collaboration with international 
capital) for its own reasons, rather than under pressure from the private sector” (Ayubi, 
1997: 161). As I have pointed out earlier, in the case of Morocco, these economic ‘ad-
justments’ were not only a story of international (imperialist) pressure upon a ‘periph-
eral state’. The eventual implemented policies also served the political and economic 
interests of the Moroccan ruling elites (cf. chapter 3).     
Throughout the history of capitalist globalization, the national state has thus always 
played a key role for establishing and regulating the conditions of that globalization, 
even during the neoliberal phase (Jessop, 2008). Yet, it is undeniable that since the rapid 
globalization of the production processes, i.e. the emergence of a truly global market 
economy	and	the	liberation	of	financial	and	investment	capital,	the	modalities	of	state	
intervention have changed profoundly. Hibou made an important contribution in her 
work on Sub Saharan and North African states, arguing that contemporary globalization 
not necessarily leads to the loss of state power but to the redeployment of state power 
into more indirect modalities of state rule (Hibou, 1998). This phenomenon, which she 
called the “privatization of the state”, entails a process in which public power entrusts 
private agents with certain tasks (security, economic functions, etc.). This leads to the 
privatization of certain domains of sovereign power and coercion (Hibou, 2004b). In 
other words, privatization should be understood as a new form of state intervention and 
not so much as a phenomenon that works against the state and undermines its authority. 
After all, it are those people who control the state that are responsible in the end for the 
privatization of certain functions, sectors and services. They determine the conditions 
of privatization:
[…]	far	from	becoming	impotent	in	the	economic	field,	the	state	is	adapt-
ing not only to external constraints, but to internal ones also. This adapta-
tion takes the form of privatisation of states, a privatisation that is not so 
much a loss of control as an option for indirect government, using private 
intermediaries on an increasing scale. This option is not necessarily a 
choice (forced or otherwise); it results from the entanglement of multiple 
strategies and reactions by public and private actors. The privatisation of 
the state is not synonymous with the domination of private interests and 
the supremacy of economic causality within it; however, it corresponds 
closely with changes in relations between public and private spheres and 
between the economic and the political (Hibou, 2004a: XVIII).     
As a result, the privatization of the state entails the continual renegotiation of social 
power	relations	between	different	elites	on	the	field	of	the	state.	The	coalescence	be-
tween economic and political positions of power confuses clear conceptual distinctions 
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between	public	and	private,	market	and	state,	and	finally	between	the	economic	and	the	
political (Hibou, 1998). 
The current presence of many French corporations and multinationals in Morocco is a 
good example. It proves that the regulation of globalization still depends on relations 
between states, in this case the good relations between the French and the Moroccan 
state elites. Especially the relationship between late King Hassan II and former presi-
dent Jacques Chirac was very productive for the interests of French private concerns 
in the Moroccan economy (Tuquoi, 2006). France was and still is the most important 
Moroccan trade partner, the primary supplier of foreign direct investments, and one of 
the	most	important	financiers	of	Moroccan	loans.83 According to Dominique Bocquet, 
head	of	the	regional	economic	office	at	the	French	embassy	in	Rabat,	the	reason	why	
Morocco is still France’s most important destination for foreign direct investment is 
because of “the desire of the French public authorities to get the investors to look more 
in the direction of Morocco, but also [because of] the capacity of the Moroccan authori-
ties to attract [these investors]”.84 As a result, all the most important French banks and 
insurance companies are present in the Moroccan market. Vivendi, one of France’s big-
gest multinationals, is the majority shareholder of the largest Moroccan telecommuni-
cation company: Maroc Telecom. French companies such as the hotel group Accor are 
important investors in Morocco’s tourist sector. Other multinationals such as SUEZ and 
Veolia have signed public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the Moroccan government 
for the distribution of water and electricity and the processing of waste in the cities of 
Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers and Tetouan. French companies are also very present in 
major Moroccan infrastructural projects, such as Bouygues in the construction of the 
industrial port Tanger Med in Tangiers, and Alstom, a world leader in transport and 
energy infrastructure, in the construction of the tramways in Rabat and Casablanca and 
the high-speed train between Casablanca and Tangiers. Only recently, Alstom also won 
its	first	contract	in	the	Moroccan	wind	power	market	by	signing	a	contract	with	Nareva	
Holding for a wind farm in Akhfenir.85 The latter is a subsidiary of the group Omnium 
Nord	Africain	(ONA),	the	leading	Moroccan	industrial	and	financial	group.	According	
to Nadia Lamlili, a journalist with the economic magazine Economie Entreprises, the 
dominance of Alstom in Morocco is due to the diplomatic efforts of current French 
president Michel Sarkozy.86 
The growing involvement of (foreign) private actors, Hibou points out, did not entail a 
loss of state autonomy but a transformation of state modes of intervention. State control 
is now exercised more indirectly. Consequently, the relationship between the state and 
the economy should not be seen as a fading one, but rather as a restructured one, in 
which	state	apparatuses	have	reorganized	and	redefined	their	role	in	representing	and	
regulating social actors and markets (Panitch, 1998). Let me give a few examples. First 
of all, consider the PPPs between the French multinationals Suez and Veolia and the 
83  French direct investment in 2008 amounted to 8,1 billion Euros compared to 2,4 billion in 2004. Be-
tween 2006 and 2009 the volume of the French investments augmented with 40% (weekly business maga-
zine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 45).  
84  Ibid. (own translation; emphasis added).
85  http://www.alstom.com/home/news/news/business_news/65485.EN.php. (accessed 22/08/2010).
86  Interview (Casablanca, 05/06/2010).
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Moroccan state. Although the state partially privatized important public services such 
as the distribution of water and electricity, it didn’t gave up its political control over that 
service. The contracts involved usually represent very lucrative markets and the bid-
ding procedures often lacked transparency. It is the wali (regional governor), directly 
accountable to the Ministry of Interior, who decided to award the concessions with-
out necessarily having given all potentially interested investors an opportunity to bid 
(Denoeux, 2007). Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior still keeps institutional control 
over	price	fluctuation	 and	 the	 infrastructural	 networks	 (Allain-El	Mansouri,	 2005).87 
Secondly, the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) is another salient example of the 
changing	modes	of	state	intervention.	The	CDG,	established	in	1959,	is	a	financial	in-
stitution to manage public servant pensions. Today, it has become the largest publicly 
owned investment bank and a major stakeholder in several urban and regional develop-
ment programs across the country (e.g. offshore, social housing, the development of 
new satellite cities (the villes nouvelles) and numerous participations in the tourist sec-
tor and the industry). The CDG functions as a private investment bank but it is owned 
by the Moroccan state. Its CEO is directly appointed by the King and thus accountable 
only to him. Third, the royal family’s grip on the Moroccan domestic market is another 
indicator of the rather dubious way in which state power is engaged in private enter-
prise. Through its control over ONA, the monarchy is not only the centre of political 
power in Morocco. It has established itself also as one of the most important economic 
actors in the country.88 
Hibou’s reference to a process of state privatization is therefore crucial to understand 
the neoliberal dynamic of the state. In contrast to the primary objectives of the welfare 
state in Europe or the developmental state in the Global South, the fundamental mission 
of “the neoliberal state”,	as	it	is	referred	to	by	David	Harvey	(2006),	is	first	and	fore-
most concerned with the creation of a good business climate and the optimization of 
the conditions for capital accumulation. Concerns for employment or social well-being 
(e.g. social security; health care) come in second place. These latter issues are consid-
ered to be dependent on the business climate. It is then believed that the better private 
business	 flourishes,	 the	 better	 created	wealth	 can	 trickle	 down.	The	 neoliberal	 state	
involves the creation of new systems of government that integrate and intermingle state 
and corporate interests. Through the application of money power, Harvey argues, these 
new modalities of government ensured the disbursement of surpluses through the state 
apparatus in favour of corporate capital and ruling class interests. A salient example is 
the contemporary (re)shaping of the urban process and the promotion of investments 
in urban renewal as an outlet for capital surpluses (Harvey, 2008: 38; see also below). 
Furthermore, the privatization of public assets can also be seen as a state-led strategy to 
open up new opportunities for capital investment and stimulate the business climate.
In addition, Hibou also points out that one of the consequences of the privatization of 
87  Interview with geographer Béatrice Allain-El Mansouri (Rabat, 20/09/2007).  
88  Only recently, ONA merged with that other major Moroccan Holding, the Société Nationale 
d’Investissement (SNI), to become the absolute dominant domestic private Holding in Morocco. The 
holding is controlled by the Royal family via the participation of the royal holding SIGER (an anagram of 
REGIS).	ONA/SNI	is	active	in	the	mining	industry,	food	industry,	distribution	sector,	the	financial	sector,	
telecommunications, etc. (See Telquel, n° 418, 3-9 April 2010).
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the state is its de-institutionalization (Hibou, 2004b: 41). Herein lies probably one of 
the explanations why some authors like Susan Strange tend to see a retreat of the state. 
However, Hibou sketches here only part of the picture. The changing modes of state 
intervention are not only resulting in more indirect forms of government and political 
control, as Hibou argues, but result also in new forms of state institutional govern-
ment on sub- and supra-national scales.89 In his critique on the ‘global cities’ literature, 
Neil Brenner argues that the current phase of neoliberal globalization has resulted in 
the	reconfiguration	and	reterritorialization	of	the	state,	rather	than	simply	in	the	ero-
sion of the state, to create a city-centric capitalism (Brenner, 1998). As a result of this 
political, geographical and institutional reorganization, the transformation of the state 
under neoliberalism not only entails a process of de-institutionalization but also its 
re-institutionalization. Neoliberalism entails a particular kind of statecraft (Parker, 
2009). New forms of spatially differentiated government and regulatory arrangements 
are introduced which transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from 
traditional state institutions to new governmental arrangements. These arrangements 
are	often	–	at	first	sight	–	not	associated	with	the government or the state. As Brenner 
highlighted, the urban scale represents the strategic institutional arena in which these 
contemporary neoliberal forms of government are unfolding. One example is the way 
in which state power has been rescaled and reterritorialized into “new state spaces”. 
These	 state	 spaces	must	 be	 understood	 as	 new	 institutional	 configurations	 in	which	
political	power	has	been	resituated	in	an	attempt	to	influence	the	geography	of	capital-
ist accumulation (Brenner, 2004). Arrangements such as in the Bouregreg Valley are 
a salient example. They constitute the new modalities of neoliberal statecraft through 
which social space is being produced and reproduced by capitalist strategies (discussed 
in detail in chapter 5).
Conceptualizing the state: the art of government, class forces and state spatiality
On the cover of the 2008 special summer issue of 
Telquel, King Mohamed VI is pictured in a stylish 
business suit. The weekly magazine opens with the 
telling title “L’Etat c’est lui” and asks herself the fol-
lowing question: does the economic boom justify ab-
solute power?90 This particular representation or imag-
ination of the Moroccan state tells a great deal about 
the	specific	implication	of	state	power	in	the	economic	
development of the country. It also tells us something 
about	the	specific	imagination	of	the	state:	i.e.	personi-
fied	through	the	monarch.	It	is	not	my	intention	to	pic-
ture the state as the only relevant territorial actor in 
the project of neoliberal globalization. This would be 
far too limiting. However, the state is still the political 
entity that is best able to orchestrate the processes of 
89  The European Union would be a salient example of how individual states now operate on a supra-na-
tional	scale	within	a	new	institutional	configuration.	In	the	case	of	Morocco	I	will	only	concentrate	on	new	
sub-national	institutional	configurations.	
90  Telquel, n°335-336, 2 August – 5 September 2008. This issue was published right before the global 
economic crisis.
Source: Telquel Weekly Magazine 
(http://www.telquel-online.com)
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globalization (Harvey, 2003). In fact, the World Bank recognized that even in societies 
that are highly market-oriented, only the state can provide the rules to make markets 
work	more	efficiently	and	correct	them	when	they	fail	(World	Bank,	1992:	6).	But	if	
the state – as an institution, or a set of institutions – is still this key player in the regu-
lation of global processes: how then do we conceptualize it? What do we mean when 
we talk about the state and state formation in neoliberal globalization? And how do we 
understand it’s crucial role in the different neoliberal projects on the ground? These 
are some important questions that are directly linked to the discussion in the previous 
paragraphs. The brief presentation of some examples above already pictured the state as 
a dispersed material force. It is beyond the scope of this research to attempt to formu-
late a general theory of the state. Moreover, I am not sure whether this would even be 
desirable. Nevertheless, I do want to touch upon two important issues. First of all, the 
continual transformation of state, especially under neoliberalism, makes it extremely 
difficult	–	if	not	impossible	–	to	distinguish	a	single	state	strategy.	The	multiplication	
of actors, the modalities of indirect rule and the processes of re-institutionalization ef-
fectively rule out the conceptualization of a single state that acts as an essential unity 
upon its society in a particular way and embedded in a particular political system (e.g. 
authoritarian, democratic, semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic). Secondly, drawing 
on the critique of Foucault, we could ask ourselves if there is not a danger of over-
emphasizing the role of the state as an institution in the context of a much broader 
genealogical evolution towards a neoliberal governmentality? Foucault wanted to step 
away from all too structural explanations. Instead he drew attention to a micro-analysis 
of power. 
Consequently, following up on this second point, the suggestion follows whether we 
should not try to abandon the state as a dominant analytical framework and replace this 
more ‘institutional-centric’ approach with an “analytics of government”? Instead of 
taking institutions as the point of departure, an analytics of government traces political 
transformations in new governmental technologies and forms of knowledge which can 
be embedded, of course, in certain institutional settings (Lemke, 2007). The political 
transformations should therefore not be automatically attributed to the policies of an 
autonomous state, appearing as free-standing apparatus from society (Mitchell, 1991: 
92). To the contrary, scholars working on governmentality have tried to avoid the trap 
of state-centrism by focusing on a broader meaning of ‘government’. This conceptu-
alization of government is not necessarily tied to the nation-state (Dean, 1999). For 
Foucault, the word government did not so much refer to the state as such, nor its insti-
tutions, but rather to particular techniques of management and methods of security that 
take the population as their object (Mitchell, 2006; see also chapter 4). While we have 
the tendency today, to link the concept of government with the state, Foucault argued 
that well into the 18th century the problem of government was placed in a more general 
context: “Government was a term discussed not only in political tracts, but also in phil-
osophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts” (Lemke, 2002: 50). In addition to 
the management of the state, the act of governing also related to the management of the 
household or the family, even to the management of the self. As a result, many people 
govern: the father governs his family, the superior his convent, the teacher his class-
room, the priest his church, and the individual eventually himself. The manner in which 
the “Prince” governs his state is just a particular mode of government (Foucault, 2007: 
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93). The concept of government incorporates all kinds of techniques, ranging from 
practices of “governing the self” to “governing others” (Lemke, 2007: 45). Therefore, 
Foucault warned us not to overstate a certain characterization of the state or to reduce 
it to a unity, an individuality (e.g. the king), a rigorous functionality, or some number 
of functions (e.g. the reproduction of the relations of capitalist production) (Foucault, 
2007: 109).91 He suggested that it was not so much the state’s takeover of society that 
is important to understand contemporary political life, but rather, what he called, the 
“governmentalization of the state”: 
Governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon, since if 
the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really 
become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and 
contestation, the governmentalization of the state has nonetheless been what has 
allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it 
is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external 
and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the con-
tinual	definition	of	what	should	or	should	not	fall	within	the	state’s	domain,	what	
is public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence, and 
so on. So, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on 
the basis of the general tactics of governmentality (Ibid.:109).
Foucault intended to show how the modern state and the modern individual co-de-
termined	each	other’s	emergence,	not	by	 limiting	 the	field	of	power	 relations	 to	 the	
government of the state but by showing how power relations historically concentrated 
themselves in the form of the state – without ever being reducible to it (Lemke, 2002: 
58).	Specific	institutions	are	therefore	in	a	way	subordinated	to	methods	and	knowledge	
when it comes to analyzing government. The state is only an episode in government 
rather than that government is an instrument of the state (Foucault, 2007: 248). As 
such,	for	Foucault	the	state	itself	is	only	a	specific	technique	or	method	of	government.	
Consequently, as mentioned before, government	refers	to	power	in	terms	of	its	specific	
methods rather than its institutional forms (Mitchell, 2006: 179). Neoliberal govern-
ment and neoliberal political transformations are thus much more than just a collection 
of principles translated through a set of institutions or a set of guidelines to reform 
those institutions. Neoliberalism, for example, is also intimately tied with the govern-
ment of the individual. This is the ‘biopolitical’ nature of neoliberalism and this nature 
determines its characteristic methods, knowledge and rationalities. Therefore, the study 
of neoliberal governmentality theorizes not only how individuals are dominated and ex-
ploited but also how they are controlled more indirectly (e.g. self-control) through cer-
tain governmental techniques. The focus is thus on the individual and how he is formed 
as a subject. The theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality lies in its ability 
to construe neoliberalism “as a political project that endeavours to create a social real-
ity that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 2002: 60). Neoliberal governmentality is 
then a new form of governmentality, a new way in which people are made subjects: the 
homo-economicus is turned into an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself in which 
he is his own capital, his own producer, and his own source of earnings (Read, 2009; 
91  This doesn’t mean that Foucault didn’t deal with the problematic of the state. In fact his lectures of 1978 
and 1979 focus on the genealogy of the modern state (see Foucault, 2007; 2008).
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see also Foucault, 2008: 226).92
This doesn’t mean that Foucault did not recognize the importance of political or govern-
mental intervention to preserve the project of neoliberalism. In the past, Foucault’s ap-
proach has often been described as anti-statist but his lectures at the College de France 
proved his interest with changing forms of statehood and statecraft (Jessop, 2007). Un-
like the negative image of the state in classical liberalism (in which the market must be 
protected from the powerful state), Foucault argued that the market mechanism and the 
impact of competition promoted by neoliberalism, can only arise if they are produced 
by the practice of a government (Lemke, 2001). As such, it is above all the analytical 
departure	from	the	state	as	an	essential	unit	–	in	other	words	the	narrow	definition	of	
the state as an autonomous policy-making actor claiming control over its territory and 
interacting with its opponents (e.g. Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985) – that is 
rejected by most scholars of neoliberal governmentality. In their view, the state can-
not be reduced to a free-standing entity, like a proper person, located apart from and 
opposed to other entities, like for example society (Mitchell, 1991). Furthermore, the 
governmentality approach rejects the taken for granted separation between the market 
and the state, or between the state and (civil) society (Lemke, 2002; Mitchell, 2006).
This critique on the conception of the state as an essential unity is something we also 
encounter within Marxist perspectives that have engaged with Foucault (e.g. Poulant-
zas, 2000; Jessop, 2008), but also within those perspectives that draw more on a Lefeb-
vrian approach, trying to integrate the concept of space into a broader theory of the state 
(cf. Lefebvre, 1991; 2009; Brenner, 1999; 2001; 2004; Harvey, 2006).93 As Lefebvre 
himself stated:
I	find	that	this	is	truly	a	modern	fairy	tale,	to	imagine	the	State	facing	off	against	
the citizen, both with needs and desires that clash with and confront each other. 
And	this	in	place	of	ruthlessly	seeking	to	overcome	the	fissure	between	the	State	
and the citizen! The State is treated as a proper personality, facing the individual, 
with the same characteristics as the individual but on a greater scale. This is the 
surrendering	of	political	reflection	to	the	State	(Lefebvre,	2009:	63).
Interestingly, the governmentality approach, in comparison to these Marxist approach-
es, equally rejects the “retreat of the state” hypothesis in current neoliberal globaliza-
tion. Thomas Lemke argues that the notion of neoliberal governmentality indicates that 
the so-called “retreat of the state” is in fact a prolongation of government, in the sense 
that neoliberalism encompasses the transformation of politics and the restructuring of 
power relations in society: 
92  A good example of the homo-economicus is given by Jason Read when he states: “The contemporary 
trend away from long term labor contracts, towards temporary and part-time labor, is not only an effective 
economic strategy, freeing corporations from contracts and the expensive commitments of health care and 
other	benefits,	it	is	an	effective	strategy	of	subjectification	as	well.	It	encourages	the	workers	to	see	them-
selves not as “workers” in a political sense, who have something to gain through solidarity and collective 
organization, but as “companies of one”” (Read, 2009: 30). 
93  It is useful to state that both Lefebvrian and Foucauldian approaches were different reactions against or-
thodox Marxism and an attempt to escape the determinism of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ within French Marxism 
at the time when the French Communist Party was still a dominant political movement in post-war France.
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What we observe today is not a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty 
and planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques 
of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government 
(e.g., nongovernmental organizations) that indicate fundamental transformations 
in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. This en-
compasses, on the one hand, the displacement of forms of practices that were 
formerly	defined	in	terms	of	nation	state	to	supranational	levels	and,	on	the	other	
hand, the development of forms of sub-politics “beneath” politics in its tradition-
al meaning. In other words, the difference between state and society, politics and 
economy does not function as a foundation or a borderline, but as an element and 
effect	of	specific	neoliberal	technologies	of	government	(Lemke,	2002:58-59).
It is obvious that both the governmentality approach and the Marxist ‘spatial’ approach 
– to be discussed more in detail below, but already mentioned with Brenner’s concept 
of new state space – emphasize the continuous changeability of the state form.94 The 
state is thus not some essence but a process,	constantly	reconstructed	and	reconfigured.	
Yet, there are some important differences (nuances) in the way they approach the state 
and	state	power.	The	first	difference	concerns	the	primacy	given	to	(state-)institutions.	
The attentive reader already noticed that Lemke’s reference to the displacement of state 
sovereignty resembles Hibou’s conceptualization of the privatization of the state. Hi-
bou also departs from a governmentality approach (Hibou, 2004b). In contrast Brenner 
– who draws on a more structuralist reading of Lefebvre –  warned us not to neglect the 
important institutional changes that do play an essential role in the production, regula-
tion and reproduction of capitalist spaces (Brenner, 2001). These (new) institutional 
configurations	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	government	of	peoples	and	places	within	
and beyond national states. Only the state apparatus can manage space on a grand scale 
(Lefebvre, 2009: 238). Think about, for example, long term investments into the built 
environment, the road network, airspace routes, the communications network, etc. As 
such, Brenner argues that attempts to evade state-centrism (e.g. the state as coherent ac-
tor), entails the danger of neglecting the state’s institutional role as a site, medium and 
agent of globalization (Brenner, 1999). And herein lies the subtle yet crucial difference 
between both approaches. While Brenner stresses that state-institutions are the motor 
behind the production of capitalist space and neoliberal globalization, the governmen-
tality approach argues that it is not so much the state (or the state-institutions) that 
defines	and	monitors	the	market	economy	(i.e.	in	the	form	of	contemporary	neoliberal	
globalization), but it is the market itself (and the rationalities that arise from it) that be-
comes the organizing and regulative principle of the state (Lemke, 2001: 200). This last 
perspective is something we can also retrace in Bayart’s notion of the continual process 
of state formation as a product of globalization. 
The second difference concerns the different conceptions of power. This is closely re-
lated to their different perspectives on the state. Foucault himself wanted to avoid a sort 
94  By the lack of a better name I refer to the Marxist spatial approach when I want to refer to writers as 
Lefebvre, Harvey and Brenner who explicitly integrated space in their analysis of the state. That doesn’t 
mean that there aren’t important differences in the way these authors integrate the notion of space in their 
analyses (cf. Soja, 1980).
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of schematism that consisted “of locating power in the State apparatus, making this 
into the major, privileged, capital and almost unique instrument of the power of one 
class over another”. With this statement he clearly rejected the orthodox Marxism of 
his time. Yet, he also clearly stated that he was not necessarily rejecting Karl Marx him-
self (cited in Hunt, 2004: 606).95 Nicos Poulantzas remarked that Foucault’s attack was 
“either against his [own] peculiar caricature of Marxism or against the Marxism of the 
Third International and the Stalinist conception that a number of us have been criticiz-
ing for a long time now” (Poulantzas, 2000: 146). Foucault also never really criticized, 
for example, Althusser’s concept of “ideological state apparatuses” by which the latter 
did precisely suggest that the state orchestrated more widely dispersed forms of power 
(Hunt, 2004).96 Instead of departing from a macro-perspective of the state, assuming 
that power is appropriated by some centre, Foucault preferred to investigate power 
from below, exploring the micro-physics of power; the anonymous strategies, the spe-
cific	form	of	its	exercise,	and	the	very	sites	where	power	is	exercised	over	individuals	
(Lemke, 2002; Jessop, 2008). The study of these micro-physics, as Foucault argued in 
Discipline and Punish, presupposes that the power exercised on the body was not so 
much a property but a strategy. Its effects should therefore be attributed to dispositions, 
manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, etc., instead of being attributed to ‘appropriation’: 
In short, this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, 
acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic 
positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position 
of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as 
an obligation or a prohibition on those ‘who do not have it’; it invests them, is 
transmitted by them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the 
grip it has on them. This means that that these relations go right down into the 
depths of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and 
its citizens or on the frontier between classes […] (Foucault, 1979: 26-27).   
Agamben notes that Foucault constantly sought ways to abandon those analyses of 
power that explicitly attributed it to some sort of possessor (e.g. a state or a class). Fou-
cault was more preoccupied by the very mechanisms through which power penetrated 
the very bodies of subjects and determined or impacted upon the government of their 
forms of life (Agamben, 2009: 12). As such, he did not necessarily wanted to give an 
explanation of power, or give a face to power, but only explain how power works. 
Moreover, to Foucault “power was everywhere”, not so much in the sense that it some-
how embraced everything but rather that it arises from everywhere (Foucault, 1990: 
93). For him, power was an “abstract machine”, present everywhere and prior to its 
concretization	in	any	particular	field.	That	is	why	Foucault	objected,	in	contrast	to	more	
classical	Marxist	interpretations,	that	power	had	specific	roots:	e.g.	in	the	relations	of	
95  According to Foucault, this schematism of locating power in the state apparatus cannot be found in 
Marx (Hunt, 2004: 606).
96  According to Althusser, the “ideological state apparatuses” were “multiple, distinct, ‘relatively autono-
mous’	and	capable	of	providing	an	objective	field	to	contradictions	which	express,	in	forms	which	may	be	
limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class 
struggle, as well as their subordinate forms” (Althusser, 2006: 94-95). He contrasted the ideological state 
apparatuses (e.g. different churches, the family, system of schools, press, radio and television, trade-unions, 
etc.) with the “repressive state apparatus” which he conceived more as a unity. 
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production or the social division of labour  (Poulantzas, 2000: 68). Power was not situ-
ated in a centre or in a position of exteriority, but rather immanent in various types of 
social relations (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc.): 
power relations were internal conditions and not superstructural (Foucault, 1990: 94). 
There was “no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the 
root of power relations” (Ibid.:94). Consequently, from a Foucauldian point of view, 
power should thus not be captured, ascribed to or sought in central points or unique 
sources of sovereignty such as the state, because power is neither an institution, nor a 
structure (Ibid.: 93). According to Foucault, power came from below and, as a result, it 
had a productive effect. This is also exactly why the concept of neoliberal governmen-
tality considers the state and its institutions to be a product of neoliberal rationalities 
(i.e. in the form of technologies of power emerging from the political rationalities that 
underpin them), and not the other way around (i.e. neoliberalism as a product of state 
institutional agency). 
In the study of neoliberal governmentality, there is therefore not much primacy given 
to class, class power and their objective to control state institutions in order to pursue 
their	specific	interests.	After	all,	the	concept	of	governmentality	implicates	that	domi-
nation always involves the interaction of multiple forms of power (Hunt, 2004). The 
idea of power concentrated into one locale (e.g. class) did not represent this complexity. 
The Foucauldian idea that people are under the control of a political and/or economic 
authority has less to do with their compliance to any administrative centre or its pro-
nouncements, but rather with the effectiveness with which subjects have internalized its 
meaning (Allen, 2004: 23).97 It is precisely this perspective on the immanent landscape 
of power that has been criticized by Marxist thinkers like Stuart Hall. It is Foucault’s 
agnostic	position	towards	any	kind	of	convergence	of	power	that	makes	it	so	difficult	to	
rhyme it with Marxist conceptions of power: 
His ‘power’ is dispersed precisely so that it cannot, theoretically, be traced back 
to any single organizing instance, such as ‘the State’. It voids the question of the 
economic precisely because it cannot, in his view, be crystallized into any set of 
global relations – e.g. class relations (Hall, 1980: 67).  
The same view can be found in Lefebvre’s criticism. He denounced Foucault’s tenden-
97		John	Allen,	who	elaborates	on	Foucault,	clarifies	this	abstract	representation	as	follows:	“If	people	
whether in hospitals or clinics, universities or prisons, or public sector housing estates for that matter, ac-
cept	the	‘truth’	of	the	arrangements	in	which	they	find	themselves,	then	those	selfsame	arrangements	pro-
vide a guide as to what kind of behaviour is thought acceptable and what is not” (Allen, 2004: 23). Power 
manifests itself through indirect techniques of self-regulation which prompt us to behave in certain ways 
and	makes	it	difficult	to	behave	in	any	other	way.	A	radical	Foucauldian	perspective	on	the	all	encompass-
ing nature and decentred cartography of power outside the context of embedded institutional practices 
of prisons, clinics, etc. can be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s conceptualization of Empire. 
Power that is manifested through Empire is “composed of a series of national and supranational organisms 
united under a single logic of rule” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: xii). “In contrast to imperialism”, Hardt and 
Negri	argued,	“Empire	establishes	no	territorial	centre	of	power	and	does	not	rely	on	fixed	boundaries	or	
barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire 
global realm within its open, expanding frontiers” (Ibid.). This contrasts with, for example, Harvey’s notion 
of the New Imperialism. In his analysis, Harvey still locates power, despite its various built-in tensions and 
complexities, into the hands of a US-led hegemony over world affairs (Harvey, 2003; see also Allen, 2004). 
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cy to omit the state’s role in producing and maintaining power relations and the capac-
ity	of	specific	state	institutions	to	condense	and	mobilize	power	resources	and	(class)	
relations (Lefebvre, 2009). And since power was everywhere, Foucault also suggested 
that resistance was everywhere because resistance could never be seen in a position 
of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault, 1990: 95). Consequently, according to 
Stuart Hall, resistance was ultimately a concept without a home because “there is no 
theoretical reason why it should appear, no accounting for its appearances, and nothing 
to check its assignment as just another aspect of the ‘positivity’ of power” (Hall, 1980: 
67). This is maybe exactly why Lefebvre referred to Foucault as “the ideologue of the 
system” (Lefebvre, 1996: 25). 
Despite the fact that the concept of governmentality successfully shows how neolib-
eralism is much more (or even something else) than just an ideology generated by the 
state or a dominant class, how it has become a mentality that can also be retraced in the 
quotidian experiences of capitalist society, and how it has extended across other social 
spaces (beyond the realm of the market) to become an image of society (Read, 2009), 
it	would	still	be	a	mistake	to	deny	the	significance	of	the	very	moments	of	condensa-
tion	or	convergence	of	power.	More	specifically,	I	still	think	it	is	necessary	not	only	to	
acknowledge but also to pinpoint the very class agency behind particular neoliberal 
projects, especially in the non-Western World.98 By focusing too much on the perme-
ability of neoliberal rationalities in our ‘way of life’, by considering the capacity of 
these rationalities to determine individual behaviour, something that stretches well be-
yond the simple capacity and interest of any class project, the risk exists neoliberalism 
in this view is deprived of its political character. If we don’t consider the use and abuse 
of class agency and/or other dominant social forces and the ways in which they appro-
priate neoliberalism as an ideology, as a restructuring strategy and as a general political 
project, than we risk to depoliticize neoliberalism. It is this very political character, 
captured so vividly in the more utopian nature of Lefebvre’s work, the possibility and 
capacity to distinguish between friend and enemy (to use Carl Schmitt’s (2001) charac-
terization of the political), that potentially gives a home to resistance (and distinguishes 
this perspective from for example the notion of good governance). That is exactly why 
the two different perspectives on neoliberalism (Marxist and Foucauldian) are compat-
ible. Not in the way that they can be thrown together into one overall theoretical frame-
work, but in the way they tell something about each other’s departing positions. In the 
end, it is important to realize that Foucault reacted against a particular kind of Marxist 
orthodoxy and not against the theoretical assumptions of Marx himself.99 
According to John Allen, the whereabouts of power shouldn’t be confronted and locked 
into a binary logic that forces us to choose between either a centred view (power is lo-
98  By acknowledge, I mean that Foucauldian approaches do not necessarily deny the existence of class 
agency, they just do not use class agency as central tenet in their analyses.   
99  Thomas Lemke opens for example one of his articles with a telling quote from Foucault: “I often quote 
concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to add the authenticating label of a 
footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the quotation. As long as one does that, one is regarded as 
someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will be suitably honoured in the so-called Marxist journals. But 
I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognizing 
Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of phys-
ics, does he feel it necessary to quote Newton and Einstein?” (cited in Lemke, 2002: 49). 
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cated in certain institutions) or a decentred view (power is everywhere). Neither a mere 
“centred or a decentred view of power is particularly helpful in terms of understanding 
the spatial trappings of power” (Allen, 2004: 19). While the concept of governmentality 
directs our attention to the contingency of the event and the underlying powers (ratio-
nalities, techniques, dispositions, etc.) that disperse it, Marxists interpretations point 
to the very processes through which power, exploitation and domination become con-
densed	in	specific	sites	and	institutions	from	which	struggles	can	arise	(Hunt,	2004).100 
Marxist critiques on neoliberalism have focused on the question why the neoliberal 
project spread around the world and emphasized the crucial role of class agency in this 
spread. Especially in the so-called ‘developing world’, where neoliberal governmen-
talities have not yet fully penetrated every aspect of social life, class power reveals that 
very attempt. 
Both conditions (governmentality and class power) thus produce and reproduce each 
other. As the market-logic increasingly regulates social and political life around the 
world, this regulation is made possible by institutions and class agency. While new 
institutions may arise from new forms of regulation and the rationalities that underpin 
them; they will, in turn, re-regulate and re-produce capitalist spaces. This continuous 
process of re-regulation and re-production will be, in a way, constrained by the very 
range and logic of earlier established institutions. Just as power stretches beyond class 
relations, it will be captured and mobilized by these class relations to be used in their 
interest.	What	the	consideration	of	both	perspectives	clarifies	is	that	there	are	centres	of	
political, economic and cultural power, but that these centres are rarely a concentration 
of all powers (Allen, 2004: 24). The current dialectic between class power and neolib-
eral governmentality is the reason why the hegemony of neoliberalism is so powerful. 
And maybe, because it has become so global (to the technological innovations, the glo-
balization of the production process, etc), the neoliberal hegemony has become more 
powerful and more encompassing	 (but	never	completely)	 than	earlier	configurations	
of	capitalist	hegemony.	It	is	this	very	‘globalness’	(to	the	extension	that	it	subjectifies	
and universalizes the homo-economicus as an entrepreneur all over the world) that 
has increased the possibilities for the repression and domination of potential homes of 
resistance and contestation.101 
It is this globalness that multiplies the possibilities and opportunities for the formation 
of new forms of actually existing neoliberalism and their scattering around the world in 
the form of new modalities and rationalities of government. It is thus the very entangle-
ment and interrelation between contingency, mentality and class power on a global 
scale	that	makes	neoliberal	hegemony	so	durable	(but	of	course	never	indefinite!).	Even	
if	the	recent	worldwide	financial	and	economic	crisis	has	put	into	question	some	of	the	
macro-economic dynamics of neoliberalism (e.g. speculation), it has not yet put into 
question the way the market regulates (or needs to regulate) everyday life. To conclude, 
100  This distinction between governmentality and the (Lefebvrian) Marxist approach is of course a pure 
theoretical approach. It is not my intention to say that there is no overlap between these perspectives among 
scholars who follow a more Foucauldian approach (e.g. Lemke) and scholars who follow a come from a 
Marxist approach (e.g. Poulantzas and Jessop).  
101  Yet, at the same time we could say that, today, more people than ever resist capitalism in some way or 
another. 
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I	want	to	share	a	final	thought	on	why	both	critical	approaches	to	power	are	comple-
mentary. It is not because we acknowledge that ruling class agents, and their strategic 
positions in society, are profoundly determined, legitimized and very often also gener-
ally accepted through rationalities, ideas and mentalities with genealogies that stretch 
far beyond and overrule the rather simple objective observation that these class agents 
accumulate capital at the expense of subaltern social groups and classes in society; in 
other words, it is not because we realize that class power is not so much possessed as it 
is exercised as an effect of the strategic position of certain classes in society (Foucault, 
1979: 26-27), that we should all at once deny the fundamental political problem of class 
agency and class strategies. To the contrary, Foucault’s insights on governmentality – 
and because of the extensive global reach of contemporary neoliberal governmentality 
– precisely suggest and explain why the “strategic positions” of the capitalist classes 
are so powerful, and why any thorough political revolution will be extremely delicate, 
fragile	and	difficult.	Because	it	needs	not	only	to	remove	the	ruling	classes	from	their	
strategic positions, it also has to abolish the very rationalities, ideas and mentalities 
that	has	put	them	in	these	positions	in	the	first	place	(therefore	any	political	revolution	
maybe has to coincide also with a psychological revolution).102 Within critical theory, 
we have to not only pinpoint the very politics in neoliberal globalization (the class strat-
egies), but also try to understand why and how class strategies and class positions have 
become the “normal state of affairs”. The fact, for example, that the good governance 
discourse utterly denies or ignores the political dimension cannot just be ascribed to 
a deliberate act or even a (global) conspiracy. The root problem situates itself much 
deeper; as mentioned, within the very ideas, rationalities and beliefs of people.    
But let us return to the question of the state. If the state is this key institution in the regu-
lation of globalization, it is crucial, as I mentioned, not to present it as “the mask which 
prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams, 1988: 82). In other words, the 
discussion	above	has	provided	the	arguments	to	avoid	state-centrism	(i.e.	the	reifica-
tion of the state as an essential unit). The state should be seen a complex phenomenon. 
The understanding of this complexity should than by followed by two simple ques-
tions. First, who makes the decisions? Secondly, where are these decisions made? The 
first	one	relates	to	the	issue	of	class,	the	second	to	the	issue	of	state	spatiality.	I	argued	
above that neoliberal globalization is connected to the political ambitions of the capital-
ist	class	worldwide	(how	dispersed	and	contradictory	specific	class	strategies	may	be	
in the end). But if neoliberal globalization is related to a class project, and if the state 
is a key player in the regulation of that globalization, then this would entail that state 
power is closely tied to class power. Although I intend to come back to this question in 
the	next	chapter,	it	is	opportune	to	outline	some	first	arguments	here.103 The association 
102  As such, it remains to be seen whether the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt – just like the Eastern Eu-
ropean revolutions in the past – will improve the conditions of the subalterns in the long term. And although 
he class nature of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were highly obvious, it is probable that genuine 
democratic reform would still reproduce – to a certain extent – similar class hierarchies. 
103  The question is whether we can relate the Moroccan state to capitalist class power and class struggle in 
the Marxist connotation of the concept? I will argue in chapter 3 that since the 1970s, and especially since 
structural adjustment non-capitalist relations of power and rule are increasingly extended, complemented 
and replaced with capitalist class relations. Furthermore, some scholars, like for example John Waterbury, 
have criticized the use of the concept of class and class analysis (cf. Waterbury, 1991). As I will discuss, 
these authors make the mistake of viewing class too much as a rigid sociological concept while it should be 
The state, politics of neoliberal globalization and forms of actually existing neoliberalism 89
between	state	power	and	class	power	rejects,	first	of	all,	the	traditional	liberal-pluralist	
image of the state as a neutral institutional framework for the articulation, organization 
and implementation of societal interests (Brenner, 2001). Just as globalization is not 
an a-political process, the state apparatus is not an a-political arrangement. The role of 
the neoliberal state, privileging the creation of a good business environment and the 
attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the social well-being of its citizens, 
is related to the political decisions and interests of a dominant class or dominant class 
fractions. As a result, the state itself can be seen as a strategic site for the organization of 
the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes (Poulantzas, 2000: 148). 
This	relationship	is	defined	by	struggle.	The	state	is	thus	a	site	that	represents	the	cur-
rent condensation of social forces that manifested itself through struggle (Ibid.: 150). It 
was through struggle that the capitalist class and class fractions have restored/formed 
their power during the transition from the Keynesian/developmental state towards the 
neoliberal state. 
From this point of view, Adam David Morton emphasizes the importance to include 
‘foreign’ class actors into the discussion on the state. He argues that the globalization 
of the production process and the emergence of a global market induced the forma-
tion of particular state forms through which a process of internationalization between 
different fractions of classes could occur (Ibid.: 132).104 As such, Morton stresses that 
foreign capital and foreign class interests should not necessarily be presented as au-
tonomous forces outside and beyond the power of the state. These international con-
nections between social forces are converging within the constitution of the state ap-
paratus. Foreign capitalists are drawn within reach (Panitch, 1998; Allen & Cochrane, 
2010). The Bouregreg Valley in Morocco is a perfect example. Both foreign capital 
coming from Abu Dhabi (via the company Al Maabar) and the Moroccan state agency 
that coordinates the project are conjoined in the Bab al Bahr Development Company. 
This	joint	venture	is	responsible	for	the	coordination	and	development	of	the	first	stage	
of the Bouregreg project. It also represents a space where state power is (re-)negotiated 
between domestic and foreign elites. It is thus important to stress that this international-
ization of class interests and class connections doesn’t mean that neoliberal state forms 
have become simple “transmission belts” from the global to the national, or simple local 
servants for global market interests (Morton, 2007: 133). Despite the fact that the state 
is intimately interwoven with the logics of globalization, David Harvey, who draws on 
Giovanni Arrighi, reminds us of the dialectical interplay between the ‘territorial’ and 
the	‘capitalist’	logics	of	power.	The	capitalist	investor	will	look	for	profitable	outlets	as	
long as these outlets generate more capital. If capital is free to move around the globe, 
the capitalist will pay little attention to geographical boundaries for his investments. In 
contrast,	politicians	and	statesman	seek	ways	to	augment	their	own	power	vis-à-vis	the	
power of colleagues in other states:
used, according to my view, more as a political concept.
104  With this notion of the ‘internationalization of class interest’, Morton (2007: 140-145) also argues 
against a particular interpretation of the state in “global system theory” which stresses that the current 
epoch of globalization not only leads to the transformation of the state but also to its supersession as an 
organizer for capitalism by transnational state apparatuses consisting of transnational class alliances (e.g. 
multinationals, capital investors, cross-national mergers, forms of outsourcing and subcontracting, etc.). 
(For a discussion on the formation of the transnational state see: Robinson, 2004; see also Sklair & Rob-
bins, 2002).
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The capitalist seeks individual advantage and (though usually constrained by 
law) is responsible to no one other than his or her immediate social circle, while 
the statesman seeks a collective advantage and is constrained by the political 
and military situation of the state and is in some sense or other responsible to a 
citizenry or, more often, to an elite group, a class, a kinship structure, or some 
other social group. The capitalist operates in continuous space and time, whereas 
the politician operates in a territorialized space and, at least in democracies, in 
a	temporality	dictated	by	an	electoral	cycle.	On	the	other	hand,	capitalists	firms	
come and go, shift locations, merge, or go out of business, but states are long-
lived entities, cannot migrate, and are, except under exceptional circumstances 
of	geographical	conquest,	confined	within	fixed	territorial	boundaries	(Harvey,	
2003: 27).    
The territorial logics of power thus make up the political, diplomatic and security strat-
egies used by state elites. The capitalist logics of power involve strategies of production 
and investment, commercial exchange, labour conditions, migration, etc. These two 
logics converge in numerous occasions as state elites, for example, attempt to create 
favourable	business	conditions	to	attract	capital	inflow.	In	doing	so	they	are	using	the	
monopoly powers of the state to try to offer exclusive privileges to whoever can take 
advantage of them (Ibid.: 107). As such, class or other forms of alliances emerge be-
tween ruling elites and capitalists for reasons of economic growth, foreign pressure, 
local bourgeois pressure and/or global market integration. But territorial logics can 
also work against capitalist logics. Obvious reasons are domestic political stability and 
security concerns. In the case of Morocco: the subsidy of consumer goods, the hir-
ing of unemployed graduates under pressure of their protests, the protection of local 
bourgeois interests, the protection of domestic economic sectors, the toleration of the 
informal market are a few examples (although these last three have also their own capi-
talist logics).105 Consequently, the two logics are distinctive and in no way reducible to 
each other, but at the same time they are intimately related and interwoven (Ibid.: 183). 
This dialectic perspective of Harvey contrasts sharply with the point of view of Susan 
Strange who thinks that “political causes and economic causes are as incommensurable 
as apples and oranges, and so are political and economic outcomes” (Strange, 1996: 
28). 
Then the question remains: where are political decisions made? “Is not the secret of the 
state, hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space?”, as Lefebvre (2009: 228) 
wonders. One of Lefebvre’s major contributions was to bring attention to the question 
of space and the political character of the production of space. According to Lefebvre, 
the production of space was inherent to the mode of production (Lefebvre, 1991). Each 
mode of production had its own produced space (Lefebvre, 2009: 234).106 Lefebvre 
105  The unemployed graduates mobilize and protest almost daily in front of the national parliament to 
claim their right to be employed in the public sector. These movements have emerged since the beginning 
of	the	1990s	(see	also	chapter	3).	Through	negotiations	between	state	officials	and	protest	group	leaders	
many	of	them	eventually	find	their	way	into	the	public	sector	after	months,	even	years	of	protest	(see	Em-
perador, 2007; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). 
106  It is important to note that Lefebvre does not see this relation as absolute. The characteristics of pro-
duced space cannot be reduced to the general characteristics of the mode of production. Neglecting the 
impact of other phenomena (culture for example) or subordinating these phenomena completely to the 
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made a distinction for example between produced spaces of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
modes	of	production.	As	such,	within	the	contemporary	city	we	can	still	find	remnants	
(monuments, buildings, etc.) of previous modes of production (whether or not appro-
priated by the current mode of production). But also within the different stages of capi-
talism, variations within the mode of production are related to variations in produced 
space. The neoliberal mode of production, characterized by the globalization of the 
production process and the deregulation of capital restrictions, has had its own impact 
on	the	production	of	space	(e.g.	the	impact	of	financial	speculation	on	the	built	environ-
ment,	but	also	the	specific	spatial	imagination	of	the	global	city).	This	process	of	the	
production of space should thus be considered as a very dynamic process. However, 
space has been often considered by many as a-political because it is conceptualized as a 
seamless whole (Massey, 2005: 41). In other words, space has been considered more as 
a	fixed	moment,	an	immobile	moment,	a	picture	that	captures	a	dynamic	time-process.	
Yet, when space is reduced to a stasis, then, Massey argues, the “very life, and certainly 
the politics, are taken out of it” (Ibid.: 30).107 A more dynamic perspective on space, and 
especially its inherent connection to social relations – for Massey social relations can 
only be fully understood when they are spatialized – is crucial to locate manifestations 
of	state	power.	If	the	state	is	a	strategic	site	for	the	organization	of	certain	configura-
tions of social relations, and if you consider space as dynamic, open and relational, than 
understanding state spatiality obliges us to see the formation of the state as an ongoing, 
continual and dynamic process that can be retraced both in time and space. So, besides 
the impact of particular modes of production on space (and vice versa), we should also 
pay attention to the ways in which state power moves through space. Political trans-
formation should therefore not only be considered in time, which is the dimension of 
change, but also in space, which is the dimension of the social and the contemporary 
co-existence of contradictions and polar opposites (Ibid.). As such, the politics of the 
state can be heterogeneous, contradictory and coeval. In this view, the state itself turns 
out to be this heterogeneity in space.108 From an institutional perspective, Tim Bunnell 
and Neil Coe, drawing on Brenner, have dubbed this reality the “spatial selectivity” of 
the state, i.e. the ways in which certain policies and reforms impact on particular groups 
of people in particular zones and spaces (Bunnell & Coe, 2005). The state has diverse 
and distinct spatial imprints, it takes on different forms in different places and this is an 
ongoing process. It produces a variety of institutional and governmental arrangements 
that in turn produce quite different results on the ground. Mapping the spatialization of 
the state gives us the opportunity to gain insight in the multiple, co-existing state forms 
and	 its	 specific	 configurations	 of	 social	 relations.	The	 creation	 of	 new	 state	 spaces,	
economic would be a mistake.  
107  Massey argues that space and time should be thought together. Additionally Both Massey and Lefebvre 
stress	that	space	is	a	social	product	that	is	open,	ongoing	and	always	unfinished,	relational	and	multiple.	
Space is thus an ongoing production. Consequently, new modes of production are not constructing entirely 
new spaces from scratch, but built on existing spaces. That is why Edward Soja talks about a socio-spatial 
dialectic. The political organization of space can express certain social relations but at the same time space 
reacts back on the evolution of these social relations. As such, according to Edward Soja, space is not only 
the product of the social, but produces it as well (Soja, 1980).
108  One of the effects of neoliberal globalization is exactly the discrepancy between the spatialization of 
the state and the state-image. The latter pictures an illusion of coherency, and in Morocco’s case, even an 
association with a proper personality (the king) (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).
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free trade zones, offshore islets and other state projects spread within the geographi-
cal boundaries of the nation-state have led to the displacement of state sovereignty in 
multiple locations. In chapter 5, these issues of state-spatiality will be discussed in the 
context of the project of the Bouregreg Valley. 
Actually existing forms of neoliberalism
I	discussed	the	political	character	of	contemporary	globalization	and	the	specific	role	
of the state in the regulation, production and reproduction of that globalization. But 
neoliberalism is not just this one policy framework that is applied in every local context 
in the exact same way. Of course, we see that there are certain kind of principles and po-
litical strategies that are applied almost everywhere in the world. As a result, it becomes 
possible to compare different places with one another, no matter how far off they are 
located from each other, or how different they are (culturally, socially and politically). 
New majestic urban development schemes are implanted in the whole Arab region, 
just as in the whole world, following the same competitive urban logic. In the case of 
the MENA-region, Dubai has become an extreme example and similar developments 
in the rest of the region are often compared to this “Dubai model” (M Davis, 2006b; 
Kanna, 2009; Barthel, 2010). Furthermore, social development programs, for example 
slum upgrading programs, follow the same kind of market-oriented logic in Morocco 
as in India and other parts of the globe (Davis, 2006a; Huchzermeyer, 2008; Roy, 2010; 
see also chapter 4). Yet, it would be too limited, even wrong, to focus only on the simi-
larities between different places and local settings and consider them all part of some 
globally	unified	system.	This	would	imply	some	(extreme)	kind	of	‘reversed	exception-
alism’.	Neoliberalism	is	thus	not	some	‘one	size	fits	all’	model	or	concept.	This	would	
mean	to	neglect	local	agency	in	the	globalization	of	politics	and	the	historic	specificity	
of local contexts. As mentioned earlier, there is an overwhelming tendency to consider 
local politics and the production of (local) space as a product of the global, as if the 
local is somehow subordinated to the global (MP Smith, 1998; Massey, 2005). Local 
places and local politics are than often pictured as the victims of the ‘natural’ process of 
globalization. According to Massey, this picture is problematic for two reasons. First of 
all, it propagates an implicit understanding of the global as a sphere that is always ema-
nating from somewhere else, and, as a result remains always something “unlocated”. 
In this view, the global has an impact on the local sphere, but it can never be localized 
itself. Secondly, this understanding of globalization presents the local without indepen-
dent agency of its own in its relation to the global (Massey, 2005: 101). Consequently, 
when it comes to the interpretation of local agency, two kinds of confusion occur. On 
the one hand, there is a depoliticized perspective on local agency. Local actors are then 
just taking the inevitable and necessary actions in accordance to the ‘reality of global-
ization’. On the other hand, it can lead to the tendency of essentializing local agency 
or local politics in its apparent opposition against the ‘outside’ forces of globalization. 
This would be to ignore the contradictions between different forms of local agency and 
the	conflation	of	local	class	interests,	local	governments	with	the	so-called	global	actors	
(private and/or public).  
However, the understanding of complex phenomena as the ‘privatization of the state’, 
the ‘internationalization of class interests’, the dialectic between the territorial and 
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capitalist logics of power, or even the use of alternative concepts as ‘glocalization’ 
(in contrast to globalization) all point to the fact that local places are not just produced 
through globalization but that they are also “‘agents in globalization”.109 With this ex-
pression	Massey	doesn’t	argue	that	‘whole	places’	are	somehow	unified	actors,	but	she	
urges upon an analysis which takes into account the “local production of the neoliberal 
capitalist global” (Massey, 2005: 101). Ipsita Chatterjee, for example, has illustrated 
in the case of India how local spaces (e.g. cities) “ground” top-down neoliberal prin-
ciples into local policies in accordance with prevalent place particularities of religion, 
class and caste. Consequently, she argues that neoliberalism is simultaneously local and 
global	(Chatterjee,	2009).	Taking	into	account	local	agency	and	the	historical	specific-
ity of local contexts enables us to see the diversity of “actually existing neoliberalism” 
and emphasize “the contextual embeddedness” of neoliberal reforms insofar as they 
are produced within national, regional, and local contexts (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). 
Neoliberal reforms are always introduced within a context of already existing insti-
tutional frameworks, policy regimes and political struggles. Neoliberal restructuring 
thus never begins with a clean sheet. The production and regulation of (new) capitalist 
spaces	depends	thus	on	the	configuration	of	social	power	relations	already	present	in	a	
specific	local	place	(country,	region,	city).	Yet,	just	because	of	a	particular	global-local	
interplay and the variegated ways in which top-down neoliberal principles are ground-
ed, its evolution will also be rather contingent (cf. Wilson, 2004), and arise out of or 
transformed	through	the	social	conflicts	that	are	brought	with	it	(cf.	Leitner,	e.a.	2007).	
Within the open and ongoing process of socio-spatial transformation, local agency and 
local	conflict	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	processes	of	deregulation	and	regulation,	de-in-
stitutionalization and re-institutionalization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, 
etc.	Consequently,	the	specific	and	variegated	ways	in	which	neoliberalism	takes	shape	
in a local context will depend on multiple structural, relational and geographical fac-
tors: local class or other social group interests, social struggle, foreign capital interests 
and opportunities, geopolitical power balances, geographical location, infrastructural 
capacities, etc. Political change will be the result of an interaction between inherited 
local	landscapes	and	the	specific	interpretation	and	application	of	neoliberalism	by	the	
various actors that are involved.  
Uneven development 
Actually existing forms of neoliberalism generate social polarizations which cannot 
be overcome but are actively produced and displaced. Contrary to the hegemonic dis-
course of international donor agencies such as the World Bank saying that the press-
ing socio-economic cleavages in developing countries can be bridged by ‘good gover-
nance’, the implementation of neoliberal policies does not bring forth overall economic 
growth	 and	 prosperity,	 but	 leads	 to	 a	 specific	 geography	 of	 uneven	 development	 in	
which some places, territories and sectors are privileged over others as sites for capital 
accumulation.110 In general, capitalism has two major characteristics that are important 
109  Glocalization is a concept that tries to incorporate the complex institutional and relational changes 
that occur within the global-local interplay during increasing globalization. It refers on the one hand, to the 
rescaled institutional reforms both towards supra-national scales and sub-national scales (region, urban, 
etc.) and, on the other hand, to the process in which economic activities and networks are becoming simul-
taneously more localized/regionalized and transnational (Swyngedouw, 2004).    
110  It is not my intention to give an in-depth theoretical discussion on the concept of uneven development. 
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to understand the dynamics of uneven development. Both of these characteristics are 
intimately related. First of all, capitalism is determined by the inherent contradictions 
of capital accumulation. One of the major contradictions of capitalism is the simultane-
ous development of enormous wealth and the concentration of capital on the one hand, 
and poverty, social marginalization and dispossession on the other. It is thus the co-ex-
istence and coevalness of poverty and wealth, dispossession and exploitation, and their 
inherent interdependence that characterizes capitalist development. Secondly, there is 
the problem of the containment of processes of capital accumulation. In other words, 
the	question	of	how	to	deal	with	the	constant	fluidity	and	motion	of	these	processes.	
With regard to the issue of motion, the concept of uneven development has the advan-
tage to depict the circulation and accumulation of capital as a process in time and space 
(i.e. as a spatiotemporal process), while the tendency in much social theory is either to 
exclude	spatiality	or	treat	space	as	a	fixed	container	(Harvey,	2006:	77).	Harvey	has	
stressed that capital is not a thing but rather a process that exists only in motion, i.e. the 
constant circulation of capital (Harvey, 2010b: 12). Through this activity, this motion, 
it lays the foundations of uneven development.
The conception of uneven development, and here I continue to draw on Harvey, both 
integrates the co-existing and inherent contradictions of capital accumulation and the 
issue	of	spatiality	(first	of	all	by	thinking	them	together).111 Capitalist activity is driven 
by	competition,	the	search	for	the	lowest	costs	and	the	highest	profits	at	the	best	loca-
tion.	It	is	constantly	seeking	to	improve	and	enlarge	its	opportunities	for	profit	making.	
Capital is therefore constantly moving and searching for growth opportunities and new 
sites for accumulation. If this motion would suddenly stop, capitalism as a systemic 
process would tumble down; there would be no surplus value creation anymore. One of 
the problems is that this motion, this capitalist activity is also spatially constrained. Ex-
changes of goods and services (including labour power) almost always involves changes 
of location, but these changes (spatial movements) are often constrained by frictions of 
distance, technological limitations and certain territorial and social boundaries (Harvey, 
2003: 94). Any equilibrium (between friction and motion) within the “space-economy” 
that emerges out of the processes of capital accumulation (but also out of struggle), will 
always be momentarily, accidental and under pressure to be interrupted by the search of 
capitalists	for	excess	profits	(Harvey,	1989a:	137,	143).	The	concept	of	uneven	devel-
Here I just want to highlight the dialectical character of capitalist development. For a detailed discussion on 
a general theory see Harvey (2006: 71-116); for a discussion on urban politics and uneven development see 
Harvey (1989a: 125-164).
111  In the world development report of 2009, the World Bank recognizes the importance of an understand-
ing of economic geography to understand the dynamics of uneven development. But in contrast to Harvey, 
who refers to the increasing “capital surplus absorption problem” in order to demonstrate the social, en-
vironmental and economic limits to ever expanding economic growth (Harvey, 2010a), the World Bank 
seems to advocate completely the opposite, arguing that more growth, more integration and more marketi-
zation are the solutions to solve the urban geographic problems of density, division and distance (World 
Bank,	2009;	on	the	MENA-region	specifically	see	World	Bank,	2010b).	As	such,	the	World	Bank	advocates	
the break off of all possible geographical and spatial frictions and barriers for capital circulation. This is 
exactly	what	Harvey	and	others	consider	to	be	the	motor	behind	uneven	development	in	the	first	place.	
And this because of the ‘coercive laws of competition’. More global market integration facilitates capital’s 
mobility	and	capitalists	possibilities	to	seek	the	locations	with	the	highest	profit	rate	(i.e.	not	necessarily	
the	location	with	the	highest	social	benefits	or	the	highest	redistribution	of	wealth).	The	World	Bank	thus	
constantly seeks to reformulate neoliberalism’s class project in order to deliver the political basis for capital 
accumulation.
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opment incorporates this unstable equilibrium, these movements and frictions, refuting 
therefore	the	image	of	capitalism	as	a	static	structural	configuration.112 Uneven devel-
opment is thus an essential feature of capitalist development. What’s more, capitalism 
survives through uneven geographical development (Harvey, 2006). Increased capital 
mobility and the privatization of public assets are some of the main resources for capi-
talists to accumulate capital in contemporary neoliberal globalization.
The question of poverty is a good example. The dominant trend is to consider poverty 
as	a	result	of	people’s	inadequate	integration,	or	even	exclusion,	from	the	benefits	and	
opportunities of the free market environment. This vision is supported by most US 
politicians	and	international	financial	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF.	
The World Bank in fact, acknowledges the “spatial disparities” in living standards in 
the MENA region and argues it is up to policy-makers to let “the market determine the 
spatial distribution of economic activity” (World Bank, 2010b: 11). In the eyes of the 
World Bank, uneven development and poverty are seen as consequences of inadequate 
market integration. The promotion of trade liberalization and economic growth are then 
obvious solutions. Special attention is usually given to the enhancement of the capaci-
ties of poor people (a form of empowerment) to seize the opportunities of economic 
liberalization (e.g. micro-credits, subsidized housing loans, training programs, etc.). 
As such, the main perception on poor people’s problems is that they are just ‘lagging 
behind’. For example, the World Bank refers to the spatial disparities as “lagging ar-
eas”, seeing uneven development predominantly as a problem of rural-urban disparity. 
Morocco in fact is the area with the biggest rural-urban disparity in the whole MENA-
region (World Bank, 2010b: 6). As such, poverty is seen as the technical problem that 
is	 related	 to	 inadequate	market	 integration.	This	 is	 a	 discourse	 that	we	 find	 also	 in	
Morocco,	among	many	politicians,	experts,	state-officials,	etc…	Whether	it	concerns	
the VSBP targeting the slums or the Bouregreg project targeting economic growth and 
the promotion of tourism, both projects were explained to me on several occasions as 
an obvious solution for the socio-economic disparities of the country. Within these 
projects the link between market integration and poverty reduction was pictured as 
self-evident. 
Ray Bush has contradicted this “neo-classical bias”.113 He argues that the “poor are poor 
precisely because of their incorporation into the reality of the contemporary capitalist 
economies” (Bush, 2004: 675).  Poverty, he argues, does not emerge from the poor 
man’s exclusion but from his particular inclusion in the neoliberal capitalist economy. 
It concerns a “differential incorporation” which entails exploitative labour regimes, 
a decline in employment due to the privatization of public assets, the prioritization 
of investment in rent-seeking economic sectors (e.g. real estate) over redistribution, 
112  According to David Harvey, who has based his idea of uneven development upon a careful reading of 
Marx, it is strange that Marx has often been depicted as a static thinker: “no, what Marx seeks out in Capi-
tal is a conceptual apparatus, a deep structure, that explains the way in which motion is actually instantiated 
within a capitalist mode of production. Consequently, many of his concepts are formulated around relations 
rather than stand-alone principles; they are about transformative activity” (Harvey, 2010b: 13).
113  The neo-classical bias is “the assumption that markets can be accessed equally between people and 
the	state	and	workers	and	consumers;	that	markets	are	neutral	arenas	to	facilitate	the	efficient	allocation	of	
resources and that the state can, at best, help facilitate the smooth running of markets, but must not regulate 
them” (Bush, 2004: 677).
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etc… As such, Ray Bush wants to direct our focus on “the crucial issue of how pov-
erty is created and reproduced” (Ibid.: 674). The narrative that global market integra-
tion will automatically alleviate poverty completely ignores the very mechanisms of 
power behind capitalist uneven development: exploitation, domination, dispossession 
and oppression. This narrative has also an a-spatial character. As long as inequality 
is considered in terms of temporal stages of progress and backwardness, alternative 
political stories will be disallowed and the production of poverty within and through 
globalization will be obstructed from view (Massey, 2005: 84). Additionally, this a-
spatial narrative of market integration has a very political character. Where does this 
need for greater incorporation come from? Why it is proclaimed in virtually all poverty 
alleviation strategies? By whom are these strategies and discourses generated and in 
whose interests are they actually (Ibid.: 686; see also Bush, 2007: 21)? Bush argues that 
it would be wrong to assume that economic growth automatically leads to less poverty. 
It	all	depends	on	how	that	economic	growth	is	distributed,	who	benefits	from	capital	
accumulation and who doesn’t. If the capitalist logic is to seek growth and the highest 
possible	profits,	there	will	always	be	a	tension	between	that	specific	drive	and	wealth	
redistribution. Not surprisingly, despite the improved macro-economic performances 
after the structural adjustments in the MENA-region, a decline in purchasing power 
of the average citizen, increasing uneven development and social inequality coincided 
with global market integration (Bush, 2004). 
To comprehend the paradox of capitalist development, we have to consider its dialectics. 
The very contradictions and transformations that lead to the interrelated co-existence 
of poverty and wealth, accumulation and dispossession, domination and oppression are 
not	the	specific	problems	that	need	to	be	(from	a	capitalist	point	of	view),	or	even	can	
be, resolved through capitalist development. And when there are apparent moments of 
resolution, we need to look at the new contradictions that these resolutions internalize 
– contradictions that may become problematic on a much grander scale in the future 
(Harvey, 2010b: 62-63).114	Slavoj	Žižek	points	to	these	dialectics	of	contemporary	glo-
balization through the comparison of the circulation of capital and people: 
in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is 
“things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” 
is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an 
unfinished	project	but	with	a	true	“dialectics	of	globalisation”:	the	segregation	of	
the people is	the	reality	of	economic	globalisation.	(Žižek,	2008:	102).				   
   
The	 dialectic	 of	 actually	 existing	 forms	 of	 neoliberalism,	 its	 conflicting	 tendencies,	
struggles and contradictions are symbolized through “creative destruction” (Brenner & 
Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2007, Harvey, 2008). In order to create new orders, old 
114  The resolution for the over-accumulation crisis in the 1970s was resolved, amongst other things, by the 
liberation of capital from nation-state control. This however lead to the project of neoliberal globalization 
and gave rise to a whole new set of contradictions (e.g. rising income inequality, decreasing social protec-
tion, breaking of labour power, etc.) (see Harvey, 2010a). Similarly, structural adjustment maybe stabilized 
capitalist economies in the Global South (by integrating them in the global circuit of capital), but the socio-
economic consequences for ordinary people were devastating. Over-accumulation, according to Harvey, is 
registered “as surpluses of labour and capital side by side with seemingly no way to put them together in 
productive,	i.e.	“profitable”	as	opposed	to	socially	useful	ways”	(Harvey,	2001:	26).  
The state, politics of neoliberal globalization and forms of actually existing neoliberalism 97
ones have to be destroyed. The promotion of economic growth and the accumulation 
of capital within a neoliberal framework not only involves the destruction of certain 
achievements, institutions and policies (public housing, public space, public sector jobs, 
welfare institutions, social services, food subsidies, full employment, etc.) but also the 
creation of new ones (tax reduction regimes, free trade zones, public-private partner-
ships, new state spaces, inner city regeneration projects, etc.). Both destruction and 
creation are intimately intertwined. This reality of contemporary neoliberal capitalism 
leads not so much to an unevenness between nation-states or between centre states and 
peripheral states as it produces a geography of uneven development within national and 
regional boundaries, and especially within the arising megacities of the Global South. It 
is creating the Manichean city described so vividly by Mike Davis in his famous book 
‘Planet of Slums’ (M Davis, 2006a). The way in which urban regions compete with each 
other sets the stage for the current geography of uneven development and places urban 
politics at the centre of neoliberal globalization. Urban regions are the cornerstones of 
the current spatial organization of neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal urbanism is the 
next stage within the continual and contingent historical process in which capitalism 
attempts to create the preconditions of its own perpetuation (Harvey, 1989a).  
Neoliberal urbanism and the Arab World
A lot of attention has been paid to the emergence of the ‘global city’ as a key locale 
in	the	regulation	of	the	global	economy	and	as	evidence	for	the	declining	significance	
of the national economy. But the impact of neoliberal capitalism cannot be reduced to 
the key role of a few global cities. It has generated far-reaching transformations which 
concerns basically every city in the world. No Moroccan city, for example, can claim 
that it is able to participate in, let alone determine, the direction and management of the 
global economy (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). But this doesn’t mean that cities 
as Casablanca and Rabat have not experienced similar political transformations. Of 
course, the claim that contemporary capitalism is city-centric seems to state the obvi-
ous. Capitalism and urbanization were always closely interrelated. David Harvey has 
argued in detail how capitalism had to urbanize from the very beginning in order to 
reproduce itself. Urbanization has always been a vital condition for the rise and expan-
sion of capitalism. A built environment that supported capitalist production, consump-
tion and exchange was crucial to capitalism in order to dominate over other modes of 
production. But the dynamics of capitalist urbanization differed through time and space 
(Harvey, 1989a). The transformation of the city cannot only be understood in terms of 
the effects of globalization or global processes, but should also be understood in terms 
of the profound transformations in the mode of production (Lefebvre, 1996). Just as the 
process of capital accumulation is inherently contradictive, the urbanization of capital 
has created and embedded these contradictions within the city-space. Consequently, 
each stage of capitalism had its own dominant forms of urbanization (or urbanization 
of capital). Harvey (1989a) has shown how the mercantile city mobilized the surpluses 
(e.g. through the violent appropriation of the means of production)115, how the industrial 
city played a key role in the production of surpluses (e.g. through the exploitation of 
labour), and how the Keynesian city absorbed these surpluses (e.g. through the promo-
tion of the demand-side and massive public investments). Finally, the contemporary 
115  Cities in Europe were built with appropriated capital (through primitive accumulation) coming from 
the colonies. 
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neoliberal city has become an “entrepreneurial city”, in which urban government had to 
be much more innovative and take an entrepreneurial stance to economic development 
(Harvey, 1989b). 
Throughout the history of the modern city both the spatial division of labour and the 
spatial	division	of	consumption	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	urban	process	and	the	
way the city was shaped. Marxist theories had the tendency to focus predominantly 
on production processes. Yet, the circulation and accumulation of capital are equally 
dependent on the expansion of effective demand. The question is then: where does 
that demand come from and how is it organized? Harvey points out that the spatial 
division of consumption (e.g. through the creation of vacation, leisure, entertainment 
and	other	consumption	places)	had	its	own	specific	impact	on	the	urban	process.	This	
involved relatively permanent structurations of social and physical spaces, both within 
and between urban regions and urban centres (Harvey, 1989a: 17-58). The reliance on 
public	investments,	especially	in	the	built	environment,	typified	the	dominant	focus	on	
consumption and the expansion of demand-side urbanization within the Keynesian/or 
Fordist city. The world-wide crisis in the 1970s marked the end of state developmental-
ism and consequently also the end of publicly steered demand-side urbanization. The 
specific	transformations	that	started	during	the	1970s,	the	transition	from	a	internation-
al market economy to a global market economy and the deregulation of state control 
over capital circulation, made neoliberal capitalism city-centric in a way it hadn’t been 
before. To begin with, state power had been ‘glocalized’ in the sense that it was resitu-
ated on supra- and sub-national scales. This re-situation of state and capitalist power on 
the urban scale made cities relatively autonomous within the global market economy. 
This entailed a shift from competition between capitalist states towards an increasing 
competition between urban regions. Therefore, an understanding of the new emerging 
urban political regimes is crucial for the understanding of the political transformations 
under neoliberal globalization. As mentioned above, the crisis of the Fordist develop-
mentalist model gave way to a transformation process in which government has been 
re-invented, re-institutionalized and re-territorialised (Brenner, 1998; 1999; Swynge-
douw, 2000; 2004; Hibou, 2004a; 2004b). And to the degree in which urbanization was 
part of the problem, it had to become part of the solution (Harvey, 1989a: 44). As such, 
the ascendency of neoliberalism radically changed the urban process. This change can 
be interpreted in two ways: spatially and politically. 
First	of	all,	the	neoliberal	city	entailed	significant	changes	in	the	spatial	divisions	of	la-
bour	and	consumption	which	culminated	into	a	specific	“spatial	fix”	(Ibid.;	Hackworth,	
2007; see chapter 5). The strong processes of spatial organization in the Keynesian city 
focused strongly on the promotion of suburbanization through public investments. This 
was to anticipate the peripheral growth of the city from a demand-side perspective and 
to create consumer landscapes. This was the particular way in which the Keynesian 
inspired	urban	policies	hoped	 to	solve	or	fix	 the	capital	surplus	absorption	problem.	
Yet, as a result, inner city development was often neglected and this caused growing 
pockets of abandonment and deprivation within the city-centre. The changes brought 
forth by the economic crisis of the 1970s reversed that process. The liberation of capital 
and the following de-industrialization of the economy in advanced capitalist societies 
entailed a spatial reorganization of the city. The city centre now became the primary 
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locus for the absorption of capital surpluses. Through the promotion of tourism, real 
estate	development,	financial	centres,	beautification	projects	and	slum	relocation	 the	
spatial	fix	of	neoliberal	urbanism	shifted	towards	the	inner	centre	at	the	expense	of	the	
middle-class suburbs.116 The changing competitive conditions within the global market 
economy, obliged local government to reinforce their own competitive position and 
the inner city became an important component of the city’s ‘unique selling position’. 
In	order	to	fixate	global	capital	flows,	local	state	intervention	shifted	from	redistribu-
tion mechanisms and the control over capitalist urban production processes towards 
more market-oriented strategies and the support of private urban enterprise and private 
investment in the built environment (Weber, 2002). Urban regions now had to compete 
themselves for investments, employment, image, etc., by trying to lure capital invest-
ment, integrate in the global capital circuit and offer unique packages of physical (e.g. 
the built environment) and social (e.g. educated labour force) infrastructure, labour 
conditions,	tax-regimes,	political	stability,	security,	and	finally,	particular	cultural,	en-
vironmental and life-style qualities (Harvey, 1989a). Cities needed to become attractive 
for capital. Hence, the increasing importance given to city-marketing, services, leisure 
possibilities, tourism, etc. The legitimation for this strategic shift is based on the as-
sumption	that	supporting	private	interests	would	first	of	all	stimulate	economic	growth	
and then coincide with a so-called ‘trickle-down’ effect.    
A typical strategy for the contemporary neoliberal city is the reliance on large-scale ur-
ban development projects or “mega-projects”. These projects are part of local govern-
ment’s effort to reinforce the competitive position of urban economies in a context of 
rapidly changing global competitive conditions (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 
2002). They are one of the key strategies for the commercial redevelopment of the city-
centre	and	a	key	aspect	of	the	neoliberal	spatial	fix.	However,	there	are	some	important	
social aspects that are related to or generated by neoliberal urban policies. First of 
all, neoliberalism entails the imagination of the city more in relation to outsiders (e.g. 
tourists and foreign investors) instead of thinking the city in function of the original 
city-dweller. The exchange value of the city is privileged over and above the use value 
of the city. The urban centre has become a highly valued consumption product and capi-
talism’s creative and innovative nature has been demonstrated through the city’s double 
role: as a place of consumption and by the consumption of place (Lefebvre, 1996: 73). 
The development of business and exhibition facilities, conference centres, amusement 
parks, luxury resorts, etc. all symbolize this trend. An essential feature of neoliberal 
urbanism and urban entrepreneurialism is the world-wide phenomenon of gentrifica-
tion (N Smith, 2002). According to Neil Smith the impulses behind the process of gen-
trification	are	now	globalized	and	part	of	the	urban	strategies	everywhere	in	the	world.	
Mega-projects and urban regeneration play a big role in pushing lower middle classes 
and poor urban residents out of the city-centre. Rising housing prices and the emer-
gence of upper class consumption places and facilities (luxury goods stores, domestic 
caterers, etc.) are causing life to become more and more expensive. As a consequence, 
116  This doesn’t mean that further suburbanization stopped. It continued at a rapid pace but not according 
to	the	Keynesian	managerialist	patterns.	Current	outgrowth	reflects	the	social	polarization	characteristic	of	
neoliberal policies. It is not based on the redistributive mechanisms. For example, the proliferation of gated 
communities and second homes for the wealthy have a whole different dynamic than state supported subur-
ban housing for the middle classes (Hackworth, 2007).
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poor people often see themselves obliged to move out of the centre to more affordable 
locations. Sometimes, this is even a deliberate policy. Slums in Third World cities are 
relocated (often by force) into the urban peripheries, or even further away into satellite 
cities. 
In	general,	both	Jason	Hackworth	and	Neil	Smith	have	argued	that	gentrification	in	the	
neoliberal city is in most cases a corporate sponsored and state-facilitated process. It 
is the “knife-edge neighbourhood based manifestation of neoliberalism” (Hackworth, 
2007: 149; see also Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Other social, often devastating, ef-
fects of neoliberal urban policy are the privatization of public space and public funds, 
the socialization or nationalization of investment risks together with the protection of 
private interests by public authority (a consequence of the PPPs). Yet, the social costs 
of	neoliberal	urbanism	in	general,	and	mega-projects	in	specific,	are	often	counterbal-
anced by the argument that there is no other alternative. If a city wants to generate 
growth it has to follow the neoliberal path. However, Bent Flyvbjerg has argued that 
both	in	the	industrialized	and	industrializing	countries,	the	benefits	and	added	value	of	
mega-projects are heavily overrated and the risks are often intentionally covered up 
(Flyvbjerg, 2005).117 The immense social and economic costs of eventual failure will 
then have to be carried by society as a whole. This bring us directly to the political 
question of the neoliberal city.    
The liberation of capital from the constraining power of the Keynesian nation-state 
entailed new processes and forms of regulation in which cities are not just passive 
places that absorb production and consumption surpluses, but become themselves the 
command centres for the attraction and absorption of capital. The neoliberal city is 
therefore a political project and the object of a class strategy. In fact this has always 
been the case. As Harvey argues, cities are constructed through geographical and so-
cial concentrations of capital surpluses. Yet, these surpluses are always extracted from 
somewhere and from somebody while the control over the surpluses often lied in the 
hands of a powerful minority (Harvey, 2008). Human agency, or more particularly class 
agency, should thus be placed at the centre of the analysis of urbanization processes. 
As Christopher Parker stated: “while pavement, steel and concrete can be rolled out to 
enable	and	direct	the	flow	[of	capital],	they	do	not	set	it	in	motion”	(Parker,	2009:	113).	
Yet, the particular ways and strategies by which the process of urbanization is given 
shape have changed over time (not in the least due to changing class relations). As such, 
the	neoliberal	city	became	the	key	arena	for	new	configurations	of	political,	economic	
and social power. As mentioned above, Brenner highlighted the way in which the urban 
scale now represents the strategic institutional arena in which current neoliberal forms 
of government are unfolding. I also mentioned that the state, or state power, has never 
been absent in this transformation. Contemporary mega-projects are, for example, al-
most	always	state-led	and	state-financed.	
The real novelty about neoliberal urban policy is that the government of the neoliberal 
city involved the subordination of formal government structures (e.g. parliament, mu-
nicipal government, etc.) to new institutions and agencies (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & 
117  Bent Flyvbjerg has done (together with others) extensive research to investigate impact of mega-proj-
ects and compared the promises with the eventual costs (see Flyvbjerg, e.a. 2003).
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Rodriguez, 2002). In chapter 5, I will discuss in detail how the Bouregreg Valley has 
turned into a ‘new state space’. In this particular case, governmental powers were trans-
ferred to a state agency that wasn’t accountable to the general public, neither pretended 
to be, as is often the case with “pseudo-democratic” reforms in the Arab World (Volpi, 
2004).	Hence,	these	forms	of	urban	government	show	a	significant	deficit	in	terms	of	
representation, accountability, and the right to the city. The concept of the “right of 
the city”, developed by Lefebvre (1996), and the question for whom the neoliberal 
city has exactly been restructured and redesigned, is a very important one. In the case 
of Morocco, it not only demonstrates the durability of authoritarian government but 
also its transformation from neo-patrimonial, clientilistic and kinship based forms of 
authoritarianism towards the more ‘universal’ (?) authoritarian character of neoliberal 
modalities of government. Here, I don’t want to argue that neoliberal modalities of gov-
ernment replaced the former modalities of authoritarian government. Rather, I want to 
argue that already existing forms of authoritarian government have been extended and 
intermingled with neoliberal modalities of government.118 
Based on the discussion above, the Arab city, obviously, lends itself as the privileged 
site to observe the political transformations of the last three decades. Nonetheless, main-
stream political analyses on the Arab World have seldom paid attention to the ways in 
which	a	cityscape	reflects	a	hegemonic	political	project	(Parker,	2009).	Within	the	area	
study, very little attention has been paid to neoliberal urbanism, and by extension to 
neoliberal political reform in general (some important exceptions are Catusse, 2008; 
Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009a; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009; Kanna, 2009; Fawaz, 2009; Kanai 
& Kutz; 2010; Parker & Debruyne, 2011). But also, within the emerging literature on 
global cities and city-networks the Arab cities are usually left out (Elsheshtawy, 2008; 
Malkawi, 2008). Of course, the process of urbanization in the Third World, or in the 
Arab	World	more	particularly,	differs	significantly	from	Western	cities.	First	of	all,	the	
“developing” cities experienced a spectacular growth in the 20th century that was noth-
ing compared with earlier periods of urban demographic expansion. The growth of the 
Third World cities in the post-colonial era took on a whole different intensity compared 
to urban development in Europe. While the processes of urbanization, urban growth, 
demographic expansion and industrialization were a gradual long term process in the 
history of European cities, many cities in the Arab region were confronted with rapid 
and chaotic urbanization and its subsequent social pressures (Malkawi, 2008; El Ouaz-
zani, 2008). Secondly, Third World urbanization was characterized by capital shortage 
and labour surpluses (Harvey, 1989a: 25). Cities in the Third World were characterized 
by an urbanization without economic growth: i.e. a strong demographic expansion of 
the cities without a proportionate expansion of the urban economy. This urbanization 
without growth, especially since the 1970s, was even exacerbated by the global politi-
cal conjuncture: i.e. the worldwide debt crisis and the subsequent IMF-led structural 
adjustment of the Third World economies (M Davis, 2006a). 
118  Swyngedouw, e.a. argue that the new systems of urban government and ruling networks under neo-
liberalism also make possible more discretional forms of management, i.e. the role of lobbies, family 
ties, business connections, and forms of clientilism (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002: 565). In 
Morocco we see a reversed evolution, i.e. the transformation of already existing discretional forms of elite 
government into more market-oriented forms of elite government. 
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As a result, the Arab cities were confronted with some serious challenges. Despite the 
fact that their demographic evolution had little to do with economic growth, rural mi-
gration	continued	unabated	because	poor	farmers	still	hoped	to	find	a	better	future	in	
the city (Ibrahim, 1975; Abu lughod, 1980; Naciri, 1984a). According to Mike Davis, 
this phenomenon surprised many experts and contradicted orthodox economic models 
that predicted that a negative growth of the urban economies would reverse the rural-
urban migration trends. Nothing was further from the truth. Part of the mystery could be 
clarified	by	the	fact	that	the	neoliberal	policies	of	deregulation	and	financial	discipline	
also negatively affected the domestic agricultural sectors and therefore accelerated the 
rural exodus of surplus rural labour to the urban agglomerates (M Davis, 2006a). This 
was also the case in Morocco. Neoliberal reforms accelerated the privatization and con-
centration of large landholdings in the hands of a few elites at the cost of the fragmented 
and small landholding majority among the Moroccan farmers (D Davis, 2006). Addi-
tionally, the recent implementation of a free-trade agreement between Morocco and the 
US,	ratified	in	2004,	is	expected	to	further	impoverish	the	majority	of	the	Moroccan	
farmers and limit their opportunities to compete in a global market. By mandating the 
elimination of export subsidies and price supports for grains in Morocco, it is more 
than likely that the US will supply nearly all wheat to Morocco in the coming decade 
(Ibid.). As a result, rural poverty, which increased rapidly during the 1980s and the 
1990s, is estimated to continue to increase by the World Bank (from 28,3% to 34,3%) 
due to the deregulation of trade protection. Extreme poverty in Morocco will probably 
even double from 6,6% to 11,7% in the coming years or decade (World Bank, 2004: 
62).	Moreover,	the	World	Bank	also	concluded	that	because	of	the	specific	dynamics	
of urbanization in Morocco, rural and urban poverty are closely related (Ibid.: 2). Con-
sequently the phenomenon of “over-urbanization” was thus primarily “driven by the 
reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs” (M Davis, 2006: 16). The result was 
a spectacular growth of slums or other kinds of informal housing, not only in Morocco, 
but everywhere in the Global South. Since the 1970s, Mike Davis argues, slum growth 
even outpaced the general process of urbanization everywhere in the South (Ibid.: 17). 
This was the price paid for structural adjustments and neoliberal urbanism, resulting in 
increasing inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation within and between the different 
urban regions.119   
119  Françoise Navez-Bouchanine warns us not to see the socio-spatial fragmentation in the Maghreb cities 
as just a recent effect (i.e. since the 1970s and the 1980s). The socio-spatial fragmentation of the modern 
city has its historic origins that go back to the colonial period (see also Abu Lughod, 1980). Furthermore 
she argues that the phenomenon of fragmentation is not a static phenomenon that can be reduced to distinc-
tions between legal and illegal or formal and informal urban spaces. Navez-Bouchanine urges us to see 
fragmentation more as a dynamic phenomenon that cross-borders the boundaries of formal/informal and 
legal/illegal. For example, the fragmentation between or within formal neighbourhoods can sometimes be 
greater than between certain formal and informal neighbourhoods. This is because of the dynamic way in 
which the degree of fragmentation can constantly decline and increase depending on social agency both 
from above (public actions, state intervention) and below (neighbourhood action, social networks, etc.) 
(Navez-Bouchanine,	2002a).	Moreover,	these	actions	from	below	have	their	own	significant	effect	on	the	
production of urban space. Asef Bayat refers to these forms of agency as the “quiet encroachment of the 
ordinary”	(Bayat,	2000;	2002).	The	concept	describes	specific	ways	in	which	ordinary	people	(re-)appropri-
ate	urban	space	for	their	own	benefits.	In	other	words,	the	“silent,	protracted,	and	pervasive	advancement	of	
ordinary people [e.g. street vendors, squatters, car parkers, etc.] on the propertied and powerful in a quest 
for survival and improvement of their lives” (Bayat, 2002: 19). Nevertheless, neoliberal policies have cer-
tainly	intensified	urban	disparities	turning	cities	more	and	more	in	to	spaces	of	extremes	(Bayat	&	Biekart,	
2009).  
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Yet, neoliberal urban policies are still not widely seen as the overall problem. To the 
contrary, very often they are perceived as part of the solution to overcome the growing 
inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation in the Southern cities. Therefore, it is inter-
esting, even absolutely necessary, to compare neoliberal policies in both the Western 
World and the Global South. In both parts of the world the liberation of global capital 
has	inspired	cities	and	local	government	to	join	the	competitive	race	for	the	fixation	
of	some	of	that	world-wide	flow	of	capital.	One	important	point	of	comparison	with	
Western cities is the politics of mega-projects. Usually, when these forms of urban 
neoliberalization are brought into connection with the Arab World, they are almost 
immediately	 associated	with	 the	Gulf	 region	 and	more	 specifically	with	 the	 city	 of	
Dubai. No doubt, Dubai – which is the fastest growing city in the world – has been 
the most documented and the most spectacular case. The megalomaniacal images of 
real estate development projects such as The World (the group of islands in front of the 
seashore), the 7-star hotel Burj Al-Arab, and the Burj Dubai (the largest tower in the 
world) certainly contributed to the fantasy of this Dubai model. Yet, neoliberal urban 
development	strategies	are,	of	course,	not	something	that	is	specific	to	the	case	of	Dubai	
or the other Gulf cities. They were copied also in the rest of the Arab region, often under 
impulse	of	investment	money	coming	from	the	Gulf	region.	However,	the	first	signs	of	
the	financial	mess	of	over-investment	and	high-risk	rent	seeking	urbanization	became	
painfully clear when a lot of ongoing projects, in Dubai for example, were abandoned 
and	stopped	(temporarily)	in	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	meltdown	of	2008	and	the	
global economic crisis that followed. Yet, two years later, it seems like the reliance 
on urban mega-projects only took a temporarily set-back.120 Also in Morocco, in spite 
of the global economic uncertainty at the moment, the current mega-projects remain 
on schedule.121 Projects like Tanger Med, Casa Marina and the Bouregreg project are 
priorities for the Moroccan authorities. Examples in the rest of the Arab World are also 
numerous. The Journal of Built Environment dedicated its summer issue of 2010 on 
Arab mega-projects (Barthel, 2010). This issue tries to look beyond the case of Dubai 
and deals with similar cases in Lebanon (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010), Algeria (Zitoun, 
2010), Syria (Clerc & Hurault, 2010), Egypt (Deboulet, 2010), Morocco (Mouloudi, 
2010; Barthel & Planel, 2010; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010), Mauritania and Sudan (Choplin 
& Franck, 2010).
Consequently, since a few decades, there has been a systemic change in the whole Arab 
region.	There	is	a	growing	influence	of	Arab	business-oriented	elites	ready	to	invest,	
integrate and participate in the global market economy (Barthel, 2010). The fact that 
so little has been written on Arab neoliberal urbanism raises the question, however, 
whether Arab urbanization can be compared to the neoliberal urban politics described 
by authors like Neil Brenner, Erik Swyngedouw, Neil Smith and David Harvey? After 
all, these authors worked almost exclusively on processes of neoliberal urbanization 
in the West. Pierre-Arnaud Barthel argues that we should be careful to compare recent 
processes of Arab urbanization, and in particular Arab mega-projects, with for example 
neoliberal urban development in Europe and the US. I agree to a certain extent. As I 
have argued earlier, forms of actually existing neoliberalism do differ from country to 
country.	As	such,	specific	urban	developments	in	Morocco	will	differ	from	develop-
120  Oxford Business Group newsletter on Dubai: A slower pace (03/04/09).
121		Oxford	Business	Group	newsletter	on	Morocco:	Urban	Outfitters	(03/03/09).
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ments in Belgium and other places. But we must avoid the tendency to essentialize 
– and therefore automatically oppose – neoliberal urbanism in both the West and the 
Arab World (something Barthel tends to do). To begin with, forms of neoliberal urban-
ism will also vary within and between the different countries and regions of the Western 
World. Likewise, neoliberal urbanism in the Arab region will vary from country to 
country, even city to city. 
Of course, we cannot be blind for some important differences. Barthel sums up some 
important arguments. First of all, in terms of public resources, the process of Arab 
urbanization cannot be compared with the Western countries. Consequently, the so-
cial polarization will be much more confronting in those countries with less public 
resources. But this is a phenomenon that is typical for all Third World countries in the 
Global South to some degree. Secondly, it is certainly true that neoliberal projects in 
the	Arab	region	take	place	in	a	specific	authoritarian	political	context.	The	involvement	
of the king in Morocco is much evident, even necessary. Moreover, opposition to these 
projects is a much more delicate issue in a country like Morocco than in any of the 
liberal	democracies	in	the	West.	Additionally,	Barthel	argues	that	the	specific	decision-
making process has shifted from formal governmental institutions to sites outside these 
institutions – what he calls the informalization of the decision-making process – and, as 
a consequence, there is a severe lack of public participation (see also Krijnen & Fawaz, 
2010). Yet, he considers this particular context to be an important difference with West-
ern developments (Barthel, 2010: 139). However, it would be a mistake to idealize 
the decision-making process in Western countries and ignore the implicit class power 
behind it. Several critical scholars have argued convincingly that large European urban 
development projects equally lack public participation, and overall, the decision-mak-
ing process has shifted equally towards non-democratically controlled institutions and 
agencies. Also, within the context of European projects, real decision-making power 
should be located in more discretionary forms of management: e.g. lobby groups, fam-
ily ties, business connections, and different forms of clientilism (Swyngedouw, Mou-
laert & Rodriguez, 2002). 
Furthermore, Barthel argues that the involvement of Gulf investors is another peculiar-
ity of prestige projects in Arab metropolises. Nevertheless, a quick look at the websites 
of some of the most important investment companies in the Gulf, the so-called Sov-
ereign Wealth Funds (SWF), reveals that Gulf capital is implicated all over the world. 
The	Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority	has	significant	investments	in	Europe	and	the	US.	
The same goes for the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Dubai Group.122 Only a few 
years ago, a world-wide debate emerged on the role of SWFs in the world economy 
and their impact on the security of national states, especially the US.123 It is true, how-
ever, that ever since the events of 9/11 damaged the reputation of Arab investors in the 
US and the rest of the Western World, investment money coming from the Gulf states 
is	now	flowing	more	easily	to	other	Arab	countries	(Bogaert,	2008).	In	short,	despite	
122  See for example the following websites: http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/dubai.php; http://www.adia.
ae/En/Investment/Portfolio.aspx; http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Marketable_Securities/Portfolio_Management/
Pages/default.aspx; (Accessed 05/09/2010).
123  See for example the article in Le Monde Diplomatique of May 2008 titled: Sovereign Wealth Funds to 
the rescue: are they saviours, predators, or dupes? An article written by Ibrahim Warde. 
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important differences, mainstream political science on the Arab World can learn a great 
deal from critical perspectives on neoliberal reform in Western cities. As such, it is 
absolutely necessary to further bridge the academic interchanges between different dis-
ciplines and area-studies. In the end, there will be of course important local variations 
when comparing Arab countries with Western countries. And of course, democratically 
elected governments in Europe and US makes it more delicate for the capitalist class to 
push true their private interests at the expense of the rest of society. Nevertheless, de-
parting	from	the	critical	perspective	described	in	this	chapter,	it	is	above	all	the	specific	
authoritarian character of neoliberal modalities of government that makes it so interest-
ing to compare cases from the Arab World with similar forms of neoliberal policy in 
the rest of the World. In doing this, we notice the global convergences of modes and 
rationalities of government in different parts of the world.   
Conclusion
As Peck and Tickell stated in the opening quote, neoliberalism does seem to be every-
where: as an ideology, a class strategy, a technology of government, even as a deeply 
entrenched rationality that produces and shapes our contemporary political societies. In 
this chapter, I discussed the political nature of neoliberal globalization, the role of the 
state in that political project and the contextual embeddedness of its local manifesta-
tions.	First	of	all,	neoliberal	globalization	is	a	political	project.	More	specifically,	it	is	
a class project. The establishment of new measures, new regulations and new policies 
to	increase	capital	mobility	worldwide	has	significantly	altered	the	class	relations	since	
the 1970s (early 1980s in Morocco). Secondly, the state apparatus plays a vital role in 
the regulation and formation of that project. Today, without state power there would be 
no	spread,	no	re-arrangement	and	no	intensification	of	contemporary	global	capitalism.	
I do agree with the governmentality approach that the state is just a (temporary) institu-
tion and not so much a universal from which some of the lineages of neoliberal capital-
ist power can be traced. As such, we should not treat the state as an actor in itself, but 
pay more close attention to those rationalities and methods of power that gave rise to 
the contemporary capitalist state and are manifested through its apparatuses. However, 
we should also avoid to empty the concept of the state and view power as something 
emerging always from everywhere without ever being able to trace it back to an or-
ganization or a structure, or without linking it to a particular crystallization of social 
relations – e.g. class relations. The state – how diffuse its materialization may be – is 
still an important home for class power. And in the sense that increasing globalization 
draws global or transnational capitalist relations into local politics, it does not neces-
sarily mean that the state has lost authority or autonomy, but rather that these ‘external’ 
relations are drawn within reach (cf. chapter 5). In other words, authority and govern-
ment are not the result of a zero-sum game between local and global actors – as sug-
gested	by	some	–	but	it	is	shared	and	negotiated	between	these	actors	on	the	field	of	the	
state. By positioning a governmentality approach against a Marxian analysis of (state)
power, I do not want to suggest we should chose between one of them. To the contrary, 
as John Allen argued, our understanding of the whereabouts of power should not be 
locked in a binary logic, but engage with the important insights offered by both these 
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critical approaches (even if we don’t succeed to craft the perfect argument in the end).124 
Finally, this chapter has put forward the argument that urban politics and the increasing 
competition between cities and city-regions in global capitalism have radically changed 
the	configuration	of	uneven	development.	In	the	remaining	three	chapters	I	want	to	dig	
deeper into the case of Morocco and explore the particular mechanisms in which urban 
politics have shaped actually existing neoliberalism in Morocco. 
124  Here, I do not want to suggest that these two approaches are the only possible approaches to consider 
contemporary political transformation.
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         Chapter 3 
Relatively few developing countries have had as good a 
performance as Morocco in the second half of the eighties. 
Inflation has been below 5% since 1987 while GDP has 
grown at an average rate of 5% since 1985. The current 
account turned from a deficit of 12,3% of GDP in 1982 to 
a surplus in 1987 and 1988 and a deficit of 3,5% in 1989. 
The budget deficit was reduced from double digits of GDP 
in the 1976-84 period to the 4% to 5% range in 1988-1989. 
This performance occurred at the same time that structural 
reforms and a stabilization program were taking place. The 
reforms undertaken in the eighties included liberalization 
of agriculture prices, opening up of the trade regime, and 
elimination of most price controls. The reforms in agricul-
ture, for example, brought about an important drop in the 
negative effective protection of the sector and have con-
sequently helped bring about a major output response in 
cereal production (World Bank, 1990b: i). 
Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capi-
talism, much more uncanny than any direct pre-capitalist 
socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer at-
tributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” inten-
tions, but is purely “objective,” systemic, anonymous. Here 
we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and 
the Real: “reality” is the social reality of the actual people 
involved in interaction and in the productive processes, 
while the Real is the inexorable “abstract,” spectral logic 
of capital that determines what goes on in social reality. 
One can experience this gap in a palpable way when one 
visits a country where life is obviously in shambles. We 
see a lot of ecological decay and human misery. However, 
the economist’s report that one reads afterwards informs 
us that the country’s economic situation is “financially 
sound” – reality doesn’t matter, what matters is the situa-
tion of capital… (Žižek, 2008: 12-13). 
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To the day one month after the above cited World Bank report came out, violent riots 
broke in Morocco. They spread out all over the country, but were especially concentrat-
ed around cities in the Northern region such as Tangiers, Fez and Meknes. After earlier 
violent disturbances in 1981 and 1984, it became clear that the socio-economic reforms 
implemented in Morocco since the beginning of the 1980s, perceived as absolutely 
necessary after a severe debt-crisis, were hitting ordinary citizens the most. The imple-
mentation	of	the	first	Structural	Adjustment	Program	(SAP)	in	1983	generated	new	and	
radical reforms. It was the watershed moment from which the current political transfor-
mations and the concomitant Moroccan state-reformation process are to be explained 
(Catusse, 2008). To begin with, the state bureaucracy and its public administration had 
to be downsized to meet the new requirements of neoliberal reform. The well known 
formula’s	of	market	liberalization,	deregulation,	fiscal	discipline	and	the	privatization	
of industrial activities and public services constituted the new governmental toolbox to 
decrease	public	deficit.	Before	the	1980s,	the	Moroccan	political	economy	contained	
specific	characteristics	of	a	“state-developmental	model”	based	on	 the	principle	 that	
the state was the main driving force and the direct stimulator for the generation of eco-
nomic growth (Catusse, 2009a). But this changed after 1983. More generally, the so-
called Third World debt crisis at the end of the 1970s marked the beginning of the end 
of	developmentalism	(the	Southern	variant	of	Fordism)	and	a	definite	turn	towards	the	
fundamentals	of	neoliberal	government.	In	that	sense,	and	symbolically,	the	first	SAP	
should not only be seen as an economic, but also a political and a social rupture. First of 
all,	characteristic	of	neoliberal	reform	is	the	reconfiguration	of	political	and	economic	
life	so	as	to	reflect	market	incentives	and	demands.	Secondly,	the	processes	of	political	
change	were	not	confined	 to	 the	 internal	or	domestic	Moroccan	political	 scene.	Lo-
cal ruling elites, international institutions, global corporations and investors, NGOs, 
civil society and foreign governments were all embedded within growing networks and 
(transnational) political spaces making government more a “global enterprise” rather 
than simply a national one (Cohen & Jaidi, 2006: 3; see also Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). 
In this chapter I want to give an overview of the neoliberal reforms in Morocco and 
demonstrate how a common hypothesis related to neoliberalism – the retreat of the 
state – is a misconception. Here, I draw on the arguments of scholars such as Catusse 
and Hibou who have shown that the powers of the state have not been restricted but 
rather redeployed (Catusse, 2009a; see also Hibou, 1998). As such, understanding the 
role of the state remains of primary importance to understand political agency in neo-
liberal transitions. Furthermore, I will not only demonstrate the Moroccan transition 
to neoliberalism but also a transition in actually existing Moroccan neoliberalism. The 
process of alternance, the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, and a changing 
international context (e.g. the changing discourse of international institutions such as 
the	World	Bank)	are	crucial	events	that	contributed	to	the	reconfiguration	of	neoliberal	
government in Morocco. The re-invention of social development and the strong ambi-
tions of urban redevelopment are characteristic of this particular transition in Moroccan 
neoliberalism. Finally, I also want to address and explore the question of class. Who 
rules in Morocco? The state may still play an important role in neoliberal political agen-
cy, but we should not make the mistake of reifying the state as a political actor in itself. 
The state cannot be seen separate from the power and (class) hierarchies that underpin 
and give from to its constitution. However, class analyses have been often ignored. One 
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of the reasons is that in the case of Morocco, and the Arab world in general, those who 
control the means of production and distribute capital surpluses are not perceived as an 
autonomous and independent class (cf. Waterbury, 1991; Aggestam, e.a., 2009). Yet, 
this	specific	perception	on	class	is	rather	limited	and	risks	to	throw	the	baby	out	with	
the	bathwater.	Instead,	I	argue	that	we	should	not	focus	too	much	on	trying	to	define	
class based on a set of predetermined sociological categories, but interpret class more 
as a political process; the process of surplus appropriating. From this perspective, the 
notions of class and class politics are actually particularly helpful in understanding the 
scope and nature of political agency in neoliberal Morocco.      
Political transformations in Morocco (1980-2010): a neoliberal transition and a 
transition in neoliberalism
The start of a fundamental process of political change in Morocco has often been situ-
ated in the early 1990s and not so much at the beginning of the 1980s with the imple-
mentation	of	the	first	SAP.	Since	the	1990s,	Morocco	has	often	been	referred	to	as	a	
model reformer in the MENA-region. Trying to leave the turbulent 1980s behind, late 
king Hassan II set Morocco on a path of political and social reform. This involved the 
so-called alternance process. The riots in Fez in December 1990 against the US-led 
invasion of Iraq (an invasion that was supported by the Morocco government), the 
increasing international criticism with regard to Morocco’s human rights record, the 
continuation	of	 the	conflict	 in	 the	Western	Sahara	and	 the	publication	of	Gilles	Per-
rault’s Notre ami le Roi (1990), which denounced Hassan II’s thirty years of human 
rights violations and criticized France’s policy of turning a blind eye to these viola-
tions, were some of the main events which urged the monarchy to implement serious 
political reforms to ensure its survival and maintain its political grip (Sater, 2010). At 
the beginning of the decade, Hassan II tried to give a political sign to the outside world 
by creating the Advisory Council for Human Rights (CCDH), releasing many political 
prisoners and closing the infamous prison of Tazmamart.125 The actual political reform 
process started in 1992 with a constitutional reform, followed by another one in 1996. 
The monarchy also undertook several attempts to set up talks and negotiations with 
its political adversaries. This general reform process eventually led to the alternance 
government in 1998 which brought the historical opposition parties USFP, Isitqlal and 
PPS	–	since	1992	unified	as	an	opposition	to	the	established	powers	in	the	so-called	
Koutla al-demouqratiyya or Democratic Block – into the government (Zemni & Bo-
gaert, 2006).126	On	4	February	1998,	the	leader	of	the	USFP,	Abderrahman	Youssoufi,	
was appointed prime minister. These events sparked the hope, especially among foreign 
observers, that a genuine process of democratization was under way. However, the 
alternance government remained a very heterogeneous coalition and the king was still 
in control of the so-called sovereign ministries: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and 
Religious Affairs.127 
125  CCDH: Le Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme. 
126  PPS (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme) was the smallest of the three opposition parties beside the 
social democratic USFP and the conservative Istiqlal. The latter two had a history that went back to the 
struggle of independence. 
127		for	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	specifics	of	the	constitutional	reforms	of	1992	and	1996;	the	electoral	
reforms and a general overview of the alternance process see: Storm (2007) and Sater (2010).
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Mohammed VI, who ascended the throne in 1999, further expanded the political re-
form process. He immediately proved his willingness to reform by getting rid of the 
widely despised minister of interior, Driss Basri, and acknowledging the government’s 
responsibility during the “années de plomb” (Vermeren, 2002).128 Additionally, the new 
king now openly stressed the importance of good governance, human rights and citi-
zen participation in many of his royal discourses. Furthermore, Mohamed VI pushed 
through notable reforms such as the changes made to the Moudawana (family code) 
and several measures leading to a considerable improvement in human rights and free-
dom of press (Vermeren, 2009).129 Together with some important electoral reforms, 
these measures tempted many observers to speak of a Moroccan exception to the wider 
trend of authoritarian durability in the Arab region. By the end of the 1990s, Amnesty 
International	and	Human	Rights	Watch	stated	that	Morocco	had	significantly	improved	
its human rights record and the World Bank and other international institutions lauded 
Morocco as being one of the ‘success-stories’ of reform in the region (Zemni & Bo-
gaert, 2006). Within academic circles this process was looked upon with much more 
prudence and scepticism. Nevertheless, some observers saw promising evolutions (e.g. 
Malka & Aelterman, 2006). However, the story of a Moroccan exception took a setback 
when several suicide bombers struck Casablanca on May 16th 2003. The monarchy re-
turned to more authoritarian methods of government and arrested thousands of Islamist 
suspects. After the violent events, security became an absolute priority, often at the 
expense of earlier achievements and progressions made in for example the domain of 
human rights (Zemni, 2006b; Zemni & Bogaert, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the rising 
criticism on the stagnation of the reform process, some still believed that Morocco’s 
social policies implemented after 2003 – as an immediate answer to the socio-political 
crisis – were evidence of a real transition. These policies were embedded within a dis-
course displaying a strong commitment towards democratization, poverty alleviation 
and social development at the highest levels of the state (Navez-Bouchanine, 2009). 
The Villes sans Bidonvilles program (VSBP) and the National Initiative for Human 
Development (INDH) are two of the most salient examples.
I argue that these new social policy commitments are indeed evidence of a fundamental 
political transition. But the origins of this transformation should not be situated just 
in the 1990s, but can be traced back to the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, this 
transformation cannot be understood in terms often provided by mainstream narra-
tives linking economic liberalization and market reform to democratization. Rather, 
it	reflects	a	profound	shift	towards	intrinsically	authoritarian	modalities	of	neoliberal	
government. As a result, authoritarian durability in Morocco transformed in the ways in 
which the interests of ruling elites and (global) economic elites are increasingly inter-
twined. It gave rise to situations where “market requirements” justify authoritarian and 
securitized interventions at the expense of genuine democratic participation. As a re-
sult, populations are being required to participate in the making of a new political world 
128  The term “Les années de plomp” (the years of lead) refers to the period (the 1970s and the 1980s) of 
severe social and political repression by the Moroccan monarchy.  
129  However, we have seen that the freedom of the press has been under pressure the last few years. Some 
critical	magazines	and	journalist	have	been	fined	for	a	lack	of	respect	to	either	the	king,	the	religion	or	the	
national	state	boundaries	(the	issue	of	the	Western	Sahara).	With	these	fines	and	juridical	battles	the	Moroc-
can authorities have tried to silence certain critical voices. The critical weekly magazine Le Journal had to 
close its doors in 2010 because it could not pay of their debts anymore.
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in which the ability to claim and articulate political rights are circumscribed not only 
by “the regime,” but by the sanctions and incentives of “the free market,” and by the 
enduring myths of contemporary globalization (cf. Parker, 2009; Parker & Debruyne, 
2011). Furthermore, the political transition in Morocco of the last three decades is not 
only characterized by a transition towards neoliberal modes of government but also 
by a fundamental transition within Moroccan neoliberalism. We therefore have to pay 
closer attention to state institutional reform, new methods of government, the political 
rationalities that underpin them, and the social and economic consequences of these 
shifts.	In	doing	so,	it	becomes	obvious	that	neoliberalism	is	a	process	rather	than	a	final	
stage or a pre-determined model. 
This transformation process within neoliberalism has been described by Jamie Peck and 
Adam Tickell as a transformation from a phase of roll back neoliberalism to a phase of 
roll out neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002; 2007).130 Since the introduction of a SAP 
in the beginning of the 1980s, Morocco entered a phase of serious economic restruc-
turing and retrenchment. “Roll back neoliberalism” refers to this destructive moment 
when state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects. The 
disengagement of the state from the economic sphere was the main objective. Yet, this 
implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particular 
(developmentalist) state functions. In Europe and the US this involved the destruction 
of the Keynesian welfare state institutions and functions. In the Global South, neoliber-
al reform, mostly implemented through programs of structural adjustment, rolled back 
the achievements and functions of the developmental state (e.g. import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI), job security in the public sector, health care, etc.). Throughout 
the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	Moroccan	political	economy	contained	specific	characteristics	
of a ‘state developmental model’ based on the principle that the state and the domestic 
economic sector were the main driving forces for growth (Catusse, 2009a). But the se-
vere	state	budget	deficit	at	the	beginning	of	the	1980s	and	the	pressure	from	the	IMF	to	
comply with the prescriptions of structural adjustment, generated a radical turn. Fiscal 
discipline, market liberalization, the downsizing of the public sector and the privatiza-
tion of important public assets were some of the main measures that were introduced to 
control	budget	deficits	in	Morocco.	These	drastic	austerity	measures	did,	however,	not	
come without severe social costs and provoked a decade of violent urban street protests 
and nationwide social disturbances. Riots broke out in cities like Casablanca (1981), 
Marrakech (1984) and Fez (1990 and 1991). 
Because of the turbulent 1980s and the limits of early neoliberal reform, an important 
reconstitution of the neoliberal project occurred. This resulted in the elaboration of more 
socially inspired state interventionist policies which evolved during and coincided with 
the Moroccan political reform process of the 1990s (the alternance process). Despite 
the fact that Middle Eastern and North African countries had been prompted to liberal-
ize their economies since the early 1980s, foreign investments and overall economic 
growth remained unstable (D Davis, 2006; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Therefore, besides 
130  The authors refer almost exclusively to the North Atlantic zone. Their description of the internal shifts 
in neoliberalism is an attempt to generalize the various and distinct processes of actually existing neoliber-
alism. In the case of Morocco, I am convinced that the concepts of roll back and roll out neoliberalism give 
us the opportunity to see the political changes of the last 30 years from another angle.  
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some political measures to improve Morocco’s human rights record, the democratic 
deficit	and	the	rights	of	women,	the	Moroccan	authorities	also	engaged	in	the	political 
reconstruction of its market to attract more foreign investments and promote economic 
growth. The transition to this phase can be associated with what Peck and Tickell por-
tray as the ascending moment of “roll out neoliberalism”.131 It refers to a more creative 
phase of neoliberalism that is characterized by new forms of institution-building, new 
modes	of	regulation	and	new	configurations	of	spatially	differentiated	government	that	
transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from traditional to new govern-
mental arrangements (see below). Therefore, in contrast to the more common idea of a 
“retreat of the state”, neoliberalization, as a market-building project, involves the mak-
ing of a new “destructively creative” social order with the iterative roll back of those 
institutions and social forms associated with the former order (e.g. Keynesianism and 
state developmentalism), together with the roll out of new state forms, new modalities 
of government and new modes of regulation (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 33). In chapter 2, 
I	already	emphasized	the	specific	changing	role	of	the	state	in	the	development	of	new	
modalities of governmental agency to facilitate and coordinate the various processes 
through which societal spaces are being produced and reproduced by capitalist strate-
gies (i.e. the processes of re-institutionalization, re-regulation and reterritorialization). 
In addition, as I will argue in chapter 4, these newly adopted modes of state interven-
tions and state-led programs were also intended to include those citizens who were 
socially marginalized and excluded by earlier neoliberal restructurings. Both VSBP and 
INDH have introduced such new market-oriented modalities of government. As such, 
the Moroccan state apparatus played a crucial role in the transformative character of 
neoliberalism	(and	vice	versa),	manifested	itself	through	specific	local	formations	of	
state craft (cf. chapter 5). As such, the alternance can not only be understood as the 
start of a (limited) process of democratic reform, but should also be seen as the start of 
a process of fundamental political transformations within actually existing neoliberal-
ism in Morocco. 
The transition from roll back neoliberalism to roll out neoliberalism was a global tran-
sition, particularly noticeable in the discourse of international institutions such as the 
World Bank. The crisis of the 1980s and the severe protests actions that rose against 
structural adjustment policies around the world, set into motion a new political and 
academic discourse of ‘market failure’ (Roy, 2010). After the so-called “lost decades” 
– between 1980 and 1998 there was an average zero per capita growth in Third World 
countries and an increasing income divergence between rich and poor countries – a 
major shift occurred in development policies (Easterly, 2001). The focus shifted from 
structural adjustment to the promotion of ‘good governance’. Although structural ad-
justment as a development practice became only institutionalized in the early 1990s 
as the ‘Washington Consensus’, the shift towards good governance as the dominant 
development policy compelled the international donor community to revisit this ‘Wash-
ington Consensus’ which had dominated economic policies since the 1980s (Santiso, 
2001).132 In the negative aftermath of the SAP-era, it was now clear that mere market 
131  Characteristic of the period of roll out neoliberalism in Europe and the US were the “Third-Way con-
tortions of the Clinton and Blair administrations” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388-389). In contrast, roll back 
neoliberalism could be associated with the free-market projects of Reagan and Thatcher.
132		It	was	however	not	until	the	economic	crisis	in	Argentina	(2001-2002)	that	the	IMF	was	finally	to	
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deregulation and price incentives were not enough to spur economic growth in the de-
veloping countries and under impulse of the then Chief Economist of the World Bank, 
Joseph Stiglitz, the idea emerged that supporting a free market economy required state 
capacity	(Kapoor,	2008:	29).	As	a	result,	the	state,	first	conceived	as	part	of	the	prob-
lem, became to be considered part of the solution. This change in discourse gave rise to 
the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ and the recognition of the important role of govern-
ments in regulatory economic policy (Stiglitz, n.d.). 
The publication of the world development report of 1997 with the telling title “the 
state in a changing world” marked a stepping stone in the discursive transformation 
of neoliberalism (World Bank, 1997). Other reports followed and they all emphasized 
the role of governmental institutions and institution building to support an inclusive 
(free) market environment (e.g. World Bank, 2001). The particular shift in the 1990s 
implied a renewed vision on the role of the state which was clearly different from the 
dominant perspectives of early neoliberal orthodoxy and structural adjustment. While 
the	so-called	‘first	generation’	of	neoliberal	reforms	aimed	to	stabilize	and	liberalize	the	
national economies of developing countries (e.g. by rolling back state engagements in 
ISI-policies, food subsidies, and public sector expansion), the ‘second generation’ of 
neoliberal reforms turned away from the idea of autonomous self-regulating markets 
and aimed at reforming and strengthening governing institutions. The general explana-
tion was that the previous failures in the developing world to spur economic growth 
and global market integration were generated by the incapacity of institutionally weak 
states. Although “state-dominated development has failed”, the World Bank insisted, 
“so will stateless development”. Therefore the World Bank urged to rethink the state 
because “development without an effective state is impossible” (World Bank, 1997: 
25). In place of the advocacy for a “minimalist state”, the international institution now 
advocated the important role for the state in protecting and correcting markets (Panitch, 
1998). In the case of the MENA-region the World Bank was convinced that weak gov-
ernance had contributed to weak growth because poor governance had “shackled the 
business environment”: 
Many factors contribute to the region’s disappointing economic performance, 
with weak governance at the origin of many. Governance helps determine policy 
formulation and implementation that, in turn, determine whether or not there is 
a sound, attractive business environment for investment and production. Busi-
nesses react to incentives, costs, and constraints, which are often summarized 
as the “business environment” or, more narrowly, as the “investment climate.” 
Influencing	the	environment	for	business	and	investment	are	the	actions	of	the	
government in shaping and implementing policies. Needed are good policies – 
and good administration of policies. One without the other would be ineffective. 
For most MENA countries, the bureaucratic environment for doing business still 
lags behind that of their comparators elsewhere in the world. (World Bank, 2003: 
10). 
 
This particular political shift was not at all the prelude for the emergence of a post-
admit the failure of its monetary and structural adjustment policies (Roy, 2010).  
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neoliberal	order	–	hinted	at	 cautiously	by	 some	observes	 (cf.	Öniş	&	Şenses,	2005)	
– but rather an indication for the fact that the core macro-economic objectives of neo-
liberalism and the Washington Consensus needed strong institutional support in order 
to succeed.133 The former macro-economic objectives now needed to be underpinned 
and supported by those institutional and social prerequisites in order to achieve what 
neoliberal theory promised. As a result, the increased attention given to the state did 
not	just	entail	that	neoliberals	now	accepted	the	definite	comeback	of	state	interven-
tion	as	such.	It	rather	entailed	that	neoliberalism	would	seriously	influence	how state 
intervention was to be deployed. This gave way to new perspectives on government, 
public management and public intervention. Past ideas on state intervention (e.g. devel-
opmentalism, protectionism, import-substitution, etc.) were replaced by more market-
oriented perspectives on public policy (e.g. new public management, workfare, good 
governance, etc.). ‘Government’ now had to incorporate and adjust to the principles of 
economic	enterprise	and	apply	to	cost-efficiency,	technocratic	management	and	com-
petition. The following statement of the former wali (governor) of Greater Casablanca, 
Driss Benhima, in the weekly magazine Maroc Hebdo in 2001, was revealing in regard 
to this new vision on government:
In	 the	 current	world,	 the	 enterprise	 is	 the	 framework	 of	 defining	 government	
[gestion]. In fact, it has imposed this framework upon several non-economic 
organizations, and several administrations are currently governed [gérées] ac-
cording to the running principles of enterprise (cited in Catusse, 2008: 195, own 
translation).134    
The appointment of highly skilled young technocrats – often trained in the US and in 
France – within the public agencies and institutions has brought in new values that 
are embedded in a neoliberal culture and adhere to international capitalist principles 
(Ibid.). Driss Benhima wasn’t the exception. In an interview with weekly magazine 
Telquel, the current minister of industry, trade and new technologies, Ahmed Chami, 
also pleaded his allegiance to this new technocratic culture, promising himself that he 
would run his ministry as a private company.135
Ultimately, this global shift towards state-led market-oriented policy and good gover-
nance had an extra advantage for the international donor agencies. The political eco-
133  Some observers referred to the Post-Wasington Consensus as a form of “inclusive neoliberalism”, 
emphasizing the attention given to poverty alleviation and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
while pointing to the contradictory nature of the new consensus between neoliberal macro-economic poli-
cies and poverty-sensitive social policies (Ruckert, 2006). PRSPs were introduced in 1999 by the World 
Bank and the IMF as a new framework to enhance domestic poverty reduction policies and promote the 
cooperation between local governments and development partners (including the World Bank and the IMF). 
However, I don’t think that current poverty reduction policies, like for example the VSBP in Morocco, 
which is also promoted by the World Bank and other international donors, are inherently contradictive 
with the macro-economic objectives of neoliberalism. As will be discussed in chapter 4, these kind of 
market-oriented social policies are not just intended to reduce poverty but can also be viewed as strategies 
to increase the possibilities for capital surplus absorption (e.g. the social housing market) and integrate the 
(already limited) assets of a vast population of urban poor into the regular market-economy.    
134  For a complete version of the interview with Driss Benhima in weekly magazine Hebdo: see: http://
www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/MHinternet/Archives_490/html_490/mes.html (accessed 01/10/2010).
135  Telquel, 2010, n°404-405, p 6.
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nomic theories that underpinned this shift anticipated in a way the criticisms of political 
adversaries who had denounced the devastating social impacts of structural adjustment. 
In the eyes of the World Bank and the IMF, it was now clear that the particular causes 
for the failure of SAPs as a development policy had little to do with the neoliberal 
dogmas per se. The actual increase of social inequality after structural adjustment was 
supposedly	due	 to	 specific	conditions	 that	were	not	 really	 their	 responsibility	 in	 the	
end. With the new discourse on good governance the World Bank now seemed to sug-
gest that it were not so much the development objectives themselves that were the root 
of the problem (i.e. the Washington Consensus), but rather the domestic governance 
frameworks of the recipient countries (Jenkins, 2002). The responsibility for failure 
was thus passed on to the ‘developing’ countries. This said, the assumption was that 
free market policies would eventually prove to be effective, according to the interna-
tional donor institutions, as long as the supportive institutional and legal frameworks 
were put in place. 
Structural adjustment in Morocco: the phase of roll back neoliberalism
The 1960s and the early 1970s can best be described as the era of étatisme and bureau-
cratic expansion in the Arab region (Ayubi, 1997). Strong bureaucratic control over 
the national economy and ISI-policies formed the basis for the developmental state in 
the region, and as I mentioned earlier in chapter 2, the ascendency of Arab socialism 
was the dominant equivalent of developmentalism in the Arab World. It constituted the 
ideological basis for popular political forces such as Nasser in Egypt and the Ba’ath 
parties in Syria and Iraq. But just as Egypt was the trendsetter for public sector expan-
sion and ISI, it was also “the mother of Arab liberalizations” (Ibid.: 129). The economic 
crisis of the early 1970s and especially the soaring fuel prices generated the failure of 
planned industrialization in Egypt (Waterbury, 1985). President Anwar Sadat’s open 
door policy (infitah) of 1974 marked the beginning of a wave of economic liberaliza-
tion in the rest of the region. Many countries followed in the 1980s. Especially those 
countries with a lack of oil resources (e.g. Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, etc.) suf-
fered	economically	and	their	state	deficits	rose	rapidly	by	the	end	of	the	1970s.	Never-
theless,	the	rise	of	oil-prices	after	1973	was	at	first	a	huge	boost	for	the	rent-economies	
of	the	oil	producing	countries	in	the	region.	And	Morocco	shared	in	the	benefits.	The	
country disposed of some of the most important phosphate reserves in the world and 
export prices quintupled after 1973. Also in other non-oil producing countries in the 
region, the increased oil revenues helped to offset some of the looming problems ahead. 
Egypt,	for	example,	benefited	from	lucrative	economic	rents	such	as	foreign	Arab	aid	
in the war against Israel and the remittances of Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf. 
This	so-called	“semi-rentier”	effect	compensated	for	the	loss	of	efficiency	of	its	own	
state-led industrial complex (Beblawi, 1990). As such, oil-importing countries in the 
region	were	thus	also	capable	to	benefit	partly	from	the	increase	in	petrodollars.	How-
ever, the economic growth generated at that time was primarily rent-based and largely 
disconnected from the performances of the domestic industrial and agricultural sectors 
(Rivlin,	2001).	As	a	result,	their	rent-dependency	and	the	significant	oil	shocks	of	the	
1980s made these economies very unstable and turned various countries in the region 
into a severe recession. 
Growing	import	bills	coupled	with	stagnant	exports	led	to	increasing	budget	deficits	
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which	were	mostly	financed	by	foreign	loans	(both	private	and	multilateral)	(Richards	
& Waterbury, 2008: 218). As such, there was another event that triggered the debt-crisis 
in the Arab region and the rest of the Third World. In 1979, Paul Volcker, Chairman of 
the US Federal Reserve Bank, pushed through a draconian monetary policy. During the 
following years, the rate of interest was often raised overnight and rose from an aver-
age of 8% in 1978 to a staggering 20% in 1981. The interest rate didn’t return to less 
than double digits until after 1984. This so-called “Volcker-shock” implied that money 
became	much	more	expensive.	The	measure	was	taken	in	order	to	find	a	way	out	of	the	
crisis	of	stagflation	at	that	time.	The	primary	goals	of	the	Volcker-shock	were	to	tackle	
the	rising	inflation,	reverse	the	declining	credibility	of	the	American	dollar	and	restore	
the	Federal	Reserve’s	control	over	monetary	policy.	This	anti-inflationary	commitment	
by the Federal Reserve would become the anchor of a neoliberal dollar-based world 
economy. While the very mechanisms of this process were economic, several critical 
scholars argued that the overall strategy was essentially a political	move	to	the	benefit	
of	central	banking	and	finance	capital	and	against	the	interests	of	organized	labour	and	
manufacturing capital (cf. Panitch & Gindin, 2003; 2005; Harvey, 2006: 17-23; Klein, 
2007: 198-201; Ruccio, 2011: 214-240). Besides plunging his own country into reces-
sion and unemployment, the decision made by Paul Volcker also marked the beginning 
of the infamous Third World debt-crisis and the ‘lost development decades’, as many 
developing countries now found themselves unable to service their debts to the New 
York investment banks (Corbridge, 2002).136 According to Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, 
the Volcker shock was one of the decisive moments that introduced neoliberalism on a 
global scale (Panitch & Gindin, 2005). 
The Third World debt-crisis which exacerbated quickly in the early 1980s was then 
counterbalanced by determined interventions of the IMF and World Bank who priori-
tized	the	economic	orthodoxy	of	anti-inflationary	policies.	In	turn	for	debt	re-schedul-
ing, the recipient countries were required to proceed with a structural adjustment. As 
such, the ‘Third World debt-trap’, followed by structural adjustment could also be seen 
as a way to hook in even the poorest countries in the world into the system of capital 
circulation (Harvey, 2003). According to a radical approach, external debt rescheduling 
was a mechanism by which capitalists and governments in advanced industrial “core” 
countries, extracted wealth from peripheral countries (Ruccio, 2011). Capitalists, Har-
vey argues, will always try to reduce the frictions of distance and the barriers for the 
movement of capital. If surpluses of capital and labour could not be absorbed anymore 
within certain territorial boundaries and regimes of regulation, then the logical solution 
was	to	find	new	exits	for	capital	and	new	opportunities	for	investment	in	order	to	avoid	
the devaluation of capital. This is exactly what happened in the 1970s. One of the main 
problems	after	the	crisis	of	1973	was	to	find	new	ways	to	absorb	greater	and	greater	
amounts of surplus capital that had piled up in the oil-rich Gulf States. These surpluses 
were eventually recycled by American investment banks and lent to the developing 
136  Many of the petrodollars were recycled through the American investment banks and dispersed back 
into the world. By lending money to many of the governments in developing countries the investments 
banks lured these countries into a debt trap after the Volcker shock (1979-1982) (see Panitch & Ginding, 
2005; Harvey, 2006). The Third World debt crisis symbolically began with the announcement of Mexico on 
August 18, 1982 that it could no longer service its debt. After this announcement many commercial banks 
cut off their lending to many other Third World debtors (Easterly, 2001).
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countries	(Harvey,	2010a).	When	debt	servicing	became	increasingly	difficult	or	even	
impossible, the resources of those countries in trouble could then easily be accumulated 
and integrated into the global circuit of capital under the strict rules of structural adjust-
ment and debt repayment (Harvey, 2003).
 
SAPs generally sought to stimulate national savings by cutting back subsidized credit 
and state interference in price mechanisms. They also tried to liberalize and encourage 
agricultural production by ‘getting the prices right’ and abolish or phase out those poli-
cies that held down the prices of basic products like sugarcane, wheat, oil, cotton, etc. 
Finally, SAPs also tried to streamline the public sector and promote privatization as a 
development	strategy	in	order	 to	finance	loans	and	reduce	state	deficits	(Richards	&	
Waterbury, 2008: 218-227). SAPs were for instance introduced in Morocco (1983), Tu-
nisia (1986), Jordan (1989) and Egypt (1991). In general, these reforms mainly affected 
the livelihoods of the poorest populations. Before the era of structural adjustment, the 
MENA-region had relatively reasonable income levels and redistribution mechanisms. 
Yet, the immediate effect of the SAPs was an increase in the cost of living, especially 
in the urban areas, and the layoff of redundant labour (e.g. in the public sector). Public 
sector cutbacks were a very sensitive measure as public employment had often been a 
means, also in Morocco, to buy the loyalty of the increasingly educated middle class. 
To put it in the worlds of Mike Davis (2006a: 152), the end of the 1970s marked the 
beginning of the “urban poverty’s big bang”. Ray Bush notes that despite (or because 
of) the economic restructuring of the region there were some improved economic per-
formances. Nevertheless, he argues, since the 1980s, real purchasing power parity of 
the average citizen fell, uneven development between countries increased and income 
inequality grew (Bush, 2004). Consequently, drastic neoliberal reforms coincided very 
often with urban mass protests in the region, with violent disturbances as for instance 
in Egypt (1977), in Morocco (1981, 1984, 1990), in Tunisia (1984), and in Jordan 
(1989). 
The pre-SAP decades in Morocco
Unlike	other	Arab	countries	–	like	for	example	Egypt	–	where	the	influence	of	Arab	
socialism	had	a	significant	impact,	Morocco	never	completely	embraced	a	state	domi-
nated sector nor did it follow the political path of many of the other states in the region 
(cf. Leveau, 1997; Najem, 2001; Catusse, 2008).137 In that sense, Morocco was a bit 
of an outsider. First of all, king Mohamed V and later Hassan II, who ascended the 
throne in 1961, installed a multi-party system. By positioning the monarchy symboli-
cally above party-politics, the king could supervise the political scene as an arbiter and 
employ a divide and rule strategy.138 Secondly, most other Arab countries implemented 
137  It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate in great detail the political economy of Morocco be-
fore the 1980s and the shifting political alliances since the beginning of the Protectorate. For more detailed 
information: (see, amongst others: Waterbury, 1970; Leveau, 1985; Zartman, 1987; Santucci, 1992; White, 
2001; Sater, 2010). 
138		This	was	not	done	without	a	power	struggle.	In	fact,	the	first	decade	of	the	new	Moroccan	state	was	
characterized by an overt political confrontation between the nationalist movement who had fought for 
independence and the makhzen (the king’s entourage). But thanks to a complex strategy of divide and rule 
and different relations of state clientilism and patronage, the makhzen managed, in the end, to establish its 
political hegemony at the cost of the nationalist movement and other social forces (e.g. the military). It was 
only	after	two	failed	coups	in	the	early	1970s	that	Hassan	II	established	firm	control.	A	Moroccan	colleague	
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policies to promote rapid industrialization often at the expense of the agricultural sec-
tor. The monarchy did not follow that trend. On the contrary, it actively developed 
and prioritized the agricultural sector after the independence in 1956. The palace saw 
a stable rural landowning class as one of the essential foundations of its power base 
(Pennell,	2000:	306).	Investments	in	the	countryside	were	first	of	all	an	attempt	to	pull	
the large propertied classes into the patronage network of the ruling elites. Additionally 
these investments were also an attempt to halt the continuous rural exodus towards the 
cities. As such, the palace intended to limit the political weight of the cities and the ur-
ban	nationalist	movement.	Indeed,	during	the	first	years	of	independence,	the	monarchy	
was mixed up in a political power struggle with the Istiqlal party, the nationalist party 
who	had	played	a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 independence.139 Thirdly, while 
important regional countries such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq turned to the 
Soviet Union for support, Morocco turned to the West. The US and especially France 
were its most important allies (Tuquoi, 2006). Morocco clearly opted for political and 
economic alliances outside the Maghreb region.140 Between 1976 and 1980, Moroccan 
exports to other Maghreb countries never exceeded more than 2% of the national total, 
while imports even never exceeded more than 0,2%. From the mid-1970s, the United 
States was the main weapons supplier for the Moroccan army forces and Morocco 
turned to Saudi Arabia for oil imports. Furthermore, never did any country receive 
more French bilateral aid as Morocco after 1975 (Pennell, 2000: 342-344).141 Finally, 
in contrast to other Arab countries who opted for a planned economy, Hassan II had 
always opted for a controlled liberal economic system.142  
This	didn’t	mean,	however,	that	the	Moroccan	economy	did	not	contain	specific	char-
acteristics of a developmental state model. In Morocco, as elsewhere, the root causes 
once paraphrased it to me rather euphemistically: “Mohamed V established the independence, Hassan II 
managed to securitize the country [read: thanks to the severe repression of the années de plomb] and at the 
end of his life he started to democratize the country [i.e. the alternance]. Mohamed VI will hopefully bring 
democracy” (Interview – Rabat 01/06/10).    
139  Through the monarchy’s support of large landownership, it even managed to drive a wedge between 
the	more	conservative	Istiqlal	members	and	the	leftist	movement	around	Mehdi	Ben	Barka.	Among	the	fist	
there	were	many	landowners	–	such	as	Istiqlal’s	agriculture	minister	Omar	Abdeljalil	who	benifited	from	
the state’s promotion of the agricultural sector. The more leftists members of the Istiqlal advocated a land 
reform	–	among	them	former	prime	minister	Abdellah	Ibrahim	–	to	the	benefit	of	the	(landless)	peasants.	
Eventually, the movement around Ben Barka left the Istiqlal to form the Union Nationale des Forces Popu-
laires (UNFP). Furthermore, no Moroccan government wanted to expropriate the foreign (mostly French) 
landowners	in	the	beginning	in	order	to	limit	the	flight	of	foreign	capital	(see	Pennell,	2000:	306;	Sater,	
2010: 91). 
140  With Algeria for example, the Moroccan government still has a discordant relationship to the present 
day. The Algerian support for Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de 
Oro) in their struggle for an independent Western Sahara is still one of the main reasons for the troubled 
relationship between the two countries.
141  Despite the clear alliance with the Western Bloc, Pennell notes that Hassan II did not ignore the Soviet 
Union and he kept good relationships with the Russian leadership in the 1960s and the 1970s. In 1978, Mo-
rocco	singed	an	important	fishery	deal	with	the	Soviet	Union	which	turned	out	to	be	the	largest	commercial	
deal between the Soviet Union and a developing country that was ever to be signed (Pennell, 2000: 344).  
142		During	the	first	five-year	plan	(1960-1965),	import-substituting	industrialization	and	agrarian	redis-
tribution of land were pushed forward as key strategies for economic independence. This was established 
under the socialist Irbahim government. However, after only six months these plans were already shelved 
when Hassan II dissolved the government and opted for agricultural modernization (i.e. irrigation) in favour 
of the large foreign and domestic landowners (Sater, 2010).    
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for structural adjustment can be traced back to the convergence of ISI-policies, the 
commodities price boom of the 1970s and the accumulation of international indebted-
ness (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 243; see also World Bank, 1987). The involvement 
of	the	state	in	the	economy	gradually	increased	in	the	first	two	decades	after	the	inde-
pendence.	After	all,	it	was	through	state	intervention	in	the	economic	field	and	through	
neo-patrimonial practices and state clientilism that the monarchy assured itself of the 
loyalty of the rural elites, foreign capital and the traditional urban bourgeoisie in its 
struggle against its political opponents. The state-administration’s role in the economy 
was used to protect the private interests of those families closely tied to the monarchy. 
Consequently the Moroccan state apparatus was above all an instrument in the hands 
of a minority who used it to secure their own privileges (Waterbury, 1970; Ben Ali, 
1997). Over the years, substantial state support was given to the domestic industry and 
agricultural crops received price support. Yet, these forms of state intervention and state 
control over the economy were not at all inspired by socialist or populist motives but by 
mere economic necessity. To be sure, the ruling elites’ economic ideology was always 
liberal and they supported the private sector. Although the public authorities national-
ized many of the former French-owned major industries such as phosphates – via the 
Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) – state intervention in the Moroccan industry 
during the 1950s and 1960s could be attributed more to the structural weakness of the 
domestic private sector than to a coherent developmentalist strategy (Kaioua, 1996: 
113). For example, the Moroccan state was obliged to nationalize a large portion of 
Morocco’s export trade in 1965 (e.g. citrus fruit, artisanal products, vegetables) through 
the Office de Commercialisation et d’Exportation (OCE) because no domestic private 
group or investor was able to take on this organization (Waterbury, 1970: 132). 
Since	the	independence	in	1956	there	were	significant	attempts	to	built	an	industrial	
sector. These efforts were taken on by the Moroccan state administration in coopera-
tion with both domestic and foreign private capital. The rise of the textile industry, for 
example,	was	closely	 related	 to	 early	 ISI-policies	 adopted	 in	 the	first	five-year	plan	
(Cammett, 2007). Nevertheless, the share of industrial output in the Moroccan GDP 
remained very modest compared to other sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Ad-
ditionally, the subsequent national economic plans (three year Plan of 1965-1967 & and 
five	year	Plan	of	1968-1972)	clearly	subordinated	industrial	activity	to	the	agricultural	
sector. The industrial sector was developed mainly to support and accompany the latter 
(Jaidi, 1992). In short, until the end of the 1960s, the agricultural sector was prioritized 
over the industrial sector, the Moroccan private sector remained relatively weak and the 
domestic economy still continued to be dominated by foreign capital.143 
Yet, the current socio-economic strategies reached their limits at the end of the decade. 
The political discourses of the 1960s, emphasizing the country’s agricultural vocation, 
were replaced by another type of discourse at the beginning of the 1970s, now focusing 
more on the role of industry as the engine of the Moroccan economy (Jaidi, 1992; Ben 
Ali, 1997). The unabated rural exodus, the chaotic urban expansion and the natural and 
structural limits of the agricultural sector reinforced the belief to expand and deepen 
143  The French Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas, for example, controlled no less than 50 companies through 
its participation in the kingdom’s largest holding Omnium Nord Africain (ONA) (Sater, 2010: 95).
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state intervention in the economy.144 Moreover, the oil boom of 1973, which caused the 
strong rise of international export-prices of phosphates, provided the government with 
considerable resources for public spending via the state-led OCP.145 Also, at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, it became clear that the Moroccan society was changing rather radi-
cally (e.g. the continuous urbanization). This was putting more and more pressure on 
existing relations of power and patronage. The urban peripheries were exposed to the 
consequences of rapid population growth, housing shortages, economic involution and 
increasing unemployment. Improved education and increased demographic pressure 
on the urban regions resulted in an urban middle class that had little prospects for the 
future. The frustrations resulting out of the social inequalities led to widespread disaf-
fection which threatened the existing political order and the stability of the monarchy 
(Joffé, 1988). It became even more evident that the monarchy had to change its political 
strategies when two coup attempts (in July 1971 and August 1972) radically demon-
strated that the social basis of the monarchy needed to be altered.146
As such, several strategies were adopted to boost the economy and renew the monar-
chy’s social pact with the elites. First of all, with the 1973-1977 Plan, the monarchy 
gradually shifted its priorities from the rural to the urban regions. ISI-strategies were re-
invigorated and public capital invested primarily in the production of basic consumer 
goods such as sugar, dairy products, oil and fodder, strategic products such as cement 
and strategic sectors such as mining. Secondly, land redistribution was also part of the 
implementation of the new social pact and with the promulgation of the dahir (royal 
decree) of 3 March 1973 foreign owned agricultural property was to be expropriated 
and distributed among large Moroccan landowners.147 Between 300,000 and 400,000 
hectares were expropriated and transferred into Moroccan hands. Most of these lands 
were controlled by two state-controlled holdings, SODEA and SOGETA. It assured the 
participation of some of the wealthiest elites of the country, many of whom were part of 
the royal family. Accordingly, in the end, only those with high connections within the 
state-administration	benefited	from	the	agrarian	reform	(see	Swearingen,	1987;	Pen-
nell, 2000; Ben Ali, 1997; White, 2001). Thirdly, the favourable economic rents were 
144  One of the reasons for the political economic shift was the structural crisis of the agricultural sector 
in the 1970s. Some important factors were population growth, changing trade relations with the European 
Community, periodic droughts, price settings to sustain and subsidize the urban poor and favoritism to-
wards the industrial farmers at the expense of small scale farmers (for extensive discussion see Swearingen, 
1987). 
145  Until today, the OCP remains the most important public company in the Kingdom with more than 
30,000 employees. It produces 3% of Morocco’s GDP and represents 30% of Moroccan exports (Catusse, 
2009b: 63).
146		After	the	coups,	Hassan	II	attempted	to	reduce	the	influence	of	the	military	in	the	Ministry	of	Interior	
(General Oufkir, then minister of Interior, was accused to be the instigator behind the second coup). He also 
turned to the nationalist movement, including the leftist UNFP (which was severely repressed during the 
1960s) for negotiations. As a result of the search for a new political consensus between the monarchy and 
the nationalist movement, the UNFP broke up and one of the fractions formed the USFP. This new leftist 
party distanced itself from the ‘revolutionary option’ espoused ten years earlier by Mehdi Ben Barka. The 
monarchy from her side complied with some of the demands of the nationalist bourgeoisie by adopting 
nationalist policies such as the Maroccanization of the economy, the Arabization of education, etc. (for a 
detailed discussion see Sater, 2010: 30-52).    
147		See	Bulletin	Officiel:	http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1973%5CBO_3149_fr.pdf. 
In Moroccan law, a dahir is a royal decree. It is an instrument by which the king legally enforces his deci-
sions.
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also used to invest massively in the expansion of the public sector and redistribute some 
of the national wealth through employment policies and job security. In addition, the 
government continued to subsidize essential food items. As such, the palace tried to 
establish a more stable social pact with the working classes and managed to purchase 
the loyalty of an emerging middle class and growing group of educated youth in the cit-
ies. Finally, the monarchy also tried to strengthen the private sector. Besides the imple-
mentation of several protectionist measures (e.g. import taxes and import-licenses), the 
government issued the Moroccanization law in order to secure at least 50% of Moroc-
can	ownership	in	domestic	firms	and	promote	an	emerging	corporate	class	(Cherkaoui	
and Ben Ali, 2007). These laws were promulgated by the dahir of 2 March 1973.148 With 
this law the palace sought the return of Moroccan assets into Moroccan hands.149 By 
June 1975, 49% of the targeted Moroccan companies were moroccanized (54% of the 
commercial sector and 45% of the industrial sector) (Rami, 2007: 68). 
The political relationship between the monarchy and the Moroccan bourgeoisie was 
very complex. In the past, the palace had always acknowledged the existence of an im-
portant	and	influential	urban	bourgeoisie	such	as	the	Fassis	in	the	north	and	to	a	lesser	
extent the Soussis in the South.150 Through special favours and practices of clientilism, 
the palace had managed to incorporate the traditional merchant families (mostly Fas-
sis)	 into	the	royal	sphere	of	 influence.	Yet,	at	 the	same	time,	and	via	the	state’s	grip	
over the economy, the palace also tried to control and circumscribe their power (White, 
2001).151 After all, Hassan II was reluctant to see the emergence of a strong independent 
bourgeoisie that could eventually form a counter force to his political power. With the 
Moroccanization of the economy, the monarchy sought to deepen and strengthen its ties 
with the bourgeoisie while it encouraged the controlled emergence of a capitalist elite 
148		See	Bulletin	Officiel:	http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1973%5CBO_3149_fr.pdf.
149		It	must	be	noted	that	this	didn’t	always	imply	a	significant	loss	of	influence	of	foreign	capital	in	the	
Moroccan economy. Although the Moroccanization law encouraged Moroccans to take over foreign busi-
nesses, many of them actually established strategic partnerships with foreign capital, allowing the latter to 
retain and in some cases even increase its holdings in the Moroccan economy. Nevertheless, the Moroc-
canization	did	radically	improve	the	significance	of	Moroccan	private	capital	in	the	economic	realm	(Cam-
mett, 2007: 98; see also Rami, 2007: 68-71). 
150  The Fassis were an amalgam of some of the most important elite families in Morocco and their origins 
lie in the city of Fez. While these families not necessarily lived in Fez – especially, since the economic 
and political power centers moved respectively to Casablanca and Rabat during the Protectorate – it was 
the family’s original descent that earned them the label of Fassi. Throughout the period of the Protectorate 
some	of	these	families	had	managed	to	preserve	their	influence	and	became	powerful	political	actors	after	
the independence. The Soussis are originally petty tradesmen of the Souss Valley. Throughout the years 
some	of	these	families	managed	to	built	large	trade	businesses	and	gained	considerable	political	influence.		
151  John Waterbury notes that it were those Fassi families with considerable economic power and com-
mercial	networks	that	managed	to	preserve	their	influence	during	and	after	the	French	Protectorate.	Their	
livelihood was assured through commerce and real estate. Other Fassi families, mostly those who depended 
on the Sultan for important administrative posts, could not fall back on an autonomous economic base. The 
offspring of the commercial families from the cities were also largely responsible for the founding of the 
nationalist movement. The Istiqlal party is generally regarded as the Fassi party and the direction of the 
party has always been in the hands of these economically powerful families (Waterbury, 1970: 94-106). For 
example, the current prime minister and leader of the Istiqlal, Abbas al-Fassi, is married to the daughter of 
one of the founders of the party, Mohamed Allal al-Fassi. As mentioned above, the Moroccan monarchy 
was involved in an extensive power struggle with an important segment of the urban bourgeoisie during the 
first	decades	of	its	rule.	It	were	these	latter	families	that	saw	great	benefit	in	the	partial	expulsion	of	foreign	
economic participations and the morrocanization of the economy in the 1970s. Some important measures 
taken by the public authorities in that period can thus be seen as a concession to their needs and interests.   
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under the wings of the state. Therefore, the Moroccanization should be seen above all 
as	a	political	manoeuvre.	To	be	sure,	it	fulfilled	the	expectations	of	a	rising	capitalist	
bourgeoisie, reinforced their positions, expanded their ranks and led to the concentra-
tion and accumulation of private capital, but exactly in such a manner that it could be 
controlled by those who controlled the state. As such, state power was mobilized to 
enlarge the monarchy’s support base and helped the economic elites to accumulate 
wealth beyond the means of mere land property and commerce (as they did mainly in 
the past). 
As a result, private capital depended on the state to improve their economic positions 
and	redefine	their	relations	with	foreign	capital.	Access	to	the	state	apparatus	and	state	
favours became a necessary condition for success in business. In return, large parts 
of the bourgeoisie re-invigorated their loyalty to the palace and were brought into the 
realm of the makhzen	(Ben	Ali,	1997;	Cammett,	2007).	Despite	the	official	discourse	
that the Moroccanization was intended to encourage middle class ownership in the pri-
vate sector, the policies, together with most other policies of state intervention, allowed 
a small segment of capitalist families, closely tied to the monarchy, to enrich them-
selves. A minority of traditional economic elites and the upper echelons of the state 
bureaucracy managed to enlarge their holdings in the Moroccan economy and gained 
control over more than 60% of the capital involved (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2007).152 
Approximately 36 capitalist families gained control over roughly 220 million MAD 
involved in the process (Ben Ali, 1997). And despite the fact that Moroccan rulers al-
ways emphasized the inherent liberal ideology behind their economic policies, the state 
remained the country’s most important entrepreneur, banker and employer until the 
end	of	the	1970s.	This	process	or	specific	mode	of	production	in	which	the	state	serves	
as the primary motor to strengthen and nurture the private sector can be labelled as a 
form of “state capitalism” (Waterbury, 1991; Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 206-209). 
Richards and Waterbury distinguish two forms of state capitalism. First, state capital-
ism can be a process of accumulation in service of the private sector and private elite 
interests. Secondly, state capitalism can also be a process of accumulation in which the 
state undertakes all activities of resource mobilization and infrastructure development 
and,	as	such,	captures	the	surpluses	to	finance	its	own	expansion,	often	at	the	expense	
of	the	private	sector.	In	the	Moroccan	case,	state	capitalism	was	specifically	deployed	
to	service	the	private	interests	of	the	elites.	The	state	transferred	surpluses	and	profits	
to the private sector and absorbed most of the investment risks. The Moroccan ISI-
policies should therefore not be confused with more populist or socialist ISI-policies 
(such as in Egypt under Nasser). The increasing control of the Moroccan state over the 
economy did not involve a major shift in the power relations between workers and capi-
talists. Public ownership or public intervention didn’t mean, in the case of Morocco, 
that	the	profit	motive	had	disappeared	or	that	the	workers	had	some	significant	control	
over the surpluses generated by their own labour (Ibid.: 207). One of the reasons for the 
establishment of more socialist inspired developmental state models was exactly a fun-
damental change in the balance of power between labour and capital, which then led to 
152		However,	the	benefits	of	the	Moroccanization	policies	were	not	exclusively	monopolized	by	the	tra-
ditional elites. A new emerging group of petty tradesmen and small businessmen from the Souss area also 
profited	from	the	new	economic	opportunities	(Sater,	2010:	95).	
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serious policies of redistribution.153 Additionally, Myriam Catusse notes that, differently 
from other countries in the region, the Moroccan state had showed itself particularly 
modest in terms of redistributing national wealth and providing social security for its 
citizens (Catusse, 2009a: 201). 
The absence of durable and extensive rent revenues from for example oil, limited the 
monarchy’s capacities to articulate public loyalties on the basis of a rentier social con-
tract (Leveau, 1997). The policies of state intervention in the mid-1970s were only suc-
cessful as long as the rents from the export in phosphate were high.154 After the oil boom 
of 1973 prices had quintupled within only three years time and the government could 
significantly	 increase	 its	public	 spending	policies.	However,	by	 the	end	of	1975	 the	
international price dropped back to the level of 1973. But, it was just at that time that 
the	king	had	mobilized	the	‘Green	March’	and	the	Moroccan	government	had	to	find	
ways	to	finance	the	conflict	in	the	Western	Sahara.	Overall,	government	expenditure	
continued to expand. For example, public investment increased by 340% between 1974 
and 1978 and more than 250 public companies were created in that same period (Sater, 
2010: 95). Moreover, between 1970 and 1984 current expenditures of the government 
rose from 14% to 30% of GDP (World Bank, 1987).155 Consequently, by the end of the 
1970s, Morocco’s state interventionist efforts began to crumble. It became clear – after 
several	droughts,	a	decline	in	phosphate	revenues	and	the	growing	cost	of	the	conflict	
in the Western Sahara – that the Moroccan government could not sustain their public 
spending spree. The sharp fall in export earnings from phosphates and the crisis in the 
agricultural sector (with a decline of export earnings in agricultural products) led to a 
sharp	increase	of	the	public	deficit.	Despite	efforts	to	keep	spending	under	control	with	
the	first	austerity	measures	at	the	end	of	the	1970s	foreign	public	debt	increased	from	
19.6% of GDP in 1975 to a staggering 85% in 1983 (Cohen and Jaïdi, 2006: 37; see 
also World Bank, 1987).
Structural adjustment and urban unrest
In	 1978	 the	Moroccan	government	 launched	 a	first	 three	 year	 austerity	 plan	 (1978-
1980)	in	order	to	cope	with	the	increasing	deficits.	Public	investments	were	cut,	some	
taxes were increased and the salaries of public servants were restricted. In the social 
sector, spending on health care and housing declined. These measures, however, were 
felt the most by the poorest social groups in society and under popular pressure the 
government retreated some of their measures in 1979, granting a 10% raise to average 
civil servants’ salaries and an increase of the minimum wage by 30-40% (Richards & 
Waterbury, 2008: 244). A second attempt to cut public spending on food subsidies was 
quickly	aborted	when	a	sharp	rise	in	consumer	prices	led	to	the	first	so-called	‘bread-
riots’ in spring 1981.156 The immediate trigger for the disturbances in 1981 was the deci-
153  In the history of Morocco, shifts in the balances of power, especially those between capital and labour, 
were less radical and have been integrated relatively easy into the realm of makhzen power (see also be-
low). 
154		But	even	at	the	height	of	the	phosphate	boom,	state	expansion	was	still	partly	financed	by	foreign	bor-
rowing (Richards and Waterbury, 2008: 243).
155  Current expenditures are recurring forms of spending. In other words, those government expenditures 
that are consumed and only limited in time. These expenses on goods and services are normally consumed 
within	the	current	year	(e.g.	salaries,	food	subsidies,	health	care,	pensions	and	other	welfare	benefits,	etc.).
156		These	riots	were	also	called	the	first	IMF-riots	as	the	government	had	accepted	IMF-austerity	measures	
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sion by the government to raise prices on staple goods between 14 and 77%. The price 
of	milk	rose	by	14%,	oil	28%,	flower	with	40%,	sugar	between	40	and	50%,	and	butter	
even with 76% (Clément, 1992: 403). To contest these decisions, the Union Marocaine 
des Travailleurs, the oldest trade union of the country and historically linked to the 
nationalist movement, called for a general strike in Casablanca on June 18. The Con-
fédération Démocratique du Travaille (CDT) – another one of the biggest trade unions 
and back then linked to the USFP – called for a nationwide general strike only two days 
later, on June 20 1981.157	The	first	strike	was	largely	successful	and	the	UMT,	together	
with the other unions who joined them, managed to shut down Casablanca (Clément & 
Paul, 1984). One day later, and in order to keep the situation under control, the govern-
ment arrested some of the leaders of the CDT in order to anticipate the second strike. 
But this couldn’t prevent the second strike from taking place also. 
In contrast to the previous one, the CDT strike assumed a more militant and radical 
character and, eventually, the situation got out of control. During the strike social ten-
sions exacerbated and riots broke out in the peripheries of the city of Casablanca. These 
quickly expanded to the city-centre. The rioters were mostly young and unemployed 
inhabitants from the poorer neighbourhoods. In the morning of June 20, cars were set 
on	fire	in	the	peripheries	of	the	city.	At	noon,	some	3000	people	coming	from	the	slums	
and the illegal quarters occupied one of the main highways and raised barricades. Later 
on,	banks	were	set	on	fire,	and	other	public	and	private	building	and	vehicles	were	dam-
aged or even destroyed. The government answered with severe repression and police 
forces	even	fired	on	the	demonstrators.	The	siege	lasted	for	several	days,	helicopters	
were deployed to survey the sites of unrest and the army was brought into action. In 
the end, thousands of rioters were arrested, party newspapers were suspended, local 
CDT	offices	were	shut	down	and	several	leaders	of	the	opposition	and	the	trade	unions,	
amongst them CDT secretary-general Moubir Amaoui, were thrown in prison. Esti-
mates	of	the	amount	of	casualties	varied	between	66	deaths	(official	number)	and	be-
tween	600	and	1,000	deaths	(figures	from	the	opposition	and	international	observers)	
(Ibid.: 403-404; Lust-Okar, 2005: 128-130).  
The	first	attempts	by	the	Moroccan	government	to	push	through	some	serious	austerity	
measures largely failed. The severe social unrests had made the political climate very 
unstable. Additionally, the agricultural sector had to cope with a series of crises in the 
early 1980s. Several droughts, bad government decisions and the agricultural competi-
tion from new European Community members such as Portugal and Spain worsened the 
economic condition of the Moroccan agricultural sector and accelerated rural migration 
(Swearingen	1987).	On	top	of	that,	the	first	Gulf	War	between	Iraq	and	Iran	caused	a	
second oil chock. As a result, public spending remained high and even increased, and 
the government saw it necessary to continue their foreign borrowing. Morocco resorted 
to	private	loans	from	the	international	financial	markets	to	cover	the	deficits,	averaging	
800 million USD a year between 1978-1980 (Rhazaoui, 1987).158 In order to confront 
the	economic	challenges,	the	government	launched	an	ambitious	five-year	Plan	(1981-
in early 1981 as a condition for further loans (Clément & Paul, 1984; Clément, 1992).
157  Nowadays the CDT has distanced itself from the USFP. After the separation, the USFP has set up a 
new union close to the party: the Fédération Démocratique du Travail (FDT). 
158  USD: US dollar.
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1985) based on an estimated GDP growth rate of almost 7% per annum. To achieve this 
objective, the plan continued to put emphasis on import substitution and an increase 
of public investments. Yet, no real structural changes were planned.159 The government 
probably hoped that the phosphate price shocks were temporarily and attempted to 
“grow through the recession” (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 243). According to the 
World Bank this investment plan by far exceeded the available resources and set the 
stage for a necessary retrenchment (World Bank, 1987). By mid-1983 it became clear 
that Morocco could no longer service its debts and pay for critical imports. The country 
was	near	bankrupt	and	joined	the	list	of	the	fifteen	most	indebted	countries	in	the	world	
(Catusse,	2009b:	62;	Sater,	2010:	97).	Foreign	creditors	refused	to	continue	to	finance	
Morocco’s	deficits	and	the	government	was	obliged	to	turn	to	the	IMF	and	the	World	
Bank for help. 
Between	1980	and	1993	there	were	nine	IMF-interventions,	six	official	debt	reschedul-
ing exercises and three commercial debt rescheduling exercises (Pfeifer, 1999; Pen-
nell,	 2000:	 357;	 Joffé,	 2009).	 In	 1983,	 the	first	 Structural	Adjustment	Program	was	
implemented.160 Morocco obtained rescheduling loans from the Paris Club (1,350 mil-
lion USD) and from the London Club (630 million USD) (World Bank, 1987).161 Both 
the World Bank and the IMF advised the Moroccan government on economic reform, 
but did so from a different perspective. While the World Bank approach concentrated 
more	on	augmenting	the	supply	of	foreign	exchange	and	improving	the	efficiency	of	
resource allocation (i.e. market re-regulation and liberalization), the IMF concentrated 
mainly	on	expenditure	containment	and	public	deficit	reduction	(i.e.	the	implementa-
tion of austerity measures). Nevertheless, both the World Bank and the IMF had the 
same macroeconomic objective (Horton, 1990). In general, this objective of macro-
economic stability was achieved through the different (typically orthodox) means of 
market liberalization and deregulation: major cuts in public expenditures, investments 
and consumer subsidies, public wage restraint, the promotion of exports through the 
devaluation of the national currency, the reduction of import taxes and customs tariffs, 
fiscal	discipline	and	reform,	the	liberalization	of	the	banking	system	(in	1985),	the	mo-
bilization of domestic capital, the attraction of FDI through the planning of economic 
free zones, and last but not least the privatization of public assets and the roll back of 
direct state intervention. In general, the mobility of capital and the means of produc-
tion were drastically improved and the direct economic control of the state drastically 
reduced.	As	a	result,	budgetary	deficits	were	reduced	to	around	2%	of	GDP	in	1985.	
Additionally, Morocco joined the GATT in 1987 and the WTO in 1995.162
IMF-promoted stabilization was above all intended to restore macro-economic dis-
equilibria, not to improve the social situation of the poorest among the population. 
159  For a detailed discussion of the plan see Rhazaoui (1987). 
160  For a detailed World Bank discussion on Morocco’s economic policies of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
IMF	and	World	Bank	interventions	and	its	public	deficit	increase	see	Horton	(1990).
161  The Paris Club works closely together with the IMF and consists of the representatives of the biggest 
economies in the world. It brings together debtor and creditor states for negotiations on debt rescheduling. 
The London club as a forum brings together debtor states and major commercial creditors for debt resched-
uling (Joffé, 2009: 163).
162  The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with the Marrakech Agreement of May 1995. 
The fact that the WTO was founded in Marrakech proved Morocco’s commitment to trade liberalization.
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As mentioned above, SAPs hit the middle and low-income groups the hardest. While 
international	financial	institutions	do	not	contradict	this,	they	often	argued	that	some	
sacrifices	have	 to	be	made	 in	order	 to	 secure	 sustainable	growth	and	welfare	 in	 the	
long term. However, structural adjustment in Morocco has set the stage for a growing 
uneven development in the country that hasn’t really improved ever since. The eco-
nomic adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a decline in real and relative 
incomes (Cohen, 2004). In 1970 40.5% of the urban households lived in a two-room 
flat.	In	1985	this	number	increased	to	54.5%.	Households	who	disposed	of	four	or	more	
rooms represented 31% of the population in 1970 while in 1985 this number decreased 
to only 19%. At the same time the average family size in the city rose from 4.3 in 1960 
and 5.2 in 1970 to 5.4 in 1982 (Rachik, 1995: 96).163 On the human development index 
of the UNDP, Morocco passed from 117th place in 1995 to the 130th place in 2009.164 
Absolute poverty in Morocco (people living beneath the poverty line) rose during the 
1990s from 13% of the population in 1991 to 19% in 1999 (Catusse, 2008: 143). The 
disappointing economic growth, especially during the 1990s, and the cutbacks in public 
investment correlated with high rates of poverty and unemployment (Cohen & Jaidi, 
2006). Unemployment was estimated at 30% to 40% in the early 1980s and especially 
affected young educated Moroccans who saw their prospects of working in the public 
administration shattered (Brand, 1998; Cohen 2004; Cohen & Jaidi, 2006).165 And as 
the economic crisis continued in the urban regions, new violent demonstrations broke 
out on 5 January 1984 in Marrakech. In the days that followed, the violence spread 
again throughout the country, especially in the North. The disturbances of 1984 were 
labelled as the second IMF-revolts – due to the rise in prices of consumer goods – and 
they comprised an accumulation of revolts in more than 50 cities. They had started with 
a university strike in December 1983 in Marrakech. In total, more than 14,000 people 
were arrested and casualties were estimated at 200 (Seddon, 1989; Clément, 1992). Six 
years later, a new general strike on 14 December 1990, set the beginning of another 
violent explosion. This time, it originated in Fez and then spread to the cities of Tangi-
ers, Kenitra and Meknes (Madani, 1995). The second Gulf war was one of the triggers 
for disgruntled citizens to come out and protest. Again shops, banks and state buildings 
had	been	set	on	fire	and	the	Moroccan	army	had	to	intervene	to	restore	order.
One of the main social consequences of the implementation of the SAP was the dra-
matic reduction of the recruitment rate in the public sector. Between 1982 and 1983 
available public sector jobs dropped dramatically from 50,000 to 5,000 (Akesbi, 2003). 
During the following years the amount of public sector jobs increased again but never 
reached the levels of the previous decade. In contrast, the 1970s, with its favourable 
economic climate, the modernization of the industry and the continuous urban migra-
tion had seen the emergence of a growing urban middle class that was largely incor-
porated into the expanded public sector. As part of the new social pact between the 
makhzen and the new urban middle class, graduates were practically guaranteed a job 
in the public sector. Just as in other Maghreb countries like Algeria and Tunisia, public 
sector employment was one of the main government instruments to redistribute wealth 
163  The rate of children per women (total fertility) was still very high in the beginning of the 1980s in 
Morocco. Rates were 5,65 in 1980 and 5,12 in 1984 (for detailed numbers see: http://www.gapminder.org). 
164  http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics (accessed 17/09/2010).
165		Official	figures	give	usually	a	less	worrisome	picture.
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in Morocco (Catusse & Destremau, 2010). Between 1970 and 1977 university enrol-
ment tripled and the number of public servants grew at an annual rate of 5,5% aver-
age (Cohen, 2003). But as a result of structural adjustment, this social-pact could not 
be	sustained	and	a	growing	group	of	young	graduates	struggled	to	find	adequate	job	
opportunities. Since the early 1990s the unemployed graduates (diplômés chômeurs) 
started	to	mobilize	for	the	first	time	and	established	the	Moroccan National Association 
of Unemployed Graduates (ANDCM). Since then, the unemployed graduates have be-
come a permanent and highly visible feature of the social protest landscape in Morocco 
(cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). They are engaged in almost daily protest actions in 
front of the national parliament in Rabat and they demand to be employed in the public 
sector. From the mid-1990s onwards, new groups of unemployed graduates (such as the 
post-graduates with engineering, master and doctoral degrees) have appeared on stage 
(Emperador, 2007; 2010). 
In general we can conclude that increased global market integration and market liberal-
ization in the 1980s and the 1990s radically reorganized the labour markets in Morocco 
and elsewhere in the Arab region. As a consequence, it radically altered the position of 
the urban middle classes. Social inequality between the mainly young lower and mid-
dle-income populations and the business and political elites of Morocco increased. Af-
ter the structural adjustments, a growing mass of urban residents now had to search for 
a different future (Cohen, 2004). It is than not a surprise, that we have seen an increase 
of social protest in Morocco over the past decade, especially in the smaller towns where 
social misery, despair and inequality among the country’s middle classes are even felt 
stronger	 than	 in	 the	 largest	 cities	 (Bennafla	&	Emperador,	2009).	 It	were	also	 these	
deprived middle classes that recently mobilized in the streets of Tunisia and Egypt in 
January and February of 2011 to chase away respectively Ben Ali and Mubarak. In the 
end, it was not so much poverty but rather social decline and increasing inequality that 
pushed these peoples to exceed themselves and become genuine revolutionary forces. 
Accumulation by dispossession
By the early 1990s, and in spite of the social costs, Morocco was being pushed forward 
by the World Bank and the IMF as a success story of macro-economic stabilization and 
text-book economic reform (World Bank, 1990; 1994; for a more critical account see 
Pfeifer, 1999). However, despite more than a decade of structural adjustment, external 
debt servicing continued to take a substantial portion of state revenues and public debt 
even continued to grow (Brand, 1998: 33).166 In order to service those debts, the privati-
zation of public assets and public companies was the logical next step in the economic 
restructuring of the country. Privatization was the dominant ‘development’ strategy in 
the	Global	South	to	redeem	state	deficits	after	the	Third	World	debt	crisis	of	the	early	
1980s. Within neoclassical and neoliberal discourses privatization strategies were pre-
sented	as	necessary	to	roll	back	highly	inefficient	public	enterprise.	In	addition,	privati-
zation was also presented as necessary to promote a political transition as the personal 
‘cash cows’ of rent-seeking state elites would be dismantled. Economic activity would 
then be a matter of more honest private initiative and independent entrepreneurship 
166  According to Laurie Brand, overall recovery was still much slower than previously estimated and 
economic windfalls at the end of the 1980s were due to a sharp rise of productivity and export in the agri-
cultural sector. 
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– the democracy of the market as it was called euphemistically. New social groups 
would then be empowered and bring forth the necessary political change. However, two 
important remarks have to take the edge of this neoliberal myth. First of all, the move 
towards privatization was inspired more by the severe decline of public revenues, espe-
cially	in	the	MENA-region,	than	by	the	so-called	inefficiency	of	public	enterprises	and	
the	efficiency	of	private	ones	(Ayubi,	1997).	In	matter	of	fact,	the	first	companies	that	
were privatized in Morocco were some of the jewels of the public sector and had little 
or	no	efficiency	or	budget	problems	whatsoever	(Khosrowshahi,	1997;	Catusse,	2008;	
2009a). Secondly, there are multiple political, economic and social causes and conse-
quences that have led to the opening up of the economy for private capital. Indeed, one 
of the effects was the loss of state-clientilistic means to buy off the loyalty of a rent-
seeking elite. Additionally, privatization also implied the end of the social pact between 
the ruling elite and the urban middle classes via employment in the public sector. 
This said, it is true that privatization could disturb the former neo-patrimonial logic of 
the political regimes in the Arab region. Yet, this didn’t mean that political liberaliza-
tion was the logical outcome. Privatization policies were still a state-led and state-
controlled policy (Ayubi, 1997). Those who controlled the state, also controlled the 
specific	implementation	of	privatization	policies.	As	a	result,	we	can	see	that	in	Mo-
rocco,	as	elsewhere	in	the	region,	privatization	served	also	another	end	besides	filling	
up the state coffers. Privatization became a new source of patronage for the makhzen 
to reinforce and extend their links with the political and economic elites of the country 
(Ben Ali, 1997; Khosrowshahi, 1997; Najem, 2001; Catusse, 2008). Nevertheless, as 
Myriam Catusse and Béatrice Hibou have stressed, while the politics of privatization 
may have little transformed the sociological fabric of the elites in the beginning, it did 
significantly	transform	the	modalities	of	governmental	action	(Hibou,	2004b;	Catusse,	
2008; 2009a). Consequently, both structural adjustment in general and privatization in 
specific,	made	former	networks	of	state	clientilism	and	neo-patrimonialism	inadequate	
to maintain the political status quo. The opening up of the domestic economies in the 
region radically changed political practices, leading up to new practices and modes of 
intervention, and in some cases even to the emergence of new groups and new political 
actors. For starters, it brought international capital back in the front seat. 45% of all 
privatizations in Morocco realized between 1993 and 2002 were allocated to foreign 
investors (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a). 
Privatization policies in Morocco were not implemented until 1989. In December that 
year, national parliament validated a new law that set the conditions for privatization. 
On	11	April	1990	law	39-89	was	published	and	officially	kicked	off	the	privatization	of	
public	assets.	Still,	it	lasted	until	February	1993	when	the	first	public	company,	the	So-
ciété des Dérivés du Sucre, was privatized. During the whole process of privatizations 
the	state	maintained	firm	control	and	law	39-89	provided	for	the	creation	of	three	new	
state-organisms that had to overview the process: a new ministry, the Ministry of Pri-
vatizations, a transfer commission and an evaluation committee (the Valuation 
Authority).167 The latter had to set the minimum price for a company sale and enjoyed 
considerable legal autonomy. For example, the government could not oppose the price 
167  The Valuation Authority is the name used by Cameron Khosrowshahi (1997: 247).
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set by the Valuation Authority, only advice the committee to revise the price (Catusse, 
2008: 77-78). As such, Hassan II kept political control over the sales.168 Law 39-89 
listed an initial 112 businesses (76 companies and 36 hotels). It was striking that in 
the beginning, most of the more strategic state-led enterprises and state monopolies 
were missing from the list. As such, the public authorities wished to keep control over 
the distribution of, amongst others, water and electricity, telecommunications, public 
transport, mining, the social housing sector, etc… It were above all those companies 
in which the state participated indirectly – through public holdings such as SNI, ODI 
and CDG – that were the listed for privatization (El Malki & Doumou, 1992; see also 
Jaidi, 1992).169 Accordingly, the initial list called into question what rhetorically and 
theoretically should have been the main goal of the process, namely the elimination of 
inefficient	public	management	and	 the	dismantling	of	excessive	and	corrupt	bureau-
cratic	control	 (Khosrowshahi,	1997:	244).	The	firms	on	 the	 list	were	not	 those	with	
major budget problems. On the contrary, those sectors and companies with consider-
able	efficiency	problems	were	exactly	 those	with	a	significant	strategic	and	political	
interests.	This	raises	the	suspicion	that	the	privatization	policies	were	first	of	all	politi-
cally	inspired	policies.	The	selling	of	profitable	firms	and	the	control	over	strategic	but	
inefficient	companies	not	only	brought	 the	accusation	that	 the	state	was	“privatizing	
the winners and nationalizing the losers”, but also demonstrated that the monarchy 
was reluctant to give up its economic control too fast (Ibid.:246). Moreover, during 
the 1990s and the 2000s some of these more strategic sectors would also be privatized 
(e.g. telecommunications) or incorporated into public-private partnerships (e.g. water 
and electricity).       
Most	observers	agree	that	the	privatization	policies	have	not	significantly	affected	the	
power of political elites and in reality actually further encouraged the concentration of 
economic wealth in the hands of a minority. Accumulated wealth was still concentrated 
around a few powerful families: Benjelloun (banking sector), Kettani (textile), Lam-
rani, Berrada, Akkhenouch and last but not least the royal family itself who dominates 
the domestic market with its control over the consortium Omnium Nord Africain. Nev-
ertheless, as mentioned above, privatization did bring forth considerable changes. First 
of all, the privatization policies, together with other free market policies, entailed a de 
facto de-maroccanization of the economy as it again permitted the establishment of to-
tally	foreign-owned	companies.	This	increased	the	flow	of	foreign	capital	to	Morocco.	
For example, although initially excluded, the telecom business became available for 
private investors at the beginning of the 21st century and Méditel became a consortium 
in the hands of one of the primary Moroccan capitalists, Othman Benjelloun, together 
with important foreign participations of Portugal Telecom and the Spanish multination-
168  There was also some opposition against the privatization policies from within the government appara-
tus. The rent-seeking elite and government technocrats, occupying key positions in the state administration, 
did not want to give up their prerogatives and feared the withering away of their political resources as their 
careers depended on the monarchy. Indeed, public sector managers were directly nominated and relieved of 
their positions by dahir. 
169  SNI (Société Nationale d’Investissement). SNI was a holding created via the Moroccanization law and 
is	one	of	the	dominant	investors	in	Morocco.	ODI	(Office	de	Développement	Industriel).	
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al Telefónica.170	As	such,	Méditel	was	Morocco’s	first	private	mobile	phone	operator.171 
Additionally, the privatization policies implicated above all the dominant return to the 
forefront of French private holdings. Morocco’s state monopoly in telecommunica-
tions,	Maroc	Telecom,	was	sold	to	the	French	multinational	Vivendi	in	two	times	(first	
35% in 2002, later 51% in 2005). Other French companies such as Société Générale 
and BNP Paribas (banking sector), Axa (assurances), Accor and Club Med (tourism), 
Suez and Veolia (water and electricity), Alstom (transport), Bouygues (constructions), 
etc.	have	now	firmly	established	themselves	in	the	Moroccan	domestic	market.	Overall,	
between 2001 and 2005, 80% of FDI was realized by French (66%) and Spanish (14%) 
investors. Only, recently things are changing with the emergence of investors from the 
Gulf in cities like Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakech (Vermeren 2009: 260-277). 
Secondly, economic liberalization since the early 1980s changed the behaviour of the 
monarchy itself. In 1982, king Hassan II increased his stake in the holding Omnium 
Nord African (ONA), which is the largest private conglomerate of the country. He 
bought his share from French owners for a sum of at least 100 million USD (Clément, 
1986). From that moment on, the king, as the primary political leader of the country, 
became also the most important private businessman of Morocco. Through the king’s 
own private holding SIGER (anagram for REGIS) the royal family is now the majority 
shareholder of ONA. Catusse (2008) argues that ONA was one of the principal ben-
eficiaries	of	the	privatization	policies.	Through	its	different	subsidiaries	and	minority	
participations, ONA is a major player in the retail market, the banking sector, min-
ing, tourism, real estate, automobiles, the textile industry and high technology. Since 
2008, the holding also tries to break the duopoly of Méditel and Maroc Telecom in the 
telecommunications sector. It was the state regulator, the Agence Nationale de Régle-
mentation des Télécommunications (ANRT), that waved in Wana (owned by ONA) to 
compete with both Méditel and Maroc Telecom.172 The king’s role as both statesman 
and	private	investor	proves	his	ambiguous	position	and	regularly	creates	conflicts	of	
interest – from state subsidies on products manufactured and traded by ONA subsidiar-
ies to the deregulation of the insurance or the banking sector (Sater, 2010: 103). In the 
beginning of 2010, the royal family even expanded its control over the economy by 
establishing the fusion between ONA and that other major Moroccan conglomerate, 
the National Investment Company (SNI). This “royal big bang”, as it was referred to 
by weekly magazine Telquel, did cost an estimated 24 billion MAD and further con-
solidated the kings economic power.173 The dominance of the royal family in Moroccan 
capitalism made many other capitalist families little inclined to rebel against one of 
their most important business partners and main political guarantor (Clément, 1986). 
170  However, both Portugal Telecom and Telefónica sold their shares to domestic investors in September 
2009 as they sought to focus on their core markets in Europe, Latin America and sub-Sahara Africa. See: 
http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=448452 (accessed 18/09/2010). Now, France Telecom wants to 
move into the Moroccan telecom market (Oxford Business Group newsletter 21/09/2010, Morocco: new 
player in telecom sector) and on 21 September 2010 the French company bought 40% of Meditel – via 
its subsidiary Atlas Services Belgium – for an amount of 640 million Euros (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 
23/09/2010: http://www.aujourdhui.ma/couverture-details78247.html, accessed 24/09/2010). 
171  For a detailed discussion on the politics behind the privatization of this sector and the controlling role 
of the monarchy (see Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).
172  Newsletter Oxford Business Group (17 March 2009). (See also www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com). This 
is actually not surprising since the ‘autonomous’ ANRT is controlled by the palace (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).
173  Iraqi, F. & Michbal, M., Big Bang Royal, in: Telquel, n°418 (3-9 April 2010), pp.18-28.
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Many elite families, such as for example the Benjelloun family, actually participate 
in the same holdings and consortiums as the royal family which brings together their 
interests.174 
Thirdly,	the	economic	liberalization	repositioned	and	redefined	the	modalities	of	state	
intervention (see below, and more in detail in chapter 4 and 5). The Moroccan state 
now	controls	the	economy	more	indirectly	through	specific	forms	regulation,	the	redis-
tribution of resources (e.g. privatizations), and through concessions and partnerships 
with the private sector (e.g. the deals concerning the distribution of water and electric-
ity with Suez/Lydec in Casablanca, Veolia/Redal in Rabat, and Veolia in Tetouan and 
Tangiers).175 Aside from indirect control, newly established institutions with direct links 
to the monarchy had to improve the latter’s control in economic affairs. For example – 
and directly related to the privatization policies – a substantial part of the earnings from 
privatization (more than 50%) went to the autonomous Hassan II Fund for Economic 
and Social Development.	This	gave	new	leverage	to	the	monarchy	to	redefine	its	patron-
age politics. The sale of the telecommunication licenses raised much more money than 
expected	and	the	monarchy	did	not	want	the	Moroccan	government	to	profit	from	it	all.	
The established Hassan II fund was to be governed by royal councillors and exempted 
from parliamentary and government control (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).176 The most impor-
tant mission for the Hassan II Fund was to sponsor those projects that promoted socio-
economic	development	(e.g.	 the	Bouregreg	project).	But	 the	specific	procedures	and	
strategies followed by the Fund Hassan II are very untransparent. As discussed earlier, 
one of the characteristic of neoliberal economic liberalization in Morocco was the roll 
out	of	state	power	into	such	types	of	new	institutional	and	territorial	configurations	(see	
also below and chapter 5).177 According to Hibou and Tozy such agencies – which are 
becoming a trend Mohamed VI’s Morocco – prove the superiority of the technocratic 
structures loyal to the palace over the more politicized and traditional government in-
stitutions (Ibid: 114). 
Finally,	privatization	policies	had	also	another	specific	consequence.	To	the	extent	that	
state property could still be considered to belong to all citizens of that state – even 
though state wealth was very unevenly redistributed and controlled by a neo-patrimoni-
al elite – the privatization of important public assets could also be considered as a form 
of dispossession of those public belongings. It becomes all the more ambiguous when 
primary commodities and services such as water, electricity, public transport and health 
care	are	turned	over	to	profit-hungry	enterprise.	These	developments	are	a	key	feature	
of a process which David Harvey has described as accumulation by dispossession. By 
this he means “the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx 
174  Othman Benjelloun has share in both ONA and SNI. (Telquel, n°418: 22)
175  For a detailed discussion on the impact of the water and electricity concessions and the public-private 
partnerships with the French multinationals Suez and Veolia, see De Miras & Le Tellier (2005).   
176  In the beginning the Fund Hassan II was even completely disconnected from the national state budget. 
As such, part of the public revenues from the privatization of the telecommunication sector wasn’t even 
inscribed in the state budget. Yet, this was restored quickly after the death of Hassan II following criticism 
from international actors such as France and the World Bank (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).
177  The case of the ANRT is another example of how the privatization of the telecom business was put in 
the	hands	of	a	specific	agency	(the	ANRT)	which	operated	largely	outside	parliamentary	and	government	
control (Hibou & Tozy, 2002b). 
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has treated as “primitive” or “original” during the rise of capitalism” (Harvey, 2006: 
43). Capitalist accumulation has often been associated with the power balances be-
tween capitalists and wage workers, the structure of property rights and commodity ex-
change. Furthermore, capitalism’s hegemony was considered to be established through 
class	 struggle,	 ideology	 and	manufactured	 consent	which,	 in	 the	 end,	mystified	 and	
concealed	the	specific	mechanisms	of	exploitation,	presenting	these	as	a	normal	state	of	
affairs (Bush, 2006). In other words, critical political economy focused mainly on what 
capitalists do best: production and innovation (through class repression and exploita-
tion) in order to produce and accumulate surpluses. However, accumulation through the 
expansion of production and reproduction is only one possible avenue through which 
capitalism can expand (Swyngedouw, 2005). Accordingly, this understanding of politi-
cal	economy	often	bypasses	the	question	of	how	capitalism	was	established	in	the	first	
place: 
The rise of the capitalist class did not depend initially upon its capacity to gener-
ate surpluses. It rested, rather, upon its ability to appropriate them, threat them as 
their own private property and launch them into circulation in search for further 
surpluses. While commerce, banking and usury provided opportunities to gain 
profit,	capitalism	as	a	social	system	eventually	came	to	depend	upon	the	forma-
tion of a proletariat and the employment of wage labor. (…) For capitalism to 
become dominant as a social system required that the bourgeoisie emerge victori-
ous over other class forces controlling surpluses (Harvey, 2006: 90-91).
Harvey observed that alongside expanded reproduction, capitalists also accumulated 
by appropriating activities, people and resources and incorporate these ‘assets’ – which 
were previously managed by other modes of production – into the capitalist mode of 
production. For example, the dispossession of land was central to the ways in which 
the proletarianization of a numerous portion of the rural (poor) population took place 
(Bush, 2006). In Morocco, this process started during the Protectorate when the French 
entrepreneurial class desperately needed new work forces in the cities (Le Tourneau, 
1955; Abu Lughod, 1980). It meant the beginning of massive rural migration towards 
the cities and the emergence of the infamous bidonvilles (slums). With regard to neolib-
eral reform, state-administrated austerity programs and privatization policies can also 
be regarded as a form of accumulation by dispossession. Especially, when it concerns 
primary goods such as for example water and electricity. To the extent that imperial 
capitalists and states accumulated through the appropriation of colonies in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries (i.e. a form of extensive capitalist enlargement), neoliberal capital-
ists used policies such as privatization, devaluation, WTO-TRIPS, biopiracy and the 
commodification	of	culture	to	dispossess	communities,	classes,	ethnic	groups	and	gen-
der (Chatterjee, 2009).178
Structural	adjustment	was	about	using	the	power	of	the	state	and	international	financial	
institutions to orchestrate devaluations of (public) assets in order to permit accumula-
tion by dispossession (Harvey, 2003: 151). As such, economic aid from international 
organizations	came	not	without	a	price.	In	return	for	financial	assistance,	the	restructur-
178  TRIPS: trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
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ing conditions were set in such a way that donors were eventually able to claim a return 
on their investments (Najem, 2001: 54). Privatization was a way to assure this. Accord-
ing to Erik Swyngedouw privatization was therefore “nothing else than a legally and 
institutionally condoned, if not encouraged, form of theft” (Swyngedouw, 2005: 82). 
In the case of Morocco, French historian Pierre Vermeren has called the privatization 
of	Morocco’s	financial	institutions	an	example	of	a	“true	economic	pillage”	(Vermeren,	
2009: 278). Many companies were sold at dumping prices. Moreover, the revenues of 
a large part of the privatization policies were transferred to the Fund Hassan II and, as 
such, controlled directly by the monarchy and its entourage (and not by the publicly 
accountable state institutions). In a situation of over-accumulation – i.e. the particular 
situation,	 according	 to	Harvey,	 in	which	 surpluses	of	 capital	 lie	 idle	with	no	profit-
able outlets in sight – processes of orchestrated accumulation by dispossession sud-
denly release considerable sets of assets (infrastructure, raw materials, labour power) 
at a very low cost (Harvey, 2003: 149). This is exactly what happened after the crisis 
of the 1970s and the concomitant oil shocks. Over-accumulated capital could seize, 
through	structural	adjustment,	new	profitable	outlets	 for	 the	accumulation	of	profits.	
The	neoliberal	political	project	was	therefore	a	global	answer	to	the	chronic	difficulty	
of over-accumulation since 1973 which was troubling the capitalist classes worldwide 
(Harvey, 1990).   
As elsewhere, state power in Morocco backed this process of accumulation by dispos-
session.	But	the	specific	outcome	of	Morocco’s	actually	existing	form	of	neoliberalism	
was of course the result of the complex dialectic between territorial and capitalist logics 
of power (Harvey, 2003), or to put it in the words of Moroccan economist Driss Ben 
Ali:  
The structural adjustment program has placed Morocco before two kinds of logic 
which appear to be mutually exclusive: a “Makhzenian” logic, founded to a large 
extent on the administrative allocation of resources and a discretionary power, 
and a liberal logic based on allocation through the market and a democratic pow-
er (Ben Ali, 1997: 206).
The economic crisis derailed the strategies of state-led economic development. As in 
many other states in the MENA-region, the crisis in Morocco and the following project 
of the state’s roll back was something that was not necessarily backed by all domestic 
capitalist elites (Waterbury, 1991). Indeed, they relied on the state for the accumula-
tion of wealth. Structural adjustment was thus predominantly a ‘recommendation’ of 
international donor institutions and powerful states such as the US. Nevertheless, this 
didn’t mean that domestic elites were powerless in the eyes of the international capital-
ist conjuncture and the political demands of powerful institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Without turning their back on the recommendations and requirements 
of	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	the	Moroccan	officials	were	careful	not	to	relinquish	
their own political control and tolerated certain developments on the side in order to 
soften the social impact of the adjustments and ensure political stability. Some of these 
territorial logics that coincided with capitalist logics were already mentioned. As such, 
privatizations and accumulation by dispossession were a source of patronage to buy off 
the loyalty of powerful elites and state managers, while at the same time the makhzen 
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made sure it didn’t give up control too fast over certain strategic companies and sectors. 
Furthermore, the government often returned to their decision to cut back certain public 
spending policies under pressure of the violent disturbances during the 1980s. Also, in 
a response to the urban violence, for example those in Casablanca in 1981, the Moroc-
can government did not recoil from heavy urban investments. Despite the then pressing 
economic crisis, considerable public spending went to the city in order to securitize and 
stabilize the situation. After the ‘successful’ urban restructuring of Casablanca, some of 
these reforms were equally implemented in other important cities in the country (to be 
discussed in chapter 4). 
Additionally, one of the factors that softened the social impact of structural adjustment 
in the 1980s was the dynamism of the informal sector. The public authorities thus tol-
erated the development of the informal sector to absorb the social costs of economic 
austerity (Ben Ali, 1997; Aksikas, 2007). Many workers were laid off and others had 
difficulties	to	find	a	new	job.	The	privatization	of	state-owned	companies	such	as	Ma-
roc Telecom or Régie des Tabacs	were	followed	by	a	significant	loss	of	jobs.	The	grad-
ual withdrawal of the state from direct control over the economy also deprived many 
former public sector workers from previously gained social protection mechanisms, 
such as a pension, health insurance and holiday pay.179 As a result, the tolerance of the 
informal sector provided a buffer. The informal sector now accounts for the livelihood 
of approximately 40% of the population (Joffé, 2009). According to estimates, small-
scale	production	units	without	any	official	record	constitute	almost	40%	of	the	urban	
economy in Morocco (Aksikas, 2007). It is undeniable that the informal sector played 
a vital role to sustain the Moroccan economy since the 1980s. This demonstrates, as 
Jaafar Aksikas argues, that both the formal and informal sector are two sides of the 
same coin: “like unemployment, marginal labour is a structural feature of capitalism 
and of dependent capitalism in particular” (Ibid.: 260). Finally, another element of the 
makhzenian	or	territorial	logic	was	the	reluctance	to	seriously	fight	illegal	immigration	
and	drug	trafficking	(Sater,	2010:	101).	At	least	until	the	mid-1990s,	when	the	EU	start-
ed to restrict immigration, migration provided a solution for the unemployed domestic 
workforce. Their remittances have become crucial for the GDP and the balance of pay-
ments of the country. Until today, remittances are the largest source of foreign income 
for the Moroccan economy (8% of GDP) and that is why the government prioritizes the 
attraction of these kind of revenues (cf. Achy, 2010).180
In conclusion, although the phase of roll back neoliberalism and the structural adjust-
ment of the Moroccan economy was enforced and required by the IMF and the World 
Bank	in	order	to	solve	the	country’s	deficit	problems,	the	specific	ways	in	which	struc-
tural adjustments were implemented and administered was above all a matter of state 
policy. At a certain moment, with the peak of the Third World debt-crisis, states in the 
MENA-region had little choice but to turn to the IMF and accept global market inte-
gration and the liberalization of their domestic markets. But governments in the region 
179  This is one of the main reasons why, up until today, the unemployed graduates continue their struggle 
to be employed in the public sector.
180  Interview with Fouad Ammor from the Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée 
(GERM), (Rabat – August 2007 – interview conducted together with Sami Zemni). One of the policies to 
do that is to encourage Moroccans abroad to invest in the Moroccan real estate sector.
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did had a lot to say about the ways in which these neoliberal policy recommendations 
would be implemented. As mentioned, two obvious results were that Morocco’s wealth 
was still largely concentrated in the hands in the hands of a minority and that the tradi-
tional elites did not lose their economic power (Catusse, 2008; 2009a; see also Dillman, 
2001). As such, neoliberal reforms in North Africa in general, also strongly promoted 
by the EU through the Barcelona Process and the European Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), allowed for the “re-concentration of economic power” and a continued political 
domination over the market (Dillman, 2002: 82). 
Related to Dillman’s observation, two last remarks should be added. First of all, in 
contrast to mainstream neoliberal discourse, structural adjustment failed to obtain its 
political goals, i.e. the empowerment of other social groups and the transition towards 
democratization through the termination of state dirigisme and through the promotion 
of private initiative and individual entrepreneurship. Privatization did not necessarily 
lead to more competition (politically and economically) between domestic elites, but 
rather to their increasing interdependence and the intertwinement of their economic 
interests (Catusse, 2008). In a way, we could state that privatization policies further ad-
vanced their formation as a genuine capitalist class (see below). Secondly, and maybe 
more importantly, through the works of critical thinkers on neoliberalism in Europe and 
the US, we can now convincingly argue that this re-concentration of economic power 
was not due to the “incomplete implementation” of neoliberal reforms, as Dillman ar-
gues, but was rather the result of a world-wide phenomenon that is inherent to the neo-
liberal political project itself. Neoliberal political projects of deregulation have always 
coincided	with	projects	of	re-regulation,	almost	exclusively	beneficial	to	the	capitalist	
and ruling classes. Of course, social inequality will be more deeply entrenched between 
North and South and within the societies of the Global South, but critical scholars 
such as Mike Davis (2006a), Aihwa Ong (2006), Ray Bush (2007) and Ananya Roy 
(2010) have emphasized that these inequalities are inherent to the hegemonic neoliberal 
development paradigms that are promoted by the national and international political 
institutions and actors that control the circulation of capital. Consequently, in the end, 
structural adjustment may have been just a means to open up and widen the circulation 
of	capital	 in	order	 to	solve	the	worldwide	over-accumulation	crisis,	find	new	oppor-
tunities for investments and circumvent the limitations and barriers of Keynesian and 
developmentalists modes of production at the and of the 1970s. 
The re-invention of state interventionism: the phase of roll out neoliberalism
As I have argued, economic liberalization and structural adjustment do not necessar-
ily implicate the disengagement of the state or the roll back of the state in general. To 
the contrary, the roll back of certain developmentalist state functions entailed the roll 
out of new state forms and new state modes of intervention. In this paragraph, I want 
to discuss two of the most salient aspects or features of roll out neoliberalism in Mo-
rocco.	The	first	one	was	the	re-invention	of	social	policy.	With	the	gradual	destruction	
of the – already limited – social welfare mechanisms, the challenge for the new king, 
Mohammed	VI,	existed	in	the	redefinition	of	social	policy	and	social	development	con-
form the global market requirements. This has resulted, amongst other initiatives, in 
the implementation of prestigious programs such as the National Initiative for Human 
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Development (INDH) and the Villes Sans Bidonvilles Program (VSBP). Accordingly, 
these initiatives entailed the redeployment of the state in social policy and the priva-
tization of public policy. Secondly, neoliberal (state) reform in Morocco will be most 
visible at the urban scale, as the Moroccan rulers look to the urban economy as the 
motor for economic growth. Over the last decade, we saw some considerable efforts to 
reshape the image of the Moroccan cities and these efforts inspired some to speak of a 
genuine “urban revolution”. The state – in its appearance of different state agencies and 
new state spaces – plays a crucial role in this development. As such, we have to pay 
attention to the ways in which state action and governmental practices in the economic 
and social sphere has been transformed in terms of distribution of resources, decision-
making and the exercise of power (Catusse, 2009a). On the one hand, we have seen an 
increasing “privatization of the state”. Public authorities are working closely together 
with	private	actors	and	delegate	certain	fields	of	intervention	to	these	actors.	The	state,	
in other words, expanded its indirect control by setting the conditions in which societal 
organizations and private companies intervene. On the other hand, the state has been 
reconfigured	in	order	to	be	better	equipped	to	operate	in	a	competitive	global	market.	
Consequently, we saw the emergence of new institutional arrangements with consider-
able	public	power	to	coordinate	and	govern	a	specific	aspect	of	economic	life.	In	the	
following paragraphs I will give a brief and more general overview of the two main 
features of Moroccan roll out neoliberalism. Both the re-invention of public policy 
and	the	specific	dynamics	of	the	Moroccan	urban	revolution	will	be	elaborated	more	
in detail in the following two chapters. Evidence will then be presented based on two 
specific	case	studies.			
The re-invention of the social question
Broadly	speaking,	and	maybe	presenting	it	a	bit	simplified,	the	three	decades	of	neo-
liberal reform in Morocco can be divided into three cycles of restructuring. First of 
all, there was a period of structural adjustment in the 1980s. Subsequently, a decade of 
“mise à niveau” (upgrading) in the 1990s was followed by a decade of increased atten-
tion to the social dimension of economic liberalization in the 2000s (Maghraoui, 2002). 
These three decades overlap with the two general phases of neoliberal restructuring. 
While the decade of structural adjustment can clearly be considered as a phase of roll 
back neoliberalism, the following two decades entailed the gradual evolution towards 
a phase of roll out neoliberalism.181	The	decade	of	“mise	à	niveau”	was	characterized	
by the privatization policies and by the political construction of the liberal free-market. 
Symbolic for the effort to construct the market in Morocco was the signing of economic 
partnerships and free trade accords with both the EU and the US (Zemni & Bogaert, 
2009). The political focus in the 1990s went to both further economic integration (the 
negotiation of the FTAs) and political reform or alternance (which was often a con-
dition for international aid). A European free trade agreement with Morocco, signed 
in 1996 with the Euro Mediterranean Association Agreement, was embedded within 
the broad political, social and economic scope of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference (hence called the Barcelona Pro-
cess).	The	MEDA	I	and	MEDA	II	programs,	the	principal	financial	instruments	of	the	
181		Of	course,	the	specific	boundaries	that	are	drawn	here	between	different	decades	and	phases	are	by	no	
means	absolute	and	are	made	only	for	the	sake	of	comparison	and	clarification.	I	want	to	thank	Sami	Zemni	
for	pointing	out	the	need	to	make	these	classifications	more	explicit.
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EMP, were essentially designed by the European Commission to generate spill-over 
effects of economic adjustment and growth to stimulate democratic transitions in the 
partner countries (Youngs, 2004; D Smith 2006). During the period 1995-2006 Mo-
rocco received 1,640 millions EUR in the form of MEDA-grants. This made Morocco 
the largest recipient of MEDA-funds among the Mediterranean partner countries. 
In 2004, given the events of 9/11, Casablanca and Madrid, the EU launched the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was inspired by the experiences of 
the EU enlargement and the European Commission’s support to Central and Eastern 
European countries during the period of their transition to liberal democracy and free 
market integration. The ENP was meant to complement the Barcelona process and sup-
port democratic reform in neighbouring countries, including the Mediterranean partner 
countries (Youngs, 2006). It also put a stronger emphasis on bilateral cooperation.182 
Since January 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
replaced MEDA for the funding of aid and development programs. The difference with 
the EMP was that this particular neighbourhood policy was based on differentiation. 
This means that the countries with the best record on democratic progress receive more 
aid. Democratic reform was the European condition for aid.183 In 2004, Morocco also 
concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US. In contrast to the implementa-
tion of the Euro Mediterranean Association Agreement which was integrated within 
the framework of a broader political partnership, the American FTA, was solely based 
on the principle of “trade not aid”, as it was stressed by one of USAID’s directors in 
Morocco.184 Through USAID funded programs the US intended to facilitate the transi-
tion to a free trade environment. For example, USAID programs focus especially on 
the agricultural sector because of the predicted negative impact of the FTA on domestic 
agricultural productivity and the lack of competitiveness of the domestic sector on the 
international market. Due to the fact that USAID does not have the means to be present 
everywhere	in	the	field,	the	financed	programs	have	rather	the	intention	to	create	some	
sort of economic models that “show the way” to others in the targeted sector in the hope 
they would eventually follow the example (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009).185
Yet, the decade of mise á niveau did not bring forth the economic and social results that 
were hoped for. Poverty rose sharply in Morocco during the 1990s with an increase 
of 50% of people living under the poverty line (from 13% of the population in 1991 
to 19% in 1999) (Catusse, 2009b: 60). Critics also doubted whether further economic 
integration in the form of FTAs would improve the situation. Very little attention was 
paid for example to the social impact of the FTAs on ordinary people’s lives. Some 
experts expected that small-scale domestic economic activity would be the main victim 
of the newly established conditions under which economic integration was to take place 
(Dillman, 2001; Martín 2004). A clear sign was that the 1990s and the 2000s were char-
182  Nevertheless, the EMP and its MEDA funds were already strongly based on bilateral cooperation 
(Hibou, 2003: 126).
183  Interview with Jérome Cassiers, Consultant of Political affairs, Commerce, Information and Culture 
with the delegation of the European Commission in Morocco (Rabat - 21/09/07).
184  Interview with Mark Parkinson, Director of Democracy and Governance Programs (USAID Morocco) 
(Rabat - 04/09/07).
185  Interview with James May, Director of the Economic Growth Department (USAID Morocco) (Rabat - 
13/09/07).
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acterized	by	a	significant	rise	of	new	forms	of	opposition	and	political	instability	that	
can	be	related	to	the	poor	socio-economic	results.	New	forms	because	first	of	all,	the	
political disturbances of the 1980s had weakened the traditional trade unions. Govern-
ment	repression	and	imprisonment	during	that	decade	had	affected	the	influence	and	
the organizational capacities of the unions, especially the CDT. Secondly, because the 
political reforms of the 1990s (alternance) opened up more space for other kinds of 
actors (social movements, civil society associations, etc.) to be politically active (cf. 
Abouhani,	2006;	Iraki,	2006a;	2006b;	Emperador	&	Bennafla,	2009).	
As I already mentioned, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of protest actions by the 
unemployed graduates. Additionally, the Islamists were growing stronger – both the le-
galized Party for Justice and Development (PJD) and the illegal but tolerated movement 
around Skeikh Yassine, al-adl wal Ihsane – and many observers have been speculating 
about their political potential in Morocco (cf. Zemni, 2006a). And besides these more 
moderate and more popular Islamist movements, there was also the looming danger of 
religious extremism which culminated in the suicide bombings of 2003 and 2007 in 
Casablanca, killing several people. Finally, more leftist associations such as the Asso-
ciation Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) and ATTAC increased their activities 
and used the new political climate to mobilize around the notion of ‘rights’ (human 
rights, socio-economic rights,…). AMDH was implicated in the organization of the 
“movement against the expensiveness of life” and organized several manifestations to 
denounce the degrading socio-economic conditions. Since September 2006, Morocco 
experienced a series of organized manifestations against the continuous increase in 
prices of consumption goods (e.g. water and electricity). These manifestations took 
place above all in smaller towns and villages of the kingdom where were the population 
suffered even more from unemployment, poverty and socio-economic marginalization 
than in the larger cities. Under the impulse of social organizations such as AMDH and 
ATTAC-Maroc and small leftist political parties, the “coordinations against the expen-
siveness of life” (the Tansikiyat) spread out around the country and even culminated 
in violent encounters between protesters and police forces in Sefrou (September 2007) 
and Sidi Ifni (June 2008).186 In Sefrou, a manifestation to denounce the increasing price 
of bread ended in riots and confrontations with the police. Even though this riot did not 
take	place	in	a	big	city	like	Fès	or	Casablanca,	government	officials	were	taking	this	
warning	seriously.	As	a	source	within	the	Wilaya	(governorate)	of	Fès	confirmed:	“If	
these events would have taken place in a big city, the scenario would have resembled 
to the popular uprisings of Casablanca in 1981 and Fès in 1992”.187 The disturbances 
even prompted the king to gather a committee, presided by his Minister of Interior, to 
reinstate the price of bread. A year later in Sidi Ifni, a six-day blockade of the port by 
militants of ATTAC and unemployed graduates ended with severe police repression. 
The spread of the images on YouTube caused national and even international indig-
nation. These disturbances were then followed by the promise for a regional socio-
186  According to some members of AMDH and the Tansikiyat there were active local coordinations of the 
movement against the expensiveness of life in more than 80 villages and cities in Morocco (Interviews with 
members of AMDH and the Tansikiyat – Rabat-August 2007; Rabat-September 2007; Rabat-30/04/2008; 
Rabat-21/05/2008; Casablanca-18/06/2008; Rabat-20/06/2008; Rabat-13/04/2009. Some interviews were 
conducted together with Sami Zemni, others with Montserrat Emperador).
187  TelQuel, n°291, 29 September –  10 October 2007, own translation. 
Three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco 139
economic development plan and more administrative autonomy (for more details see 
Gussé,	2009;	Bennafla	&	Emperador,	2009).188  
These increased socio-political tensions together with the new political context at the 
end of the 1990s – both internally with the arrival of a socialist prime Minister in the 
“alternance” government of 1998 and the accession to the throne of king Mohammed 
VI, and externally with the appeal of the good governance discourse promoted by in-
ternational	institutions	like	the	World	Bank	–	initiated	a	reflection	on	the	social	dimen-
sion of economic reform and generated fundamental changes in the public discourse. 
As	a	result,	the	phase	of	roll	out	neoliberalism	intensified	and	was	further	character-
ized by a renewed attention for the social dimension of (economic) reform. This mo-
ment	of	intensification	can	also	be	placed	within	a	more	broader	international	context.	
As mentioned above, both in the ‘developing’ world as in the ‘developed’ world the 
self-regulating capacity of the market to reduce poverty and improve the livelihoods 
of the poorest populations was put into question. In Europe and the US, we saw the 
ascendency of the so-called “third way” and the workfare model. In the South, there 
was an increased attention to the requirements of good governance. As such, the third 
decade of neoliberal reform in Morocco was characterized by an increased political 
attention to and the construction of the “social question” (Catusse, 2005; 2009b; see 
also Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b; De Miras, 2007). This meant that more government 
attention was given to the negative social impact of market-oriented reforms and new 
state-arrangements	were	rolled	out	to	address	specific	problems.	
The	challenge	for	the	new	monarch	and	his	entourage	was	to	reform	and	redefine	state	
policies of social development as the public sector had clearly lost its leverage as a 
provider and distributor of accumulated wealth. According to Myriam Catusse, new 
social policy initiatives were taken in two domains: the improvement of social legis-
lation	and	poverty	alleviation.	In	the	first	domain,	there	were	some	improvements	of	
the labour conditions with a raise of the minimum wage, the adoption of a new labour 
code in 2003 and initiatives to improve health insurance.189 Only 25% of the quali-
fied	population	had	right	 to	a	pension	and	approximately	85%	didn’t	have	access	 to	
healthcare	(Catusse,	2009b).	However,	the	results	were	rather	limited	and	confined	to	
the wage-earning population. Moreover employees in the public sector enjoyed bet-
ter conditions and more social protection than those in the private sector.190 Secondly, 
188		Bennafla	and	Emperador	argue	that	the	social	movements	that	are	emerging	in	the	smaller	villages	and	
towns retain a largely local and pragmatic focus, demanding foremost social-economic improvements and 
employment. 
189  For a more detailed discussion on the new labor code and other initiatives: see Catusse, 2005; 2008; 
2009a; 2009b.
190  Additionally, a typical feature of these kinds of limited improvements was that they were not so much 
resulting out of a political struggle but rather developed in a depoliticized context. The transition in Mo-
rocco from an apparent class struggle instigated by the trade unions and the leftist opposition in the 1970s 
and 1980s to the institutionalization of a social dialogue in the mid-1990s, transformed both trade unions 
and national employers into “partners” sitting around the same table, leading to a form of ‘class collabora-
tion’	(Catusse	2008:	252-264).	The	specific	rationality	behind	the	social	dialogue	can	be	compared	to	some	
extent with the rationality of the third way-politics in Europe and the US that advocated the end of the 
adversarial forms of politics and aimed to go beyond the classical left/right divide (Mouffe, 2005). Chantal 
Mouffe	(Ibid.:	119)	argues	that	instead	of	facilitating	the	establishment	of	a	pacified	society,	these	consen-
sus politics have created the terrain for the rise of right-wing populist movements.
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considerable	state-led	initiatives	were	taken	in	the	domain	of	the	fight	against	poverty.	
After the Casablanca attacks of 2003 the Moroccan government quickly launched two 
prestigious and very ambitious social development plans: the VSBP in 2004 and the 
INDH in 2005. I will discuss the VSBP more in detail in the next chapter. Here, I want 
to	elaborate	briefly	on	the	INDH	to	clarify	some	characteristics	of	the	specific	political	
transformation that occurred during the 2000s. In his royal discourse of 18 May 2005, 
Mohammed VI presented the National Initiative for Human Development, calling pov-
erty alleviation a major challenge for the Moroccan societal project.191 Furthermore, 
he made explicit reference to “extremist tendencies” (velléités extremistes) that found 
fertile ground in social misery and economic marginalization, thereby clearly setting 
the political targets and priorities of the INDH in the light of the Casablanca attacks of 
2003.	This	“royal	project”	specifically	aimed	to	tackle	pressing	social	problems	such	
as unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion. To do so, INDH aims to 
include local authorities and grass-roots organizations in the elaboration and funding 
of micro-projects all over the country. In the remainder of 2005, 1,104 projects were 
started	within	the	framework	of	three	broader	programs:	the	fight	against	rural	poverty,	
the	fight	against	social	exclusion	in	the	urban	regions	and	finally	the	fight	against	inse-
curity (précarité). 
To this end, 250 million MAD were mobilized (50 million from the national budget and 
100 million from both the local governments and the Hassan II Fund).192 For the next 
five	years	(2006-2010)	an	overall	budget	of	ten	billion	MAD	had	been	allocated	to	the	
INDH. The national state budget mobilized 60% of the resources, the local authorities 
20% and the other 20% of the budget was covered in the form of loans and gifts by 
foreign donors and international organizations (e.g. the World Bank, the EU, Saudi 
Arabia, etc.).193 The control over and the distribution of the resources takes place via the 
Ministry of Interior and the representatives of the state at the regional, prefectural and 
provincial level.194 Some observers remain sceptic about the amount of resources made 
available and consider it way too little to solve the pressing socio-economic problems 
of the country. Economist Driss Ben Ali called INDH “just a drop in the ocean”.195 In 
general,	no	extra	state-funds	were	allocated	to	finance	the	INDH.	The	individual	so-
cial	projects	are	financed	solely	from	existing	resources	that	were	diverted	from	other	
ministries (Sater, 2010: 108-111). Furthermore, James Sater argues that the estimated 
cumulative loss of state revenues and social costs due to the singing of FTAs with the 
EU and the US are actually a multiple of the value and the impact of the entire 2006-
2010 INDH program (Sater, 2010: 108-111; see also Martín, 2004).
Yet, a critical analysis of the INDH-initiative should go beyond the mere question of 
numbers. First of all, king Mohamed VI explicitly stressed in his speech of 18 May that 
191  For a complete version of the discourse see: http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/discours.asp (accessed 
22/09/2010).
192  For more details on the 2005 programs: http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/programme_2005.asp (accessed 
22/09/2010). 
193		For	a	complete	overview	of	the	foreign	financing	of	the	INDH:	http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/partenaires.
asp 
194  Morocco is administratively divided into 16 regions. Every region is divided into prefectures (urban) 
and provinces (rural). Provinces and prefectures are headed by governors, directly appointed by the King.
195  Interview conducted together with Egon Gussé (Rabat – 26/10/2009).
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the increased initiatives in social development did not imply a break with the overall 
liberal macro-economic direction of the country which is based on economic stability 
and growth, free market reform and trade liberalization: 
If	the	level	of	economic	growth	is	insufficient	and	inequitable	in	the	sense	that	
not	all	people	and	regions	of	our	country	benefit	from	its	dividends,	all	the	more	
because some continue to suffer from marginalization and social degradation, it 
is important to note, at the same time, that the desired level of inclusion should 
not be considered, according to a simplistic and narrow vision, as a weight 
that burdens [economic] growth, but rather as its condition and catalyst (own 
translation).196   
Two years later, in his address from the throne on 30 June 2007, the king called “eco-
nomic liberalism” one of the fundamental pillars of the Moroccan “État de droit” and 
the Moroccan “national consensus” (Vermeren, 2009: 57-58). It was thus clear for the 
king and the makhzen that the economic directions the country had taken since the 
1980s were not negatively linked to the conditions of poverty and marginalization. 
What’s more, the king’s discourse insinuated that more (market) integration was re-
quired	to	fight	the	social	and	economic	problems	of	his	country.	Accordingly,	and	with-
in the logic of this vision, INDH and other social development schemes in Morocco 
rely strongly on a cooperation between the state and the private sector in order to create 
alleged	win-win	situations	for	both	beneficiaries	and	private	 investors.	For	example,	
the French multinational Suez (with Lydec as its subsidiary in Casablanca) is integrated 
into the INDH project, via a special program called INMAE, to provide shantytowns 
in Casablanca with basic services such as water and electricity. Lydec works closely 
together with state-agencies such as Idmaj Sakan (responsible for social housing) and 
civil	society	organizations.	The	state	thus	sponsors	and	stimulates	private	actors	to	fight	
poverty.  
Secondly, INDH has a depoliticizing effect which is closely related to the economic 
vision that underpins it. The philosophy of INDH is based on two popular codewords 
that are common in contemporary neoliberal development schemes: responsabilization 
and participation. In his speech, the king emphasized that the program is backed by the 
contemporary mainstream discourse on development:
We also call on them [the government] to adopt an action plan [INDH] based 
on the principles of good governance, namely responsibility and transparency, 
the rules of professionalism, the broad participation of the population, integra-
tion and the rationalization of the interventions of public institutions and organ-
isms, as well as the permanent follow up and evaluation of the realizations (own 
translation).197 
   
Within	this	framework	the	final	responsibility	for	social	development	is	passed	on	from	
the	public	authorities	to	other	(individual)	actors	(e.g.	the	private	sector	and	the	benefi-
ciaries). A perfect example of the responsibilization of the poor man is the increasing 
196  http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/discours.asp (accessed 22/09/2010).
197  Ibid.
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reliance on micro-credits as a poverty reduction strategy. With more than 500,000 cli-
ents, the impact of micro-credit in Morocco is considerable (De Miras, 2007).198 Micro-
credit encourages the transformation of poor people into small scale entrepreneurs (Ca-
tusse,	2009b).	The	fight	against	poverty	is	then	turned	into	a “fight of the poor against 
their own poverty”,	a	fight	that	doesn’t	concern	the	other	social	classes	anymore	(i.e.	the	
inherent relation between poverty and class divisions is either denied or ignored) and, 
as such, disconnects the question of social development from broader political ques-
tions (i.e. neoliberalism as a class project) (De Miras, 2007). Social development then 
comes down to “help the poor help themselves” – the classic neoliberal adage – through 
all kinds of market-oriented facilitations and the promotion of individual capacities (M 
Davis, 2006a). 
Third, the promotion of participation in social development schemes such as INDH has 
opened up new spaces for political and social action and brought forth the emergence 
of	new	social	actors	in	the	field.	Yasmine	Berriane	demonstrates	that	through	the	INDH	
“new actors who were not part of the traditional local notability have been able not only 
to climb the social ladder but also become part of the local decision making apparatus 
as	political	actors”	(Berriane,	2010:	98).	This	confirms	a	general	trend	in	Morocco	and	
proves a kind of political transformation ‘from below’. Since the end of the 1970s, we 
have seen a substantial growth of associational life in Morocco and the emergence of 
new urban neighbourhood associations and other civil society organizations. Several 
reasons can be given to explain this trend: the increasing rural exodus towards the cit-
ies, the emergence of an new urban middle class, important urban reforms which gave 
more authority to local elected governments (e.g. new Communal Charter of 1976), 
the	process	of	political	liberalization	of	the	1990s	and	finally	the	gradual	roll	back	of	
the developmentalist welfare functions of the state which obliged citizens to explore 
alternatives and take matters into their own hands to improve their neighbourhoods 
and	 livelihoods	 in	 difficult	 socio-economic	 situations	 (cf.	Navez-Bouchanine,	 1995;	
Ameur, 2000; Abouhani, 2006; Iraki, 2006a; 2006b; see also chapter 4). The active 
promotion of cooperation schemes between local authorities, social organizations and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has even accelerated this process during the 
last decade. Initiatives such as INDH have stimulated the growth of local associations 
(Berriane, 2010).
However, this doesn’t meant that we are witnessing some kind of burgeoning tendency 
of democratization. In the end, the Moroccan authorities remain in political control 
through	the	distribution	of	resources	and	by	setting	the	specific	conditions	for	the	ac-
tual elaboration of social programs. For example, the coordination of INDH depends 
on a pyramid structure that includes all levels of decision-making but is ultimately 
controlled in a centralized matter by the Ministry of Interior.199 Even though, this state-
program encourages participation and the creation of new associations, these new ac-
tors are still politically controlled – especially the NGOs – and have to conform to the 
predefined	rules:	
198  Zakoura under the direction of Noureddine Ayouch is one of the main associations that works with 
micro-credit programs and is supported by the Fund Hassan II, the Moroccan banks and international orga-
nizations such as UNDP (for more detailed information on Zakoura, see: Ayouch, 2008).
199  For an overview of the hierarchical structure see: http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/comites.asp 
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At the very top of the ladder, the Ministry of Interior oversees NGO activity 
while at the bottom it is the mqaddem who keeps a close eye on an NGO’s daily 
activities, taking part for example in general assemblies, conferences and festivi-
ties that are organized by associations. Furthermore, a central database designed 
to contain all the information about each association was launched a few years 
ago. From this point of view, we could argue that the growing number of NGOs 
signifies a greater control over society by the state (Berriane, 2010: 100, empha-
sis added).200
As	such,	INDH	exemplifies	the	reorganization	and	redefinition	of	public	action.	Through	
different mechanisms, such as the delivery of licenses and authorizations, the alloca-
tion of resources, etc., the Ministry of Interior intervenes in associational life, actually 
increases	its	social	control	and	has	the	possibility	to	filter	out	those	actors	and	organiza-
tions it considers not politically suitable. In reality this means that those associations 
with	a	clear	political	agenda	or	a	certain	political	affiliation	(e.g.	al adl wal ihsane) are 
discriminated and excluded from the distribution of resources (Ibid.). Additionally, due 
to the INDH, the Ministry of Social Affairs was actually deprived of an important part 
of its core business. As a consequence, some redistribution policies were recentralized 
within the ministry that is closest to the monarchy (i.e. the Ministry of Interior). Fur-
thermore, international aid within the framework of INDH, from for example the EU, is 
also re-distributed via the Moroccan state apparatus and does not affect its control over 
the space of action outlined by the projects on the ground (Bono, 2007). 
In the end, the INDH program is a salient example of what Béatrice Hibou has called 
the privatization of the state in which certain domains of public action are entrusted 
to private agents and in which the state opts for an indirect form of government in 
certain policy domains. Similar social development schemes are also to be found in 
the rest of the Arab region, such as for example, the National Solidarity Fund or the 
26.26 in Tunisia (cf. Hibou, 2006), and the Social Fund for Development in Egypt (cf. 
Elyachar, 2002).201 To a similar extent, Catusse speaks of the “privatization of public 
policy” which consists in the redistribution of responsibilities, the redrawing of the 
public-private boundaries and the transformation of the state modes of regulating social 
risks (Catusse, 2009a: 208). The privatization of public action in Morocco is further 
developed and supported through the establishment of new types of institutions. I men-
tioned the Hassan II Fund earlier. The establishment of the Mohamed V Foundation for 
Solidarity is another example. Both agencies were created at the end of the 1990s. They 
are	(semi-public)	hybrid	structures	financed	by	exceptional	resources	and	directed	by	
private entrepreneurs, close advisers of the king, and a technocratic “state nobility” 
(Catusse, 2009, 206; Vermeren, 2009: 90).202 Besides investments in the framework of 
200  The mqaddem is a representative of the state to act as an interface between the citizens and the Minis-
try of Interior and keep an eye on everyday life in a certain neighbourhood.
201  The name 26.26 refers to the postal account number of the fund. The fund became better known under 
this name in Tunisia.
202  By 2006, the Hassan II Fund received approximately 31 billion MAD (3 billion Euros). Most of these 
funds came from the privatization of the telecommunications licenses (e.g. Méditel). Other resources are 
generated by the Fund’s own activities, donations and as well as contributions from the state budget (Britel, 
2008: 277-279) 
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the INDH-program, the Fund Hassan II also invests in other sectors such as large in-
frastructural projects (Tanger Med and Bouregreg), social housing, agriculture, cultural 
and sporting events.203 The Mohamed V Foundation has realized projects for an amount 
of 3,3 billion MAD and invests in social welfare domains such as sustainable develop-
ment, formation, medical care, education, etc. Powerful elites such as Othman Benjel-
loun are member of its board of directors.204	Officially,	such	organizations	are	created	
in the name of national solidarity and intended to confront the pressing socio-economic 
problems. In reality, these kinds of agencies not only bypass standard budgetary proce-
dures and controls, they also establish important connections between state elites and 
private interests groups and alter the mechanisms for patronage and economic inter-
vention as they are placed under the direct authority of the monarchy and its entourage 
(Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).
These modalities of government and social policy do not imply the restoration of the 
developmental state-model, but rather the active redeployment of the state (the roll out 
of the state) in institution-building, regulatory re-arrangement and rescaled interven-
tion, in order to consolidate economic reforms, engage with private actors and sustain 
the workings of a market environment. Furthermore, in contrast to the political goals 
of	the	developmental	state,	the	final	responsibilities	for	social	welfare	are	now	passed	
on to private non-state actors (enterprises, NGOs, neighbourhood associations, trade 
unions, individuals, etc.). They are presented to be responsible for the negotiation of 
new	labour	agreements	(the	social	dialogue),	and	assumed	to	fight	themselves	against	
social inequality and uneven development. In discourse at least, the state is assumed to 
provide mere technical coordination and to operate as a neutral supervisor over these 
different civil society actors (Catusse, 2005). The issue of poverty, in this regard, is then 
reduced to a mere technocratic problem and a individualized matter (cf. chapter 4). As 
a result, the re-invented social policies in Morocco tend to mitigate and depoliticize the 
class divisions that are generated by neoliberal market-oriented reforms. What’s more, 
these new kinds of social policies suggest a false image of formal equality between (all) 
“citizens” (Wacquant, 2008). 
Morocco’s urban revolution
A	second	important	feature	of	Morocco’s	phase	of	roll	out	neoliberalism	are	the	specific	
political strategies for urban redevelopment. Despite the radical economic restructur-
ings of the 1980s, the Moroccan economy remained fragile for several reasons. Com-
pared to other regions in the world, foreign direct investments still largely by-passed 
the Arab region. The MENA-region still obtained a rather subordinated position in the 
world economy (Bush, 2004; White, 2007; Catusse, 2009b; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). 
Furthermore, in the case of Morocco, the general economy was still largely dependent 
on the agricultural sector for economic growth and employment (D Davis, 2006; Sater, 
2010). In order to break these patterns, the Moroccan monarchy tried to redirect its fo-
cus on urban development and the urban economy. Within the context of contemporary 
global market integration, the city has become not only a place to live but also product 
in itself to attract foreign investments and stimulate economic growth. The city has 
become a “growth machine” (Molotch, 1976). And even more so than in the days of 
203  Interview with dr. Charaf Britel, treasurer of CDG (Rabat – 29/05/2008). 
204  For more information see: http://www.fm5.ma 
Three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco 145
Harvey Molotch, local governmental interventions do not only impact on the distribu-
tion of economic growth generated by government interventions at the national scale, 
but also play an active role in the generation and distribution of economic wealth and 
accumulated capital within global (or glocal) production processes. Cities, or more gen-
erally any locality, are becoming primary links or junctions in those global processes, 
not in the sense that they are entirely disconnected from national decision-making pro-
cesses, but rather in the sense that they are ‘relatively autonomous’ (cf. chapter 5). As 
Harvey (1989b) emphasized, local government assumed a more entrepreneurial role. 
It was above all under the impulse of king Mohammed VI that the country positioned 
the city as the prominent site for the promotion of economic development and capital 
accumulation. Since his reign, Morocco has been busy catching up in preparing its 
cities to welcome more businesses, tourists and (real estate) investors. At this very 
moment, massive infrastructural works are being undertaken to upgrade the Moroccan 
urban areas and to prepare them to globalize. Therefore, the current propaganda around 
king Mohamed VI goes beyond presenting him as the king of the poor, but focuses 
even more to present him as a builder (Bargach, 2008). He is attributed to be leaving 
his mark on the future of a modern Morocco that looks resolutely at the primary (West-
ern) capitalist urban centres as models for socio-economic development. In every local 
business magazine or newspaper comparisons are made by business experts, techno-
crats	and	government	officials	between	the	Moroccan	cities	and	global	cities	such	as	
London, Paris, Rome and Dubai. As mentioned in chapter 2, cities and city-regions are 
the sites through which the current global economy is coordinated, where surplus value 
is	 realized	and	accumulated,	and	where	new	frictions	and	social	conflicts	arise.	The	
contemporary “royal managers” are very much aware of that.205 In a recently published 
‘National Strategy for Urban Development’ the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism 
(MHUAE) underlines the necessity to prepare the Moroccan cities in order to expand 
its	share	of	global	 investments	and	financial	flows	(MHUAE,	2009:	30).206 And with 
relative	 success.	Although	Morocco’s	 rural	 economy	 (agriculture,	 forestry	 and	 fish-
ery) still remains the most important sector for employment (34,3 per cent), the urban 
economy	has	become	by	far	the	most	significant	producer	of	national	economic	growth.	
Three-quarters of the national GDP is generated within the urban economy (Ibid.: 21).
In that sense, trade liberalization has accelerated the urbanization of capital. Over the 
last	decade,	massive	investments	flowed	into	the	built	environment.	Numerous	ambi-
tious	urban	development	schemes	were	launched	in	the	first	decade	of	Mohamed	VI’s	
reign. They are becoming the showcases of an “urban revolution” – as it was referred 
to	in	the	local	press	–	with	striking	flagship	projects	such	as	the	Bouregreg	Valley,	the	
Marina in Casablanca, and the Tanger City Centre and the Tanger Med project in the 
North.207 The role of the king in these development schemes should not be underestimat-
ed. The simple label of “royal project” (e.g. in the case of the Bouregreg project) is very 
symbolic and means that a project simply cannot fail because of the ‘moral guarantee” 
205  Royal managers is a term used by Pierre Vermeren to describe the current captains of industry and 
leading elite within the state-administration who are implicated in the most important economic sectors of 
the country (Vermeren, 2009: 288).
206  MHUAE: Ministère de l’Habitat, de L’Urbanisme et de l’Aménagement de l’Espace
207  Telquel, n°390, 2009: www.telquel-online.com/390/index_390.shtml (accessed 10/10/09)
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the monarch represents (Bargach, 2008: 108). Furthermore, major infrastructural works 
– highways, new train stations, tramways (in Rabat and Casablanca), a high-speed train 
connection (between Casablanca and Tangiers), bridges, mega-malls, marinas, etc. – 
are put in place in order to prepare the country’s cities for further capitalist integration. 
After all, the export-oriented shift promoted by structural adjustment needed to be sup-
ported by the necessary physical infrastructural conditions. By looking at some of the 
proposed designs, it becomes clear that over the next 5-10 years Morocco’s infrastruc-
tural endeavours will drastically redesign the face of its cities and change their image 
once and for all.208 The word Arab city may still evoke a number of stereotypes and 
preconceived images, as if it were a place full of mosques and minarets, small alleys, 
crowded cafés and little shops characterized by chaotic planning and informal expan-
sion. Nevertheless, the Arab city is now also becoming a place of skyscrapers, modern 
shopping malls and unabashed consumerism (Elshestawy, 2008: 3). Dubai is the most 
obvious example but recent developments in countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Egypt and Lebanon prove that it is a regional phenomenon. As a result, these urban 
transformations will most likely also change ordinary city-life for the majority of the 
urban dwellers (rich or poor). However, the main target group for these restructurings is 
not so much the city-dweller who has lived his whole live in the city, or the poor farmer 
who looks for a new future. Cities as Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech and Tangiers are 
put on the global city-map especially to attract outsiders: tourists and investors. 
208  That is of course if all of these projects get funded in the end. Due to the current economic crisis, some 
of	the	projects	experienced	some	financing	difficulties.		
The scale model of the Casa-Marina project with in the background the famous Mosque Hassan II 
(October 2009)
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The	attraction	of	“global	fixed	capital	investments”	(infrastructural	projects)	and	“cir-
culating capital” (e.g. tourism) are now the components of a “nearly universal eco-
nomic development strategy” (Paul, 2004). As such, the restructuring of the Moroccan 
city	is	inscribed	in	a	global	political	project	that	reflects	and	defends	(global)	market	
requirements and connects local business networks with the outside world. Geographi-
cal location plays a crucial role in the economic strategies of the kingdom. In 2009, for 
example, the head of the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) Karim Haji underlined to 
the international press that Morocco wants to become “a stepping stone for investors 
from the US, Asia, Europe and the Middle East looking for opportunities to diversify 
investments”.209 The new determined priorities within this competitive urban logic are 
real estate development, international trade and investments, offshore activities and of 
course tourism. Today, several large urban development projects are reshaping the city-
scapes of Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers, Fez and Marrakech. The Tanger Med project, a 
new	international	seaport	with	an	industrial	hinterland	(Tanger	Free	Zone),	is	definitely	
the largest mega-project and the symbol for Morocco’s commitment to global market 
integration. Designed to exploit the strategic location of Tangiers as a redistribution 
centre for international trade the project ‘Tanger Med I’ was launched in 2002 and 
strived	for	a	capacity	of	3,5	million	containers.	This	first	section	of	the	port	became	
operational in 2007. By the year 2016 the port wants to extend to an estimated capac-
ity of eight million containers (Tanger Med II) and become a nodal point between the 
African, European and Asian markets.210 When Tanger Med becomes fully operational, 
it will be the biggest commercial port in Africa, and on the Mediterranean Sea. The 
project is accompanied by the development of a economic free zone, the Tanger Free 
Zone (TFZ), which was launched in 1999. It is located only 30 km from the port. With 
a surface of approximately 500 hectares it is the most important special economic zone 
of the country. At the moment more than 475 companies are settled in the TFZ and 60 
ha are dedicated to the development of the “Tanger Automotive City” to support the 
further expansion of the Renault holdings in the country.211 According to the Moroccan 
authorities the TFZ creates 40,000 industrial jobs (manufacturing, textile, electronics, 
etc.) and 3,600 of them are in service of the port (Vermeren, 2009: 294-295). Two new 
highways (between Rabat and Tangiers; and between Tetouan and Tangiers) are cur-
rently under construction to support the further economic development of the Northern 
city-region. To complete the transformation of Tangiers, the authorities planned the 
development of the ‘Tanger City Center’ (TCC), a new business district in the east of 
the city. On the website of TCC we can read that “Morocco is about to become very big 
business	indeed,	so	the	well	informed	investor	can	expect	significant	returns	from	this	
world class destination which is set to return to its former glories”.212 
The same competitive logic applies for Casablanca with projects such as Casa Marina, 
Anfa Park and the Casanearshore park.213	The	latter	was	the	first	Moroccan	offshore	park	
to	be	officially	opened.	At	the	moment	it	is	the	largest	offshore	zone	in	North	Africa.	
209  Newsletter Oxford Business Group (29/10/09).
210  For more information: http://www.tmsa.ma (accessed 24/09/2010).
211  For more information: http://www.tangerfreezone.com (accessed 24/09/2010).
212  http://www.tangercitycentre.com/project.html (accessed, 24/09/2010). 
213  For more information and an impression of the prospect of these projects see: http://www.anfaplace.
com; http://www.casablancamarina.ma; http://www.casanearshore.com (accessed 23/02/2011).
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Promoted as “the dream of every outsourcer” it advertises top-notch, low-cost services 
to	multinational	firms	(Zemni	and	Bogaert,	2009:	99).	As	I	mentioned	in	chapter	2,	five	
city-regions in Morocco developed or are set to develop offshore zones: Casablanca, 
Rabat, Fez, Tangiers and Marrakech. These industrial free zones and offshore zones are 
newly	reconfigurated	islets	inscribed	into	the	Moroccan	national	territory,	where	spe-
cific	laws	and	regulations	exist	from	site	to	site.	But	besides	industry	and	outsourcing,	
Morocco’s urban economy and new investment strategies focus particularly on its most 
valuable sector: tourism. In 2010, approximately 9 million tourists were estimated to 
have travelled to Morocco. Growth in the tourism industry has averaged a 9% contribu-
tion to the GDP in recent years and sustained a growth of 15% over the last decade.214 
The	CDG	plans	to	invest	1	billion	EUR	in	tourist	projects	over	the	next	five	years.215 
Currently, several large scale and luxurious projects are being developed, especially in 
the	neighbourhood	of	Marrakech,	targeting	specifically	the	so-called	“superconsumers”	
(Klein, 2007). The prestigious Plan Azur (involving the creation of six sea-side resorts), 
the development of Casa Marina, the Saphira project which aims to develop the coast-
line in Rabat, and the planning of the Bouregreg Valley, are but four of the most presti-
gious endeavours to promote luxury tourism (Barhtel, 2008; Mouloudi, 2009). Resorts 
and	gated	communities	similar	to	Chrifia	Oasis	Resort	in	Marakkech,	Royal	Resort	Cap	
Malabata in Tangiers and Anfaplace Living Resort in Casablanca are expected to mush-
room in the near future and intend to lure the well-off both from inside and especially 
outside Morocco – at least if the current economic crisis doesn’t slow its pace. 
This urban revolution in Morocco would not be possible without state regulation and 
state interventions. Economic zones such as Casanearshore and TFZ are created by the 
Moroccan state authorities. The services and products that are manufactured in those 
zones	–	and	which	are	mostly	intended	exclusively	for	export	–	benefit	from	specific	
government	regulations	(e.g.	tax	exemptions,	specific	legislation,	etc.).216 Furthermore, 
neoliberal	 reforms	 coincide	 and	 are	 intimately	 intertwined	with	 significant	 state-in-
stitutional reforms (e.g. the new state spaces). Old forms and arrangements are rolled 
back, new ones rolled out. Consequently, besides more indirect governmental control 
– through the privatization of the state – the urban transformations were also supported 
by institutional reform and a rescaling of state power in order to improve state interven-
tion. In 2002, for example, the wali (regional governor) received more competences 
and responsibilities to develop regional and local entrepreneurial policies and manage 
local investments. Under the tutelage of the wali, Regional Investment Centers (RIC) 
were installed to act as one-stop contact points between political authorities and private 
investors. As such, the monarchy not only recognized the growing economic role of 
cities and regions, with the expansion of the wali’s competences it also reinforced the 
power of the makhzen in local economic affairs by transferring some of the economic 
prerogatives from certain ministries to the governorates (Catusse, 2009a). These gover-
norates are directly accountable to the Ministry of Interior. 
Additionally, large-scale development projects such as the Bouregreg project or the 
214  Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: Tourism on the up (08/10/2010).
215  Ibid.
216  Interview with Jerome Cassiers, Consultant of Political Affairs, Commerce, Information and Culture 
with the Delegation of the European Commission in Morocco (Rabat – 21/09/2007).  
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Tanger Med project are placed under the authority of newly established institutional 
arrangements which have exclusive authorities over their territories: respectively the 
Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg (AAVB) and the Tanger Med 
Special Authority (TMSA). Through these institutional reforms the Moroccan ruling 
elites managed to pull important economic projects and developments out of the realm 
of control of the national and local elected government bodies (cf. chapter 5). As such, 
the rapid restructuring of the Moroccan urban economy was state-led, carefully manu-
factured and controlled by the palace and its entourage. The late Abdelaziz Meziane 
Belfqih	was	for	example	one	of	the	most	influential	advisors	of	king	Mohamed	VI	and	
he played an important role in the new economic direction taken by the Monarchy. As 
a former member of the Royal Cabinet, he was involved in the planning of several big 
infrastructural projects and appointed young technocrats as directors of the coordinat-
ing	governmental	agencies.	His	influence	was	also	important	in	bringing	in	investments	
from	the	Gulf	to	the	Bouregreg	project	(Vermeren,	2009:	63).	Also	in	Morocco,	the	offi-
cial discourses take example from the narrative of the Post-Washington Consensus and 
clearly emphasize that the state should actively support private initiatives and interests. 
The following statement of Hamid Ben Elafadi, director of the RIC of Casablanca, is 
exemplary for the rationality of Moroccan roll out neoliberalism. In an interview with 
the economic magazine Challenge, he refers to the different role of both the private 
sector and the public authorities in order to solve problem of scarcity in the real estate 
sector for businesses in Casablanca:
First of all, the dynamic of the real estate sector for business, which comprises 
also	the	real	estate	of	offices,	commercial	locations,	logistic	platforms	and	indus-
trial parks, is a guarantee for the territorial attractiveness [of Casablanca]. Sec-
ondly, we are convinced that the traditional approaches are not adapted anymore 
to the demands that we experience in the metropolis of Grand Casablanca and 
only	the	private	sector	has	 the	reactivity,	 the	flexibility	and	the	capacity	to	re-
spond to this demand for real estate for business in a quantitative and qualitative 
manner. Third, the public authorities, however, cannot leave this sector totally 
on its own, without strategic orientations, attractive incitements and spatial and 
temporal regulation.217  
 
Elite politics and the question of class in Morocco
An important question left to be discussed is the question who rules in Morocco? Al-
though the political dominance of the monarchy is undeniable, we cannot just reduce 
political authority to one man or one family. From a Marxist perspective, the neoliberal 
reforms in the Global South involved processes of class formation and class politics. Is 
it possible, however, to point out a ruling (capitalist) class in Morocco? Generally, in the 
case of Morocco, the assumption goes that the makhzen (the clique of elites close to the 
monarchy) controls the country politically and economically. Yet, can we see a change 
in the constitution of the ruling elite due to the current capitalist transformations in Mo-
rocco? Ali Benhaddou (2009) argues that since the 19th century, with the beginning of 
trade with the Europeans, a small group of powerful merchant families has dominated 
217  Cited in a special issue dedicated to the current scarcity of business real estate in weekly business 
magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: p.18.
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the political economy of Morocco. Until today, this minority controls the political and 
economic space. According to Benhaddou, there is little or no social mobility in Mo-
roccan society. Through marriages and personal ties, the Moroccan “aristocracy” has 
managed to keep control over the country for centuries. In addition, he argues that there 
is no independent bourgeoisie today in Morocco that could play the same role as did 
the European bourgeoisie in the 18th century. As such, the Moroccan capitalist system is 
pictured to be in the hands of a few powerful families with feudal features. In the eyes 
of Benhaddou, they are the ones that block the democratic transition towards a com-
petitive and modern free-market society. I do not entirely agree. Although Benhaddou 
rightfully sees political power in the hands of a few powerful actors, I argue neverthe-
less, that his perspective is a rather a-spatial perspective – as Doreen Massey would 
call it – on the history of Morocco and Europe. First of all, it suggests that historic 
political transitions that took place in two completely different time-periods and within 
different social settings can be simply compared and framed within a timeline of stages. 
Furthermore, throughout his book, he tends to compare a ‘crony’ capitalist system in 
Morocco with some kind of ideal type of “democratic capitalism” that is supposed to 
exist in other parts of the world. In this view, the Moroccan aristocratic families block 
an (almost logical) evolution towards a kind of more honest and honourable capitalist 
society.	Although	he	never	clearly	defines	democratic	capitalism,	Benhaddou	gives	the	
following description which might indicate what he means: 
Education, science and technology play an essential role in national develop-
ment.	Yet,	their	contribution	can	only	be	efficient	as	far	as	they	can	be	integrated	
in existing structures and integrated in local tradition and culture. For this, we 
need men, organizations and modalities of government. Men, above all, who are 
technologically formed and which possess the qualities that are inherent to the 
spirit of democratic capitalism (Ibid.: 48, own translation).
Besides a few exceptions, the Moroccan elites do not dispose of these qualities and 
block the emergence of those who can put that spirit into practice. As he continues:
Except a minority of very dynamic men, linked to central power [pouvoir poli-
tique], the Moroccan entrepreneurs don’t posses these qualities yet because, be-
hind	them,	there	is	an	education	and	certain	habits	of	thinking	which	are	difficult	
to reconcile with the spirit of capitalism in the Weberian sense. Generally, it are 
the achievements of competitors that force them to undertake and not the spirit 
of capitalism which brings forth economically rational behaviour, and comprises 
the	sources	of	financing	and	the	fair	redistribution	of	wealth.	Among	them,	the	
conservative spirit supplants the spirit of enterprise. [Their] entrepreneurship is 
not born out of a capitalist vocation, but out of a rentier mentality [un besoin 
d’acquérir des rentes de situations durables].	They	never	sacrifice	their	auton-
omy for growth. To the contrary, growth has to be the result of the autonomy of 
family	management.	Profit,	expansion,	export	are	not	the	aim	of	enterprising	but	
rather the means to escape the rationality of competition and, as a consequence, 
the modernization of the economy (Ibid., own translation).      
Benhaddou basically argues that the modern capitalist principles of competition and 
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entrepreneurship are not respected among the Moroccan ruling elite. As a result, they 
block the transition towards a more democratic capitalism in which both the produc-
ers	 and	 the	 consumers	have	 equal	powers	 to	 influence	 the	 future	 evolution	of	 a	 the	
free-market	society.	In	his	view,	free	enterprise	driven	by	profit,	expansion	and	export	
is what leads a country to a modern and fair society. Despite Benhaddou’s insightful 
views on the Moroccan political and economic elites, three critical remarks should be 
added. First, his view entails a liberal and very utopian conception of capitalism. Ad-
ditionally, if you read between the lines, he suggests that Western societies approach 
this ideal much better than Morocco. Yet, in reality, he only compares Morocco’s actual 
existing form of capitalism with some essence or ideal type of something that probably 
does not exist. In general, if we are to believe that ‘pure forms’ of liberal or neoliberal 
capitalism can exist, then we would also have to conclude that there exists no example 
of that kind of (neo-)liberalism in any region or country in the world today. However, 
Samir Amin has reminded us that conceptions of pure forms of capitalism or “pure eco-
nomics”	reflect	only	a	theory	of	imaginary	capitalism	that	doesn’t	really	answer	to	the	
actual existing reality of capitalism (Amin, 2003: 16). Secondly, in arguing that the cur-
rent competitive politics in Morocco are the result of aristocratic politics, while instead, 
the “spirit of capitalism” would bring forth rational behaviour and a fair redistribution 
of wealth, Benhaddou ignores the very dynamics that drive (any form of) capitalism: 
accumulation (often by dispossession) and (class) power. I will further elaborate in 
chapters 4 and 5 why contemporary political and economic reforms in Morocco sug-
gest otherwise. Third, Benhaddou’s perspective also underestimates the fact that it are 
the inherent contradictions of capitalism (and not so much certain aristocratic habits of 
thinking) that lie at the basis of both the social deprivation of the majority of the Moroc-
can population and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. The capitalist sys-
tem (anywhere in the world) does not promote competition in the sense that everybody 
gets an equal opportunity to undertake and enterprise in a free-market and politically 
neutral space. This is the neo-classical bias that Bush (2004) refers to. To the contrary, 
capitalism promotes the accumulation of wealth and power, generates the conditions 
for uneven development and the establishment of monopolies worldwide, and is built 
and dependent on relations of labour exploitation. 
As I discussed in chapter 2, uneven development is the driving force behind capitalism 
and the processes of accumulation and capital circulation. These are global processes 
in which local elites are involved. I argue that since the 1980s, with the economic 
liberalization of the Moroccan economy and the implementation of neoliberal reform, 
the Moroccan ruling elites adapted to the new neoliberal reality and took reforms both 
in accordance to the requirements of international donor agencies (World Bank and 
IMF) and their own private interests. This is the dialectic between the territorial and 
the capitalist logics of power. As a result of that very dialectic, the same elite families 
that ruled Morocco for centuries largely succeeded (so far) in maintaining their power 
during the capitalist transformations of the last three decades. This was not only due to 
their aristocratic (feudal) practices but equally due to their willingness to adapt to the 
new situation, to act as a capitalist class and give in to the continuous transformation 
of their practices into more capitalist class-based practices. Their relations of power 
transformed together with the necessity to compete in a neoliberal global economy. The 
mechanisms by which they ‘competed’ are of course not fair and just, let alone that they 
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are true to some kind of spirit of democratic capitalism. That is just the way by which 
the ruling capitalist classes operate everywhere in the world.  
The state bourgeoisie
During the protectorate, both the monarchy and the nationalist movement realized that 
they needed each other as strategic allies in the struggle for independence. Consequent-
ly, after the independence in 1956, the domestic economy came into the hands of these 
Moroccan elites and key economic positions left by the French were taken in by the 
most	influential	urban	and	rural	families	(Waterbury,	1970).	The	alliance	between	king	
Mohamed	V	and	the	Istiqlal	(the	nationalist	movement	and	the	first	political	party	in	
independent Morocco) was essential for the political stability of the newly established 
state. Quickly however, both parties became inevitable competitors for power and the 
first	two	decades	after	the	independence	were	marked	by	this	struggle	to	dominate	the	
domestic political scene (Joffe, 1988; see also Zartman, 1987). As I elaborated earlier, 
two strategies were decisive in the establishment of the political dominance of the mon-
archy. First of all, the monarchy reinforced its political base in the rural areas. Thanks 
to royal support, the Moroccan “fellah” (in this case the rural landowning elite) became 
the primary defender of the throne (Leveau, 1985). These Moroccan landowning elites 
had largely lost their political power immediately after the independence due to their 
affiliations	with	 the	French	administration	during	 the	Protectorate	 (see	also	Pennell,	
2000; Holden, 2007). Yet, these elites still disposed over considerable economic power 
and the monarchy quickly turned to them for support and loyalty to counterbalance the 
urban bourgeoisie. Moreover, at the end of the 1950s, still more than 70% of the Moroc-
can population lived in the rural areas. To ensure this political alliance and control the 
rural migration, Mohamed V, and later his son Hassan II, heavily concentrated national 
investments in the development of the rural areas and the agricultural sector, thereby 
largely ignoring the industrialisation and the planning of Morocco’s urban agglomer-
ates.	In	doing	so,	the	monarchy,	hoped	to	contain	the	influence	of	the	urban	commercial	
elites within the nationalist Istiqlal party. Secondly, the monarchy did not completely 
ignore the urban elites and tied the traditional urban families into its patronage net-
works by protecting their commercial interests and making them dependent on state 
support (Ben Ali, 1997). As a result, they became dependent on the Moroccan state as 
a kind of “comprador bourgeoisie”. In other words, their development was conditioned 
by state intervention and state support, by the rhythm and expansion of important state 
monopolies (e.g. phosphates) and determined by investment decisions taken elsewhere 
– i.e. by foreign capital (mostly French-based) (Oosterlinck, 2007: 112; Rami, 2007: 
64). Consequently, the urban nationalist movement balanced between co-optation and 
repression (Leveau, 1985: 245). 
During	those	first	decades,	the	considerable	control	and	interference	of	the	state	in	the	
economic	field	allocated	considerable	power	and	influence	to	the	state	technocrats.	This	
was an essential part of the divide and rule strategy of the monarchy. The technocratic 
elites are typically opposed to the partisan elite because they occupy important govern-
mental	positions	without	(a	clear)	party	affiliation	(Benhaddou,	2009).	They	are	recruit-
ed amongst the powerful families (very often fassi) and because they are not elected 
but appointed by dahir (royal decree) they are tied to the monarchy and depend on the 
goodwill of the makhzen for their privileged positions within the state bureaucracy. 
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These elites occupy leading positions in state companies, state agencies and the public 
administration. They are also often appointed as ministers in technocratic departments 
(e.g.	agriculture,	finance,	trade	and	industry)	and	appointed	in	strategically	important	
departments (e.g. interior, foreign affairs). Between 1977 and 1985 the technocratic 
influence	on	the	Moroccan	government	even	increased	significantly	and	the	ministerial	
appointments doubled (Sehimi, 1992). The comparison with what John Waterbury has 
called the state bourgeoisie is salient. According to Waterbury the state bourgeoisie was 
the driving force behind state capitalism in the decades preceding structural adjustment 
and neoliberal reform in the Arab region. They consisted of “those top-level managers 
and technocrats who are in direct control of the assets owned fully or partially by the 
state” (Waterbury, 1991: 2). Especially during the Moroccanization process, but also 
in the years before, the process of state capitalism transformed the state’s high admin-
istrative bureaucracy into a state bourgeoisie that dominated the economic activities in 
the country (Ben Ali, 1997). According to Waterbury this state bourgeoisie cannot be 
considered as a dominant ruling or state class. First of all, he argues, they do not own 
the means of production they control. Furthermore, because of this, they cannot re-
ally secure their own incumbency or their reproduction as a state class. Waterbury and 
Richards (2008: 208) that from a classical Marxist perspective the dominant capitalist 
class will always try to perpetuate its control over the means of production and pass this 
control on to its offspring through the legal ownership of private property. Members of 
the	state	bourgeoisie	have	no	legal	claim	over	their	offices	and	the	assets	they	control.	
As such, they remain tributary to the state. As Ben Ali argued: 
Even	though	they	had	a	clear	idea	of	their	professional	interests	and	clung	fierce-
ly to the privileges that they enjoyed at the helm of the public sector, Moroc-
can technocrats did not attain the degree of homogeneity necessary to forge a 
social group able to break free from the Makhzen. Since managers were directly 
nominated and relieved by their posts by dahir, their dependency on the state was 
complete. Besides, their nomination was not only a function of their competence, 
but also – indeed, fundamentally – a product of their allegiance; for their tenure 
at the head of public enterprises was contingent upon support accorded to them 
by the ruling circle. In sum, being the creation of the state, these technocrats were 
totally dependent on it. Their existence as an autonomous group is not conceiv-
able at the present time. By allowing them to establish rent-seeking positions as 
well	as	benefit	from	corruption	and	other	gains	and	facilities,	the	Makhzen	has	
ensured control over Morocco’s technocrats (Ben Ali, 1997: 204-205).
    
As such, the monarchy and the makhzen managed the economy through a neo-pat-
rimonial logic in the sense that its goal was not only to accumulate capital through 
state capitalism, but also to tie an important segment of Moroccan society (the urban 
bourgeoisie) into a network of clients by distributing positions, privileges and granting 
them rent-seeking opportunities. This state domination over the economy had some 
additional effects. Although the private sector was encouraged to play its role in eco-
nomic development, no Moroccan entrepreneur succeeded in occupying an important 
economic position without royal consent (Leveau, 1985). Most of Morocco’s current 
millionaires previously occupied privileged positions in the state administration or pub-
lic sector before they turned to the private sector (Berrada & Said Saadi, 1992). These 
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neo-patrimonial politics eventually contributed largely to the economic distortions and 
imbalances at the end of the 1970s. As a result of the debt-crisis, the state bourgeoisie 
proved	incapable	to	sustain	their	specific	mode	of	production	and	had	to	give	up	large	
parts of its direct state-control over domestic economic affairs. The logical question 
that follows would be whether the neoliberal reforms in Morocco involved the estab-
lishment of an autonomous capitalist class that (partly) replaced the state bourgeoisie? 
While this may not entirely be the case, I still suggest that a class analysis is helpful to 
understand political agency and power in Morocco. As such, I disagree with perspec-
tives on Morocco that tend to place political power solely in the hands of a “regime” 
(the makhzen) which controls the state and its state bourgeoisie. In order to move away 
from such a tendency we should also move away from Waterbury’s perspective on the 
state bourgeoisie. To begin with, I do not agree with Waterbury’s perspective on class. 
The	important	question	is	not	so	much	whether	we	can	define	some	set	of	fixed	socio-
logical characteristics in order to categorize and determine a certain class and its degree 
of autonomy (e.g. by the ownership over the means of production), to the contrary, what 
matters is whether we can distinguish politics as being class politics, and power as be-
ing class	power.	There	is	a	crucial	difference	in	approach.	But	let	me	first	elaborate	on	
the	emergence	of	new	politically	and	economically	influential	groups	in	Morocco	as	the	
result of shifting balances of power that related to neoliberal globalization.
 
Neoliberal reform leading to capitalist class formation?
The reforms of economic liberalization in the 1980s radically altered the political prac-
tices that underpinned the balances of power. New social groups and actors emerged 
and old forms of power (state clientilism) proved inadequate to maintain the political 
status quo (Ben Ali, 2005). Once the Moroccan regime had to reduce its mechanisms of 
wealth and service redistribution, the political basis of its authority would possibly be 
undermined as well. The economic crisis was therefore a challenge and an opportunity 
for authoritarian regimes and ruling elites in the whole Arab region to change political 
coalitions and networks of power (Pratt, 2007: 61). In Morocco, the neoliberal transi-
tion entailed important political shifts. First of all, powerful elements within the ruling 
coalition changed their practices of power. The most obvious example was the king 
himself. Since ONA purchased the interests of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas in 
1980, king Hassan II became the primary private investor in Morocco (Leveau, 1985: 
257).	This	was	a	first	sign	that	the	monarchy	redirected	its	political	strategies	and	tried	
to establish itself as an undeniable and dominant private actor in the emerging neo-
liberal market economy. Mohamed VI continued this road and further expanded the 
ONA-empire to become the country’s undisputed primary capitalist. Much more than 
his father, who even showed diminishing interest in business at the end of his life, Mo-
hamed VI became known as Morocco’s primary ‘patron’ due to the expanding activi-
ties of ONA, but also due to the increasing intervention of (semi-public) state-agencies 
in large-scale neoliberal urban development projects that were under his control. The 
dominant perception today is that the monarchy’s grip over the economy is stronger 
than ever (Denoeux, 2007). Yet, other upper-class elites within the state-administration 
also had to redeploy their accumulation strategies. The roll back of the state in econom-
ic affairs had reduced the capacities of the state bourgeoisie to intervene directly in the 
economy.	Yet,	many	of	them	managed	to	profit	from	the	privatization	of	public	assets	
and established themselves as the captains of the Moroccan private industry. 
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Secondly, for decades, a small elite had dominated the economy by relying mainly on 
personal relations and clientilist networks within the state apparatus. Yet, due to the 
structural adjustments and economic liberalization, new social groups emerged and 
gained	political	influence.	Myriam	Catusse	and	Melani	Claire	Cammett	(who	focuses	
more	 specifically	 on	 the	Moroccan	 textile	 industry)	 describe	 in	 detail	 how	 a	 grow-
ing group of entrepreneurs	gained	political	influence	within	the	new	economic	order	
in Morocco (Cammett, 2007; Catusse, 2008). Neoliberal globalization had brought to 
the fore a group of export-oriented manufacturers, a relatively new component of the 
private sector, which sought its fortunes on global markets, largely through subcon-
tracting relationships (Cammett, 2007: 99). Cammett argues that this new export class, 
especially in the textile industry, managed to delink itself from domestic markets and 
oriented itself almost exclusively towards the global market:
Working through the Admissions Temporaires (AT) regime, or the in-bond, tem-
porary import regime for export-oriented production, subcontractors and export-
ers maintained minimal connections to the domestic market and cultivated ex-
tensive interests in the global economy. Through the AT system, local export 
manufacturers could divorce themselves almost entirely from the national market 
by dealing exclusively with foreign textile suppliers for inputs. Overseas clients 
and multinationals often supplied all inputs, including cloth, thread, zippers, but-
tons, and other accessories. As a result, backward linkages were virtually nonex-
istent and local value-added was minimal (Ibid.: 99-100).218
Although the traditional elite families continued to dominate the capitalist economy – 
they	were,	after	all,	the	ones	who	benefited	the	most	from	the	privatization	of	public	
assets – these new actors (e.g. owners of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)) 
nevertheless tried to have an impact on political decision-making. As such, the rise of a 
new social group of entrepreneurs did not so much supplant the position of these tradi-
tional elites, nor did they necessarily alter the rules of the game – after all, personal net-
works were still of crucial importance for doing business in Morocco. Yet, nevertheless, 
they did change the ways in which the Moroccan private sector related to the state and 
how	this	sector	adopted	different	patterns	of	interaction	with	state	officials.	These	new	
entrepreneurs often lacked high-level access to the palace and the upper-echelons of the 
state bureaucracy. In order to establish these necessary connections, they transformed 
important employers’ associations into powerful lobby groups. Both Catusse and Cam-
mett demonstrate in detail how the increasing importance of business associations in 
the 1990s marked this changing state-business relation. These lobby groups interacted 
with the state on behalf of the different economic sectors and their particular interests. 
They introduced new styles of placing demands on the state. By organizing themselves 
in professional associations and by restructuring their modes of political action they 
were able to construct a critical mass of private businessmen and managed to pressure 
218  The AT system allowed producers to obtain duty-free inputs on the condition that they exported the 
goods made from these inputs within a time-limit of six months. In the mid-1990s a group of apparel ex-
porters, organized in the textile association AMITH, even advocated for the complete abolition of the AT-
system, the further liberalization of export-oriented activities and the dismantling of the remaining protec-
tive trade barriers. For more details see Cammett (2007). 
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the state administration (Ibid.: 179-180).219 The transformation of the Confédération 
Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), is a salient example. It evolved from a 
“club de patrons”, closely tied to the makhzen, to a broad interest group – a “syndicat 
patronal” – that pretended to defend the interests of the employers and private business 
in general (Catusse, 2008).220 Until the 1990s, its leaders were members of the tradi-
tional Fassi bourgeoisie who strongly relied on the state and the monarchy to protect 
their business interests.221 
But since the mid-1990s, the CGEM has expanded from four membership federations 
to over twenty and integrated all kinds of new business elites – albeit the CGEM was 
still far from representing the whole spectre of the private sector at that time. One of 
its most powerful members was the Association Marocaine de l’Industrie Textile et de 
l’Habillement (AMITH). This association assembled a growing group of apparel ex-
porters that had great interest in pressuring the government to further liberalize trade.222 
Characteristic for the transformation of the CGEM was the increasing prominence of 
“a-typical” business elites. Until the early 1990s, the CGEM was directed by former 
ministers and controlled by the Moroccan big capitalists (Benhaddou, 2009). A break 
from this was established with the election of Aberrahmane Lahjouji at the head of the 
CGEM in 1994 (Catusse, 2008: 214-221). He hadn’t enjoyed his education in one of 
the Moroccan elite schools and he wasn’t an ex-minister nor did he previously occupy 
any other high position in the state bureaucracy. In other words, he wasn’t the preferred 
candidate of the makhzen. His election therefore symbolized the emergence of this new 
interest group of entrepreneurs.223 Many of the new entrepreneurs that assembled in the 
CGEM came from comparatively more modest origins. These so-called “self-made 
men”	now	opposed	the	traditional	“fat	cats”	(to	use	Cammett’s	comparison).	The	first	
group contended that they earned their living through honest and hard work rather than 
through the support of the state and the reliance on a privileged family background. 
In reality, however, this image should be nuanced. Although many of these so-called 
self-made men did not have connections within the upper-echelons of the Moroccan 
political	 elite,	 they	 still	 were	 well-connected,	 affluent	 individuals	 (Cammett,	 2007:	
171-172). 
Another turning point in the relation between the private sector and the state was the 
infamous ‘sanitation campaign’ (campagne d’assainissement) or anti-corruption cam-
219  Because of their lack of access to the makhzen and the state technocrats, these associations tried to put 
pressure	on	elected	government	officials	to	influence	the	decision-making	process.	Cammett	argues	that	
this didn’t entail a trend towards political liberalization. The new entrepreneurs did not sought to alter the 
political	system.	Instead,	like	most	businessmen	in	the	world,	they	just	tried	to	find	alternative	ways	and	
strategies to pursue their private interests. The press, Cammett adds, was another channel to convey their 
interests. During the 1990s prominent entrepreneurs relied on press releases, interview and television ap-
pearances to express their demands and grievances (Cammett, 2007: 181).
220  The establishment of the CGEM dates back to 1933, during the Protectorate, as the country’s main 
private sector organization.
221		These	traditional	elites	were	the	ones	who	had	profited	the	most	from	the	Maroccanization	law	(Sater,	
2002).
222		Myriam	Catusse	focuses	in	her	book	specifically	on	the	transformations	within	the	CGEM,	while	
Melani	Cammett	focuses	specifically	on	the	AMITH	and	the	growing	influence	of	the	apparel	exporters.		
223  Symbolic was also the change of the name of the CGEM from ‘Confédération Générale Economique 
du Maroc’ to ‘Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc’ (Catusse, 2008: 201).  
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paign	which	was	started	by	 the	government	 to	fight	against	drug	 trafficking	and	 tax	
evasion.	The	campaign	was	launched	by	the	Minister	of	Interior,	officially	to	improve	
Morocco’s image in the light of the recently signed FTA with Europe. With this cam-
paign the government wanted to prove its willingness to do something about the infor-
mal economy and other illegal economic activities. However, many suspected that the 
makhzen	actually	targeted	specific	businessmen	and	attempted	to	reinforce	its	grip	on	
the entrepreneurs. Therefore, according to some observers, the anti-corruption cam-
paign	cannot	only	be	understood	within	the	framework	of	the	state’s	efforts	to	fight	cor-
ruption and fraud but must also, and maybe more importantly, be understood within the 
framework of the changing balances of power between the makhzen and the Moroccan 
private sector (Sater, 2002; Hibou & Tozy, 2002b; Cammett, 2007; Catusse, 2008). The 
eventual signing of a “gentlemen’s agreement” in 1996 between the government and 
the CGEM drew the boundaries of a new balance of power and further institutionalized 
the contacts between the professional associations and the Moroccan government. 
Consequently, the CGEM had revealed itself as one of the most important political 
competitors of the makhzen in the 1990s. While the organization was practically in-ex-
istent	in	the	1980s,	it	grew	out	to	be	an	influential	pressing	group	over	the	course	of	the	
1990s.	The	singing	of	the	gentlemen’s	agreement	assured	the	definite	inclusion	of	the	
entrepreneurs in the Moroccan political space (Catusse, 2008: 241-242). Yet, this didn’t 
necessarily meant that the Moroccan entrepreneurs succeeded in the end in imposing 
their will on the established political powers. To be sure, they managed to express their 
demands and caught the attention of the makhzen, but their autonomy from the latter 
was still limited. The makhzen remained the most powerful economic and political 
force or elite network in the country. More accurately, the political struggle between the 
CGEM and the makhzen	revealed	that	the	first	had	managed	to	gain	important	political	
access, while the latter succeeded in co-opting their contestants. In this context, the 
gentlemen’s	agreement	should	be	understood	as	a	 reconfiguration	of	 the	assemblage	
of	intermediaries	that	were	allowed	to	influence	and	negotiate	with	the	inner-circle	of	
central political power in Morocco (Hibou & Tozy, 2002b). That was the compromise 
reached after the sanitation campaign. After the singing of the gentlemen’s agreement, 
the leadership of the CGEM was co-opted and joined the political establishment, not 
necessarily as a political actor in itself, but more as privileged intermediary (Ibid.: 
42).224 Characteristic of this co-optation was the fact that the three following successors 
of	Lahjouji	as	president	of	the	CGEM,	Hassan	Chami,	Moulay	Hafid	Elalamy	and	Mo-
hamed Horani, were all more closely connected to the palace. In contrast to Lahjouji, 
who was a manager of a family business in Meknes, Chami came from a respectable 
Fassi family and occupied important government positions before he became president 
of the CGEM. Elalamy was the CEO of an important insurance company. He had previ-
ously worked for ONA and enjoyed the support of the royal inner circle and economic 
elite (Catusse, 2008: 220). Finally, Horani was elected president of the CGEM on 23 
May 2009. Allegedly, he was the only candidate for the presidency and he enjoyed the 
support of ONA. Yet, the two actual favourites to win the election, Mohamed Chaïbi 
and Youssef Alaoui, had withdrawn their candidacy when Horani presented himself. 
224  What is striking, according to Hibou and Tozy, is that the Moroccan government (i.e. the political par-
ties) was kept out of these negotiations that led to the gentlemen’s agreement. The negotiations took place 
directly between the makhzen (through the Ministry of Interior) and the employer’s federation.
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Alaoui, for example, declared that he withdrew “out of respect for ONA”.225    
In	contrast	 to	 the	entrepreneurs,	 the	 influence	of	other	 social	actors	diminished	dur-
ing the decades of economic restructuring and neoliberal reform. Before the era of 
structural	adjustment,	Morocco	had	a	rather	unusual	political	configuration	compared	
to other countries in the region. In contrast to many other authoritarian regimes in the 
region, some social institutions in Morocco enjoyed a relative autonomy from the state 
apparatus and often opposed – to a certain extent of course – the repressive regime 
of king Hassan II. Among these institutions were the press, the political parties (i.e. 
foremost the historical opposition parties USFP and Istiqlal) and above all, the trade 
unions (Clément & Paul, 1984). However, despite this unique situation, the policies of 
economic adjustment brought forth some important political shifts that were more or 
less characteristic for the whole Arab region. Nazih Ayubi (1997: 159) argues that the 
traditional	political	configurations	built	around	the	military,	the	technocratic	manage-
rial state bourgeoisie and organized labour was a typical corollary of the famous ISI-
strategy.	The	Moroccan	 labour	unions,	 for	 example,	 proved	 to	be	 a	fierce	opponent	
during the early 1980s (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2007: 752). They had successfully put 
pressure on the government in several occasions and obliged the authorities to with-
draw	some	of	its	economic	austerity	measures.	Yet,	this	specific	balance	of	power	em-
bedded in the developmental state regime could not be sustained in a more liberalized 
economy. In Morocco, the inclusion of the new entrepreneurs was one consequence, the 
diminishing	influence	of	organized	labour	another.	As	such,	the	unions	were	one	of	the	
main	victims	of	these	shifting	power	balances.	Moreover,	this	trend	wasn’t	confined	to	
the Arab region. The diminishing power of the organized labour movements manifested 
itself as a global trend. Harvey argues that it was one of the main political objectives of 
the neoliberal class project (Harvey, 2006; Harvey, 2010a). 
As	I	discussed	earlier,	the	early	years	of	neoliberal	restructuring	coincided	with	fierce	
strikes and even riots. The Casablanca-riots in 1981 were largely an expression of the 
increasing social discontent among the poor population of Casablanca, but also an indi-
cator	of	the	influence	and	mobilization	capacities	of	the	trade	unions,	in	particular	the	
CDT.226	Some	observers	at	the	time	even	thought	the	unions	had	the	potential	to	inflict	
a full-scale insurrection. However, in the period that followed, the monarchy managed 
not only to repress the unions but also to incorporate some of its leadership and that of 
the allied opposition parties into a general politics of consensus. By November 1983, 
both USFP leader Abderrahim Bouabid and Istiqlal leader Mohamed Boucetta joined 
the government. Subsequently both the historical opposition parties and the major trade 
unions agreed to the new round of austerity measures imposed by the IMF (Clément 
225		Jamal	Berraoui,	Elections	au	patronat:	tempête	à	la	CGEM,	Challenge	Hebdo,	09/05/2009,	available	
at: http://www.maghress.com/fr/challenge/4593 (accessed 05/10/2010).  
226  However, these expressions of discontent cannot be reduced to the working class alone. Violent 
demonstrations and urban mass protests against the declining standards of living and the removal of basic 
(food) subsidies were often also carried and supported by the urban lumpenproletariat. This was the case 
in countries as Egypt (1977), Sudan (1985), Jordan (1989), Tunisia (1978 & 1984), Algeria (1988) and 
elsewhere (Ayubi, 1997; Bayat, 2002). In Morocco, slum dwellers played a vital role in the violent urban 
outbreaks in Casablanca (1981) and also during the subsequent violent troubles of the 1980s. In fact, since 
the early 1950s, the slum population and the lumpenproletariat in Morocco were consistently involved in 
urban riots (Madani, 1995).
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& Paul, 1984).227 As a result of the repression against the unions and the co-optation of 
the political opposition, the role of these actors in the subsequent riots in 1984 were 
marginal at the least (Ibid.; Seddon, 1989). Also in the early 1990s, neither the unions 
nor the emerging Islamists played a crucial role in the violent uprisings around cities 
as Fez, Tangiers and Meknes. These events revealed a more general and spontaneous 
dissatisfaction	that	went	well	beyond	the	influence	and	scope	of	the	unions	(Madani,	
1995; Brand, 1998). In the mid-1990s, Catusse argues, the apparent class struggle of 
the early 1980s was further neutralized when both the unions and the CGEM were 
brought together as “partners” with the institutionalization of the social dialogue. On 1 
August 1996, leading representatives of the CDT, the Union Générale des Travailleurs 
(UGTM), the CGEM and the Minister of Interior, had signed a joint declaration in 
Rabat	to	install	a	social	dialogue	between	the	different	social	partners	in	order	to	find	a	
common ground between their different interests in the future.228 This was a typical ex-
ample of the privatization of the state. By bringing the social partners together around 
the same table, the central authorities had reduced their own role in the arbitration of 
class	conflicts.	As	such	they	were	able	to	redistribute	responsibilities,	regulate	the	so-
cial risks and supervise the process of ‘class collaboration’ they had installed. This new 
apparatus (dispositif) contributed to the depoliticization of the socio-economic prob-
lems in Morocco. In the name of economic growth, securitization and social peace the 
left-right divide was now, also in Morocco, put aside in favour of the consensus model 
(Catusse, 2008: 247; see also Mouffe, 2005).  
All	these	evolutions	(i.e.	the	emergence	of	new	social	actors	and	the	diminishing	influ-
ence of others under capitalist liberalization) brings us to the question whether a class 
analysis	is	a	valuable	method	to	analyze	the	specific	case	of	the	Moroccan	neoliberal	
context? More importantly, if neoliberalism is a (global) class project, who then con-
stitutes the (ruling) capitalist class in Morocco? To be sure, the Moroccan economy 
remains largely oligarchic. Traditional families with ties leading directly to the mon-
archy	(often	through	marriage)	continue	to	dominate	strategic	sectors	such	as	finance	
and telecommunications. As a consequence some argued that we cannot speak of an 
autonomous capitalist class in Morocco. The entrepreneurs are a very heterogeneous 
group	with	different	interests	and	internal	conflicts.	The	CGEM	incorporates	both	man-
agers of the SMEs and CEOs belonging to the big private consortiums. Furthermore, 
in	 the	end,	political	power	and	 influence	 still	depends	on	close	 ties	with	Morocco’s	
biggest capitalist: the king. The decision, for example, to embark on a structural ad-
justment program in 1983 was taken by king Hassan II personally and perceived as a 
sovereign decision (Ben Ali, 2005). Today, it is perceived to be Mohamed VI person-
ally – together with his clique of close advisors – who determines the political economy 
of Morocco. He launches “royal projects” such as the Bouregreg project, Tanger Med 
and	Casa	Marina.	Obviously,	the	current	influence	of	the	“royal	managers”	is	undeni-
able (Vermeren, 2009). They continue to dominate the economy and the development 
of actually existing neoliberal urbanism in Morocco. The directors of important state 
agencies such as the AAVB, the TMSA and the CDG are some of today’s most promi-
227		The	political	reform	process	of	the	1990s	(the	alternance)	had	a	similar	effect.	By	their	definite	co-
optation into the realm of monarchial power, the historical opposition parties (Istiqlal and USFP) had lost a 
lot of their appeal amongst the main public and as a result also their capacity to pressure ruling authorities.
228  The UGTM was linked to the Istiqlal.
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nent economic actors in Morocco. 
Comparable to Waterbury’s conception of the state bourgeoisie, these state managers 
do not own the means of production. They are only appointed by dahir and therefore 
still depend on their loyalty to the king – and his goodwill – for their personal fortunes. 
With the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, some of the country’s leading tech-
nocrats under Hassan II were replaced by his own inner circle. Over the past decade, 
we	have	witnessed	the	rising	influence	and	visibility	of	a	young	group	of	assertive	and	
dynamic managers with close ties to Mohamed VI. They now occupy leading positions 
both in the state apparatus as well as in the private sector (Denoeux, 2007; Tozy, 2008). 
Consequently, it seems like these managers can as easily be replaced and displaced as 
they emerged if it suits the political interests of the makhzen. In 2009 for example, just 
after the municipal elections, Mustapha Bakkoury was replaced by Anass Alami as 
director of the powerful CDG. Rumour had it that the king appointed Alami because 
he was a close ally of Mohammed Mounir el Majidi, the CEO of SIGER and manager 
of the royal fortune.229 Yet, Bakkoury on the other hand, was an ally of Fouad Ali El 
Himma, also a close friend of the king and leader of the newly founded (royalist) politi-
cal Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM).230 Despite the close contacts between 
El Himma and Mohamed VI, the king maybe wanted to avoid too much economic and 
political	influence	in	the	hands	of	the	El	Himma	clan	(Boussaid,	2009).	Bakkoury	was	
later appointed chief executive of the Moroccan Agency of Solar Energy (MASEN), an 
agency	with	far	less	prestige	and	influence	than	the	CDG	at	the	moment	but,	neverthe-
less, with the potential to grow as solar energy is perceived to be an important sector 
for	the	future.	Whatever	the	real	reason	may	have	been	for	the	shuffle,	this	example	
shows	how	easily	influential	state	technocrats	can	be	replaced	and	how	dependent	they	
are on the monarchy.               
As a consequence, the rising Arab bourgeoisie, in Morocco as elsewhere in the region, 
during the last three decades of neoliberal reform is, according to Karen Aggestam e.a., 
by no means a class in itself: 
On the contrary, it is more like the compradora bourgeoisie of old colonial times. 
Together with the new infitah elites, “old” post-independence elites still hold the 
reins of power. The “state bourgeoisie” or upper echelons of the public admin-
istration and security sector elites (army, security forces) are still very important 
in the power structure, as are old community leaders (…) and local notables. 
Consequently, the increased elite variety and complexity seem to be mainly the 
result of a more complex society, rather than the product of new, independent, 
emerging classes (Aggestam, e.a., 2009: 328-329). 
Two remarks are at place here. First, these allegations seem to suggest the non-exis-
tence of capitalist class politics – or at least their subordination to neo-patrimonial poli-
tics – and consequently, also the pointlessness of a (Marxist) class analysis of political 
life in the Arab region. After all, there can be no class politics without class agency. At 
229  SIGER is the Royal company which has a majority share in ONA. 
230		In	an	interview,	a	close	contact	within	the	CDG	confirmed	me	that	the	allegiance	of	Alami	to	the	el	
Majidi-clan was probably one of the reasons for the dismissal of Bakkoury (Rabat – 17/05/2010).
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best, if neoliberalism is taken into account in mainstream political accounts of Arab 
politics, the nature of its implementation is then mostly considered to be determined 
by a small clique of neo-patrimonial elites (the regime) and not understood as a class 
project, which is, I would argue, a much broader and more insightful perspective. Ad-
ditionally, in a period in which structural adjustment and neoliberal reform clearly ag-
gravated the social living conditions of the majority of the Arab population – and at the 
same time did not necessarily worsen the conditions for the ruling elite to accumulate 
capital – the focus of many MENA-studies (both within the transitologist as the post-
democratization traditions) did not so much turned to a consideration of emerging or 
repressed class struggles, but instead, focused on the role that civil society could play in 
political transition and processes of democratization (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 133-134; 
see for example Bellin, 1994; Kamrava & O Mora, 1998; Hawthorne, 2004; Cavatorta 
& Elananza, 2008). No doubt, as I mentioned earlier, Morocco experienced a spectacu-
lar growth of local associations and other social organizations during the 1990s due to 
the new political climate of the alternance (cf. Abouhani, 2006; Berriane, 2010). But 
the focus on phenomena as civil society can also be seen as the continuous attempt of 
liberal	theory	to	displace	class	analyses	and	class	identification	in	favour	of	conceptions	
which present a more contractual relationship with the state (Radice, 2008). Moreover, 
it was also through the good governance discourse that the World Bank co-inspired 
the interest in civil society, by emphasizing the positive role civil society can play in 
processes of transition and democratization (Kapoor, 2008). Although, I do not wish 
to deny the validity of research on civil society’s potentially political role, mainstream 
accounts on political change in the Arab region, however, still tend to deny the crucial 
impact of neoliberal hegemony as a form of class rule. Consequently, Marxist class 
analyses are largely ignored as valuable critical modes of thought that can produce new 
insights about the problems of capitalist development in the region.231 
Secondly, positivist approaches to class and class analysis are rather limited to draw 
definite	conclusions	on	the	usefulness	of	such	an	analysis.	As	such,	the	conclusion	that	
the state bourgeoisie or the emerging entrepreneurs cannot be seen as an autonomous 
class is not particularly illuminating to determine whether we should or should not 
revert to a Marxist class analysis. To begin with, according to advocates of “global 
system theory”, we have to turn away from state-centrist analyses of colonial and post-
colonial (developmental) states and their grip on the domestic economy.232 Instead, in 
order to understand the (class) nature of the ruling elite in the Third World and their 
relationship with capitalism, we should analyse the global capitalist system as a whole 
and	try	to	capture	the	definite	dynamics	of	the	emergence	of	a	transnational	capitalist	
class, both locally and globally (Sklair & Robbins, 2002; see also Robinson, 2004). 
While these theorist recognize that this transnational capitalist class is not yet fully de-
veloped, they argue that it is just a matter of time. According to them, the economic grip 
of many Third World states is declining and the economic interests of those who control 
231  A positive exception in this regard is the recent call by Francesco Cavatorta in an article published in 
the special issue that was edited by Valbjørn and Bank (see chapter 1). He argues that we should look into 
the insights of Marxism to see how they can broaden our understanding of politics in the region (Cavatorta, 
2010). 
232  Global system theory argues that national states and national capitalist classes will eventually sub-
merge in transnational states and transnational capitalist classes due to an ever globalizing capitalist system.
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and lead the global economy are increasingly intertwined across and beyond national 
boundaries.	Class	relations	and	class	identities	are	therefore	globally	defined,	instead	of	
being rather exclusively local and/or national in origin (Ibid.). But even if we don’t go 
as far as global system theory to disconnect class relations from national political space, 
a class analysis is still valuable to understand the nature of political change in the Arab 
World	 (and	Morocco	more	 specifically).	As	 such,	 and	maybe	more	 importantly,	 the	
critical question is not so much whether neoliberal reform in the Arab region has given 
rise	to	a	new	(independent)	class	(transnational	or	otherwise),	or	whether	we	can	define	
certain	fixed	sociological	categories	by	which	we	can	determine	the	apparent	(class	or	
non-class) nature of politics. To the contrary, I would like to argue that the crucial issue 
is to understand how traditional and new emerging elites are gradually transforming 
their practices even more into capitalist class practices in a context of neoliberal reform. 
This is important not only to understand how relations of capital and labour are trans-
formed through neoliberal political projects, but also to investigate the particular ways 
in which neoliberal globalization has brought forth a new social order and transformed 
the existing balance of (class) forces.233 
Adam David Morton, who draws on Kevin Cox, argues that class should be viewed 
more “as a historical category and employed in a heuristic way rather than as a static 
analytical category” (Morton, 2007: 117). Authors such as Waterbury and Aggestam 
view class too much as a rigid sociological category which gives us the illusion that 
this concept can be used in a positivist method to decide whether someone belongs to 
a certain class or not (some positivist Marxists have that same tendency).234 One of the 
important	elements	that	defines	this	rigidity	is	the	objective	category	which	is	dictated	
by the ownership over the means of production. Yet, this feature of ownership does 
not necessarily bring clarity. Even in the heartland of neoliberal hegemony, the US, it 
becomes	more	and	more	difficult	to	attune	a	class	analysis	to	the	simple	fact	whether	
one owns the means of production or not. CEO’s and managers of multinational consor-
tiums do not own the means of production (or not all of them) which they control. Addi-
tionally,	in	the	contemporary	phase	of	finance	capitalism,	production	has	become	sub-
ordinated to speculation. This brings to the fore all kinds of new actors (stockbrokers, 
day traders, hedge funds, etc.) who’s class position is not necessarily only determined 
by mere ownership over the means of production. More closely related to the case of 
Morocco, the institutions of the European Union have proved on many occasions that 
they are involved in projects to neoliberalize European political and economic life. Are 
the politics of commissioners and Eurocrats – this rather particular kind of state bour-
geoisie – then not a form of class politics? 
Class formation or the existence of a capitalist class are the result of processes that 
are inherently linked to the uneven geographical development of capitalism world-
wide. The continuous extensive and intensive enlargement of capitalism around the 
globe coincides, irrevocably, with the extension of class relations and class practices 
233  A interesting detail in this regard is for example the fact that even ONA had to reconcile with the en-
trance of new powerful foreign capitalist actors as it could not match the offer of French and Spanish multi-
nationals in the Moroccan telecom deals (Sater, 2010: 104).
234  In contrast, someone like Melani Cammett for example, consistently uses the concept of class when 
she speaks of the emerging entrepreneurs in Morocco. 
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everywhere in the world. I do agree with Waterbury when he argues that structural 
adjustment was forced upon the ruling elites in the Arab region. But I differ from his 
opinion when he states that in the face of the debt crisis the state bourgeoisie failed to 
act as a class (Waterbury, 1991: 8). According to Waterbury the state bourgeoisie had 
no consistent class project (Ibid.: 9). Yet, Waterbury’s conceptualization of the state 
bourgeoisie as a coherent social category hides internal contradictions. He considers 
all state personnel – including both elite managers and members of the petty bourgeois 
working in the state-administration – to be part of one social group. In that sense, the 
state bourgeoisie – or the way he conceptualized it – failed indeed to act as a single 
class.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	that	the	specific	political	strategies	of	the	state	bourgeoisie	
to respond to the debt crisis did not have a class content. 
Nicos Poulantzas is one of those Marxist authors who critiqued rigid conceptualizations 
of class and analyzed the class status of – what he calls – the “state personnel”. Accord-
ing	to	Poulantzas,	the	state	personnel	has	a	specific	class	place	but	cannot	be	treated	as	
a	coherent,	unified	social	category	in	the	same	way	Waterbury	treats	them:
Class contradictions are also inscribed within the State through internal divisions 
of the state personnel in the broad sense of the term (the various administrative, 
judicial, military, police and other state bureaucracies). This personnel constitutes 
a social category with a characteristic unity that results from the organization and 
relative autonomy of the State. Nevertheless, it is not a social group existing 
alongside or above classes: it has a class place and is therefore internally divided. 
This class place is distinct from the class origin of the state personnel (i.e., from 
the classes out of which it emerges): it refers to the position of the personnel in 
the social division of labour, such as it crystallizes in the state framework (in the 
form,	amongst	others,	of	the	specific	reproduction	of	the	division	between	intel-
lectual and manual labour at the very heart of the intellectual labour concentrated 
in the State). It is a question of bourgeois	class	affiliation	or	place	for	the	upper	
reaches of this personnel, and of petty-bourgeois	affiliation	for	the	intermediate	
and subaltern echelons of the state apparatuses (Poulantzas, 2000: 154).
Poulantzas would have criticized Waterbury for ignoring the obvious class contradic-
tions within the state bourgeoisie. Waterbury does not attribute a different class position 
to the petty bourgeoisie and thereby ignores the differentiated forms of power and hi-
erarchy within the state apparatus itself from a class perspective. Just in order to main-
tain political continuity within a neoliberal global environment, former neo-patrimonial 
relations of power had to be extended with and transformed into more market-oriented 
class relations of power, relatively autonomous from state-control. Only in this way 
did the makhzen and the state-elite manage not lose its power. Moreover, as I argued in 
chapter 2, the state still proved an essential and crucial apparatus for the establishment 
of neoliberal policies. Yet, in contrast to the vision that considers the worldwide spread 
of neoliberal government a result of a global hierarchy of states – in which certain capi-
talist states (e.g. the US) would then be the main driving force behind the neoliberal 
transformations of Third World states – the neoliberal hegemony in Morocco should be 
first	of	all	understood	as	a	form	of	class	rule	that	operates	within	and	beyond	national	
boundaries and through the state apparatus (Overbeek, 2005; see also Morton, 2007: 117).
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To point out particular class politics is not the same thing as claiming that class is de-
termined	in	advance,	but	rather	an	attempt	to	explain	the	specific	nature	of	the	interests	
and	conflicts	behind	wage	labour	exploitation,	accumulation	by	dispossession	and	capi-
tal circulation. Class as a concept does not exist prior to struggle, but arises out of that 
struggle (Thompson, 1978).235 Therefore, Harvey argues that:
A central tenet of Marx’s historical and materialist method is that a concept such 
as “class” can take on a meaning only in relation to the historical context in which 
it is to be applied. “Class” has a contingent meaning depending upon whether we 
are considering feudal, capitalist, or socialist modes of production. 
Even more concrete, we could argue in the context of Morocco, as elsewhere in the 
world, that the meaning of class will vary upon whether we are considering actually 
existing developmental or neoliberal forms of capitalism. To give a concrete example: 
global system theory will attribute a transnational character to class forces in contem-
porary global capitalism, while in contrast, class forces under Keynesianism and/or 
developmentalism were considered to have a more national character (cf. Sklair & Rob-
bins, 2002; Robinson, 2004).236 Class theory, Harvey argues, is therefore not “a matter 
of	identifying	a	fixed	set	of	categories	which	are	supposed	to	apply	for	all	times	and	
places”	(Harvey,	1989a:	111).	To	the	contrary,	class	configurations	are	always	relational	
and	 these	 configurations	 are	 embedded	within	 the	 dynamics	 and	 transformations	 of	
actually existing capitalism. The Marxist economist David Ruccio adds an important 
argument to that. He argues that class can therefore also be interpreted as a process 
of appropriation of surplus labour (Ruccio, 2011). Marx has distinguished necessary 
labour (labour necessary to keep oneself alive) from surplus labour. According to the 
interpretation	of	class	as	a	process,	Marx,	building	on	this	distinction,	defined	class	as	
the particular social process in which surplus labour is appropriated from those who 
directly produce it (e.g. by buying or exploiting it). In addition, seeing class as a process 
does not imply that it replaces all other non-class processes. To the contrary:
This process of surplus appropriation is, in turn, complexly determined by the 
other economic, political, and cultural processes that make up social life. The 
various modes of surplus labor appropriation or class processes designated by 
Marx (primitive communal, feudal, slave, capitalist, etc.) are then produced by 
differing	configurations	of	such	nonclass	social	processes.	Each	particular	class	
process is understood to exist only as an effect of its own uniquely constituted 
social context (Ibid.: 223).      
If we go back to the basic social relationship that Marx observed within capitalism, the 
power relation between capital and labour, this relation is expressed through the actual 
235  Edward Palmer Thompson stated that “class struggle is the prior concept to class, class does not pre-
cede but arises out of struggle” (Thompson, 1978: 298). Here, his argument resonates with Foucault’s cri-
tique	that	we	should	primarily	be	concerned	to	find	out	what	the	(class)struggle	is	in	concrete	terms,	instead	
of	first	being	preoccupied	with	the	task	to	determine	what	class	is	(Marsden,	1999:	24).				
236		Morton	raised	some	important	critical	reflections	on	global	system	theory,	arguing	that	we	should	
neither	accept	the	dominant	fixity	of	state-centrism	nor	the	assumption	that	the	national	state	and	therefore	
also national ruling classes are irreversibly merging into transnational structures and class forces (Morton, 
2007: 139 & 140-150; see also chapter 2, in particular footnote 104). 
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existing market mode of economic integration and determined by the outcome of actual 
class struggle (Harvey, 1989: 111). The capitalist class process, therefore, is determined 
by the appropriation of surplus labour in the particular form of surplus-value (Ruccio, 
2011: 223). Capitalists accumulate by extracting more value from the results of produc-
tion than the value of labour power to produce these results. Under “normal conditions” 
this value is generated by the sale of the commodities that were appropriated by the 
capitalists (i.e. through their control over the means of production). But there are all 
kinds of other ways to accumulate capital. We can, for example, extend the analysis of 
the class process to consider the distribution of surplus labour. Once surplus-value is 
appropriated,	it	is	commonly	distributed	via	specific	channels	to	finance	those	social	
processes that are fundamental for the reproduction of the capitalist class process (e.g. 
via	 the	stock-market,	state	officials,	money-lenders,	merchandising,	etc.)	 (Ibid.).	Via	
these channels extra surpluses are generated. Finally, I discussed above, surpluses can 
also	be	generated	through	accumulation	by	dispossession	which	is	a	specific	form	of	
exploitation. In this regard, I want to argue that the concept of class should not so much 
be	used	as	a	fixed	sociological	concept	defined	by	a	set	of	predetermined	categories	
but rather as a political concept which provides new insights on (neoliberal) capitalist 
transformations.237 A Marxist analysis of class and class politics is above all an analysis 
of the nature of politics. 
One of the essential features of class rule and class politics are the historical processes 
of economic exploitation. By focusing on particular examples of such processes (cf. 
chapter	4	and	5)	we	can	identify	some	specific	examples	of	how	the	Moroccan	soci-
ety is organized around and through existing forms of class exploitation. “Bring back 
exploitation as the hallmark of class, and at once class struggle is in the forefront, as 
it should be” (de Ste. Croix cited in Morton, 2007: 117). Morton agrees with authors 
as Erik Olin Wright (see chapter 2) and David Harvey, when he considers exploitation 
as one of the crucial points of interest for a Marxist perspective on class politics. In 
Morocco, neoliberal reforms have been the result of various political struggles between 
representatives of labour (e.g. the unions, the unemployed graduates, the slumdwell-
ers) and capital (e.g. the entrepreneurs, the state bourgeoisie, the makhzen, etc.). These 
struggles are not always straightforward, let alone logical or rational. They sometimes 
have an internal character, as for example the struggle between different class fractions 
(e.g. between the new entrepreneurs and the makhzen). Of course, the variety of these 
struggles contradicts the existence of one coherent class with clear characteristics and 
one coherent and rational class project. Yet, class strategies are not necessarily con-
certed actions, planned to obtain one single aim (Lefebvre, 1996: 77). Let alone that 
these	strategies	would	be	rational.	As	such,	the	theoretical	and	empirical	difficulty,	if	
not the impossibility, to fix class in Morocco and elsewhere does not make the nature of 
political struggle less real (i.e. the struggle between capital and labour, the exploitation, 
the process of accumulation by dispossession, etc.). 
Yet, this doesn’t mean of course that all politics have to be reduced to class politics. 
The crystallization of social forces in contemporary Moroccan society are also deter-
mined by other kinds of power relations that are embedded within religious, ethnic and 
237  I thank Matthias Lievens for this particular insight. 
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cultural contexts. These relations are to be situated usually within a broader historical 
framework and they are often ‘residuals’ – as Harvey (2006) would label them – from 
an earlier political order (tribal, feudal, etc.). For example, the religious authority of the 
king	as	‘the	Commander	of	the	faithful’	was	and	still	is	a	specific,	very	important	power	
relation that has its historical roots before the emergence of capitalist social relations 
in Morocco and has little to do with the relation between capital and labour (see Wa-
terbury,	1970).	Furthermore,	specific	neo-patrimonial	relations	of	power	(the	makhzen) 
are still prevalent in contemporary Moroccan political life. Another example are the 
specific	residuals	of	relations	established	through	colonialism	and	through	the	French	
cultural	and	social	influence	on	Moroccan	society	–	aside	from	its	economic	influence.	
Nevertheless, class issues are intimately intermingled with non-class issues such as 
ethnicity and gender. These other issues are to be seen in relation to class issues in order 
to understand the complex social realities that are shaped by neoliberal modes of pro-
duction and accumulation (Morton, 2007: 117-118). The question is then not so much 
whether class politics supplanted or prevailed over former neo-patrimonial politics, but 
rather how they are intertwined within Morocco’s actually existing neoliberalism.
Conclusion
In	this	chapter	I	attempted	to	give	a	first	overview	of	the	neoliberal	transition	in	Mo-
rocco	and	the	subsequent	transition	in	Moroccan	neoliberalism.	The	specific	changes	
and political transformations described above testify how authoritarianism in the re-
gion	has	been	renewed	and	reconfigured	in	the	face	of	economic	liberalization	(Pratt,	
2007). Since the introduction of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1983, 
Morocco entered a phase of radical economic restructuring. “Roll back neoliberalism” 
refers to this destructive event and state power was mobilized to complete it. Yet, this 
implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particu-
lar (developmentalist) state functions. Furthermore, through strategies of accumulation 
by dispossession (e.g. privatization) ruling class formations managed to maintain and 
even increase their (economic) control, the royal family’s enhanced grip on ONA being 
of course the most obvious example. The concept of roll out neoliberalism points to a 
fundamental transformation within neoliberalism itself. According to Peck and Tick-
ell, it refers to a more creative phase of neoliberalism, characterized by new forms of 
institution-building,	new	modes	of	regulation	and	new	configurations	of	spatially	dif-
ferentiated government. New modalities of roll out neoliberalism in Morocco emerged 
after	three	developments;	first	of	all,	the	disappointing	socio-economic	improvements	
after structural adjustment, especially for the majority of the Moroccan population; 
secondly,	 the	 increased	 social	 tensions	 over	 the	 last	 decade,	which	 reached	 a	 (first)	
critical	peak	with	the	terrorist	attacks	of	2003;	and	finally,	the	changed	global	discourse	
and the new (post-Washington) consensus on good governance. As a result, new politi-
cal debates and reform processes opened up space for new ways in which state agency 
was	redeployed	in	social	development	schemes	(e.g.	INDH)	to	fight	poverty,	but	also	
in large-scale urban development schemes to promote economic growth and redirect 
strategies of capital accumulation. 
Some saw this apparent return of ‘the state’ as evidence for the decline of the impact of 
neoliberal ideology (cf. De Miras, 2007). I would argue that this is not the case. What 
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distinguished the neoliberal phase from the developmentalist phase were the changes in 
class relations and the overall balance of power. If we consider the balances of power 
of both the roll back and roll out phase of neoliberalism we have to consider that there 
have been no fundamental shifts. In the previous chapter, I used Harvey’s political 
definition	 to	 describe	 global	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 political	 project	which	 involved	 the	
restoration of capitalist class power. Also in Morocco, the power of the trade unions di-
minished during the 1980s and the social pact of the Moroccan developmental regime, 
i.e. the pact between the ruling elites and the urban middle classes, has been gradually 
dissolved. But the economic power of the makhzen didn’t not suffer any setback. To 
the	contrary,	despite	the	emergence	of	a	new	entrepreneurial	elite	that	benefited	from	
trade liberalization and despite the return of foreign capital in the domestic market, 
traditional political elites continued to dominate the economy to the present day. Conse-
quently, during the phase of roll out neoliberalism, it was not so much the state of class 
power (i.e. the mutual class relations) that has been altered, but rather only the modes 
of	class	rule	(government).	The	following	two	chapters	spend	specific	attention	to	these	
new modalities of neoliberal rule.
The evolution of the state’s institutional materiality and the manifestation of new gov-
ernmental practices are related to the political organization of the dominant classes 
and	the	disorganization	of	subordinate	ones	(Jessop,	1999).	This	brings	us	to	the	final	
argument of the chapter. If we consider class as a process of appropriation of capital 
surpluses, in other words, if we consider class to be a political rather than a sociological 
concept, than a class analysis proves to be very insightful to understand the political 
changes in contemporary Morocco. Neoliberal globalization has transformed the bal-
ance of class forces – in Morocco notably through the emergence of new entrepreneurs 
and the implication of foreign capital. This implicated that the national state had to 
re-organize both nationally-based capital (comprador, export-oriented, or productive) 
as well as serve the interest of foreign capital with which domestic capitalist actors 
are	affiliated	 in	one	way	or	another	(Ibid.:	6-7).	On	the	one	hand,	 the	ruling	bloc	 in	
Morocco can therefore not just be reduced to some endogenously coherent “regime”. 
The situation under neoliberalism is far more politically complex. On the other hand, 
however, the traditional ruling class did manage to maintain its political dominance. 
They reformed the Moroccan state apparatus, changed their governmental practices, 
adapted	to	the	new	neoliberal	environment,	and	finally	also	contributed	to	the	produc-
tion of neoliberalism as a global project through the establishment of its particular 
Moroccan form. 
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         Chapter 4
Urban segregation is not a frozen status quo, but rather a 
ceaseless social war in which the state intervenes regular-
ly in the name of “progress,” “beautification,” and even 
“social justice for the poor” to redraw spatial boundar-
ies to the advantage of landowners, foreign investors, elite 
homeowners, and middle-class commuters. As in 1860s 
Paris under the financial reign of Baron Haussmann, ur-
ban redevelopment still strives to simultaneously maximize 
private profit and social control. The contemporary scale 
of population removal is immense: every year hundreds of 
thousands, sometimes millions, of poor people – legal ten-
ants as well as squatters – are forcibly evicted from Third 
World neighborhoods. (…) And like the sans-culottes driv-
en from their ancient quartiers by Haussman – to whom 
Blanqui apostrophized a famous complaint – they “weary 
of grandiose homicidal acts … this vast shifting of stones 
by the hand of despotism.” They are also exasperated with 
the ancient language of modernization that defines them as 
“human encumberments” (to quote the Dakar authorities 
who cleared 90,000 residents from central bidonvilles in 
the 1970s) (M Davis, 2006a: 98).
For the city’s planners the poor were a public danger, their 
potentially riotous concentrations to be broken up by av-
enues and boulevards which would drive the inhabitants of 
the crowded popular quarters they replaced into some un-
specified, but presumably more sanitary and certainly less 
perilous locations. (…) For building entrepreneurs and 
property developers the poor were an unprofitable market, 
compared to the rich pickings from the new specialised 
business and shopping districts and the solid houses and 
apartments for the middle class, or the developing suburbs 
(Hobsbawn, 1975: 211).
Power and control in neoliberal politics: 
A bio-political transition from sovereign 
city planning to techniques of security
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This	chapter	 looks	at	 the	slums	of	Morocco,	and	yet,	 it	 is	not	specifically	about	 the	
lives of slum dwellers. Although it is important to study the everyday lives, and more 
specifically	the	political,	economic	and	social	strategies	of	poor	people	in	precarious	
neighbourhoods, I want to highlight another aspect.238 In this chapter, I demonstrate the 
shifting methods of neoliberal government between the 1980s and the 2000s by look-
ing	at	the	slums	as	spaces	to	be	governed.	I	will	focus	more	specifically	on	the	chang-
ing methods, techniques and rationalities of urban government, economic development 
and social control, and consider how slums were perceived as a particular governmental 
problem.239	As	such,	this	chapter	is	above	all	influenced	by	a	Foucauldian	perspective	
on political change and government. In contrast, the next chapter will focus more on 
the	 specific	 state-institutional	 transformations	 under	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 changing	
forms	of	class	agency	on	the	field	of	the	state.	Evidently,	both	institutional	transforma-
tions and facets of neoliberal governmentality are closely intertwined and will be pre-
sented	in	both	chapters	(only	the	dominant	focus	of	each	chapter	will	be	significantly	
different). Understanding urban politics requires paying attention to the question of 
power. However, power should not only be regarded as something that precedes and 
determines capital accumulation, exploitation and the domination of labour, but also as 
something productive, something that is implicated in ethics, in the way we imagine 
our lives and in the techniques that are used to dominate others and to determine our 
own conduct (Bayart, 2007).   
Slums are a worldwide phenomenon and a crucial element of contemporary urbaniza-
tion and globalization, especially in the Global South (Bolay, 2006; M Davis, 2006a). 
Consequently, the slums have become a central concern for neoliberal urbanism. Also 
in Morocco, slums have been an important feature of the Moroccan urbanization pro-
cess. According to UN Habitat more than 30% of the Moroccan population lived in 
slums before 2003 (Un Habitat, 2003). For a long time, these informal and in many 
ways spontaneous forms of urbanization have been tolerated by the public authorities. 
This changed however after the violent riots of 1981. From then one, the slums and its 
population would become one of the political priorities of the ruling class in Morocco. 
The main argument in this chapter is that we can distinguish a particular governmental 
shift in the ways slums are governed over the last three decades. This shift relates to the 
specific	transition	in	the	Moroccan	neoliberal	project:	more	specifically,	the	transition	
from a phase of roll back neoliberalism to a phase of roll out neoliberalism. Further-
more, because of two particular violent moments that can be considered as watershed 
moments that have accelerated this shift, I argue that the privatization and institutional 
reformation of the state are also closely related to or even determined by the question 
of security.    
A focus on technologies of power: governmentality, sovereign city planning and 
techniques of security
Besides the economic pressures of the Moroccan crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, 
some	specific	governmental	methods	developed	under	neoliberalism	were	intimately	re-
238		On	the	specific	every	day	political,	economic	and	social	strategies	of	slum	dwellers,	both	in	Morocco	
and elsewhere see amongst others: Navez-Bouchanine (1995), Bayat (2002), Zaki (2005), Ismail (2006), 
Iraki (2006a; 2006b). 
239		This	chapter	is	based	on	an	idea	that	was	first	elaborated	in	an	article	(cf.	Bogaert,	2011b).
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lated to and generated by security concerns. The ways in which these security concerns 
were taken into consideration and gave rise to the development of new governmental 
methods,	reflect	and	coincide	with	the	transition	from	a	phase	of	roll	back	neoliberalism	
towards a phase of roll out neoliberalism. Building on a brief sketch of longer urban 
trajectories, this chapter proceeds to an in-depth discussion on the political reactions to 
two watershed moments of urban unrest that have accelerated the elaboration of new 
governmental practices. These are: the bread riots of 1981 and the suicide bombings 
of 2003, both involving slum dwellers, and both occurring in Casablanca. These two 
moments of violence marked a turning point in time to explain the changing methods 
and objectives of urban government. Both moments of violence instigated reactions 
from	the	public	authorities	to	control	the	urban	environment,	and	more	specifically	the	
populations and spaces that were involved in the disturbances. As such, both moments 
of	violence	were	followed	by	specific	attempts	to	securitize	the	urban	scale.	But	while	
the methods of control taken after the riots of 1981 were more focused on the physi-
cal environment through which people move (the urban territory), the bombings of 
2003	reinforced	the	objectification	of	the	slum	population itself as a calculable target 
for a general strategy of control, trying to convert the slum-dweller into a responsible 
citizen. 
Evidence will be drawn predominantly from the case of Casablanca. First of all, be-
cause the white city has been the main stage in numerous eruptions of social unrest 
which then often spread throughout the country. Secondly, because Casablanca was/is 
exemplary for Third World urbanization: rapid urban demographic growth without pro-
portional economic growth. The coastal city expanded furiously during the twentieth 
century to become Morocco’s biggest urban 
environment. Until 2003, Casablanca was 
not only the economic centre of the coun-
try, at the same time it also accommodated 
more than 30% of Morocco’s slum dwellers. 
Because	of	this	specific	social	situation	and	
because of Casablanca’s dominant position 
in the national economy, the city has always 
been a “ville laboratoire”, a test-case and 
model for other Moroccan cities (Catusse, 
e.a., 2005). Over the course of the last 30 
years, new strategies of social and spatial 
organization ‘tested’ in Casablanca, were 
adopted afterwards in other major Moroc-
can cities.240 As such, Casablanca’s history of 
urban government offers valuable insights in 
the ways in which Morocco’s political elite 
sought to securitize the city through strategic 
and politically motivated planning and ad-
ministration (Rachik, 2002). While current 
efforts	of	urban	restructuring	reflect	a	specif-
240  This was also true during the Protectorate (see following footnote).
A century of urban expansion in Casablanca. 
Source: SDAU (2008)
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ic and contemporary neoliberal governmentality, it is important not to lose sight of the 
ways	in	which	the	city	also	reflects	earlier	regimes	of	biopolitical	production.	In	the	his-
tory of city planning the poor populations were often considered a danger (Hobsbawm, 
1975). Since the beginning of the 1950s, the urban poor in Morocco were consistently 
involved in urban riots (Madani, 1995). This rendered the government and control of 
the poor a primary concern.241 One of the arguments of this chapter is that the political 
consequences and implications of neoliberal urbanism cannot be reduced to the capital-
ist logic alone. The increasing urbanization of capital and its coinciding contradictions 
entail	a	double	shift:	it	reflects	not	only	capital’s	preference	to	guarantee	the	smooth	
flow	of	capital	circulation,	but	also	the	concern	to	protect	the	established	political	order	
(and by extension capital’s interests) from possible threats. As Mike Davis stated in 
the opening quote, “urban redevelopment still strives to simultaneously maximize pri-
vate	profit	and	social	control”. Urban re-structuring and urban re-organization since the 
1980s, therefore, equally aimed for the preservation of political stability. 
The	first	important	point	of	convergence	of	the	two	logics	of	power	during	the	period	
of neoliberal reform, can be situated at the beginning of the 1980s. Back then, Moroc-
can cities were centre stage for the so-called ‘bread riots’. Today, the dazzling urban 
street protests of the 1980s seem banished to the recesses of collective memory; a dark 
period to be recalled more as a warning than a possibility.242 Nevertheless, these urban 
riots	have	set	in	motion	specific	methods	of	urban	control	which	reflect	the	complex	
dialectic between capitalist and territorial logics of power. Immediately after the 1981 
riots, urban planning in Morocco was oriented predominantly towards the expansion of 
territorial control. In a way this expansion of control had to compensate for the nega-
tive outcomes of structural adjustment and the roll back of state developmentalism. In 
comparison with the urban strategies of control that were implemented more than 20 
years	later,	these	measures	of	urban	planning	in	the	1980s	differed	significantly	from	
the objectives of the VSBP – launched directly after the Casablanca suicide bombings 
in 2003 – which attempted to regulate and manage not so much the urban territory but 
more	specifically	the	slum	population	as	such,	through	new	modalities	of	state	inter-
vention.	Understanding	the	significance	of	these	ensuing	changes	requires	attention	to	
the	link	between	specific	strategies	of	urban	government	and	the	modes	of	thought	and	
practice	that	reflect	the	political	rationality	underpinning	these	strategies.	To	do	so,	the	
particular shift in urban governmental practices that targeted the slums between the 
early 1980s and the early 2000s, can be best explained with the distinction made by 
Mariana Valverde between “sovereign city planning” and “cities of security”. Drawing 
on the Foucauldian notions of sovereignty and security, she argues that sovereign city 
241  It is beyond the scope of this study to compare the neoliberal phases of urban restructuring with the 
colonial project of the French. The genealogy of the urbanization process can be traced back to the French 
administration and colonial urban planning. French colonial urbanism gave way to a politics of design 
which resulted in the social and spatial segregation of the indigenous and the European populations within 
the colonial project. The French ‘experimental’ urban planning project laid the foundations for sub-sequent 
socio-spatial struggles. Just as in 1981 and 2003, the 1952 urban riots in Casablanca marked a radical shift 
within the process of urbanization and generated the proliferation of new measures and technologies of 
government in order to restore the political order (for further information see: Abu Lughod, 1980; Rabinow,
1989; G Wright, 1991; Rachik, 1995; 2002; Cohen & Eleb, 2002; Abouhani, 2005).     
242  Even today, in the light of the social upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it still seems rather un-
likely that Morocco would follow that same path. 
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planning relies predominantly on techniques that capitalize a territory and emphasize 
monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign. In contrast, a city 
of security involves planning which assembles techniques that are more concerned with 
the biopolitical management of the urban population and the future risks related to that 
population (Valverde, 2007; see also Foucault, 2007: 55-86 for his discussion on town 
planning). In short, whereas sovereign city planning in the 1980s dealt with individuals 
as a set of legal subjects within the designated territory, technologies of security devel-
oped	in	the	2000s	will	precisely	constitute	and	target	a	specific	population, i.e. the slum 
population in this case study.
The distinction between these two modes of spatial organization is embedded within a 
theoretical framework which Michel Foucault has introduced as the study of govern-
mentality. He elaborated the history of governmentality in his lectures at the Collège 
de France in Paris where he had his chair “the history of systems of thought”.243 In his 
1977-1978 lectures on “security, territory and population” Foucault introduced the con-
cept	of	governmentality	for	 the	first	 time.	It	captured	Foucault’s	working	hypothesis	
on the reciprocal constitution of techniques of power and forms of knowledge. The 
semantic linking between government and mentality emphasized the inseparable inter-
relation between technologies of power and the different modes of thought (the politi-
cal rationalities) that underpin them (Lemke, 2001: 191). Foucault himself described 
governmentality as follows: 
By this word “governmentality” I mean three things. First, by “governmentality” 
I	understand	the	ensemble	formed	by	institutions,	procedures,	analyses	and	reflec-
tions,	calculations,	and	tactics	that	allow	the	exercise	of	this	very	specific,	albeit	
very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its 
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of 
force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards 
the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so 
on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the 
development	of	a	series	of	specific	governmental	apparatuses	(appareils) on the 
one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (sav-
iors). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or 
rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages 
became	the	administrative	state	in	the	fifteenth	and	sixteenth	centuries	and	was	
gradually “governmentalized” (Foucault, 2007: 108-109, text between brackets 
in original).     
Consequently, governmentality should be understood on three different levels: as an 
ensemble of governmental techniques, encompassing a dominant form of power (i.e. 
243  Foucault thought at the Collège from 1971 until his death in June 1984. Teaching at the Collège de 
France was organized by particular rules. Each year, the professors had to present their original research to 
an	audience.	Courses	and	seminars	were	completely	open	and	no	enrolment	or	qualifications	were	required.	
The professors did not had to grade their students. They had no students in fact, only auditors (See fore-
word by François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana to the 1977-1978 lectures). As a result, Foucault presented 
largely unpublished research material and new theoretical and methodological research tools. Unfortunate-
ly,	he	never	had	the	chance	to	publish	his	findings	in	a	book.	
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government)	which	was	 the	 result	 of	 a	 specific	historic	 evolution	or	process. These 
three components constituted the general framework of biopolitics. Foucault’s interest 
in modern governmentality can be associated with his interest for the development of 
technologies	of	 subjectification	which	were	 the	 result	of	a	 fundamental	 shift	 from	a	
focus on territory (which was the subject of sovereign power and sovereign politics) 
towards	a	 focus	on	population	as	 the	defining	object	of	government.	 In	his	 lectures,	
Foucault traced the genealogy of modern politics which shifted gradually from the pre-
occupation of the sovereign ‘prince’ to establish control over his territory (epitomized 
by Machiavelli’s Prince) to a new art of government in which the control over life itself 
became central.
While the relation between the prince and his territory used to be key in the Middle 
Ages, with the population that inhabited the territory in a secondary role, modern gov-
ernmentality prioritized the government of the population (Rose-Redwood, 2006; El-
den, 2007a). Consequently, this shift has led – as Foucault himself pointed out – to the 
pre-eminence of government over all other types of power (e.g. sovereign power and 
disciplinary power).244	Government	is	therefore	a	specific	form	of	biopower.  Biopower 
refers to a form of power that “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” 
(Foucault, 1990: 143). In his introductory class on the history of governmentality he 
defines	biopower	as:
the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human 
species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, 
or, in other words, how starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western 
societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a 
species (Foucault, 2007: 1).
In concrete terms, Foucault argued that this power over life has evolved into two basic 
forms during the 17th century and replaced sovereign power as the pre-eminent type of 
power	in	Western	societies.	The	first	form	in	which	biopower	emerged	was	“disciplin-
ary power” which was the object of inquiry in Foucault’s book Discipline and Punish. 
Disciplinary power included the “methods, which made possible the meticulous control 
of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and 
imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility” (Foucault, 1979: 137). In his book he 
specifically	discusses	the	emergence	and	development	of	the	penitentiary	system	as	a	
paradigmatic example. Foucault argued that in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries 
the disciplines (whether employed in prisons, schools, psychiatric institutions, etc.) be-
came the general formulas of domination. The paradigm of disciplinary power he used 
was	the	architectural	figure	of	the	Panopticon. The major effect of the Panopticon was 
its capacity to induce in the prison inmate “a state of conscious and permanent visibil-
ity that assured the automatic functioning of power” (Ibid.: 201). As such, disciplinary 
power	focused	on	getting	control	over	the	individual	body	by	developing	the	specific	
capacities and techniques to manipulate its behaviour within the space of a closed insti-
tution.	The	efficiency	of	that	form	of	power	was	embedded	within	a	design	that	derived	
244  Note that Foucault does not state that government completely replaces all other forms of power.
Power and control in neoliberal politics 175
its effectiveness from the capacity to make the targeted life visible, and more important-
ly, to make that life conscious of being visible. Additionally, the exertion of disciplinary 
power,	its	efficiency	and	its	productivity	depended	also	on	its	own	invisibility.	Power	
needed	to	be	designed	within	architectural	configurations	and	specific	procedures,	and	
was centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of his capabili-
ties, the extortion of its forces, etc. (Foucault, 1990: 139).245
The second form of biopower, which emerged historically somewhat later than the 
first,	involved	a	biopolitics of the population, the regulation of entire populations and 
the biological processes of life: propagation, births and mortality, health, life expec-
tancy, etc. (Ibid.: 139). The difference between the two forms of biopower was that 
disciplinary	power	had	the	individual	body	as	its	object	within	the	confinement	of	a	
closed institution, while government targeted “populations at risk” and attempted to 
regulate and manage them (Rose, 1999: 235).246 The supervision of the population was 
effected through particular interventions and regulatory techniques. This resulted in 
the proliferation of all kinds of new technologies of power which concentrated on the 
“conduct of conduct”. The ensemble of these kind of techniques was a form of power 
which Foucault (2007) later described as “government”.247 The Foucauldian reference 
to government, or rather “the birth of government” in the 18th century, referred not to 
the institutions of the modern state, but rather to the methods and techniques of regula-
tion and management out of which the modern state was gradually formed (Mitchell, 
2002). In this view, “power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over 
whom the ultimate dominion was death [i.e. the reason of sovereign power], but with 
living beings” (Foucault, 1990: 143). In contrast to sovereign power, biopower had a 
positive	influence	on	life.	It	administers	and	produces	that	life.
Since the 17th century, sovereign power, according to Foucault, was gradually sup-
planted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life (Ibid.: 
140). On the one hand, there was a rapid development of various disciplines such as the 
245		Consequently,	in	my	own	case	on	the	urban	restructuring	of	Casablanca,	I	first	explored	the	possibility	
of something like “urban panopticism” when I read Foucault’s discussion on panopticism and the studies of 
writers as Haim Yacobi who investigated the power of design in the Palestinian case. Just as Michel Fou-
cault indicated that the panoptic schema was much more than just an analysis of the architectural form, the 
securitization of the urban space is much more than a technical architecture or planning design. It equally 
reflects	and	symbolizes	the	location	of	bodies	in	space	on	which	particular	forms	of	behaviour	are	imposed	
(Yacobi 2004). However, this conception of urban panopticism is problematic in the case of Morocco (and 
by extension in the case of most cities in the world). An important distinction to be made was that the 
panoptic schema was limited beyond the enclosures of total institutions – like for example the prison – in 
which	subjects	are	confined	and	subjected	to	disciplinary	technologies	(Simon	2005).	Therefore,	what	
Foucault meant by discipline cannot be established within and attributed to a more open space; for example 
the city. In a response Gilles Deleuze (1992) suggested that in modern societies the intention to discipline 
conduct should be replaced by the intention to control conduct (i.e. the objective of government). As such, 
I	eventually	turned	away	from	the	conceptualization	of	something	like	urban	panopticism,	finding	more	nu-
anced	answers	in	Foucault’s	conception	of	governmentality	and	in	the	concept	of	government	as	a	specific	
form of biopower.
246  For a detailed discussion on the difference between discipline and apparatuses of security (related to 
governmental	management,	see	first	two	lectures	on	governmentality	(Foucault,	2007:	1-49).
247  Reuben Rose-Redwood makes a distinction between disciplinary power and biopower (Rose-
Redwood, 2006). Foucault, however, clearly states that both disciplinary power and the biopolitics of the 
population are forms of biopower (Foucault, 1990: 140). It is only in the courses on governmentality that he 
describes the second form as government.
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university, the prison, the barracks, workshops, secondary schools, etc… On the other 
hand, there was also an emergence of political problems such as birth-rate, longevity, 
housing, migration, public health and welfare. Overall, Foucault observed the prolifera-
tion of numerous and diverse techniques of power which aimed to subjugate the indi-
vidual body and control the conduct of populations. The invention of statistics played a 
crucial role in the constitution of the political problem of population and the develop-
ment	of	a	new	art	of	government.	Statistics	enabled	specific	phenomena	related	to	the	
population	to	be	quantified	and	revealed	that	these	were	irreducible	to	the	frameworks	
of earlier modes and models of rule (e.g. the mapping of major epidemics, migration 
trends, the distribution of wealth, labour statistics, etc.). Consequently, the population 
became	both	the	new	model	of	government	and	its	final	end	(Foucault,	2007:	104-105).	
Foucault described the new techniques that proliferated out of government as “appara-
tuses of security”. Security in this sense, refers to “the future-oriented management of 
risks” (Valverde, 2007: 172). Foucault gave several examples of security apparatuses in 
his	lectures:	as	for	example,	town	planning	and	the	specific	strategies	to	cope	with	food	
shortages and epidemics (e.g. through market regulation and vaccination campaigns). 
It was no longer the safety (sûreté) of the prince and his territory, but the security (sé-
curité) of the population that was now the central problem for government (Foucault, 
2007: 65).248
It would be wrong to see the different forms of power, i.e. sovereign power, discipline 
and government, as mutually exclusive. First of all, Foucault, explicitly stressed that 
both forms of biopower (discipline and government) are not antithetical. They consti-
tute the two poles around which the administration of life is organized (Foucault, 1990: 
139). Furthermore, he does not propose a linear narrative from a society of sovereignty, 
to a disciplinary society to a society of government (Elden, 2007b). Rather, he tried 
to expose the interconnected triangle of sovereignty, discipline and government. The 
latter has become pre-eminent in contemporary capitalist society but not exclusive, 
especially when we look at non-western societies who haven’t been integrated in the 
capitalist world system for a long time (Luke, 1996; Elden, 2007b; Dillon, 2007). Ques-
tions and problematics of sovereignty did not simply disappear with the emergence of a 
‘life-administering power’. Nevertheless, one of the reasons why ‘government’ became 
pre-eminent over all other types of power, was because biopower in general, and the 
government	of	populations	 in	 specific,	was	without	a	question	 indispensable	 for	 the	
further development and expansion of capitalism:
[the development of capitalism] would not have been possible without the con-
trolled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment 
of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it 
required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as 
well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of 
optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making 
them	more	difficult	to	govern	(Foucault,	1990:	141).
Consequently, as Harvey argues, Foucault’s analyses can also be read “as continuations 
248  Note that the English meaning of security does not exactly coincide with the French word of sécurité. 
Power and control in neoliberal politics 177
of rather than departures from Marx’s arguments concerning the rise of a disciplinary 
[and administering] capitalism in which workers have to be socialized and disciplined 
to accept the spatiotemporal logic of the capitalist labor process” (Harvey, 2010b: 
149)249 Additionally, Foucault directly addressed the more Marxist-inspired accounts 
on the development of capitalism and the role of the state in this development. Instead 
of rejecting Marx, he actually gives an additional insight on the particularity of their 
different, or rather complementary, visions on state, and the prominence given to either 
institutions or methods (techniques)250:
If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, 
ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- [dis-
ciplinary power] and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth century as techniques 
of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse 
institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine 
and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic 
processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them. They also 
acted	 as	 factors	of	 segregation	 and	 social	 hierarchization,	 exerting	 their	 influ-
ence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of 
domination and effects of hegemony (Ibid.: 141).
In his lectures of 1978-1979 on The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault elaborated on our cur-
rent systems of knowledge – the governmental regimes of liberalism and neo-liberalism 
– which he considered central to the understanding of biopolitics (Foucault, 2008). He 
saw classical liberalism and neoliberalism not as the antithesis of governmental ratio-
nality (embedded in the minimal state myth), but rather as forms of governmentality 
which produced subjects capable of shaping their own conduct through technologies 
of the self (Lemke, 2001; Rose-Redwood, 2006: 474). Consequently, if capitalism, and 
more	specifically	neoliberal	capitalism,	was	made	possible	in	part	by	the	exercise	of	
biopower in its many forms and modes of application, the spread of capitalism around 
the world would then logically entail the spread of these techniques. As such, we have 
seen a growing amount of scholars, with different disciplinary orientations, who turned 
to the study of governmentality to explain the socio-economic transformations in non-
Western societies (e.g. Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Hibou, 2004b; Bunnell & Coe, 2005; 
Ismail, 2006; Bayart, 2007; Zemni, 2007; Ong, 2008; Kapoor, 2008; Roy, 2009). Of 
course, we cannot forget that these socio-economic transformations take place in com-
pletely different political settings (e.g. in a non-liberal-democratic setting). But while 
the bulk of the governmentality literature still focuses on Western neoliberal rationali-
ties of rule, Mitchell Dean has examined the dynamics of what he called “authoritarian 
governmentality”. Like (neo-)liberalism, Dean argues that authoritarian governmen-
tality is an articulation of elements of sovereign power and bio-politics (biopower). 
However, in contrast to more liberal forms of rule, non-liberal and authoritarian forms 
249  David Harvey argues that Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power and his analyses of spatially 
organized disciplinary apparatuses (e.g. the prison, the clinic, etc.) were clearly inspired by Marx’s analysis 
of the working day. Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and governmentality adopts, according to Har-
vey, this notion of the moment when people started to internalize a sense of temporal discipline – realized 
through several technologies and methods of power (Harvey, 2010b: 147). 
250  Here I come back to the discussion in chapter 2 on the difference between a Marxian and a Foucaul-
dian perception on the relation between state and capitalism.
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of rule seek to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or at least, seek to 
neutralize opposition to authority (Dean, 1999: 131).251 Authoritarian governmental-
ity operates thus through a more intensive and explicit use of sovereignty and sover-
eign instruments of repression. Additionally, due to the more peripheral position in the 
capitalist world-system of many states in the Global South, the administration of life 
will not be as integrated or embedded as in many Western states. Foucault rightfully 
emphasized that life, especially outside the Western world, constantly escapes (or tries 
to escape) its integration into the techniques that attempt to govern it (Foucault, 1990: 
143).252 Some states, and even non-state sovereigns253, will still use sovereign power to 
defend and secure their territory – this was clearly the case in the discordant and often 
violent aftermath of the Cold War – while other (Third World) states take little or no 
account of their population at all (Luke, 1996; Elden, 2007a).  
Nevertheless, in a country like Morocco which becomes increasingly integrated into 
the global capitalist system and which pretends to draw on a ‘liberal’ regime of govern-
ment, a governmentality approach provides us with interesting insights on the transfor-
mation of its society. King Mohamed VI emphasized in his speech from the throne on 
30 July 2007 that the political order in Morocco is founded upon a “national consen-
sus”. Yet, his conceptualization of this national consensus clearly demonstrates how 
elements of sovereign politics and biopolitics are articulated in the political visions of 
the	monarchy.	Mohamed	VI	defined	this	national	consensus	as	follows:
It concerns, particularly, the Constitutional State and its institutions, a citizenship 
based on a respect for human rights and the duties of men, an economic liberalism, 
and the liberty of entrepreneurship. This besides solidarity, social justice and an 
openness to the rest of the world. It is up to Us [the Monarchy] to watch over the 
permanency	of	these	values,	whatever	the	consequences	and	its	fluctuations	may	
be. This is (…) Our conception of la Monarchie citoyenne (own translation).254 
He then concludes at the end of his speech:
I will remain, dear people, just like you have always known Me, le roi citoyen, 
leading	the	militants	who	are	working	on	the	field,	in	all	regions	of	the	country,	
just like abroad. Likewise, I commit Myself to consolidate the pillars of unity and 
democracy, to strengthen the dynamics of development, progress and solidarity, 
and	to	reaffirm	the	capacity	of	Morocco	to	act	in	synergy	with	the	outside	world	
and the changes that occur, without ever abandoning the authentic Moroccan iden-
tity (own translation).255  
251  Free subjects in a liberal democratic society are of course only free within the boundaries delineated by 
capitalism and liberal democracy.  
252  This could be one of the reasons why the use of sovereign power is still more prevalent in those societ-
ies. However, further research is needed to explore the validity of this hypothesis.
253		Luke	refers	for	example	to	the	numerous	conflict	between	warlords	in	Sub-Sahara	Africa	and	the	way	
they use sovereign power to secure their territories and their interests. 
254  http://www.maroc.ma/PortailInst/Fr/MenuGauche/Institutions/Monarchie/Les+discours+du+Roi/2007.
htm (accessed 02/10/2011).
255  Ibid.
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Here we clearly see how the king, as the symbol of absolute power in Morocco, refers 
to modern technologies of government which he personally promises to preserve (and/
or implement). Sovereign power, in other words, is promised to be used to assure the 
continuation	and	efficiency	of	government	(biopower).	It	gives	an	indication	of	how	
non-democratic political systems constitute their own mixture of sovereign and biopo-
litical technologies of power (i.e. the constitution of an authoritarian governmentality) 
to rule their territory and their population.  
 
The governmentality approach becomes especially useful when one studies the politi-
cal changes in an urban setting. Foucault learned us a great deal about the organization 
and politics of space (Elden, 2007b: 30). Along with time, he saw space as a constitu-
tive element of the technologies of power and the practices of government (Ismail, 
2006: XXV). “To govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which govern-
ment is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999: 36). Power – in the Foucauldian understanding 
– therefore works to manage human activity in time and space. Power has thus both 
temporal and spatial dimensions (Massey, 2005; Ismail, 2006). In his lectures on gov-
ernmentality, Foucault attributed a central role to the city, or rather the town, as a key 
problem for government and security. It were problems like epidemics, food scarcity, 
rural migration, etc... that turned public health, market regulation and urban planning 
(“town planning”) into central mechanisms of security. It was the eventual integration 
of the town into the central mechanisms of power, or rather the conversion of the town 
as a primary government problem, that generated the development of new techniques 
of power (Foucault, 2007: 64). The apparatuses of security that emerged out of that 
process were not only the fundamental techniques which underpinned government as a 
form	of	power,	they	also	demonstrated	the	specific	spatial	connotation	of	security	and	
its biopolitical relation to the population (e.g. in the urban space):
(…) security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or 
possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent 
and	transformable	framework.	(…)	the	milieu	appears	as	a	field	of	intervention	
in which, instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of 
voluntary actions – which would be the case of sovereignty – and instead of af-
fecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, 
and of required performances – as in discipline – one tries to affect, precisely, a 
population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and 
essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live 
(Foucault, 2007: 20-21).    
With regards to the state, these mechanisms of security are brought together by Fou-
cault, under the general concept of the police. This concept emphasizes one of the key 
dimensions of state power (Valverde, 2007).256 It refers to all the mechanisms and/or 
techniques by which a population or community is regulated by public authority (Elden, 
2007a). It is this public aspect that is important. The government of a family cannot be 
considered police because it lacks a public aspect – a res publica – which assembles the 
means, the calculative capacities and techniques by which state power maintains its in-
256  Police in the Foucauldian sense refers to a broad set of regulating mechanisms and is not to be con-
fused with our general more narrow understanding of police and the police forces.
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ternal order (Ibid.: 572). Police, according to Foucault, was the necessary condition for 
the existence of the urban: “it is because there was a police regulating this cohabitation, 
circulation, and exchange that towns were able to exist” (Foucault, 2007: 336). Again, 
I think we can distinguish in this concept of police, Foucault’s own process of thinking 
through and engaging with the Marxist argument (instead of rejecting it) that capitalism 
and capitalist urbanization depend on state power and state regulation.   
Let us now turn back to the distinction made by Mariana Valverde between “sovereign 
city	 planning”	 and	 “cities	 of	 securities”.	The	first	 concept	 refers	 to	 specific	mecha-
nisms	of	power	in	which	the	objective	of	urban	government	is	determined	first	of	all	
by the attempt to seek the submission of urban subjects to a sovereign (e.g. through 
urban planning and restructuring). In this regard, sovereignty refers to the legitimacy 
and strength of the sovereign over a bounded territory. The second concept refers to 
mechanisms of urban planning in which techniques of security are pre-eminent over all 
other	mechanisms	of	power.	The	city	will	then	be	considered,	first	of	all,	as	a	“complex	
composed of men and things” in which life must be administered or policed, rather than 
as a territory which must be controlled (Rose-Redwood, 2006). Consequently, the dif-
ferent technologies related to the notions of sovereignty and biopower (or security) will 
approach and structure the urban space differently. After what happened in 1981 and 
2003 in Casablanca, the slum population – perceived as inhabitants of so-called spaces 
of “high risk” – became the target of new strategies and technologies of power and 
spatial organization (Rachik, 1995).257 As I will show, the ways in which the Moroccan 
authorities	dealt	with	the	situation	after	1981	and	2003	differed	significantly.	I	also	ar-
gue that some of the reasons for this different approach can be found within the context 
of	the	specific	phase	of	neoliberal	restructuring	at	the	time	(roll	back	or	roll	out	neo-
liberalism).	With	this	specific	distinction	between	sovereign	city	planning	and	cities	of	
security – keep in mind that this is a distinction made for the sake of comparison – I do 
not want to assert that the mechanisms of control in the 1980s were only preoccupied 
with the urban territory as such, while the mechanisms of the 2000s were only preoc-
cupied with the urban population as such. To the contrary, both set of mechanisms were 
first	of	all	aiming	to	control	the	people	living	in	the	space	of	the	city,	only	the	specific	
strategies	to	establish	social	control	differed	significantly	over	time.258
In 1981, urban restructuring was oriented predominantly towards the expansion of ter-
ritorial control just because of the roll back of important policies of state developmen-
talism – public job creation, food subsidies and health care were, after all, particular 
apparatuses	of	security.	The	specific	measures	to	expand	urban	territorial	control	after	
1981 were means to compensate for the negative social outcomes of structural adjust-
ment. We do not see this only in Morocco. Loic Wacquant highlighted that the roll back 
of the welfare-state in the US, has led to new strategies of control and increased efforts 
257  We must not forget that 1981 was not a starting point. Already during the Protectorate, after the riots of 
1952, the slum population became the target of a whole new government program of public housing, devel-
oped by French architect Michel Ecochard (Rachik, 1995; 2002).
258  Furthermore, as I already indicated with the reference to the notion of authoritarian governmentality, 
I do not want to claim that methods of sovereign city planning in the 1980s in Morocco implied a form of 
rule	that	reflected	17th century methods of Western sovereign rule. I use the concept of sovereign city plan-
ning to demonstrate how methods of sovereign power became pre-eminent in urban planning strategies 
within a more broader context and framework of authoritarian government in Morocco at the time. 
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to securitize the streets. In his case this meant the increasing incarceration of social 
outcasts in the US as an alternative to social policy (Wacquant, 2006). These kind of 
strategies which try to compensate the loss of ‘security’, can be considered expressions 
of sovereign power by which the primary goal is not so much to control the conduct 
of a population, that potential had been reduced momentarily by rolling back welfare 
policies, but to clear the streets of potentially dangerous subjects during the phase of 
reduced “security”.259 Hence, Wacquant’s reference to mechanisms of “punishing the 
poor”.260 
The	 approach	 after	 the	Casablanca	 suicide	 bombings	 in	 2003	was	 significantly	 dif-
ferent. The objectives of a social development program such as the VSBP – launched 
quickly after the bombings – were inscribed in a phase in which new apparatuses of 
security emerged. The program was an attempt to regulate and manage the slum popu-
lation through new modalities of state intervention (which were rolled out). The in-
ternational political context was also different. Structural adjustment had been widely 
criticized, the World Bank had developed and promoted the discourse of good gover-
nance in a response to the criticisms, and the roll out of new state arrangements had to 
regulate	and	compensate	market	failure.	Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	Morocco,	specific	
measures to control the urban territory were already in place to a large extent (due to 
sovereign city planning in the 1980s). The question was now focused more on how to 
control and manage the conduct of the targeted population. The discourses, rationalities 
and technologies that coincided with the new principles of roll out neoliberalism and 
good governance provided a new set of responses. In chapter 3, I already discussed the 
re-invention of the social question during the period of roll out neoliberalism, while in 
chapter	2,	I	referred	to	the	specific	way	in	which	people	are	subjectified	under	contem-
porary	neoliberal:	i.e.	the	specific	process	of	turning	individuals	into	entrepreneurs,	an	
entrepreneur of himself in which he is his own capital, his own producer, and his own 
source of earnings (Read, 2009). Programs such as the VSBP and also the INDH were 
meant to control and steer the conduct of a particular segment of the urban population 
through new forms of regulation and the promotion of new techniques of self-regula-
tion. The ultimate goal was then to turn the slum dweller into a “good citizen” (Zemni, 
2007). 
I do risk here to overdraw the distinction between a focus on urban territory in the 
1980s, and one on population in the 2000s. This distinction is far from absolute.261 Ilan 
Kapoor for example, argued that the period of structural adjustment introduced a new 
biopolitical dimension to the established forms of power in the Global South (Kapoor, 
259  I explicitly use security here in the Foucauldian sense.
260  Once incarcerated of course, these “outcasts” can then be subject to forms of disciplinary power in 
order to correct and alter misconduct. 
261  To begin with, territory is also subject to manifestations of biopower. Stuart Elden, for example, has 
pointed out how the concept of territory is actually marginalized in the lectures of Foucault on governmen-
tality. Yet, he argues that territory must be understood as more than just land but rather as a vibrant entity, 
a rendering of the concept of space as a political category. Territory, according to Elden, can be owned, 
distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled. Therefore the notion of governmentality and the 
politics of calculation are not only manifested in population but also in territory (Elden, 2007). Further-
more, there is no such evolution as a transition from a “territorial state” to a “population state” because the 
pre-eminency of biopower does not involve “a substitution but rather a shift of emphasis and the appear-
ance of new objectives, and of new problems and new techniques” (Foucault, 2007: 363).   
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2008: 27). This biopolitical dimension was introduced by the World Bank and the IMF 
and in the ways they controlled indirectly some of the Third World states’ collective 
bodies	(e.g.	state-institutions)	and	made	them	more	efficient,	flexible	and	autonomous	
(Lemke,	2002:	60).	Today,	in	contrast,	the	specific	position	of	the	monarch	in	Morocco	
still	supports	on	significant	elements	of	sovereign	power.	Moreover,	biopolitics	are	not	
confined	to	the	neoliberal	era.	Rabinow	emphasized	that	even	during	the	Protectorate,	
with the introduction of the capitalist mode of production, Morocco was already the 
scenery for the implementation of new experimental urban govermentalities by the 
French (Rabinow, 1989). So, as I already mentioned, there is no straightforward linear 
development from a society of sovereignty to a society of government. Both forms of 
power (sovereignty and biopower) will continue to shape societies together and the 
specific	implementation	of	these	forms	of	power	will	vary	in	different	places	around	the	
world. This is exactly what makes neoliberal governmentality not some single unique 
form of governmental rationality, but rather an actually existing form interrelated to 
specific	location	and	time.	
What I want to highlight with the distinction between sovereign city planning and cit-
ies of security is the degree in which either sovereign power or biopower will be pre-
eminent	 as	 an	answer	 to	a	 specific	 threat	or	political	problem	 (e.g.	 a	 riot	or	 suicide	
bombing; or the slum population in general). As such, I want to highlight a shift of 
emphasis, the emergence of new objectives which ultimately result in the development 
of new problems and new technologies of power. In this case, the focus on sovereignty 
and	biopower	is	a	particular	methodology	to	determine	specific	shifts	and	transforma-
tions in neoliberal government. The government of slums are just one example through 
which the proliferation and implementation of new technologies can be demonstrated. 
This chapter tries to explain the more technical aspect of neoliberal government which 
characterizes the way in which issues of violence, political stability and poverty are 
dealt with in Morocco. This particular analytics of government is a useful and maybe 
necessary complementation to the analyses of political power and change in the Arab 
region. The particular technical aspect of government that I discuss here, highlights a 
particular characteristic of political rule that attempts to complement analyses of party 
politics,	class	conflicts,	or	the	specific	instruments	of	sovereignty	and	authoritarian	rule	
(Rose-Redwood, 2006: 473). After all, the biopolitical (i.e. more technical) apparatuses 
of	government	are	the	specific	technologies	through	which	power,	class	power	in	many	
cases, is actually deployed (Ibid.). 
 
Urban growth and socio-spatial fragmentation: from tolerance to control
Before elaborating in detail on the two phases of urban restructuring in Morocco, I 
want	to	sketch	briefly	the	urban	backdrop	against	which	neoliberal	restructuring	took	
place. Morocco has experienced rapid urban growth in the twentieth century and many 
of the current problems, can be related or traced back to earlier periods of urbanization 
and especially to the years of urban neglect. Decades of uncontrolled urban develop-
ment	have	generated	many	of	 the	difficulties	urban	planners	and	administrators	face	
today.	Different	flows	of	rural	migration	have	radically	changed	the	constitution	of	the	
Moroccan city over the course of the twentieth century. After the independence, the Eu-
ropeans have gradually left the Moroccan city. Their places and residences in the ville 
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nouvelle were taken by the Moroccan elite. These elites, for their part, left the medina 
and their places were taken by rural migrants and the Moroccan workforces. However, 
the	medina	could	never	provide	enough	space	for	the	massive	influx	of	the	rural	poor	in	
search for a better future. Eventually, the poor had to look for other options and install 
themselves in the numerous shanty towns at the peripheries of the colonial cities.  
Already, in the early days of the Protectorate problems arose when the Moroccan popu-
lation in the cities increased rapidly. To begin with, the enclosure of tribal farming and 
herding lands for French agricultural and mining interests pushed indigenous people 
towards the cities. In the cities, new migrants were employed in the construction of the 
European cities (villes nouvelles) or incorporated as an industrial or domestic labour 
force.	Consequently,	many	of	the	once	self-sufficient	Moroccan	families	were	obliged	
to turn to urban wage-labour as their main livelihood strategy (G Wright, 1991). It were, 
above	all,	coastal	cities	such	as	Casablanca	and	Rabat,	which	benefited	from	increased	
trade with European cities, that attracted most rural migrants. Especially Casablanca, 
thanks to its port, rapidly developed as the industrial centre of the country. Ironically, 
while many of the new rural migrants were gratefully used as cheap urban workforces, 
the French administration never really anticipated and planned the demographic growth 
of the colonial city. Moreover, the original Arab cities (medinas) were often encircled by 
the French colonial city as the French had appropriated the available land around these 
cities to built their villes nouvelles.262	As	a	result,	the	increasing	afflux	of	Moroccans	
towards the cities created enormous housing problems (Ibid.; see also Le Tourneau, 
1955). For example in Casablanca, the Moroccan population rose from 20,000 in 1900 
to almost 72,000 in 1926 and close to 550,000 in 1952.263 Most newcomers used to seek 
refuge	in	the	medina	as	a	first	option.264 At the same time, many of the rich Moroccan 
families left the medinas and managed to establish themselves in sumptuous housing at 
the edge of the European city. Their places were taken by the newcomers who started to 
subdivide the former residences of the Moroccan elite into smaller units or apartments. 
But as the urban population continued to grow, courtyards, little squares and rooftops 
in the medina were built over and rented or sold. 
Little effort was made by the French authorities to improve housing conditions for the 
Moroccan population. The few modest efforts to foresee in housing facilities for the in-
digenous people, like for example the new medina (la nouvelle medina) and neighbour-
hood of Aïn Chock in Casablanca, were quickly saturated and occupied by the petty 
bourgeoisie – and thus these projects missed their original goal of providing housing 
for the urban wage-labour force. As a result, the bulk of the Moroccan wage-laboures 
and lumpenproletariat either stayed in the increasingly overcrowded medinas or settled 
in vacant areas around the peripheries of the ville nouvelle and built their barracks 
with everything they could get their hands on (e.g. industrial refuse, tin, scrap wood, 
262  Before the Protectorate there were very little private landowning titles in Morocco. Most land was 
either property of the makhzen (what could be considered as state-property, although not in the European 
sense) or Habous (religious mortmain property – in the Middle East also known as waqf).
263		These	numbers	are	based	on	official	sources	from	1975	(schéma	directeur)	quoted	in	Cattedra	(2001:	
92). Similar estimates are to be found in: Le Tourneau (1955), G Wright (1991), Rivet (2004).
264  There was also an important growth of the European population in the Moroccan coastal cities. How-
ever, for them the French administration provided more adequate facilities to assure their settlement in the 
city.
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etc.). Hence, the name “bidonville” (oilcan city). The term bidonville refers both to its 
particular urban character and the materials that were used to construct the barracks. 
The term became a synonym for provisional and precarious settlement, despite the very 
permanent character of the bidonvilles in many of the Third World cities. The bidon-
villes – which has become the French term for slum or shantytown – appeared as early 
as 1907 and can be directly linked to the impact of the European presence (G Wright, 
1991;	Hauw,	2004).	However,	 the	first	 large	Moroccan	 shanty	 towns	will	 appear	 as	
soon	as	the	early	1920s.	The	first	one,	and	very	famous	because	of	the	role	its	popula-
tion played in the riots of 1952, was Carrières Centrales, situated in an industrial zone 
in the East of Casablanca, in the neighbourhood of Roches Noires. In the early 1950s 
an estimated amount of 30,000 people lived in Carrières centrales and another 45,000 
in Ben ‘Msik which was a second famous shantytown in Casablanca.     
With the rapid expansion of the Moroccan cities, urban government became more and 
more	difficult.	Urban	policy	and	planning	during	 the	Protectorate	was	unable	 to	 re-
spond to the needs and problems of the bidonvillois (shantytown population). As such, 
the urban uprisings of 1952 would not only demonstrate the growing strength of the 
Moroccan labour movement and its close ties to the nationalist struggle – Moroccan 
workers staged large demonstrations on May Day of 1951 which was later followed 
by a general strike in December in 1952 to denounce the assassination by the French 
of Tunisian trade union leader Farhat Hached (Clément & Paul, 1984) – but the riots 
that	followed	the	general	strike	of	1952	would	also	demonstrate	for	the	first	time,	the	
potential threat of the bidonvilles and its population for the political stability of the 
Protectorate.	Between	6	and	8	December	Casablanca	was	shocked	by	its	first	“bidon-
ville-uprisings”.	They	gave	the	starting	shot	for	further	violence	and	conflicts	all	over	
the country. This violence was usually explained and framed in nationalist terms (i.e. 
as	a	struggle	against	the	French).	Yet,	Jean-François	Clément	argues	that	the	specific	
causes and sources for the violence were complex and should not be reduced to merely 
nationalistically inspired forms of protest. He claims that little research has been done 
on the socio-economic background that underpinned the 1952 riots (Clément, 1952). 
Nevertheless,	the	specific	responses	of	the	colonial	administration	actually	revealed	the	
underlying socio-economic basis. The French realized that the marginalized urban ar-
eas had to be taken into consideration, and that a change in urban planning strategy was 
needed. Not coincidentally, around that period the French started to take a real interest 
in urban programs of mass housing. Numerous plans and initiatives were elaborated by 
the famous architect Michel Ecochard.265 The colonial administration initiated, for the 
first	time,	an	elaborated	social	housing	policy	in	an	attempt	to	integrate	the	urban	poor	
and calm the masses (Rachik, 2002). 
The goals set by Ecochard were never realized. Only four years after the 1952 riots Mo-
rocco	gained	its	independence.	During	the	first	decades	of	independence,	the	primary	
objectives of the public authorities moved away from urban development. The Mo-
roccan monarchy didn’t really proceed with an elaborated and all-round urban policy 
265  Although a gradual shift towards a social housing policy for the masses started already in the 1940s, 
the uprisings of 1952 were a watershed moment that accelerated planned policies and initiatives. This 
signified	a	new	phase	of	the	politics	of	French	colonial	urbanism	(for	further	information	see	Rachik,	1995;	
Rachik, 2002; Cohen & Eleb, 2002; Hauw, 2004).
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strategy and chose to prioritize the rural areas in accordance with its political coalitions. 
If there was any formal urban policy and planning vision, it equated essentially with the 
policies of the French administration of the post-war era (Johnson, 1972). As I men-
tioned	in	chapter	3,	the	public	authorities	attempted,	first	of	all,	to	halt	the	rural	exodus	
during	the	first	two	decades	of	independence	in	order	to	limit	the	political	weight	of	
the cities and limit the potential power base of its nationalist bourgeoisie. The king’s 
political	influence	was	based	predominantly	on	its	ties	with	the	rural	and	tribal	elites,	
the pre-colonial bourgeoisie and the religious leaders of the country. The fast-growing 
cities	and	the	increasing	influence	of	urban-based	political	forces	–	the	trade	unions	and	
the left-wing intellectuals – were seen as a challenge to the monarchy’s political domi-
nance. Consequently, authorities invested heavily in the agricultural development of the 
rural areas, and largely ignored the industrialization and planning of Morocco’s urban 
agglomerates (Naciri, 1984b). Until the mid-1960s the economic policies of the country 
maintained this particular focus on rural economic growth. Yet, despite the efforts, rural 
migration	continued	and	rapid	urbanization	profoundly	modified	 the	structure	of	 the	
Moroccan society. Casablanca is the most salient example of this trend. Its population 
more	than	doubled	between	the	1950s	and	the	1970s.	Today,	officially	between	3.7	and	
3.8	million	people	 live	officially	 in	Casablanca	which	meant	 that	 the	city	grew	with	
more than 500% since the independence.266 Casablanca attracted on average more than 
35% of all rural migrants (Zriouli, 1998). This rapid expansion constituted new chal-
lenges for urban government. Issues that had been neglected in the 1950s and 1960s 
began to bubble to the surface posing new threats to established patterns of rule (Naciri 
1984b). For example, between 1956 and 1974, 42% of all urban expansion was infor-
mal	(Bargach,	2008).	Additionally,	the	1960s	were	economically	very	difficult	years.	
There were several successive crop failures (which caused rural migration to increase 
even	more	than	usual),	unemployment	rose	sharply,	inflation	increased	and	price	con-
trol	over	essential	commodities	became	much	more	difficult.	There	was	also	a	severe	
political crisis in which Hassan II saw it necessary to take over the prime ministry and 
called upon a state of emergency (after urban riots in Casablanca). This was in the year 
of 1965. The King would then rule by decree (Waterbury, 1970; Zartman, 1987).   
The	urban	riots	of	1965	in	Casablanca	marked	a	first	turning	point	within	a	gradual	but	
significant	shift	in	government:	a	shift	from	a	focus	primarily	on	rural	development	to	a	
focus directed more on urban planning and urban development.267 This didn’t mean that 
the urban centres were completely ignored before the riots.268 Only, urban government 
was basically limited to surveillance, authoritarian control and the problem of secu-
rity – not in the Foucauldian sense – and not so much on development and planning. 
The riots of 1965 were brutally suppressed by the army, and little mercy was shown to 
those suspected to be the instigators (Johnson, 1972). Again, the slum population was 
involved in violent confrontations with security forces. It were the inhabitants of Car-
266		Unofficially	the	population	of	Casablanca	is	often	estimated	much	higher.	
267  Interview with Abdelghani Abouhani, former lecturer at the National Institute for Urban Planning 
(INAU), currently the General Director of Urbanism and Architecture within the Ministry of Housing, 
Urbanism and Spatial Planning (MHUAE) (Rabat – 21/04/2009, conducted together with Sami Zemni). 
268  The 1965 riots could also viewed as a “bidonville-uprising”. The immediate provocation was the pro-
hibition of the education ministry for older students (older then 17) to go to school. In March 1965 rioting 
students	joined	the	inhabitants	of	the	bidonvilles	to	set	Casablanca	on	fire	(Pennell,	2000:	323;	see	also	
Clément, 1992).
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rières Centrales who played a leading part, just as in 1952 (Clément, 1992). Addition-
ally, the census of 1971 revealed a chaotic urban situation and showed that an urban 
policy based solely on surveillance and harassment was not tenable anymore. Half of 
the houses in the cities were deemed inadequate (Rachik, 2002: 93). These develop-
ments rendered the government of the urban space instable and called for new policy 
initiatives.	With	regard	to	the	social	problems	of	urbanization	some	specific	measures	
were taken. In 1967, the government installed an urban planning and housing depart-
ment	within	the	Ministry	of	Interior.	This	is	significant.	The	Ministry	of	Interior	was	
the power base of the monarchy, especially during the reign of Hassan II. This transfer 
thus meant that there was now a stronger political potential for effective urban policy. 
All matters of urban planning and housing were now supervised by the Ministry of 
Interior.	The	extended	 role	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Interior	 therefore	clearly	 reflected	 the	
increasing importance given to urban policy by central powers. Also, in the same year, 
the establishment of a research and formation centre (CERF), under the direction of the 
French architect Alain Masson, had to develop new knowledge and strategies related to 
urban planning and social and low-cost housing.269 The CERF was incorporated in the 
department of Urban Planning and Housing at the Ministry of Interior. 
In 1972, however, urban policy was detached from the Ministry of Interior and an 
autonomous and technocratic Ministry of Urbanism, Housing, Tourism and Environ-
ment (MUHTE) was created. Only a year later, 7 regional agencies (the ERACs) were 
created to coordinate regional housing policies together with a national fund (FNEAT) 
to ensure access to property for housing projects.270 With regard to housing projects for 
the slum population, the Moroccan authorities received the support of the World Bank 
from the mid-1960s onwards (Naciri, 1987).271 Also, during the 1970s, there were sev-
eral attempts to elaborate a new Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement Urbain (SDAU) or 
master plan for the city of Casablanca, a general urban planning strategy which had to 
determine a coherent vision for the future of the city. A SDAU had to provide a general 
development plan for the metropolitan area, including a general scheme for land use, 
zoning provisions, transportation network designs and proposed new public facilities 
(Johnson, 1972: 86). The master plan had to follow up on the previous SDAU that 
was elaborated under the coordination of Michel Ecochard and dated back to the early 
1950s. However, it was not until after the riots of 1981 that a new SDAU would be put 
into action.  
The	rapid	urban	demographic	expansion,	specifically	in	the	1970s,	also	witnessed	the	
emergence of new pressures and forces at the urban scale. Urban growth brought forth 
the	emergence	of	new	commercial	elites	who	benefited	from	the	economic	boom,	but	
269  In Cattedra (2001:81) CERF is the abbreviation for Centre d’Experimentation, de Recherche et de For-
mation. The same reference can be found in Johnson (1972:71). However, in Naciri (1989:239) CERF is the 
abbreviation for Centre d’Etude, de Recherche et de Formation. The CERF was made up primarily of for-
eign (French) researchers, trained as architects and planners. Certainly in the beginning there was very little 
mingling with other disciplines such as sociology and economy. In general the plans of the CERF were too 
ambitious and took little into account the political and economic reality of the country (Johnson, 1972).  
270  ERAC: Etablissements Régionaux d’Aménagement et de Construction. FNEAT: Fonds Nationale 
d’Equipements et d’Achats de Terrains.
271  UNESCO will provide foreign support for the restructuring and renovation of that other typically 
impoverished urban space: the medina (Naciri, 1987).
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also the growth of a lower urban middle class with considerably more means than 
the urban poor living in the slums. These growing segments of the urban population 
would become the new political clientele of the Moroccan monarchy and this partly ex-
plains the gradual shift in governmental focus from the rural to the urban areas (Naciri, 
1984b). The Moroccanization of the economy was one measure to answer to the needs 
of	the	first	group.	The	second	group	(the	lower	urban	middle	class),	who	had	mainly	
benefited	 from	government	 initiatives	 to	provide	mass	education,	also	profited	 from	
the economic growth in some ways. For example, many of them were incorporated in 
the public sector. However, the general growth of this lower middle class was at the 
same time putting pressure on available public services and recourses in the cities. Fur-
thermore, their growth also exposed pressing challenges for Moroccan housing poli-
cies. There was a real shortage of affordable housing in the city-centre for these lower 
middle classes due to limited availability of building lots and a rise in housing prices. 
Only about 20,000 social houses were built in Morocco between 1956 and 1965, and 
virtually all of them still formed part of projects designed by the colonial administra-
tion (Johnson, 1972). Although, the government increased their efforts to supply social 
housing in the 1970s, the shortfall in housing was put at 390,000 units in 1973 and was 
estimated at 800,000 in 1977. In order to meet the demand, approximately 70,000 new 
housing units were needed each year to avoid the overcrowding of existing housing and 
the deterioration of the then present urban living conditions (World Bank, 1981). 
As a result of failing efforts to meet these pressing demands, many of the lower middle 
class residents sought refuge in informal housing and purchased agricultural land in 
the peripheries of the cities to built their apartments.272 This gave rise to a phenomenon 
that would be even stronger than the growth of the slums: the growth of the Habitats 
Clandestins (HC) or the informal housing neighbourhoods.273 This was a typical (lower 
middle class) phenomenon related to more favourable economic times and urban de-
mographic expansion not only in Morocco, but also in other parts of the region like 
for example Egypt (Ismail, 2006), Tunisia (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a), or Lebanon 
(Fawaz, 2009). Adequate housing was one of the most visible and pressing problems 
of both the increased number of urban residents and their governments in the Arab 
region (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 270). Just like the slums, the HC are originally 
built on lots without public facilities such as electricity connections, paved roads and 
sewer	systems.	They	are	also	built	illegally,	without	official	public	authorization.	The	
big difference is that the HC are built “en dur”, in brick and wood, and, as such, they 
look a lot like formal and legalized apartments. A lot of the informal houses count two, 
three	or	even	four	flours.	Additionally,	the	owners	of	the	informal	houses	are	also	owner	
of the land – albeit not legally recognized (Lehzam, 1995). This is another difference 
with the bidonvilles where the inhabitants at best only own their barrack. The land they 
occupy illegally. 
272		It	was	also	the	official	policy	to	prioritize	public	servants’	access	to	low-cost	housing	projects	imple-
mented by the state. But state efforts never succeeded in meeting these demands either. 
273  This distinction is rather important because Moroccan government strategies differed when dealing 
with either slums or HC. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the difference because there is a tenden-
cy in some literature to classify all forms of informal, dilapidated and precarious housing as ‘slums’. Con-
sequently, the concept of slums remains vague in some of the literature (Milbert, 2006). As a result, some 
have denounced the use of the concept slum as a container concept (Gilbert, 2007). I, nevertheless, wish to 
keep using the term ‘slum’ or ‘bidonville’ to distinguish it from other forms of informal housing. 
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While the increase of slums characterized urbanization in Morocco until the late 1960s, 
the increase of HC dominated the urban process since the 1970s (Abouhani, 1995c; 
Ameur, 1995). All large cities will experience a growth of their peripheries largely due 
to the increase of HC. Surprisingly, this phenomenon was relatively limited to Casa-
blanca. Yet, it applied all the more to cities as Salé (thanks to the proximity of Rabat and 
the increase of the public sector) and Tétouan (thanks to the increase of the informal 
sector) (Lhezam, 1995; see also Iraki & Rachik, 2005).274 Not all inhabitants of the HC 
came from the rural areas. There was also a lot of internal urban migration. The new 
owners were often people who came from the city-centre and wanted to escape either 
the uncertainty of not having a property of their own or the duty of having to pay rent. 
In general, the population of the HC differs from the population of the slums. Although 
we should avoid the homogenization of both populations an important distinction can 
be made.275 The population in the HC are there to stay. In contrast, the inhabitants of 
the bidonvilles always maintained a temporary and informal status due to the fact that 
they did not own their land and thus occupied a terrain illegally. The population of the 
HC are not living in the same uncertain situation. They do not occupy the land illegally 
but	 own	 it	 informally,	which	 is	 a	 significant	 difference.	As	 a	 result,	 they	 are	not	 as	
vulnerable to relocation or expropriation as are the inhabitants of the slums. Addition-
ally, the HC population will also often revert to all kinds of agency in order to provide 
their informal neighbourhoods with the necessary (urban) services and facilities. This 
occurs in two ways. First, they themselves will try to organize and establish the further 
integration of their quarter into the urban fabric. The owners will arrange their own 
collection of garbage, pave their own streets, connect electricity, build sewer systems, 
etc… In addition, they will fall back on social neighbourhood networks to help each 
other (Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; 2002a; Ameur, 2000; Iraki, 2006a).276 The mosque, for 
274  In the beginning of the 1980s more than 45% of the population of Salé lived in HC, 35% in Oujda, 
26% in Fez and 25% in Tétouan (Ameur, 1995: 58). 
275  Numerous studies emphasize the enormous heterogeneity of both the slum population and the inhabit-
ants of the HC (e.g. Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; 2002c; Abouhani, 1995b; Ameur; 1995; Zaki, 2005; Iraki, 
2006a)
276  In many ways the slum population has done the same. Especially in the older slums, barracks were for-
tified	and	made	more	permanent.	Dwellers	have	also	tapped	electricity	and	water	from	the	public	networks,	
built sewer systems, etc. Especially the tapping of electricity in Casablanca has resulted in a battle between 
the private consortium Suez (lydec), the public authorities and the population during the 1990s. In the end, 
Picture of an informal neigbourhood (habitat clan-
destin) (May 2008)
Picture of a slum (Douar Skouila in Casablanca) 
(May 2008)
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example, will play a crucial role in the establishment of these social networks (Naciri, 
1987; Iraki, 2006b). These activities and networks are some of the particular ways by 
which inhabitants re-appropriate the urban space and give a political dimension to their 
everyday life.277 
Secondly, the particular relationship between the informal buyers of HC-land and the 
official	 landowners	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 lever	 once	 the	 latter	 has	 the	 political	 power	 and	
influence	 to	 advocate	 the	 reconstruction,	 formalization	 and	 integration	 of	 the	 infor-
mal neighbourhood. Many of the landowners who parcelled their agricultural lands 
and sold them to the inhabitants of HC, would also use the loyalty of their ‘clients’ 
to get elected in the municipal councils. As such, for this landowning elite, the lower 
urban middle class became an important social base for a political career. In return, 
the	elected	officials	could	lobby	for	certain	public	investments	or	start	the	necessary	
administrative procedures to formalize the HC. These new clientilist relations and the 
increasing	 influence	of	 a	 local	urban	 landowning	class	will	 eventually	bring	 forth	 a	
new municipal reform in 1976 (Chartre Communal) which will transfer a considerable 
amount of executive power from central government representatives at the local scale 
(e.g. the qaids and other agents that are directly related to the Ministry of Interior) 
to the locally elected government bodies. Thanks to the new municipal reform, the 
municipal council received more competences in social, economic and administrative 
affairs.	As	such,	the	reform	of	1976	transferred	significant	executive	power	from	the	
traditional elite structures to the municipal council and increased political competition 
at the urban scale. This decentralization of political power marked another important 
rupture with the former patronage system based on rural elites and further integrated 
the emerging urban elites into the realm of decision-making (Abouhani, 1995b; 2006; 
Iraki, 2006a). According to Abdelghani Abouhani, this reform was a crucial develop-
ment to explain the governmental shift that occurred in the 1970s. Again, it symbolized 
the increasing attention given to the urban space and its main actors. Although central 
power in Morocco (the makhzen)	 still	 largely	 retained	 its	 influence	 and	 dominance	
over the future of urban development, Abouhani argued that mainstream accounts on 
the	Moroccan	political	system	have	neglected	the	very	real	political	influence	of	these	
local elites (landowners).278 Mainstream accounts had focused too much, according to 
Abouhani, on institutions and national political forces, while ignoring the particular 
relation	between	political	power	and	land	property	at	the	urban	scale	and	its	influence	
on the production of the urban space (Abouhani, 1999).279  
all parties worked out a system to provide the slums with electricity which was a politically delicate matter 
because it could mean that the temporary status of the bidonvilles was put into question (for a discussion on 
this particular case see Zaki, 2005; 2008).  
277  This resonates with what Asef Bayat has termed the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”, i.e. “the 
silent, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people [e.g. squatters and informal property own-
ers] on the propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives” (Bayat, 2002: 
19). 
278		He	specifically	refers	to	the	works	of	Remy	Leveau	(1985)	and	John	Waterbury	(1970).	However,	in	
their defense, both works were based on research largely conducted before the shift was really observable 
(the	first	edition	of	Leveau’s	book	dates	from	1976).	Nevertheless,	I	do	think	that	Abouhani’s	statement	is	
still a valid critique on many other studies that were conducted afterwards (Abouhani, 1999: 6). 
279  Abouhani has dedicated most of his academic career on the study of these local urban elites and their 
political	influence	on	the	development	of	the	Moroccan	city,	more	specifically	the	city	of	Salé.
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Both the slums and the HC were/are forms of spontaneous urbanization. This is one of 
the crucial differences between processes of urbanization in the Third World and those 
in Europe or the US. Cities in Third World countries display different spatial patterns 
which	constitute	their	specific	dynamics	of	socio-spatial	fragmentation.	In	contrast	to	
European or American cities – where access to the city is normally guaranteed by an 
access to work – the access to the Third World city is mainly established by an ac-
cess to property – in the form of land and/or housing (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a). The 
majority of the Moroccan population owns their house – whether formally, informally 
or even illegally. Spontaneous urbanization is therefore the real motor behind urban 
expansion in countries like Morocco and the Arab region more generally. As such, in 
those countries, there is a real divergence between ‘planned’ urbanization and ‘actual’ 
urbanization. The latter is a process driven both from above and below, and directed 
by both formal and informal social and spatial practices (Navez-Bouchanine, 2005). 
Access to informal housing was in many cases much easier because complex, often 
untransparent and very slow administrative procedures could be avoided that way. The 
informal market could respond much faster to the demands of the urban population, 
especially in times of scarcity on the formal market. Additionally, fast growth of cit-
ies like Casablanca, Salé, Tangiers, Tetouan, etc. also demonstrated that urban growth 
and economic development were not necessarily related (Balbo & Navez-Bouchanine, 
1995; see also M Davis, 2006a). It was often poverty that drove new migrants to the 
cities and not necessarily the need for new labour forces. The Third World city was/is to 
a large extent an illegal, informal and in many ways disconnected city. And it has been 
tolerated as well by public authorities. 
To conclude, despite the fact that more government attention was paid to the Moroccan 
urban regions since the 1970s, particularly in Casablanca, there was still a lack of an 
overall and coherent urban political vision at the national level (Kaioua, 1996). More-
over, public authorities in Morocco, but also elsewhere, still largely tolerated spontane-
ous urbanization until the late 1970s – not in the least because of a lack of resources and 
public services to foresee in the need of a growing urban population. Toleration was a 
strategy to keep social peace and political stability. Besides toleration, repression was 
the only other means to keep the city under control. Until the late 1970s government 
‘solutions’ were still more based on the premise that “a good repression [meant] ten 
years of social peace” than on a profound strategy for city-restructuring and planning 
(Clément, 1992: 402, own translation). Moroccan urban policy was still ad hoc and 
insufficient	to	deal	with	the	complexity	of	increasing	urbanization.	It	failed	to	provide	
sustainable solutions for a growing lower middle class looking for affordable housing 
outside the expensive ville nouvelle.	As	a	result,	state	officials	continued	to	tolerate	the	
disorganized, chaotic and impoverished informal expansion of its urban peripheries un-
til the “shock” of 1981 urged central power to take a radical turn (Naciri, 1984b; 1989; 
Abouhani, 1995a; Rachik 2002). Since then, the perception that the informal – thus less 
controlled – expansion of the urban peripheries could pose a serious threat for the po-
litical stability of the country prevailed. After what happened in 1981, the informal ur-
ban area’s became the primary focus of a general political urban restructuring strategy 
which symbolized the transition from an urbanism of tolerance towards an “urbanism 
of control” (urbanisme de contrôle) (Abouhani, 1995a) or an “urbanism of urgency” 
(urbanisme de l’urgence) (Rachik, 2002).   
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Sovereign city planning after 1981
The structural conditions at the beginning of the 1980s marked an end to the benign 
neglect of the urban periphery, its slums and spontaneous urbanization in general. The 
riots of 1981 were the starting shot for a radical governmental shift, leading to a tighter 
control over the urban territory.280 Of course, this didn’t mean that spontaneous urban-
ization completely stopped. I want to emphasize above all a change in governmental 
attitude and strategy. The reforms of the 1980s were intended to increase the presence 
of government agents in the informal neighbourhoods or integrate these urban spaces 
into governmental techniques. The general strike organized by the CDT signalled the 
convergence of pressures for structural adjustment and the tensions that were emerg-
ing within the city. The social disturbances exposed the growing cleavage between an 
emerging	urban	entrepreneurial	elite	with	considerable	political	 influence,	benefiting	
from economic liberalization, and the rest of the urban population bearing the costs 
of neoliberal reform and the roll back of welfare policies (Clement, 1986; Catusse, 
2008). Just as in 1965, the riots that followed the strike of 1981 would be severely op-
pressed by police and army forces. But in contrast to the disturbances in 1965, the use 
of physical violence was not the only answer the government had in store. After 1981, 
the marginalized peripheral urban areas – the slums, the informal housing quarters and 
the working class area’s – became a primary focus within a general master plan for the 
restructuring of Casablanca. Urban planning and administrative division were the two 
core components of this project of urban control. 
The deconcentration of state power at the urban scale
The expansion of administrative control after 1981 can be seen in the light of a longer 
process of administrative politics that characterized the transformation of the Moroc-
can state and its power structures since the independence.281 In 1956, king Mohamed 
V came out as the main victor of the independence struggle. There was no doubt that 
his legitimacy was reinforced considerably due to his stance against the Protectorate 
and the following negotiations with the French to discuss the terms of independence. 
Nevertheless, there were other political forces which the king had to take into consid-
eration: i.e. the nationalist movement, primarily based in the cities and the traditional 
(tribal) elites primarily based in the countryside. One of the main challenges for the 
monarchy was to reconstruct the Moroccan state and establish the structural funda-
ments of his rule.282 This effort had both an institutional and a socio-political dimension 
(Rousset, 1992). Institutionally, it came down to the instalment of a new machinery of 
state power. Socio-politically, this machinery was embedded within social bases that 
supported the power and legitimacy of the new state and thus also the political domi-
nance	of	the	monarchy.	One	of	the	first	reforms	was	the	creation	of	the	“communes” 
(the municipalities) in 1959 as the basic administrative subdivision of the Moroccan 
280  This shift did not come out of nowhere. It was due to the gradual changes in the 1970s that the basis 
existed for more radical changes in the 1980s. 
281  And even much earlier. It was the French administration who turned the Moroccan power balance 
upside down. Not only with the establishment of their own administration but also with their efforts to 
institutionalize	indigenous	power	structures.	The	French	ruled	officially	through	a	Moroccan	government	
apparatus.	I	mentioned	this	already	briefly	in	chapter	2.	For	a	discussion	on	the	administrative	reforms	dur-
ing the Moroccan Protectorate see: Blanc & Cabanis (1998).
282  Of course one of the most fundamental elements was his status as head of the Moroccan military.
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territory.283 Two years later, with the Constitution of 1962, the provinces and prefectures 
were converted into institutions of local authority.284 As such, the municipalities, the 
prefectures and the provinces replaced the more traditional sociological power struc-
tures of Moroccan society (the tribal structures) as the fundament of the Moroccan state 
apparatus (Ibid.; see also Naciri, 1987). Consequently, the growth of administrative 
power	centralized	political	power	in	Morocco	–	and	this	was	definitely	also	the	case	
during the Protectorate – at the expense of the more traditional and rather decentralized 
power relations between the bilad al-makhzen and the bilad as-siba in the period before 
the Protectorate.285 The king’s main social base in the 1950s and the 1960s, the tradi-
tional urban bourgeoisie and the rural landowning elites were, of course, incorporated 
in the new administrative apparatuses.  
Nevertheless, the riots of 1965 and the socio-political pressures created by the demo-
graphic explosion, especially in the urban centres, will quickly demonstrate the limita-
tions of this administrative division of power. In 1971, the Moroccan authorities cre-
ated a third administrative territorial level: the region. The multiplication of prefectures 
and provinces required a higher subdivision, but it was only with the constitutional 
amendments of 1992 and 1996 that the regions and the regional government obtained 
the status of local government (Hinti, 2005: 170).286 The regional government is com-
posed of representatives of the locally elected councils, the professional chambers and 
indirectly elected blue-collar workers (salariés). The Regional Council is placed under 
the authority of a governor (wali) who is directly appointed by the king.287 As such, the 
administrative entity of the region is characteristic of a complex and often paradoxical 
double	process	in	which	both	elected	and	appointed	state	officials	are	engaged.	This	
double process entails the decentralization and deconcentration of state authority (Ca-
283  In 1959 Morocco counted 801 municipalities (66 urban and 735 rural municipalities). Currently, there 
are 1503 municipalities (221 urban and 1282 rural).
284  In 1956 Morocco counted 5 prefectures (urban) and 19 provinces (rural). Until 1962 they were simple 
administrative districts without legal personality and public authority (Hinti, 2005: 170).
285  John Waterbury highlighted that before the French Protectorate, the makhzen was a very dynamic and 
changeable coalition which supported the reign of the sultan. The frontier between the ‘bilad al-makhzen’, 
the area over which the sultan had military control and taxing powers, and the ‘bilad as-siba’, the area of 
dissidence which refused to recognize the Sultan’s political authority and only accepted his religious au-
thority, was never clearly delineated. Both areas blended into each other according to relative degrees of 
submissiveness	or	defiance	on	the	part	of	the	tribes.	As	such,	the	sphere	of	influence	of	the	makhzen	was	
never	really	fixed	and	wandered	continuously	along	the	perimeters	of	the	imperial	cities;	Fez,	Meknes,	
Marrakech	and	Rabat.	The	French,	who	never	officially	colonized	the	Moroccan	territory,	institutionalized	
this	fluid	system	of	power	relations	during	the	Protectorate	in	order	to	rule	the	country	via	the	sultan	and	his	
entourage. In practice, however, this meant that the French completely dominated Moroccan politics and 
it were eventually only those Moroccan elites with a strong economic base that managed to sustain their 
relative	autonomy	and	influence	(Waterbury,	1970;	Claisse,	1987).	During	the	protectorate,	these	rich	Mo-
roccan merchant families were able to accumulate a considerable amount of wealth in the cities, while the 
agricultural sector, through large landownership, was principally dominated by the French (Berrada & Said 
Saad, 1992). At the end of the Protectorate, it was for a great part this Moroccan bourgeoisie that supported 
the nationalist movement and their claims for independence.
286  Dahir n°1-97-84 (April 2 1997): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1997%5CBO_44
70_fr.PDF 
287		Officially	the	region	–	above	all	considered	to	be	a	governmental	scale	for	the	promotion	of	local	
socio-economic development – is presided by a regional president. The wali, as governor of the prefecture 
or province where the region has its seat, is responsible for the execution of the deliberations of the Re-
gional Council. However, in reality, the wali is the most powerful actor at the regional level because of his 
symbolic position and high rank within the Ministry of Interior. 
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tusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007; see also Findlay & Paddison, 1986). Decentralization 
refers to a process which transfers public competences and resources from the central 
government to sub-nationally elected authorities. Consequently, in theory, decentral-
ization is based on the democratic principle of subsidiarity. It suggests a reduction of 
administrative supervision by a central government or administration and a genuine 
transfer of power to a separate and relatively autonomous government entity. The Com-
munal	Charter	of	1960	marked	the	first	effort	to	decentralize	government	authority	to	
the municipal councils. The subsequent creation of prefectures, provinces and regions, 
followed by the transfer of public resources and decision-making authority can also be 
considered	as	significant	decentralization	rounds.	
Since the municipal reform of 2002 (Chartre Communal de 2002) there are basically 
three “Moroccan style” decentralized levels. First of all, the local City Council. This 
council is headed by a president (mayor). However, in cities with more than 500,000 in-
habitants, the urban territory is also divided up in arrondissement councils with limited 
jurisdiction.288	The	establishment	of	one	City	Council	in	every	city	meant	a	significant	
break with the administrative crumbling of the cities before 2002. Before the munici-
pal reform of 2002 cities were subdivided by several smaller rural and urban munici-
palities. In 1997 Casablanca counted for example 29 urban municipalities and 6 rural 
communities,	with	a	total	of	1,147	elected	officials.	Subsequently,	in	large	cities	such	
as Casablanca the presidents and the vice-presidents of the urban municipalities were 
assembled in a supra-municipal administrative body: the Urban Community. However, 
with the municipal reform of 2002 the Urban Community Council was abolished at the 
expense of the City Council. This suddenly and drastically reduced the number of local 
elected	officials.	In	2003,	after	the	local	elections,	Casablanca	counted	only	131	elected	
City Councillors anymore (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). The second decentral-
ized level was the prefectural or provincial assembly. This assembly has limited com-
petences and comprises indirectly elected City Councillors and representatives of the 
professional chambers (Ibid.). The third decentralized level was the regional council. 
This council is also indirectly elected.   
  
However, this decentralization of public power stands in close relation – and is more 
than often subordinated – to the process of deconcentration. This process refers to the 
shift or displacement (and thus not a transfer) of competences, resources and executive 
power from the national scale to sub-national governmental scales within the central 
state-administration. Deconcentration involves a sort of rationalization of state power 
in	order	to	enforce	it	more	efficiently	at	different	scales.	It	is	thus	crucial	not	to	con-
fuse decentralization with deconcentration. The latter was a logical consequence of 
the former within a context of authoritarian government. In Morocco, deconcentrated 
state reform is basically associated with the territorial and local agents of the Ministry 
of Interior. They are the delegated authorities. These agents are seen as the wheels of 
the state and the representatives of the makhzen. As such, the makhzen was represented 
at all levels of society. The intention was to bring the “administration closer to those 
administered” (Ministry of Planning, 1981, cited in Claisse, 1987). The governor is the 
highest representative of central power at the local level. It is the governor who has the 
288  The arrondissement is an administrative division comparable with those in large French cities such as 
Paris, Lyon and Marseille (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). 
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executive authority within the region, province or prefecture (Planel, 2009). He coor-
dinates all administrative departments and many state agencies within his territory. He 
presides the decentralized assemblies but he is not elected. On the contrary, a governor 
is directly appointed by dahir and as the “representative of His Majesty” he or she be-
comes automatically the most powerful authority within the decentralized government 
body.289 Defying the authority of the governor would be considered an act against the 
king himself and consequently punishable (Claisse, 1987: 41). 
Besides the governor, the makhzen is represented at the lower local level by qaids and 
pashas.290	They	have	significant	powers	at	the	municipal	level	as	they	attend	the	council	
meetings and assist the council president in the decision-making process. Also, qaids 
and pashas disposed of considerable extra powers, especially before the municipal re-
forms of 1976 and 2002, when it comes to issuing certain administrative permits (e.g. 
construction	permits,	financial	aid,	hawkers’	licences,	passports,	etc.)	(Ibid.:	42).291 At 
the lowest levels (street level) the qaids and pashas are represented by khalifas, sheikhs 
and the mqaddem. The latter is only charged to supervise a few streets.292 These local 
representatives perform functions that are not always stated in the law but exist mostly 
in practice, like for example the function as mediator (Ibid.). In short, qaids, pashas and 
governors represent the central state administration (i.e. the Ministry of Interior) at dif-
ferent	governmental	levels.	As	representatives	of	the	king	and	officials	of	the	Ministry	
of	Interior	they	dispose	in	many	situations	of	more	authority	than	the	elected	officials.	
The paradox of deconcentration in Morocco entails that the central authorities main-
tain the control and initiative over the process of decentralization (Catusse, Cattedra & 
Janati,	2007;	Planel,	2009).	This	was	definitely	the	case	after	what	happened	in	1981.	
This time however, urban planning and the reproduction of the urban space would 
become a central feature of the deconcentration process and the reorganization of state 
power at the urban scale.
The	reforms	implemented	after	1981	signified	in	many	aspects	a	rupture	in	the	modern	
history of urban planning in Morocco. The riots brought the urban peripheries and the 
urban	poor	definitely	back	at	the	centre	of	government	attention.293 Especially the popu-
lation in the eastern periphery of Casablanca. Since the Protectorate, Casablanca can 
be roughly divided into two parts. The western part of the city was a more residential 
area, while industry was mainly concentrated in the east.294 Until today, the socio-spatial 
289  Casablanca has one female governor: Fouzia Imanssar who is governor of the prefecture of Aïn Chock. 
290  Qaids are more rural based representatives of the Ministry of Interior. Pashas are more urban based 
representatives.
291		As	I	mentioned	above,	the	municipal	reform	of	1976	was	a	first	reorganization	of	power	in	which	the	
upcoming urban elites – and locally elected representatives – received more executive power at the expense 
of the qaids and the pashas.
292  I have never met the mqaddem who was responsible for the immediate neighbourhood where I lived 
in Rabat (at least I think I never met him). Neither did my foreign roommates in Rabat. Nevertheless, most 
of our Moroccan friends assured us that he was perfectly aware of our presence. I also remember one night 
when I was walking home at three o clock in the morning when a group of young guys, who I had never 
met or seen before, greeted me with “hey le belge!” (Hey Belgian guy!). I guess, the mqaddem was not the 
only guy in my neighbourhood who knew who I was.  
293  This happened already once in 1952 when the urban poor became a central focus point of the French 
administration (cf. Rachik, 1995; 2002).
294  This division was planned by Henri Prost, the main architect behind the French colonial urban project 
Power and control in neoliberal politics 195
fragmentation	 of	 the	 city	 reflects	 this	 historical	 east-west	 divide.	 In	 the	west	 you’ll	
find	luxurious	residential	neighbourhoods	like	Anfa	where	the	high	class	of	Casablanca	
resides. They represent approximately 5% of the urban population. This is a more open 
part of the city. There are a lot of parks, public spaces, and many houses have huge gar-
dens. The architecture is diverse and modern. The east, with districts such as Ben M’sik 
and Sidi Moumen, is characterized by many bidonvilles, habitats clandestins and low-
cost housing blocks. The bulk of Casablanca’s poorest population (approximately 20% 
of the urban population) lives here. The eastern part of the city is much denser. The ar-
chitecture is also more monotonous. Many of the numerous apartments blocs located in 
the east are the result of state-sponsored housing policies and a lot of the former public 
spaces were taken over by informal housing. This east-west divide is also perceptible 
in	the	names	given	to	neighbourhoods	and	streets.	In	the	west	you	can	find	areas	with	
Western names such as Californie, Bourgogne, Gauthier and Racine. In the east, Arab 
names were more common, like for example Sidi Othman, Ben M’sik, Jamila, Lalla 
Mériam, Moulay Rchid and Sidi Moumen. It was as if the west of Casablanca was as-
sociated with Western modernity and characterized the city’s openness towards Europe, 
while the east of Casablanca was associated more with Moroccan tradition and its links 
with the rural hinterland (Nachoui, 1998). 
As a result of the riots, security and development became the two (complementary) 
core objectives of urban state intervention (Kaioua, 1996: 611). State interventions af-
ter 1981 implied a double shift in the regulation and organization of the urban space 
of Casablanca (Zriouli, 1998). First of all, it involved the further expansion and frag-
mentation of the urban space via new forms of administrative division. Casablanca had 
expanded	significantly	and	the	current	administrative	division	had	become	inefficient.	
In 1982, for example, douar Skouila – a bidonville located in the in the east (Sidi Mou-
men) where many of the perpetrators of the suicide bombings of 2003 came from – was 
physically integrated in the city, while administratively the neighbourhood was still 
part of the rural community of Tit Mellil.295 Secondly, despite the further administrative 
division of the urban territory, the interventions also assured a recentralization and a 
strengthening of central power at the urban scale (cf. Naciri, 1989; Rachik, 1995; 2002). 
This recentralization or deconcentration of state power had to assure the control over 
emerging and competing political forces at the urban scale (e.g. the trade unions, the 
political parties, the neighbourhood associations). The creation of the wilaya was one 
of the main characteristic reforms of this governmental shift. By bringing the “adminis-
tration closer to those administered”, the wilaya integrated peripheral living spaces into 
the administrative borders of the city. Only a month after the riots of 1981, the authori-
ties	divided	the	territory	of	Casablanca	into	five	administrative	prefectures	(until	then	
in Morocco. The western part of the city was reserved for the European residents. The south for the Moroc-
cans and the east and north-east of the city was developed as an industrial zone. This partition had its effect 
on the social fabric of the city and this is still visible today (e.g. Rachik, 1995; 2002).
295  There is some confusion about douar skouila in the sources I consulted. According to Mostafa Nachoui 
Tit Mellil will become an urban community in 1992 (Nachoui, 1998: 115). However, according to Lamia 
Zaki, Douar Skouila will only be attached to the territory of Casablanca in 2001, as part of the transforma-
tion of the rural community of d’Ahl Loghlam into an urban community (Zaki, 2005: 27). The term douar 
originally refers to an encampment. Later it became a synonym for a rural agglomeration. Within an urban 
context, the term is used to denote the bidonvilles, more particularly those with a rural background (ibid.). 
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Casablanca	existed	out	of	only	one	prefecture	and	five	urban	municipalities).296 After this 
division,	the	five	prefectures	were	accommodated	within	a	newly	established	adminis-
trative superstructure: the wilaya of Greater Casablanca (the wilaya of Rabat-Salé was 
created at the same time).297 The wilaya (Arabic for governorate) became the highest 
sub-national administrative division in Morocco. It integrated the different prefectures 
and provinces into one governmental structure. The wilaya is headed by the wali. He 
is at the same time governor of the main prefecture of the city. The wilaya didn’t had 
the	same	juridical	status	as	the	prefecture	or	the	province.	Officially,	it	isn’t	a	separate	
local government body, but only an inter-prefectural and provincial framework for the 
coordination of urban policies. The wali had to coordinate the increasing administrative 
deconcentration – fragmentation – of the urban agglomerate. That is why, technically, 
the wali has the same administrative rank as the different prefectural and provincial 
governors. Symbolically however, the wali enjoys far more authority than the other 
governors. He has much closer ties with the Ministry of Interior and consequently also 
with the monarchy. He is the direct mediator between the political centre of Morocco 
and the urban level. The wali, just as the other governors, is appointed directly by the 
king and it is only the latter who can dispose him of his duties. 
The administrative division of the territory of Casablanca and the creation of the wilaya 
were reforms to strengthen the state’s grip on the urban scale. The wali disposed of con-
siderably more power and competences than the locally elected councils. Today, he has 
three main tasks. First, he has to coordinate the policies of the prefectures and provinces 
in his jurisdiction and supervise the local governments. With regard to the latter, the 
wali, as haut fonctionnaire of the state and the highest representative of the Ministry 
of Interior within the territory of Casablanca, takes over the supervisory function of 
the ministry over the locally elected municipal governments. The local City Councils 
are depended on the Ministry of Interior for the redistribution of resources and their 
budgetary, technical and juridical affairs are supervised through the General Direction 
of the Local Communities (DGCL) (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007).298 Secondly, the 
wali was responsible for the preservation of security and public order on his urban ter-
ritory. He directs and controls the deconcentrated network of the “agents d’autorités” 
(qaids, pashas, mqaddems, etc.). The wali himself is only directly accountable to the 
minister of Interior for his actions and decisions. Finally, since 2002, the wali has to co-
ordinate all issues related to economic investment within his territory and supervise the 
process of urban planning.299 As such, the wali maintains close contact with other state 
296		The	five	prefectures	were	Casa-Anfa;	Ain	Sebaa-Hay	Mohammedia;	Ben	M’Sik-Sidi	Othman;	Aïn	
Chock-Hay Hassani; and Mohammadia-Zénata. 
297  Decree n°2-84-129 (3 July 1984): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1984%5CBO_3
740_fr.PDF
298  The DGCL was a department of the Ministry of Interior established by former minister Driss Basri 
in 1976 in order to maintain control over the extended competences of the local municipal governments 
established with the Chartre Communal (the municipal reform) of 1976. For example, the local tax system, 
which dealt mainly with the granting of licenses, urban taxes and the redistribution of TVA fees, depended 
on the redistribution of the resources by the Ministry of Interior. This deprived the local councils largely of 
any margin for autonomous decision-making (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007).
299  In 2002, the security tasks of the wilaya were extended with the promotion of economic development 
and industrialization. In addition to that, the king ordered the creation of Regional Investment Centres 
(RIC) under the supervision of the wilayas. As mentioned in chapter 3, the RICs were one-stop contact 
points for Moroccan and foreign economic investors who wished to invest in the region. As a result the 
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agencies, such as the urban planning agencies and the regional inspection departments 
who are authorized with the elaboration of particular urban policies. After 1981, the 
wali thus became the most important political actor within the territory of the city. As a 
deconcentrated authority and representative of the state, he not only overrules the local 
elected government but also replaces the national ministries in many policy domains of 
urban planning and urban government.300 The local political control over the urban scale 
was now located almost exclusively into the hands of the prefectural system.
Casablanca expanded to 6 prefectures in 1985, 7 in 1990 (after the riots in Fez), and 9 in 
1997. Today, Greater Casablanca is divided into 12 prefectures.301 During that same pe-
riod, the central authorities also effectively decentralised the urban scale of Casablanca 
and multiplied the amount of municipalities. In 1976 Casablanca was divided into 5 
municipalities. In 1985 there were 23 urban and rural municipalities. And just before 
the municipal elections of 1992, the authorities effectively almost doubled the amount 
of municipalities (to 35 – 28 urban and 7 rural)302 in order to break up certain political 
alliances at the local level and weaken the political and territorial strength of the local 
elected councils. As mentioned above, this was before the 2002 municipal reform fused 
the multiple locally elected councils into one City Council. The double process of de-
concentration – i.e. the reinforcement of central state power at the urban scale – and de-
centralization – i.e. the crumbling of the municipal constituencies in Casablanca – had a 
perverse effect on the power balances in the city. It partly reversed the municipal reform 
of 1976 which had sought to integrate the emerging urban middle class into the realm of 
decision-making (Naciri, 1987; Kaioua, 1996; Cattedra, 2001). The immediate political 
strategy was to weaken the alliance (the Koutla) between the two historical opposition 
parties: the socialist USFP and the conservative Istiqlal (Zriouli, 1998). 
Following the perceived effectiveness of the reforms in Casablanca, its administrative 
model was applied in other cities during the 1980s and the 1990s. After the violent riots 
of December 1990, three new wilayas were established in the cities of Fez, Marrake-
ch and Meknes.303	There	were	then	five	wilayas	in	Morocco	(Greater	Casablanca	and	
Rabat-Salé	being	the	other	two).	These	five	wilayas	integrated	in	total	four	provinces	
(rural) and 18 prefectures (urban). In January 1994, another four wilayas were cre-
ated (Oujda, Agadir, Tétouan and Lâayoune). This time, however, there was no direct 
provocation. It was more a pre-emptive measure anticipating the creation of regional 
technocratic and economic ministries were dispossessed of some of their prerogatives that were transferred 
to the wilaya. This resulted in the appointment of several so-called “techno-walis” or “super-walis” who 
were supposed to bring a new technocratic and management culture to the job (Catusse, 2008: 130; 2009: 
197-198).  
300  For a more detailed description of these particular functions of the wali, see the site of Grand-Casa-
blanca: http://www.casablanca.ma/index/portal/media-type/html/user/anon/page/accueil.psml;jsessionid=5
C695BDCD8948E73496D6DBF6424E694?noteid=2325 (accessed 25/10/2010). 
301  For an overview of the different prefectures and provinces of Casablanca and the governors in func-
tion:	see	the	official	website	of	the	city:	http://www.casablanca.ma (accessed 11/10/2010). However, the 
official	websites	are	confusion	about	the	exact	constitution	of	the	administrative	division	of	Casablanca.	
On	the	official	website	of	Morocco,	Mediouna	and	Nouaceur	are	listed	as	prefectures,	while	on	the	official	
website of the city of Casablanca they are listed as provinces. See: http://www.maroc.ma and http://www.
casablanca.ma. (accessed 11/10/2010).
302  In 1997 Casablanca counted 29 urban municipalities and 6 rural communities (Catusse, e.a., 2005).
303  Also in 1990, the inhabitants of the bidonvilles in Fez had played a major role in the disturbances.
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governments in 1996 (Zriouli, 1998). Today, there are 16 regions and 17 wilayas in Mo-
rocco (Tétouan and Tangiers have their own wilaya in the region of Tangiers-Tétouan). 
As mentioned above, the Regional Council is directed by the wali and resides in the 
prefecture or province of the wali. In general, the multiplication of wilayas coincided 
with the multiplication of the prefectures and provinces in Morocco. Today there are 27 
prefectures and 45 provinces (Hinti, 2005: 170).      
Decentralized authorities Deconcentrated authorities
City Council
(in cities with more than 500,000 inhabit-
ants, the territory is subdivided in ar-
rondissment councils.
Qaids and Pashas
(urban district level. At the street level 
they are represented by mqaddems and 
khalifas)
Prefectural and Provincial assemblies
(indirectly elected)
Prefecture and Province
(headed by a governor. He is the direct 
boss of the local agents d’autorités, i.e. 
the qaids and pashas)
Regional Council
(indirectly elected)
Wilaya
(headed by a wali. The wali is also gover-
nor of the main prefecture. His authority is 
largely based on his status as direct repre-
sentative	of	the	king.	Officially	he	has	the	
same status as the other governors. The 
wali also directs the regional assembly) 
    Table 1: the decentralized and deconcentrated authorities in Morocco 
Besides	this	specific	administrative	division	of	Casablanca,	the	1981	riots	also	triggered	
the creation of several governmental agencies and new urban planning instruments to 
enhance control over the urban territory and its process of urbanization. Within a month 
after the riots, king Hassan II entrusted the French urbanist Michel Pinseau with the 
elaboration of a new Schéma Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire (SDAU), a 
new general masterplan, to map out Casablanca’s future for the next two decades.304 
This	was	 the	first	 fully	elaborated	SDAU	since	Morocco’s	 independence.	According	
to Pinseau, the SDAU had to outline and determine the framework in which the ur-
ban population of Casablanca would live and work for the coming 20 years (Nachoui, 
1998). With this assignment, however, Pinseau’s team received also the explicit mission 
to “securitize the city” (Cattedra, 2001: 130-131). The SDAU attempted to formulate 
a response to three: (1) a solution for the housing problem, (2) the improvement of the 
quality public spaces and buildings, and (3) the amelioration of the mobility within the 
city. The planning of a metro line was one of the most salient objectives of the master 
plan.305 The new SDAU resembled the original SDAU of Michel Ecochard in the way 
which it also projected a linear growth of the city along the coastline. This linear growth 
would then eventually integrate the neighbouring prefecture of Mohammedia. In con-
trast, the original plans of Henri Prost had anticipated a more concentric growth of the 
304  As such, Michel Pinseau became the third French architect/urbanist, after Henri Prost and Michel 
Ecochard, to have a great impact on the future development of Casablanca.
305  However, this metro was never realized. Today this plan has been replaced by the plan to built a tram-
way	by	analogy	with	the	tramway	in	Rabat	which	should	be	finished	in	2011.
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city. Additionally, in comparison with the two former master plans of Casablanca, the 
SDAU of Pinseau was also brought out after a violent crisis. The Prost plan (1917) was 
elaborated	in	the	middle	of	a	civil	war	during	the	first	years	of	the	French	Protector-
ate, the Ecochard plan (1952) was designed after the violent riots in Casablanca, and 
finally,	the	Pinseau	master	plan	was	clearly	intended	to	put	things	right	after	the	violent	
disturbances of 1981 (Rachik, 1994).    
Following the elaboration of the SDAU, two important agencies were created in 1984 
to	implement	the	new	urban	strategies.	The	first,	the	Agence Nationale pour l’Habitat 
Insalubre (ANHI), was charged with the eradication and re-integration of the slums 
and the informal neighbourhoods (HC). It was placed under the control of the Min-
istry	 of	 Interior	 but	 operated	 as	 a	financially	 autonomous	public	 institution	because	
the requirements of structural adjustment implied, after all, a radical decrease of state 
subsidies for social housing programs. This meant a clear break with some of the state-
led housing policies before the implementation of the SAP in 1983. In the following 
years, the real estate market and the construction sector were largely privatized and the 
Moroccan	state	disengaged	more	and	more	from	direct	financial	intervention	(Philifert	
& Jolé, 2005). ANHI would work more closely together with the emerging private 
sector in order to provide social and low-cost housing.306 Yet, despite the liberalization 
of the housing market, the deconcentrated authorities still maintained strong control 
over the urban planning process (Nachoui, 1998; see also below). Additionally, the 
establishment of the ANHI had another consequence. It implied a return to programs 
of	 slum-resettlement	 which	 were	 popular	 during	 the	 final	 years	 of	 the	 Protectorate	
(Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c). By contrast, during the 1970s, preference was usually 
given to a restructuring in situ. The restructuring of shantytowns on the spot was back 
then a policy that was strongly promoted by the World Bank, also in Morocco (Naciri, 
1987).307 However, due to the new economic climate of the 1980s and the rapid expan-
sion of Casablanca – which caused the absorbtion of many bidonvilles into the urban 
fabric – some of the leading architects and urban planners at the time considered that 
the restructuration of the shantytowns would imply the permanent “bidonvillisation” 
of the city-centre and, as a result, this would negatively impact the future economic 
development of Casablanca, i.e. within a neoliberal spatial logic (Navez-Bouchanine 
& Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005: 66). The experience with Ben M’sik, a large ‘restructured’ 
306  This private sector developed itself especially during the 1990s (cf. Hauw, 2004).
307  With the World Bank presidency of Robert McNamara in the early 1970s, the World Bank prioritized 
for	the	first	time	the	improvement	of	slums	as	an	essential	part	of	poverty	alleviation	strategies	(Milbert,	
2006; Davis, 2006a). Ironically, the inspiration for this new priority came from the British anarchist ar-
chitect John F.C. Turner, who advocated the roll back of state intervention in public housing projects and 
privileged housing projects with a strong focus on participation and autonomy of local inhabitants. The 
most important objective for policy, according to Turner, had to be to improve their access to resources (see 
Turner, 1976). His anarchist view on self-help had turned into a new World Bank strategy that advocated 
a departure from heavy state-subsidized public housing projects and emphasized slum-upgrading in situ to 
make housing more affordable without these subsidies (Davis, 2006a: 72). In Morocco, the intentions of the 
World Bank were quite typical compared to those in other countries. They aimed to demonstrate the viabil-
ity of low-cost slum upgrading and the improvement of the access to services as an alternative to the previ-
ously preferred strategy of relocating slum dwellers to heavily state-subsidized public resettlement projects 
(Kessides, 1997). In the 1980s, two World Bank Urban Development Projects (UDPs) were launched and 
concentrated mostly on projects in Rabat, Kenitra and Meknes. However, in the end, the government still 
refused to accept the legitimacy of the bidonvilles as a permanent solution and continued to call for their 
permanent eradication. As a result, the two UDPs were not widely replicated in Morocco (Ibid.).  
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slum in the eastern part of the city, was one of the events which probably explained 
the shift in focus from restructuration to relocation. Ben M’sik was indeed one of the 
epicentres of the 1981 disturbances and had put the effectiveness of restructuration into 
question (Naciri, 1987; Hauw, 2004).  
A second agency that was created following the SDAU, the Agence Urbaine de Casa-
blanca	(AUC),	was	of	even	greater	significance.308	The	AUC	was	Morocco’s	first	tech-
nocratic urban planning agency. Its main task was the implementation and elaboration 
of the recommendations in the SDAU. The intention was obvious. Issues of urban plan-
ning and urban reorganization had become a top priority and the central administra-
tion	 needed	 a	 specific	 instrument	 that	 concentrated	 the	 resources,	 the	 expertise	 and	
the political power to govern the urban terrain from a more technical perspective. The 
wilaya clearly concentrated the necessary political power at the urban scale, but missed 
the technocratic baggage to elaborate the technical missions and urban projects delin-
eated	in	the	SDAU.	The	AUC	was	established	specifically	to	manage	the	urban	crisis	
and rationalize the urban demographic process. Furthermore, it would assemble and 
coordinate all other specialized agencies active at the urban scale (e.g. ANHI, ERAC, 
etc.). Politically, the creation of the AUC cannot be misunderstood. The director of 
the AUC has the status of a governor. He is nominated by the king and placed on the 
payroll of the Ministry of Interior.309	This	means	that	he	finds	himself	at	the	same	hier-
archical level as the prefectural and provincial governors of Casablanca. As such, the 
AUC was another example of how the Ministry of Interior established its domination 
over the urban territory of Casablanca at the expense of all other local actors and forces. 
The AUC disposed of considerable public powers. It had the right to expropriate, the 
right of pre-emption and the agency had also the autonomy to expand its own property 
reserves.	As	such,	the	AUC	could	intervene	in	the	market	and	influence	land	prices	by	
selling or buying land on its own account. The AUC-model was subsequently adopted 
in the other Moroccan cities. A dahir of 10 September 1993 permitted the establishment 
of urban agencies in every city in Morocco.310 Nonetheless, the AUC remains particular. 
Unlike other urban agencies that are now all placed under the political supervision of 
the MHUAE (the current ministry of housing and urbanism), the AUC still remains, 
to the present day, a deconcentrated department of the Ministry of Interior. And unlike 
the AUC-governor, none of the directors of the other urban agencies have the status 
of governor. As such, the AUC remained the privileged instrument of the Ministry of 
Interior to control the increasing complexity of Casablanca’s urbanization. In 1985, 
this political domination of the Ministry of Interior was demonstrated yet another time 
when the national government transferred the ministerial authority over urban planning 
back to the Ministry of Interior, at the expense of the more technocratic MUHTE.311 The 
latter was reduced to a ministry of housing.
308  For a detailed discussion on the AUC see: Moujid (1989).
309  Dahir n°1-84-188 (9/10/1984): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1984%5CBO_376
2_fr.PDF 
310  Dahir n°1-93-51 (10/09/1993): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1993%5CBO_422
0_fr.PDF 
311  As mentioned above, in 1972 the government had entrusted the autonomous and technocratic Ministry 
of Urbanism, Housing, Tourism and Environment (MUHTE) with the competence of urban planning. Over 
the years the ministry has changed status and names several times. 
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After the administrative division of the city and the establishment of the wilaya, the 
AUC and the ANHI, urban planning became an exercise of power to ensure spatial 
visibility and, consequently, political stability (Rachik, 1994).312	The	specific	reforms	
implied a clear centralization of political power in Casablanca, with the AUC and the 
wilaya as the local representatives of the Ministry of Interior (Moujid, 1989; Catusse, 
e.a., 2005). To use a quote of Raffaele Cattedra, after 1981, the Ministry effectively 
succeeded in “territorializing its own power” (Cattedra, 2001: 142). And despite a re-
transfer of the competence of urban planning to a renewed and autonomous ministry of 
housing and urbanism in 1998 under the alternance government, the Moroccan urban-
ist Abdelghani Abouhani stressed that to the present day “it is the Ministry of Interior 
who	really	governs	the	cities	(...)	The	ministry	of	urbanism	has	the	possibility	to	define	
the norms, but nothing really more than that”.313 In the end, the reforms of the 1980s had 
foremost a territorial focus. Other key political and social questions remained unad-
dressed. Both Kaioua and Cattedra emphasized the particular technocratic character of 
the	SDAU.	Additionally,	the	specific	mission	of	the	ANHI	and	the	AUC	made	it	clear	
that the Moroccan authorities would deal with the increased social tensions in a techni-
cal and sovereign way, rather than in a comprehensive social and political way. As a 
result, the attention given to the urban scale after the riots failed to take into account 
the social complexity of the city as a whole and avoided the pressing political questions 
about the future role of the metropolis in the social and economic development of its 
population. Despite the massive reorganization of the urban space in Morocco, little 
attention was paid to the root causes of social inequality which was, after all, the basis 
for	the	riots	in	the	first	place.
Urban restructuring and state architecture in Casablanca
Sovereign city planning in Morocco was characterized by administrative division and 
new	urban	planning	instruments	and	institutions,	but	it	had	also	some	significant	spatial	
implications. In spite of the then economic crisis, public authorities invested heavily 
in the spatial reorganization of Casablanca (cf. Moujid, 1989; Naciri, 1987; Kaioua, 
1996;	Rachik,	2002).	The	restraints	of	the	public	deficit	and	the	pressures	of	the	IMF	
to cut back public spending have not held back the Moroccan authorities to intervene 
in numerous ways in the reorganization of the urban space of Casablanca. No less than 
two	billion	MAD	were	invested	in	the	restructuring	of	the	city.	For	the	first	time,	the	
authorities planned the integration of all bidonvilles (at least they talked about it). Ad-
ditionally, they planned the elaboration of whole new road network for the city (Rachik, 
1995: 85).In the following years, new social housing projects, new roads, the installa-
tion of police stations in the urban peripheries and above all the construction of the ma-
jestic prefectural headquarters gave a face to the state in those neighbourhoods where 
it was previously absent (Naciri, 1989).314 Urban restructurings and renovations – espe-
cially the renovation of the Mohamed V and the United Nations squares – were meant 
312  These three examples were some of the most obvious examples. They are not the only examples. There 
were other institutions and instruments that were created during the 1980s and 1990s that further exemplify 
the increased attention given to urban government and planning (e.g. the Regional Inspections, the prefec-
tural departments of urbanism, etc.) (for more information see Zriouli, 1998; Catusse, e.a., 2005; Philifert & 
Jolé, 2005).   
313  Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat-21/04/09).
314  King Hassan II had explicitly denounced the lack of police presence in the urban peripheries in his 
speech of 8 July 1981, two weeks after the riots (Claisse, 1987). 
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to give testimony to the greatness and richness of Casablanca (Rachik, 1995: 71-72). 
To do so, two additional objectives were delineated in the SDAU: (1) the renovation of 
the city-centre; (2) the construction of new majestic prefectural buildings. As such, the 
authorities attempted to demonstrate the state’s intention to be overtly and physically 
present in peripheral districts such as Ain Sebaa, Ben M’sik and Aïn Chock (Naciri, 
1987). These buildings, their decoration, their grandeur, and the open space that sur-
rounds them, stand out in stark contrast to the impoverished and monotonous apart-
ment buildings in the immediate surroundings. According to Mohamed Naciri these 
constructions represented not only the preoccupation of central power with the control 
of the peripheries of the country’s most important city, but also the desire to implant 
new beacons of modernity in the midst of degraded urban areas (often depicted as the 
antithesis of modernity), so they could become new attractive and alternative urban 
centres within the territory of Greater Casablanca.   
At the same time these spatial interventions turned the urban territory into a more cal-
culable and governable space. First of all, the urban restructurings sought to improve 
the control over urban residents and their movements by emphasizing monumental 
state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a (or the Moroccan) sovereign. Addition-
ally,	in	an	attempt	“to	curb	the	habits	of	[the]	unruly	inhabitants”,	some	specific	urban	
interventions disentangled the densely populated peripheries by linking Casablanca’s 
impoverished peripheries with the city-centre and improve the connection between dif-
ferent nodes of capitalist accumulation throughout the city (Ossman, 1994: 30). As 
such new boundaries were drawn within the urban space. For example, the A3-highway 
between	Rabat	 and	Casablanca,	finished	 in	 the	mid-1980s,	 literally	 cleaved	 the	 city	
in two, forming a barrier between the predominantly working-class periphery and the 
city-centre (Ibid.; see also Cattedra, 2001: 143). Today, the urban space of Casablanca 
is cleaved by large boulevards. This not only improved the mobility of the Moroccan 
labour force, it also increased the velocity of urban life in general – with the boulevard 
as its symbolic pinnacle – leading to the constant circulation of goods, capital and 
people. Accordingly, it reduces people’s capacity to stand still, wonder, think and – if 
necessary – mobilize. The urban space of the street is a place for communication and 
movement that can eventually lead to ‘street politics’, but streets – as the French phi-
losopher Henri Lefebvre argued – can also be a repressing place where cars are hunters 
and pedestrians become the hunted (Lefebvre, 2003: 21). The enlargement and renova-
tion	of	the	road	network	in	Casablanca	in	the	1980s	specifically	aimed	to	make	urban	
circulation	more	fluid,	ensure	spatial	visibility	and	improve	the	physical	integration	of	
(and consequently the control over) the urban periphery (Rachik, 1995: 80-82).
Two projects in particular symbolized the rationality of sovereign city planning in the 
1980s. These two large-scale “neo-Haussmanian” projects represented the symbolic 
presence and power of the sovereign, the Moroccan monarch, at the urban scale (Ca-
tusse, e.a. 2005).315	The	first	one	was	the	impressive	Mosque Hassan II, named after 
315		The	Haussman	period	in	the	1860s	in	Paris	has	become	a	synonym	for	specific	class	strategies	aim-
ing at the re-planning of the city without any regard for its original life (Lefebvre, 1996: 76). Moreover, 
in Haussmans’s case these class strategies were directed against the neighbourhood Belleville which had 
become a working class neighbourhood which the bourgeoisie had become to fear. The neighbourhood had 
become	impossible	to	penetrate	for	police	forces	and	as	a	result	very	difficult	to	regulate	by	the	govern-
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the former king. It was a royal project im-
posed upon the city by a sovereign deci-
sion of the king himself.316 Not even the 
SDAU elaborated by Pinseau mentioned 
any plans to build the mosque. The im-
pressive	Mosque	was	 also	 the	 first	 proj-
ect in Morocco that characterized a new 
vision on urban restructuring and devel-
opment: waterfront development. For 
years urban planners had neglected the 
shorelines of cities like Casablanca and 
Rabat. In the past, these cities literally 
turned their backs to the Atlantic ocean. It 
is only a recent trend in Morocco to take 
into account the exploitative value of the 
seashore (cf. chapter 5). The Mosque Has-
san	II	was	one	of	the	first	projects	which	
opened up to the sea. It was located at the 
shoreline right in front of the old medina 
and build partially on the water. It took six 
years (1987-1993) and 50 million man-hours to build the mosque. Today, it is the sec-
ond largest mosque in the world and it has the largest minaret (200m). In his study, Raf-
faele Cattedra shows in detail how the Mosque Hassan II played an important symbolic 
role in the “reconfessionalization” of the city. It was the showpiece by which central 
power in Morocco reclaimed the city in a symbolic way and attempted to counter the 
proliferation of new mosques and the emergence of Islamist movements in the urban 
peripheries.317 Additionally, the Mosque Hassan II was supposed to give back the city of 
Casablanca its image as a Muslim city. During the Protectorate, the French had never 
provided the space in the ville nouvelle for the building of religious monuments. Conse-
quently the city lacked the necessary infrastructural symbols to be perceived as a Mus-
lim city in the collective imagination (Cattedra, 2001). As such, the Mosque Hassan II 
ment (Scott, 1998: 63). In the end, Baron Haussman torn down the old Parisian slums in the name of “civic 
improvement and renovation” and removed the working class from the centre of the city (Harvey, 2008: 
33). The association with many of the urban renewal projects in Morocco during the 1980s was obvious.  
Specific	class	strategies	to	remove	the	urban	poor	out	of	the	centre	of	the	Moroccan	cities	will	continue	and	
even increase in the 2000s, albeit with different governmental techniques (see below).    
316  As mentioned in chapter 3, receiving the label of royal project not only meant that the decision was 
taken by the king himself but also that the project itself could not fail at any cost. In the case of the Mosque 
Hassan II, the government had put pressure on every citizen in Casablanca to donate money for the con-
struction of the mosque. 
317  In 20 years time (1960-1980) there were more mosques built in Morocco than in the two preceding 
centuries. The recurrent stigmatization of the slum population – as for example breeding places for Islamist 
radicalists – played a crucial factor in the decision to build the mosque Hassan II. It is however beyond the 
scope of this study to elaborate on the complexity of the relationship between slum populations, the prolif-
eration of mosques in the city’s periphery and the emergence of Islamist opposition groups (cf. Cattedra, 
2001). Nevertheless, numerous studies have argued that mosques played a crucial role in the emergence 
of bidonvilles and HC. The building of a mosque protected the neighbourhood from being torn down and 
destroyed. It also provided a central meeting place from which new forms of mobilization and association 
could emerge, and eventually potentially oppose established powers in the urban space (cf. Naciri, 1987; 
Cattedra, 2001; Iraki, 2006b). 
The Mosque Hassan II (May 2009)
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had to represent the Muslim identity of the residents of Casablanca and re-establish at 
the same time the religious authority of the king as the ‘Commander of the Faithful’. 
The	mosque’s	architectural	grandeur	is	in	itself	a	reflection	of	the	monarchy’s	power.	
The second characteristic project was the Avenue Royale (Royal Avenue).318 This urban 
renewal project involves an axis of 1,5km long and 60 metres wide that connects the 
coastal area and the Mosque Hassan II with the inner city-centre and the United Nations 
square, alongside the historical medina. The project had to present another image of 
Casablanca to the outside world – an image of a vibrant and dynamic city, instead of an 
image of urban violence and discontent – and redevelop Casablanca’s inner-centre to 
meet	the	desires	of	tourists,	investors	and	high-class	residents.	The	project	(still	not	fin-
ished) plans amongst other things the construction of high and middle class apartments, 
a new commercial centre, a conference centre and a theatre. However, the realization 
of these plans and constructions implied the relocation of more than 12,000 families 
(60,000 people) out of the historical city-centre. In 1989, the AUC conducted surveys to 
identify the population that had to be relocated. Faced with the complexity and magni-
tude of the project, the public authorities entrusted SONADAC – a semi-public agency 
created in 1991 and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior – with the 
management of the further construction of the Royal Avenue (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010: 
219).	A	first	resettlement	program	was	launched	in	1995.	530	families	were	resettled	to	
the urban residential estate of Attacharouk. Since 1997, most of the remaining people 
are being relocated to the new site of Nassim, almost 10 km from the city-centre (cf. 
Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005; Anglade, 2005; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). 
Between 1998 and 2002 about 2,000 households were relocated. Since then, however, 
the	pace	of	resettlement	has	slowed	down	considerably	due	to	operational	and	financial	
problems. By 2009, no more than 3,000 people were relocated out of the total of the 
12,000 households that were planned in the beginning (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). The 
detailed studies by Françoise Navez-Bouchanine and Isabelle Berry-Chikhaoui reveal 
the authoritarian character of this kind of development strategy (i.e. the remodelling of 
Casablanca’s city-centre according to ‘global market requirements’). Preference was 
clearly given to the market value of the urban site, while the original inhabitants of the 
site did not take part whatsoever in the decision-making process. They were little or not 
informed neither before nor during the course of the project. 
Ironically, the project, just like many other projects in Morocco, has often been present-
ed in the media as a social project. Allegedly, the project aimed– besides its economic 
objectives – to provide a new future and decent living conditions for the inhabitants 
living at the outside of the walls of the medina (by moving them 10 km further away). 
The	justification	for	this	urban	renewal	project	was	to	be	found	in	the	fact	that	the	ben-
eficiaries	–	80%	of	them	were	tenants	–	would	receive	preferable	state-subsidized	con-
ditions	to	become	home-owners	in	Nassim	(Ibid.).	This	justification,	first	of	all,	directly	
neglected the fate of the nearly 2,000 households that did own their current apartment.319 
Additionally,	in	the	opinion	of	many	‘beneficiaries’	the	new	site	was	not	an	improve-
ment of their situation at all. From an economic point of view, Nassim was much less 
interesting than their current living place because it was located at the periphery of the 
318  This project was also not mentioned in Pinseau’s master plan. 
319  These home-owners also denounced the underestimated expropriation fees.
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city and it would disrupt a lot of the social and economic links that were established 
with neighbouring central districts, and in particular with the souks of the old medina 
(Ibid.: 224). As a result, there was a lot of resistance against the project and against the 
conditions of their relocation. Local residents used a wide variety of tactics to delay the 
advancement of the project (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). If one 
takes a walk today along the future Royal Avenue one quickly notices that the project 
has been on hold for years. 
Nevertheless,	 the	 urban	 renovations	 of	 the	 1980s	with	flagship	 projects	 such	 as	 the	
Mosque Hassan II and the (planned) Royal Avenue, but also the construction of the pre-
fectures and the renovations of major squares, symbolized the symbiosis of an increas-
ing territorial control with an authoritarian vision on urban renovation.320 The mosque 
and the Royal Avenue were royal projects subject to the decision of the Moroccan sov-
ereign. State architecture thus played a central role in the reorganization of the urban 
space of Casablanca. In this view, architecture is not merely about the construction of a 
space,	it	also	has	“specific	expressive-experiential	effects”	on	subjects.	The	“particular	
practice involved in such architecture”, Paul Hirst argues, “is the transformation of hu-
man subjects through geometrically organized space” (Hirst, 2005: 162-164). Lefebvre 
goes one step further and stresses that monuments – like the Mosque Hassan II – are 
essentially	repressive	because	they	have	been	specifically	raised	to	glorify	the	power-
ful. As such, they control people, but also brings them together at the same time, by 
projecting	onto	the	place	where	these	monuments	are	implanted	a	specific	conception	
of the world (Lefebvre, 2003: 21- 22). The concept of sovereign city planning thus tries 
to grasp the political dimension behind certain strategies of urban renovation, i.e. those 
strategies that try to capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture 
in order to incite the loyalty of the urban citizens to a sovereign. 
Additionally, sovereign city planning in the 1980s was closely intertwined with the in-
terests of capital to guarantee a better circulation. Urban planning was not only focused 
on the securitization of the urban space but also on the economic development of the 
city.	Despite	its	current	operational	and	financial	difficulties,	the	project	of	the	Royal	
Avenue was a prelude to the contemporary context of rapidly changing global com-
petitive	conditions	in	which	the	Moroccan	cities	–	and	Casablanca	specifically	–	try	to	
320  The construction of the Casablanca Twin Towers, inaugurated in 1998, is another example. It repre-
sents the economic stature of the city. 
What is left of the billboard anouncing the project 
of the Royal Avenue (May 2009)
The Royal Avenue (May 2009)
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maintain a favourable position. In 2007, SONADAC was taken over by the semi-public 
investment bank CDG and as a result the latter now controls all waterfront development 
projects around the Mosque Hassan II. The prestigious Casa-Marina project, launched 
in 2007 just on the other side of the medina, is developed by CGI, a subsidiary of CDG 
(cf. Barthel & Planel, 2010).321	Such	urban	development	schemes	fit	in	a	wider	project	
of capitalist restructuring and set the boundaries between those who can afford to in-
vest, live and consume in these newly designed places of consumption and those who 
fall by the wayside. After the realization of the Royal Avenue and the Marina, the his-
torical medina of Casablanca will be enclosed by two luxury projects. Yet, the medina 
is a very impoverished urban area with a majority of poor tenants.322 It is most likely 
that this enclosure will create further socio-spatial tensions and could lead eventually 
to	the	gentrification	of	the	historical	medina.323 Several other medinas in Morocco could 
serve as a forerunner. Especially the ones in Marrakech and Fez that are now subject 
to	an	influx	of	rich	(foreign)	investors	who	wish	to	exploit	its	exotic	character.	Projects	
such	as	the	Royal	Avenue	and	Casa-Marina	will	definitely	upgrade	the	attractiveness	
of the ancient medina of Casablanca and encourage private investors to take over that 
space in the future.
Techniques of security in the 21st century
The expansion of urban territorial control in the 1980s did, in the end, not bring forth 
a credible and sustainable solution for the slums in Casablanca and other major Mo-
roccan cities. In general, the resettlement operations of ANHI were quite effective in 
smaller cities but less successful in bigger cities due to for instance land scarcity, specu-
lation, the reluctance of people to move from their original living place and the inability 
of	 slum	dwellers	 to	finance	 the	 resettlement	 (cf.	Lehzam,	1995;	Navez-Bouchanine,	
2002c). Many eradication operations were postponed or delayed. Overall, there are 
three particular strategies in Morocco when it comes to the eradication of slums and 
the	re-integration	of	its	population.	The	first	strategy	is	‘restructuration’, which means 
that the slum space is reorganized on the spot (e.g. by improving access to services like 
water and electricity, paving roads, fortifying houses, etc.). But as I mentioned earlier, 
the restructuration of slums in Morocco (slum upgrading) – advocated by the World 
Bank in the 1970s and the 1980s – was abandoned as the main strategy in favour of re-
settlement. The second strategy is ‘recasement’.324 In this particular kind of resettlement 
operation the slum dwellers are allocated a parcel on which they have to build their own 
house or apartment (very often in co-ownership). The third strategy is ‘relogement’ 
(rehousing). In this kind of operation, the slum dwellers are transferred to a whole new 
apartment that has been built for them by a public or private developer.325 
321  CGI: Compagnie Générale Immobilière.
322  Interview with Marie-Pierre Anglade, sociologist (Casablanca-19/05/09).
323  The Moroccan sociologist Aberrahmane Rachik argues that the authorities always adopted a dubi-
ous	role	vis-à-vis	the	medina.	First	of	all,	it	would	have	been	politically	and	socially	impossible	to	simply	
eradicate the medina – due to its mythical and historical character and due to its densely populated areas 
– but at the same time public authorities have always neglected the medina with severe social degradation 
as a result (lack of public services, little renovation, etc.) (Rachik, 1995:73-75). Today, however, we see a 
renewed capitalist interest in these historical sites.          
324  This term comes from the French verb ‘recaser’ which means ‘to reinstall’ or ‘to re-site’. 
325  Recasement is the cheapest and most applied solution because the public authorities only had to liber-
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One of the reasons for the failure of slum resettlement in the 1980s can be found in the 
paradox of roll back neoliberalism. Despite the obvious efforts to reorganize the urban 
space after 1981, the coinciding structural adjustment policies had still deprived the 
state	of	the	necessary	financial	means	to	plan	and	fund	heavy	subsidized	public	housing	
programs. As such, a kind of paradox arose. On the one hand, the state strengthened its 
control over the urban territory (e.g. with the wilaya, the AUC, the ANHI, etc.) – and 
as	a	result	it	became	increasingly	difficult	to	expand	the	city	informally.	On	the	other	
hand,	this	increasing	administrative	control	coincided	with	a	financial	disengagement	
of the state in the provision of low-cost housing (Lehzam, 1995; Nachoui, 1998). One 
of the results of structural adjustment was the liberalization of the housing market and 
the emergence of private real estate and construction companies who controlled and 
even monopolized this market. Yet, the growth of the private sector in the housing mar-
ket undermined the affordability of legal accommodation, especially in cities like Casa-
blanca, as increasing speculation and ‘laisser-faire’ policies skyrocketed the housing 
prices. This resulted in a failure to meet the original objectives of the housing projects 
that were launched in the 1980s and the early 1990s.326 As a result, many inhabitants of 
the slums and the HC found themselves unable to buy a house on the formal market and 
their places were taken by a more well-off middle class residents for whom the housing 
projects	weren’t	intended	in	the	first	place.327 One of the results of this paradox was that 
the	already	significant	density	in	existing	informal	settlements	(slums	and	HC)	even	
increased. These areas became more and more overpopulated (Lehzam, 1995).
It was not until the Casablanca suicide bombings in 2003 that the Moroccan govern-
ment would seriously renew its engagement to eradicate all slums in the Moroccan 
cities. Two differences can be observed when we compare the new efforts with earlier 
policies of the 1980s. First of all, the state would now play a more prominent role in 
the support of slum resettlement operations. In the big cities the resettlement opera-
tions	had	become	a	real	obstacle	(due	to	speculative,	financial	and/or	social	reasons)	
and required more engaged state intervention (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 
2005: 67). Consequently, new state arrangements were rolled out in order to manage 
the operations on the ground and coordinate the cooperation with the private sector. 
Secondly, the contact with and the participation of the slum population was more cen-
tral in the new operations. In the past, ANHI would establish little contact with the 
slum residents and pushed through many of their operations in a very top-down man-
ner (Philifert & Jolé, 2005: 393). This changed in the 2000s. The new state arrange-
ments and the increased cooperation with private partners introduced new methods of 
intervention. These new methods not only increased contact with the slum population, 
it	also	implicated,	with	the	assistance	of	specific	social	 intermediaries,	an	increasing	
administration of life in the slums itself. The methods of sovereign city planning that 
were implemented in the 1980s, which treated the urban poor as legal subjects within a 
bounded territory, were gradually supplanted or complemented with new methods and 
ate and parcel out new building lots.
326  For example, in 1994, king Hassan II launched the prestigious plan “200,000 houses” (of which 70, 
000 were to be built in Casablanca). The private sector (e.g. important companies such as Addoha) played a 
big role in this project (Hauw, 2004).
327  It was a typical phenomenon, not only in Morocco, that urban middle class residents often supplanted 
the poorer urban residents in the slum upgrading and resettlement projects when the private sector and 
market-price mechanisms were involved (cf. Milbert, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2008).
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techniques	of	government	which	focused	first	of	all	on	the	population	itself.	The	urban	
poor, and not so much the urban territory, now had to be administered or policed.328 As 
I will discuss, new techniques of social engineering will be developed and character-
ize this shift from methods of sovereign planning towards techniques of security and 
risk management. Also, as Foucault had already remarked in the mid-1970s when he 
published	the	first	volume	of	the	History of Sexuality, the expansion of capitalism and 
the	exploration	of	new	markets	required	the	deployment	of	biopower	in	new	fields	and	
domains. As such, the new techniques involved in the government of slums were not 
only intended to enhance social control over the urban poor, or just to improve their 
quality of housing; these techniques also attempted to integrate the slum dweller into 
the formal capitalist market. One of the main objectives was to hook in even the poorest 
citizens into the system of capital circulation.  
In 2003, preference was also given to the resettlement of the slum population.329 Several 
reasons can be given as an explanation. First of all, there were obvious security reasons. 
The suicide bombers came from two slums in Sidi Moumen (a district in the periphery 
in	Casablanca).	These	urban	areas	were	difficult	to	control.	The	state	had	little	grip	on	
those who lived within these dense spaces. The bombings had raised awareness about 
this problematic and pictured the slum space as an ‘ungovernable space’.330 The reloca-
tion of the population to new estates (less dense, with wider roads, better planned, etc.) 
facilitated the management and control of the slum population. Secondly, slum upgrad-
ing – in contrast to resettlement – was less interesting for private companies. Also, the 
high density of the slums made upgrading either impossible or very costly. Barracks are 
usually located very close to each other, often on top of each other. In slum areas, virtu-
ally every bit of space was used by someone somehow (Werlin, 1999). On top of that, 
land had become very expensive in the inner-city and thus unaffordable for the inhabit-
ants.	Even	with	significant	state-subsidies	and	guarantees	there	was	no	way	that	many	
of the urban poor could afford living in the city-centre in a formal and legalized manner. 
Finally, there were also macro-economic interests that explained the preference given 
to the resettlement of slum populations to new estates often located in the peripheries of 
the bigger cities. The city-centre is a central and valuable space in the neoliberal spatial 
fix	(see	chapters	2	and	5).	As	a	result,	city-planners	were	more	concerned	about	 the	
city’s unique selling position and the renovation of the inner-city than that they cared 
about the needs and concerns of the poor population (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-
Chikhaoui, 2005). Slum populations were often resettled – also before the violent dis-
turbances of 2003 – with the very intention to recover the valuable terrains these people 
often occupied (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c; Le Tellier, 2009b).   
328  Again, I want to emphasize that biopolitical power did not merely supplant sovereign power. Both 
forms of power were already implemented since the neoliberal restructurings in the 1980s. After all, as 
I mentioned earlier, the deconcentration of administrative power was meant to bring the administration 
closer to the administered. Also, I want to re-emphasize that strategies of sovereign city planning did not 
attempted to control urban territories/space only for the sake of controlling them. In the end, they attempted 
to control the population that lived in and moved through the urban territory. Nevertheless, if we compare 
both periods (the period following the 1981 riots with the period following the 2003 bombings) we can see 
a clear pre-eminence of sovereign power in urban planning strategies in the 1980s, while forms and tech-
niques of biopower will be more elaborated in the aftermath of 2003.   
329  Only about 10% of the operations after 2003 will involve the restructuration.
330  Here, I make the link with Nikolas Rose’s concept of “governable spaces” (Rose, 1999: 31-40).
Power and control in neoliberal politics 209
The increasing administration of life in the slums
While tolerated in the past, the slums always maintained a temporary and informal 
status due to the fact that the inhabitants occupy a terrain illegally. This created a para-
doxical standoff. As Lamia Zaki argues: “by maintaining the inhabitants on the legal 
margin, the state creates a latent insecurity which sustains the shantytown dwellers’ 
fragility and limits the assertion of collective demands” (Zaki, 2008: 118). This form 
of “management by absence” – as Zaki calls it – has resulted in the exclusion of the 
slum dweller from formal city-life and the social norms city-life involves. Physically, 
the slum space was clearly separated from the ‘formal’ city (despite the fact that it 
was often located within the formal city). In the eyes of both the citizens living in the 
formal city and the slum dwellers, the ‘real’ city was constructed “en dur” (Zaki, 2005: 
52). Moreover, this perceived exclusion was not only limited to physical aspects. It 
was often believed that the slum dweller was excluded from modernity because their 
urbanization (mostly due to a rural exodus) had not necessarily led to a modern urban 
life style (Ibrahim, 1975). From this perspective, slums were seen as the emblem of a 
“ruralization” of the city, because their inhabitants maintained a so-called rural mental-
ity and were not yet adapted to modern city-life (Zaki, 2005: 67-69). The ‘formal’ rep-
resented the ordered city – both in terms of its urban and architectural shape as in terms 
of the cultural, economic, political and social organization of space – while the ‘infor-
mal’ was considered to represent the opposite: the shapeless areas of the city where 
economic and socio-political structures are particularly unstable and where culture is 
characterized as more “traditional” (Hernández & Kellet, 2010: 1). This perceived ten-
sion between formal and informal, this particular social and spatial imaginary not only 
essentialized the slum as a homogenous and coherent unity threatening the city and 
its public life, it also constituted the slum as a space to be governed separate from the 
spatial problematic of the city as a whole, thereby obfuscating its social and structural 
complexity. However, the formal-informal divide is in many ways only a perception – a 
powerful one nevertheless – and neglects the many ways in which both parts of the city 
are socially, culturally, politically and economically connected.331 
Nevertheless,	 this	perception	of	 the	 slum-space	has	marked	and	 influenced	 the	con-
struction of a “politics of truth” within Moroccan neoliberal governmentality and pro-
duced new forms of knowledge, new prejudices, notions and concepts that contributed 
to the “government” of the slums and the development of new techniques of interven-
tion and regulation (Lemke, 2002). The neoliberal rationality behind these politics of 
truth often emphasises the lack of (market-)integration in the formal urban economy 
as one of the main reasons for the deprived conditions of the slum dwellers. On the 
website of MHUAE the bidonville	is	defined	as	“an	anarchic	ensemble	of	houses,	built	
with anomalistic materials, deprived of hygiene and collective services and populated 
by indigent people or people badly integrated in the urban fabric”.332 The fact that the 
Moroccan state keeps silent about one of the main characteristics of the bidonvilles in 
331  The television, to give an obvious example, is one of the ways in which the bidonvilles are included 
in the urban universe and characterises their social integration and the attachment to modernity (Ossman, 
1994: 57-60). 
332		Original	in	French:	“ensemble	anarchique	d’habitations	sommaires,	édifiées	à	l’aide	de	matériaux	
hétéroclites, privées d’hygiène et d’équipements collectifs, où vivent des populations démunies ou mal 
intégrées dans le tissu urbain”. See : http://www.mhu.gov.ma/NR/exeres/7B0C459B-A424-463D-A2BB-
98D44FFA5816.htm#B (accessed 02/11/2010).
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this	definition,	namely	the	illegal	occupancy	of	the	land,	permits	the	official	discourse	
to obfuscate one of the basic dynamics behind their “management by absence” of the 
slums. Furthermore it neglects the structural causes for their existence and pins the 
responsibility of the lack of integration onto the inhabitants themselves (Zaki, 2005: 
53).	Two	specific	events	contributed	to	the	shift	towards	a	more	active management of 
the	slum	space.	The	first	one	was	the	changing	international	context	and	the	changing	
international discourse on development. The second event was the domestic political 
crisis	after	the	2003	suicide	bombings.	This	last	event	significantly	accelerated	an	al-
ready ongoing governmental shift.  
Internationally, there was a general shift from repressive approaches aiming to eradicate 
slums to an assimilating view of the slum population (Bolay, 2006). As I mentioned in 
chapter 3, the World Bank had distanced itself from some of the rigid assumptions of 
the Washington Consensus. The euphoria concerning the so-called “end of history” and 
the infallibility of free-market capitalism made place for a new engagement to “end 
poverty” (Roy, 2010). World Bank president at the time, James Wolfensohn, expressed 
in a key speech in 1998, titled “The Other Crisis”, his concerns about a looming crisis 
which the world had failed to notice: the crisis of poverty. He called for a worldwide 
prioritization of poverty alleviation (Ibid.: 16 & 74-83).333 At the following Millennium 
Summit in 2000, all 192 member states of the United Nations agreed upon eight general 
development goals to halve poverty in the world by 2015. The 7th	goal	aimed	specifi-
cally at the preservation of environmental sustainability and target 7D (also referred to 
as	target	11)	aspired	“to	have	achieved	a	significant	improvement	in	the	lives	of	at	least	
100 million slum dwellers” by 2020.334 This target was based upon a global initiative 
launched a year earlier by Cities Alliance, a global multi-donor coalition of cities and 
their development partners promoted by the World Bank and UN Habitat.335 The initia-
tive, known as the Cities Without Slums Action Plan, was endorsed by 150 member 
states (Morocco was one of them). Within this framework of the seventh Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG), new types of development had to be promoted which re-
lied on a more outspoken role of state institutions and state-modes of intervention (i.e. 
the principles of good governance). Herbert Werlin, who worked as a consultant for 
the World Bank, emphasized that the earlier slum upgrading policies promoted by the 
World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s were a myth because they exactly minimized the 
role of the state. In contrast, he indicated that the slum upgrading approach required “a 
very powerful as well as humanistic bureaucracy to carry it out successfully (Werlin, 
1999: 1526). A few years later the Global Report on Human Settlements of UN Habitat 
confirmed	–	in	the	line	of	the	post-Washington	consensus	–	that	the	slums	were	not	go-
ing to be eradicated and integrated based on neoliberal recipes of minimal government 
and structural adjustment alone:
333  It’s important to note that this discourse of poverty alleviation refers to absolute poverty and not what 
can be understood as relative poverty. Roy notes that absolute poverty is generally seen as the degradation 
of the human condition, and therefore demands an urgent response, while relative poverty entails a struc-
tural logic of inequality and its mitigation would require a more radical analysis of the power balances that 
underpin this structural logic and radical means to alter these balances (Roy, 2010: 76).  
334  See website of the UN: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (accessed 02/11/2010).
335  For more information see their website: http://www.citiesalliance.org 
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An important message of this report is that slums and urban poverty are not just 
a manifestation of a population explosion and demographic change, or even the 
vast impersonal forces of globalization. Slums must be seen as the result of a 
failure of housing policies, laws and delivery systems, as well as of national and 
urban policies. (…) The failure of policy is at all levels – global, national and lo-
cal. At the global level, policies that have weakened national governments with-
out any countervailing central control appear to be leading to an un-restrained 
globalization that is accommodating greater inequality and marginalization. At 
the national level, liberalization and the sectoral fragmentation of policy and ana-
lytical and institutional frameworks have failed to support the urban-rural and 
cross-sectoral dynamics that are critical both to sustainable economic growth and 
the distribution of its opportunities. At the local level, a startling lack of capacity 
to cope with, or manage, the situation has left many slum citizen’s in a no-man’s 
land of illegality, insecurity and environmental degradation (UN Habitat, 2003: 
5-6).  
Moreover, UN Habitat argued that policies to address slum conditions must go be-
yond the mere assessment and improvement of the physical conditions in which slum 
dwellers live. The underlying causes of their living condition (e.g. poverty) had to be 
tackled as well (Hernández & Ketlett, 2010: 11). The most important precondition for 
this objective was the active involvement of the slum dweller himself. Consequently, 
Un Habitat emphasized that taking into account the slum population and draw them 
into	the	elaboration	of	the	specific	operations	meant	a	significant	break	with	the	period	
before this turnover:
In earlier years, many internationally driven housing and slum reform projects 
that simply concentrated on engineering and construction solutions failed because 
they were not sustainable or appropriate in developing country environments. 
They failed to consult with and involve the people for whom they were intended. 
They did not work with their organizations and meet their cultural requirements. 
In	addition,	they	failed	to	take	sufficient	account	of	good	governance	issues	and	
political will, without which little can be achieved and nothing sustained once the 
foreign experts have gone home. Social cohesion is critical for societies to pros-
per economically and for development to be sustainable. Incorporating the poor 
within the design and implementation of development projects not only helps to 
produce more appropriate projects, but also ensures that they are better targeted 
to reach those with the greatest needs. Including the poor from the outset helps 
to	build	confidence	in,	and	loyalty	to,	improvement	projects,	as	it	was	shown	in	
work	on	participatory	development	 in	Sri	Lanka	and	confirmed	in	many	other	
projects (UN Habitat, 2003: 71-72).    
This increased attention to a participatory approach and the active inclusion of the 
population into the development schemes, ostensibly seemed to discard earlier central-
ized decision-making processes, and a break with the harsh and heavily criticized IMF/
World Bank-led macro-economic structural adjustment programs, in favour of “bot-
tom-up” politics, participatory development and local empowerment (Kapoor, 2008). 
The focus on participation had become development’s new orthodoxy (Ibid.: 60). These 
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new global development paradigms trickled out to the individual countries and affected 
local development schemes. However, this participation paradigm is not as neutral and 
bottom-up as it appears to be. To the contrary, I want to emphasize the technologies 
of power invested in these new participatory development schemes once they are de-
ployed in particular local settings (see below).   
Domestically, the suicide bombings of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca really accelerated 
Morocco’s commitments within the framework of the goals set by international orga-
nizations such as the World Bank and UN Habitat. The perpetrators all came from two 
large bidonvilles in Sidi Moumen, a district in the prefecture of Sidi Bernoussi in the 
eastern periphery of the city. The events strengthened the stigmatisation of the slums as 
a	breeding	ground	for	radical	Islamists	(Zaki,	2005).	Nevertheless,	the	specific	debates	
that had led to the reorientation of Morocco’s social development policies had started 
already a few years earlier during the period of the alternance-government. The new 
political context at the end of the 1990s – with the appointment of a socialist prime 
Minister in 1998 and the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999 – initi-
ated	a	reflection	on	the	social	dimension	of	slum	clearance	and	generated	fundamental	
changes in the public discourse (cf. chapter 3). Before, issues of urban planning and 
urban intervention were considered to be mere technical and physical affairs. There was 
little attention given to the social, cultural and economic aspects of urban poverty and 
the solutions for the problems of the urban poor were reduced to their need of appropri-
ate housing (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). Yet, the changed political climate generated 
a rupture with earlier conceptions of slum clearance and started a whole new dynamic 
in	which	 the	fight	 against	poverty	became	a	 central	 concern.	Several	 initiatives	 and	
workshops were organized in 1999 and 2001, directed by the then ministry of housing, 
to develop a critical approach on public interventions and discuss the social impact of 
all the dimensions and aspects of slum clearance and resettlement (Navez-Bouchanine, 
2004;	Zaki,	2005:	90-91).	Specifically,	it	 implicated	that	the	insights	and	findings	of	
three	specific	disciplines	–	urban	geography,	sociology	and	economy	–	were	taken	into	
account to construct an understanding of the wider social dimension of the slum space 
and resettlement operations. This resulted in the elaboration of a new concept launched 
by the Social Development Agency (ADS)336, i.e. that of the “maîtrise d’ouvrage so-
cial” (MOS)337. The idea of MOS attempts to conceptualize an integrated approach in 
which both the technical and the social dimension of slum resettlement projects are 
equally valued. Furthermore the concept underlines the participation of the local popu-
lation as a key for success (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). In an interview with Lamia 
Zaki, Hicham Berra of ADS stated that the idea of MOS:
consisted	first	of	all	in	better	understanding	the	constraints	and	the	ways	of	ac-
tion of the [slum] populations in order to develop policies that are better adapted 
to their needs. As such, ADS adhered to a contextualized conception of public 
intervention as opposed to a too centralized and standardized planning (Rabat 
–  21/09/2010, own translation).338  
336		ADS	is	a	public	institution	created	in	1999	and	could	be	considered	as	one	of	the	first	materializations	
of the new political context of the alternance. ADS has supported above all social development policies in 
rural	areas	but	intervened	also	in	specific	resettlement	operations	like	for	example	that	of	Douar	El	Kora	in	
Rabat.
337  Could be translated as ‘social management’.
338  I want to thank Lamia Zaki for letting me use some extracts from the interview.
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This evolution should not be underestimated and counted as a strong political sign. It 
proved the willingness of the makhzen to break with the ‘années de plomb’ of the Has-
san II-era. The debates on MOS between 1999 and 2001 implied a rupture with the ‘old’ 
methods (i.e. more repressive) of public intervention. One of the key achievements was 
the recognition of the central role of intermediation between the public authorities and 
the local population (Navez-Bouchanine, 2004). This emphasis on the participation of 
inhabitants in resettlement programs was explicitly recognized and acknowledged by 
government	officials	and	official	documents	(e.g.	MATUHE,	2002;	MHU,	2004,	Ben-
nana, 2004).339 This required of course the formation of new competences within the 
public administration (e.g. the creation of ADS) and the cooperation with new actors 
on the ground such as NGOs, local associations, foreign development agencies (e.g. 
USAID) and even private companies (e.g. Lydec). The idea of MOS, the emphasis on 
the social dimension, and the creation of new state-agencies such as ADS were closely 
related to and derived from the new international visions on social development and 
the	renewed	engagements	of	the	fight	against	poverty	promoted	by	the	World	Bank	and	
UN Habitat. Again, Hicham Berra emphasized that ADS, for example, was founded 
because:
the World Bank and the UN talked a lot about the importance of the participation 
of the communities that were to be developed, about their participation in order 
to identify their needs. We started from this point, emphasizing proximity: we 
wanted to go to the people and not wait until they came to Rabat. We wanted to 
demonstrate that we were able to make, to propose the idea of a partnership with 
the population. It came down to say that even if we represented the state, even if 
we were the state, the state negotiated, the state contracted with the civil society 
as peers, equal to each other (Rabat – 21/09/2010, cited in Bogaert & Zaki, 2011: 
under review, own translation).
The development of new notions and new discourses such as MOS within the context of 
the	specific	problematic	of	slum	resettlement	can	be,	of	course,	situated	within	the	more	
general process of what Myriam Catusse has called the “re-invention of social policy” 
(cf. chapter 3). As I mentioned earlier, the INDH program was one of the manifestations 
of this new orientation on social development. With regard to the housing question, the 
Moroccan government launched the Programme National d’Action pour la Résorption 
de l’Habitat Insalubre (PARHI) in 2001. This program, however, concentrated above 
all on the restructuring of the informal neighbourhoods (HC) and their integration in 
the urban fabric (e.g. through the provision of water and electricity, the installation of 
a sewer system, etc.). PARHI aimed at preventing the proliferation of informal housing 
by strengthening the government’s engagement to provide more social housing (Iraki 
& Rachik, 2005; Le Tellier, 2009a). However, the events of 2003 will push aside most 
of the objectives of the PARHI and the focus on HC. The following government efforts 
would	 privilege	 from	now	on	first	 of	 all	 the	bidonvilles. The bombings in the city-
centre of Casablanca were an immediate starting shot for the launch of the ambitious 
Villes Sans Bidonvilles program (VSBP) and it implied a multiplication of the actors 
involved in slum resettlement (see below). In this regard, the bombings of 2003 and the 
339  MATUHE (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de l’Environne-
ment) and MHU (Ministère Délégué Chargé de l’Habitat et de L’Urbanisme) were two of the precursors of 
the current MHUAE. The latter was created in 2007.
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subsequent launching of the VSBP could be considered as the symbolic shift towards 
an active management of the slum population in an attempt to include them into formal 
city-life. In contrast to the measures taken in the 1980s, not the urban territory but the 
slum	population	itself	now	definitely	became	the	ultimate	end	of	urban	government.	In	
that sense, the VSBP symbolically broke with methods of sovereign power (e.g. repres-
sion) and dedicated government attention to particular techniques of security, i.e. the 
future management of urban risks. 
The	VSBP	was	the	first	nationwide	slum	program	which	tried	to	deal	with	slums	within	
a much broader urban perspective (in contrast to the more directed and isolated opera-
tions of the past). The program seeks the integration of all bidonvilles in Morocco and 
prioritises the relocation of its inhabitants (Le Tellier, 2009a). 80% of the cases involve 
the procedure of recasement.	Because	of	 its	particular	 timing,	 the	VSB	had	specific	
security objectives. In this view, the VSBP can be compared, according to urban soci-
ologist Abderrahmane Rachik, with the urban restructurings after the 1981 riots. Urban 
security and social control were still the dominant strategic objectives.340 But despite 
this	apparent	continuity,	the	specific	methods	to	achieve	these	objectives	have	changed.	
The VSBP explicitly commits itself to the principles of Goal 7 of the MDGs and its 
target 11 (Al Omrane, 2010a). The program targets 327,000 households, i.e. 1,6 mil-
lion inhabitants spread over 1000 bidonvilles in 83 Moroccan cities. Furthermore, the 
program involves 64 city contracts which assemble the central authorities (the Ministry 
of Interior and the MHUAE), the local governments and the public operators in charge 
of	the	specific	missions.341 VSBP is funded for a great part by the state via the Solidar-
ity Fund for Housing (FSH) and the mobilization of public land (for resettlement). 
The resources of the FSH are generated by a 12 USD tax per tonne of cement sold in 
Morocco.342	Furthermore,	the	VSBP	is	supported	financially	(through	gifts	or	loans)	by	
various international agencies such as, amongst others, USAID, the European Invest-
ment Bank, the French Development Agency (AFD) and the World Bank. By the end of 
March	2010,	40	cities	were	declared	slum	free	and	some	154,000	households	benefited	
from the program. As such, almost 50% of the program was already realized and, ac-
cording	to	official	sources,	the	total	slum	population	decreased	from	8.2%	in	2004	to	
3.9% in 2010 (Ibid.). It is estimated that by 2012 large cities such as Casablanca, Rabat 
and Marrakech will also be declared slum free. Following these efforts and results of 
VSBP, Morocco received the 2010 UN Habitat Award.343 
340  Interview (Casablanca-21/05/08)
341  Interestingly, Casablanca does not have such a city contract. This was due to its particular status and 
political importance (see below).
342  The state has allocated 25 billion MAD for VSBP. 10 billion comes from FSH and the other 15 bil-
lion will be granted in the form of state-subsidies and state-guarantees to support the loans that have to be 
negotiated between private banks and the slum dwellers. See article in the newspaper L’Economiste – “Lo-
gement social. Le Souverain reprend le dossier en main”. Available at : http://www.leconomiste.com (ac-
cessed 31/01/2011).
343  See: http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2010/09/23/fea-
ture-02. Despite these optimistic numbers, other sources in the media (e.g. the newspaper l’économiste, 
edition 3307 of 28 June 2010) have questioned the numbers of the Moroccan authorities and argued that 
new bidonvilles continue to emerge in cities like Casablanca, Marrakech and Tanger: see article in the 
newspaper	L’Economiste	–	“Bidonvilles:	Ils	prolifèrent	toujours	et	pas	qu’à	Casablanca!”	Available	at:	
http://www.leconomiste.com (accessed 03/11/2010). Recent sources already talked about a new deadline 
(2015) for the VSBP. See also in the same newspaper – “Villes Sans Bidonvilles: la panne est générale” 
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VSBP relies on a close cooperation with the private sector. Since the 1990s the private 
sector increasingly participated in social housing projects. Yet, the systematic engage-
ment of private actors distinguishes VSBP from former initiatives. By encouraging 
public-private partnerships the public authorities wished to intensify the construction of 
low-cost housing units and the restructuring of existing neighbourhoods. Construction 
enterprises	such	as	Addoha	and	Chaabi	Lil	Iskane	benefit	from	important	tax	reliefs.	
Houses built at prices between 16,800 and 30,000 USD are tax-free (Ibid.). But also 
several	 foreign	 companies	 are	 brought	 in	 as	 partners	 in	 the	Moroccan	 fight	 against	
poverty. In Casablanca, Lydec, the subsidiary of SUEZ, was brought into the opera-
tions of slum resettlement and restructuration via the INMAE agreement signed with 
the authorities in 2005. Within the framework of INMAE, Lydec aims to provide infor-
mal neighbourhoods with water and electricity. Following the launch of VSBP, ANHI 
merged	with	other	local	public	housing	agencies	to	form	a	new	financially	autonomous	
state-agency: Al Omrane.	This	 agency,	 as	 an	official	 explained,	 is	 “the	 armed	 force	
of the Ministry [MHUAE]” in the VSBP.344 In 2007, Al Omrane also absorbed the 7 
ERACs (i.e. the regional entities for development and construction). The agency is re-
sponsible for the coordination of more than 80% of the slum-resettlements projects. In 
2009, Al Omrane invested more than 1 billion dollars and is therefore the biggest public 
investor in the country (Ibid.).345 
Despite the similar social objectives between the VSBP and the INDH, both programs 
also reveal an inter-institutional rivalry between the MHUAE and the Ministry of In-
terior. The VSBP is under the supervision of the MHUAE, while the INDH is under 
the direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior (Toutain, 2011). VSBP is developed 
independently from the INDH initiative and the minister of the MHUAE, Ahmed Taou-
fiq	Hejira,	is	reluctant	to	see	his	program	to	be	integrated	within	the	framework	of	the	
INDH.346 The situation in Casablanca is a result of this rivalry. Despite the fact that 
Al Omrane is supervising large resettlement operations in the district of Sidi Mou-
men (e.g. Douar Skouila and Douar Thomas), the city of Casablanca has not signed 
a city-contract within the framework of the VSB because this would have entailed a 
decrease	of	the	influence	of	the	Ministry	of	Interior	on	Casablanca.	Moreover,	the	op-
erations of Al Omrane in the rest of Casablanca are limited. Most of the operations in 
Casablanca – concerning approximately 34,500 households – are supervised by another 
public agency: Idmaj Sakan. This state agency was created in 2005 and is supervised 
by the wali of Casablanca. As a result, the actual political control over most of the slum 
resettlement operations in the city is in the hands of the Ministry of Interior. Illustrative 
is that the 2006 action plan of Idmaj Sakan situated its objectives explicitly within the 
framework of the INDH and not so much within that of the VSBP (Ministry of Interior, 
2006). Another example is the INMAE agreement signed with Lydec. This agreement 
was also integrated in the framework of INDH and not the VSBP. Both Lydec and 
Idmaj Sakan work closely together in several operations.
(accessed 31/01/2011).
344		Interview	with	Al	Omrane	official	(Rabat,	04-06-2010)
345  See also interview with Najib Laraichi Bedoui (director of Al Omrane) in weekly business magazine 
Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 47.
346  This would mean, amongst other things, that the MHUAE and Al Omrane would lose direct access to 
the funds of the FSH.
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All this implied that the decision-making process with regard to the slum operations in 
Casablanca were recentralized into the hands of the Ministry of Interior.347 The creation 
of	Idmaj	Sakan	and	the	specific	contract	with	Lydec	demonstrated	yet	again	the	politi-
cal importance of the city of Casablanca and proved that the Ministry of Interior did not 
intend to lose its grip on Casablanca.348 Finally, in a few other cases, slum resettlement 
operations are carried out by a third semi-public operator separately from the MHUAE 
and Al Omrane: Dyar Al Mansour.349 This operator is a subsidiary of the public invest-
ment bank Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG). Douar Al Kora, a major slum at the 
coastline in Rabat (towards the direction of Temara and Casablanca), was one of the 
projects that was taken over by Dyar Al Mansour. This project was originally super-
vised by ANHI, but due to an impasse in the resettlement operation, the king ordered 
the CDG to take over in 2002. As a result, CDG created the Société de Développement 
al Kora, which than later became Dyar Al Mansour. They are more specialized in op-
erations of relogement, while Al Omrane specializes primarily in operations of recase-
ment.350 Yet, despite this difference, it is still not entirely clear to me as to why exactly 
Dyar Al Mansour was created. When I asked their technical director, he told me: “we 
intervene	there	where	the	state	has	difficulties	to	advance”.351 
Citizen participation and poverty capital: the re-making of development
Due to the social complexity of resettlement projects and the often fragile and mistrust-
ful relationship between the inhabitants and the public authorities, new governmental 
methods have been deployed within the framework of the VSBP to intervene more 
at the level of the individual, trying to facilitate his cooperation and adherence to the 
347  I attempted several times to speak with the director of Idmaj Sakan and also with one of his employ-
ees. Without any luck however. And just as with the Ministry of Interior, Idmaj Sakan does not have its 
own website. My information on the public agency is does primarily based on interviews with people who 
worked	together	with	Idmaj	Sakan	in	specific	projects	or	people	who	know	the	VSBP	project	from	the	
inside.   
348  In several interviews with people who follow the evolutions on the ground from close by, I picked up 
rumours indicating that the inter-institutional confrontation between the MHUAE and the Ministry of Inte-
rior escalated (this was during the spring of 2010). Some suggested that there were talks about transferring 
the supervision over the urban agencies from the MHUAE towards the Ministry of Interior. Others spoke of 
a transfer of the department of Urbanism to the Ministry of Interior. Albeit these are just rumours, a trans-
fer of competences would generate new balances of power at the urban scale, most likely in favour of the 
central authorities and the makhzen. Although, the wali has considerable power over the urban territory, his 
power has always been counterbalanced by other actors that were controlled by the MHUAE (e.g. the urban 
agencies (except the AUC of course), Al Omrane, the Regional Inspections, the Department of Urbanism, 
etc.). Extra transfers of power to the Ministry of Interior would re-install the absolute control of the latter 
over the urban territory. The MHUAE would then only be able to fall back on Al Omrane.    
349  Dyar el Mansour has currently three projects under its supervision. One in Rabat (Douar Al Kora) and 
two in Temara (the Annasr project and the Mers El Kheir project). (See also www.dyaralmansour.com, ac-
cessed 28/01/2010).
350  Just like the rivalry between Idmaj Sakan and Al Omrane, I got the feeling that both employees of 
MHUAE and Al Omrane on the one hand, and Dyar Al Mansour on the other hand, do not really like to talk 
about each other. In quite a few cases they considered each other to be competitors (while they are striving 
for the same social goals within the objectives that are delineated by the VSBP). As such, a staff member 
of the cabinet of the Minister of MHUAE entrusted me for example that Dyar Al Mansour “only resettles 
people that live on land that interests them [i.e. the CDG]” (Interview Rabat – 09/06/2010). When I con-
fronted the Technical Director of Dyar Al Mansour with this statement, he told me: “If CDG is interested 
in the land and it is advantageous to the CDG then it is also advantageous for everybody” (Interview Rabat 
– Rabat 01/07/2010).     
351  Interview (Rabat – 01/07/2010).
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project.	Specific	mechanisms	of	“social engineering” were implemented to increase the 
‘participation’ of the inhabitants and their assent to resettlement (cf. Le Tellier, 2009a; 
2009b; Toutain, 2009a). First of all, there was the methodology of “accompagnement 
social” (social accompaniment) (AS). This method resulted out of the debates on the 
social impact of slum clearance in the early 2000s and the subsequent conceptualiza-
tion	of	MOS	(Navez-Bouchanine,	2002b).	AS	 is	a	 specific	methodology	 to	enhance	
the “active participation” of the inhabitants and facilitate the more technical aspects 
of resettlement (Le Tellier, 2009b). As such, AS is a set of methodological guidelines 
to accompany (literally) the slum dweller through the whole process of moving to a 
new place. It aimed to improve the modalities of public intervention in the slums and 
establish a better contact, a relation of trust, with the inhabitants. Between 2002 and 
2008, AS was implemented in 23 resettlement programs (20% of the VSBP), targeting 
approximately 50,000 households (55% of them live in Casablanca) (Le Tellier, 2009a; 
Toutain, 2009a). 
In the bidonvilles, AS is carried out by cellules d’accompagnement sociale (CAS). The 
CAS are teams of 3-5 persons that are set up in the bidonville (Toutain, 2009a). They 
guarantee the “proximity” of the public authorities and mediate between the population 
and	the	public	operator	(Toutain,	2008:	27).	Officially,	their	job	includes	five	different	
(chronological)	steps	(Le	Tellier,	2009b).	The	first	step	is	the	promotion	and	communi-
cation of the project. This means that the inhabitants have to be informed and sensibi-
lized through, for example, the organization of several workshops which assemble the 
local	authorities,	the	beneficiaries	and	the	neighbourhood	associations.	The	second	step	
is the administrative accompaniment. Households are assisted in all the different ad-
ministrative	stages	of	the	“transfer”,	specifically	in	the	setting	up	and	the	following	up	
of the allocation of a plot (recasement) or an apartment (relogement).352 In the process, 
the slum dwellers are assisted with all the necessary documents (e.g. property titles, 
etc.) The third step is the social intermediation with and between the different house-
holds.	Sometimes	conflicts	arise	or	 inhabitants	have	specific	requests.	Normally,	 the	
assumption is that every barrack counts for one household and that the inhabitants of 
that barrack have the right to a plot or state-subsidized apartment (in some cases two). 
In reality, it happens that several families live within one barrack (the barrack is often 
split in two or three separate living units). This means that these households will have to 
divide the allocated plot or apartment between themselves. This can lead to all kinds of 
conflicts	and	tensions.	Also,	in	the	bidonvilles there are a lot of tenants and technically 
they do not qualify for an allocation.353	The	fourth	step	is	giving	assistance	in	finding	
the	appropriate	financial	solutions	for	every	household	(i.e.	facilitating	their	access	to	
credit	and	credit-institutions)	so	they	can	finance	their	part	of	the	transfer.	Finally,	AS	
also involves further social and economic accompaniment (i.e. the human development 
352  The allocation of a plot or apartment is often determined by drawing lots. While this may sound pecu-
liar, this innovative organization is established to make the whole process of slum resettlement more trans-
parent and permits a break with clientilistic practices of the past (Le Tellier, 2009b).
353  There is also a lot of speculation with barracks. Some people see it as an investment to own several 
barracks (which they can rent). As such, they technically qualify for an equal amount of state-subsidized 
plots or apartments. This is a dubious situation. Technically speaking, the owners have built the barracks il-
legally	and	benefit	from	VSBP,	while	tenants	pay	their	monthly	rent	and	eventually	threaten	to	end	up	with	
nothing (interview with Hicham Berra (ADS), Temara – 31/05/2010). 
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dimension) once the people are transferred to their new site.354
It is important not to confuse AS with MOS. The latter is an integral conceptualization 
of the social dimension of resettlement operations. It takes into account the social, eco-
nomic,	urban,	fiscal	and	juridical	aspects	of	both	the	operation	and	the	precarious	living	
conditions of the populations. Despite the fact that MOS has been conceptualized and 
extensively documented, it has never been implemented on the ground (Toutain, 2011). 
AS is far less ambitious. According to the methodological guide published by the MHU 
in 2004, AS refers to a social action that is “subordinated” to the technical aspect of the 
resettlement operation (MHU, 2004: 5). The transfer of the population is the priority 
and AS is, as I was told by the Al Omrane director of quality, “meant to accelerate the 
rhythm of social housing […], to put in place a measure to proceed more rapidly […], to 
put in place an arrangement to facilitate people to move”.355 This means that the social 
operator within the AS program has to persuade	the	slum	dweller	of	the	benefits	of	the	
project. In other words, make him willing to move to the assigned location (Navez-
Bouchanine/ADS, 2005). As the geographer Julien Le Tellier stated: 
In reality, on the ground, it mostly comes down to making the slum dwellers 
[bidonvillois] accept the fact that they have to leave their bidonville and that they 
have	to	destroy	their	barrack,	but	also	that	they	have	to	participate	in	the	financ-
ing of the transfer and of their new home. In fine, the cooperation in the projects 
of recasement and relogement materializes above all through the financial par-
ticipation	of	the	beneficiaries	in	the	costs	of	the	operation	(Le	Tellier,	2009b:	57,	
own translation, emphasis added).
This contrasts with the objectives of MOS which aims at an equal valuation of both 
social and technical aspects of slum clearance. The idea of ‘participation’ is here re-
duced to its mere economic dimension. AS has to facilitate the technical operation and 
recover the costs that are imposed upon the slum dwellers. Even the World Bank, one 
of the sources of inspiration for this new participative methodology, has denounced 
some of the lacuna (e.g. lack of communication beforehand, lack of social and eco-
nomic accompaniment afterwards, etc.) in the current participatory approach embed-
ded within the VSBP (World Bank, 2006a). As such, although the “mediator” (e.g. the 
CAS) may portray himself as a neutral and fair arbiter, it is important to emphasize that 
the whole process of “participatory development” is managed top-down and it is not the 
slum dweller himself who decides upon the different proceedings every step of the way 
(Kapoor, 2008). The so-called participatory element is subordinated to the mediator’s 
deciding on the need for, and purpose of, meetings (Ibid.). The initiators of AS decide 
upon whom to include and exclude, they make up the agenda and most importantly 
they determine the eventual objective(s) of participatory development, which is in most 
cases resettlement.  
354		However,	this	final	aspect	of	AS	really	depends	on	the	social	operator.	NGOs	will	be	more	inclined	
to take this stage seriously. Private consultants, however, are mostly paid based on the amount of transfers 
they accomplish. For them, there is little reason to stay afterwards (see below).
355  Interview (Rabat – 08/06/2010)
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There are three sorts of social operators implicated in AS projects: the Social Devel-
opment Agency (ADS), NGOs and private consultants. The private consultants take 
on 45% of all households in AS-programs but spent only 28% of the total amount 
dedicated to AS. In contrast ADS spends 60% of total AS-budget while they are only 
responsible for 33% of the households (Le Tellier, 2009a). It was ADS that launched 
the	first	AS	operations	hoping	to	bring	forth	and	set	the	standards	for	a	comprehensive	
methodology	before	other	actors	would	 intervene	in	 this	field.	However,	Al	Omrane	
quickly made an appeal to private operators by putting out public contracts based on 
quantifiable	targets.	This	has	not	only	caused	the	emergence	of	new	private	consultan-
cies trying to compete for these contracts, but also brought about the “commercializa-
tion” of the AS-procedure itself (Bogaert & Zaki, 2011). Under these conditions, it is 
not a surprise that, depending on the type of social operator, the interpretation of the 
objective	of	AS	and	the	specific	approaches	on	the	ground	differed.	Le	Tellier	makes	
a distinction between minimalistic and maximalistic visions on the method of AS (Le 
Tellier, 2009b). The minimalistic vision, mostly supported by the public operators (e.g. 
Al Omrane, Dyar Al Mansour, etc.) and the private consultants, consider AS to be an 
act of informing people, sensibilization, and technical support. As mentioned above, 
the primary goal in this view is to persuade the inhabitants and give them the necessary 
administrative assistance.356 As such, their vision on participation is limited to a passive 
conception of the word. Slum dwellers are reduced to a simple audience, or at best, 
“clients”. 
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that for the public operators the problematique 
of the slums in Morocco still remains a mere technical rather than a political issue. Re-
settlement is the obvious solution. Moreover, it can be measured. As Olivier Toutain, a 
French consultant for the VSBP, stressed: “They [Al Omrane] need to make numbers”.357 
When answering some of the critiques about the delays in the VSBP, the director of 
Al Omrane, Najib Laraichi Bedoui, emphasized in an interview with weekly business 
magazine Challenge that “Morocco advanced from the resettlement of 5,000 families 
a year to 30,000, since the start of the program in 2004 until today”.358 Numbers, more 
specifically	 those	 that	 represent	 the	amount	of	 transferred	people,	are	very	often	 the	
preferred way to demonstrate or evaluate the success or failure of the program. This is 
also one of the reasons why Al Omrane tends to favour contracts with private consul-
tants in AS-programs. They do it “faster and cheaper” and they can be held responsible 
for results (Le Tellier, 2009a: 205). After all, the remuneration of these private actors 
depends on results, or in other words, on the amount of people they are able to transfer. 
Dyar Al Mansour has the same technocratic vision when it comes down to determin-
ing their targets and choosing their (business) partners (cf. Barthel & Zaki, 2011). This 
minimalistic conception of AS was also made clear to me by a staff member of Team 
Maroc, a private operator working for Al Omrane and Idmaj Sakan in cities like Casa-
blanca, Tangiers and Larache. He compared his role with that of ADS:
356  Fouad Benchakroune, architect, former staff member of the MHUAU and one of the initiators behind 
the VSPB went even so far to state that the people living in the bidonville have to realize and must be con-
vinced of the fact that they get“only this one chance to move” (Interview Rabat – 22/05/2008).
357  Interview (Rabat-15/04/09)
358  See interview in weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 47.
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We are a private operator, we answer to calls for public contracts [appels d’offres]. 
We have to keep ourselves to the public plan [cahier de charge]. (…) We don’t 
do MOS. (…) And actually we don’t do AS either. We rather do administrative 
accompaniment. (…) I talk in terms of results. We arrive at a number of 300 
destroyed barracks per month, while public actors such as ADS arrive at an aver-
age	of	10	barracks	per	month.	We	achieve	five	times	the	number	of	ADS.	In	four	
years time we have eradicated more than 4,000 barracks, while ADS only arrived 
at approximately 1,000 over the same period. (…) We are happy with Al Omrane 
and Al Omrane is happy with us. (…) We are bound to a cahier de charge. We are 
obliged to deliver results.359
He continued arguing that the public actors are, in contrast, not bound to results and 
that	this	was	actually	a	form	of	discrimination	vis-à-vis	the	private	sector.	Public	ac-
tors	received	assignments	without	any	requirement	to	account	for	any	specific	results.	
“According to me”, he stated, “that is money thrown out of the window”. Accordingly, 
following this logic of the private sector, the market and not the public interest is the 
main motive for their involvement. When I asked him whether the private sector had a 
role to play in social development, he answered: “That’s the market, it is a question of 
supply	and	demand,	if	there	is	a	demand	we	try	to	fulfil	it”.	A	colleague	of	him,	work-
ing as a CAS-member for Team Maroc, was a bit more cynical: “what other role do 
we have than orientate people towards credit institutions?”360 Several cases, however, 
have already demonstrated the contra-productive effect of this partnership with private 
operators. In order to speed up the operation, private consultants sometimes applied 
the	 principle	 “first	 arrived,	 first	 served”	 in	 particular	 cases.	As	 a	 consequence,	 they	
sometimes	exhausted	the	available	land	reserve	before	all	beneficiaries	were	resettled	
(Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).
Social operators such as the ADS and NGOs like ENDA Maghreb usually have a more 
maximalistic vision on AS. Their vision appears to approach more to the conceptualiza-
tion and objectives of MOS. One of the crucial differences between the AS and MOS, 
according to these actors, is that MOS has to be applied prior to a resettlement opera-
tion, while they are contracted during the operations.361 Although, all the staff members 
of ADS and ENDA Maghreb I talked to were critical about the way things are evolving, 
they are often constrained by the space of manoeuvre they receive from public opera-
tors such as Al Omrane. They can for example never question the operation itself. This 
is explicitly underlined in the methodological guideline of AS published by the public 
authorities (MHU, 2004: 11). Furthermore, this is also probably why Al Omrane pre-
fers to work with private consultants and why ADS and NGOs are pulling out of the 
VSBP lately (cf. Toutain, 2011). One staff member of ENDA Maghreb explained me 
his opinion on the situation:
We care about the people. Al Omrane only cares about the administrative support 
[we deliver]. That is why they work more with the private sector now. ENDA 
359  Interview (Rabat – 05/07/2010).
360  Interview (Casablanca – 07/07/2010).
361  Interview with the coordinator of communications and human development programs of ENDA 
Magrheb (Rabat – 02/07/2010).
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pays	attention	to	women’s	rights.	We	work	to	find	sustainable	solutions.	We	re-
spect the human rights and also help people in generating new revenues, etc. 
(…) The private sector only does what Al Omrane asks from them. (…) They 
have only a servicing role [un rôle uniquement de prestataire de service]. They 
carry out their research, they make an inventory [recensement], they send in their 
poll-takers [enquêteurs] and focus primarily on quantitative data. (…) When they 
finish	their	job,	they	are	gone.362   
In general, more political questions related to issues of social welfare and human devel-
opment are ignored, while the current engagements of the Moroccan authorities related 
to	the	fight	against	poverty	are	reduced	to	a	housing	question	for	which	mere	technical	
solutions	are	supposed	to	suffice	(Barthel	&	Zaki,	2011).	At	the	MHUAE	they	are	quite	
open about this. A staff member of the cabinet of the Minister argued that: 
[the MHUAE] is a technical ministry, we deliver houses, (…) All other social as-
pects should be provided by other ministries. We don’t do education, health care, 
etc. (…) we limit ourselves to houses [Nous on fait que le logement].363 
Ironically, this actually negates the whole philosophy behind the debates on the social 
dimension of slum resettlement that started during the alternance period. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, these debates were actually directed by the then ministry of housing. 
Today, the actual elaboration and results of the VSB seem miles away from the original 
objectives of social and urban integration that were pushed forward so promisingly at 
the beginning of the century. The resettlement operations elaborated in the city of Aga-
dir are emblematic for the strictly quantitative approach (cf. Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).364 
First of all, one of the destinations for the relocation of slum dwellers, Taddert, an 
empty site located at approximately 20km from Agadir, experienced a strong growth 
and a concentration of social apartments due to the fact that the original convention 
signed in order to resettle 3,200 households had to be readjusted to 5,800. Additionally, 
the public operator not only ignored the recommendations to provide social mixture 
in the new site, the necessary public services and infrastructures (schools, transport, 
hospitals, etc.) are still not put in place due to the fact that the installment of some of 
these services depend on competences that are not included in the VSBP (the MHUAE 
only delivers houses) but depend on decisions taken in other ministries (e.g. Ministry 
of Education).365 Moreover, the construction works could initially not keep up the pace 
and	some	beneficiaries	had	to	wait	more	than	three	years	before	they	could	move	into	
their new apartments. Meanwhile, however, the public authorities had compelled the 
beneficiaries	to	destroy	their	former	barracks,	so	they	were	obliged	to	find	temporary	
accommodation. For those who couldn’t rely on family or couldn’t afford a temporary 
accommodation, a return to precarious and informal housing was, without a doubt, 
362  Ibid.
363  Interview (Rabat – 09/06/2010).
364  This paragraph is based on information delivered by Lamia Zaki (cf. Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).
365  Social mixture (péréquation) is an often used strategy in resettlement operations to diversify the 
population in the relocation sites (e.g. by allowing others, often more well-off urban residents to install 
themselves	in	the	same	place).	Additionally,	social	mixture	is	often	also	a	strategy	to	finance	resettlement	
projects.	It	enables	operators	to	increase	their	profits	or	reduce	their	costs	as	they	can	sell	a	certain	portion	
of the built apartments (usually of a higher standard) at a higher price. 
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the	only	solution	left.	Finally,	the	specific	CAS-team	working	on	the	Taddert	resettle-
ment operation only worked there for 9 months. Despite these experiences, an expert’s 
report published by Al Omrane underlined that a poor social mixture in resettlement 
projects, the absence of additional urban facilities and services, and the repetitive and 
monotonous spatial planning of urban districts in medium-sized towns (up to a 100,000 
inhabitants, e.g. Taddert) are elements that can cause problems in terms of the desired 
social and urban integration of the population (Al Omrane, 2010b).
A second important aspect of resettlement operations, besides the methodology of AS, 
was	the	development	of	new	mechanisms	to	improve	the	slum	dwellers’	access	to	fi-
nances	and	pump	up	his	solvability	artificially	in	order	to	facilitate	the	purchase	of	a	
new apartment. Ownership is central in the VSBP. The intention is not only to transfer 
people to a new living environment, but also to turn these illegal occupants into legal 
home-owners. However, one of the main problems is that most of the people who are 
being	resettled	dispose	of	very	little	means	to	finance	this	move.	Additionally,	for	obvi-
ous reasons, there is little trust and familiarity between the poor and commercial credit 
providers. As a consequence, there was an obvious aversion to lending to the urban 
poor. Therefore, in the wake of the VSBP, new mechanisms were created to solve that 
problem. One of those mechanisms was the FOGARIM convention.366 This convention 
permits slum dwellers to obtain a bank loan with a government guarantee up to a maxi-
mum amount of 200,000 MAD.367 With the intention to promote low-cost and social 
housing,	FOGARIM	was	created	 specifically	 for	 those	populations	 “with	modest	or	
irregular revenues”. This guarantee fund permits the spread of risk between the com-
mercial credit-institutions and the state in order to break down the metaphorical walls 
between both commercial banks and slum dwellers. FOGARIM was established in 
2004 and guarantees a recovery of 70% of commercially invested capital (World Bank, 
2006a:	16).	In	the	following	five	years	more	than	50,000	loans,	worth	approximately	
7.3 billion MAD (almost 664 million EUR), were granted within the framework of 
FOGARIM.	More	than	250,000	persons	in	147	cities	and	villages	have	benefited	from	
this program. 38% of those loans went to people living in Casablanca. FOGARIM is 
not limited to the population of the bidonvilles alone. In fact, the number of bidonville 
households	that	profited	from	FOGARIM	remains	relatively	limited	(10%)	compared	
to other populations with limited revenues. Nevertheless, their number is on the rise 
(Toutain, 2009b).368 One of the problems, however, is that instruments like FOGARIM 
are still little known among the poorest populations. AS is one of the ways in which the 
bidonvillois are informed. According to Olivier Toutain, FOGARIM is a very innova-
tive instrument in public housing policies. There is for example no equivalent in the 
wider MENA-region – albeit there are other kinds of initiatives in Tunisia and Jordan 
which resemble it (Ibid.). Morocco is for example one of the few countries in the world 
– if not the only one – where you can obtain such a loan without any proof of a stable 
income or guarantee of solvability. In fact, the borrower only has to deliver a declara-
366  FOGARIM stands for Fonds de Garantie des prêts au Logement en faveur des Populations á revenus 
modestes et/ou non réguliers. 
367  The interest rate is 6%.
368  The average monthly payment of a loan with a FOGARIM guarantee is between 950 and 1100 MAD. 
The	minimum	wage	in	Morocco	was	fixed	in	2008	at	9,66	MAD	per	hour	or	approximately	2000	MAD	per	
month (Toutain, 2009b). 
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tion	with	his	word	of	honour	where	he	confirms	his	average	revenue	and	the	nature	of	
his economic activities (Ibid.).369 
Besides	FOGARIM,	another	innovative	financial	mechanism	was	put	in	place.	Since	
2004,	the	Moroccan	legislation	permitted	the	involvement	of	Moroccan	microfinance	
institutions in resettlement and restructuring operations (Le Tellier, 2009b). Since the 
1990s,	microfinance	is	a	booming	business	in	Morocco,	but	it	was	only	since	the	launch	
of	the	VSBP	that	 these	financial	products	could	also	be	used	for	rehabilitation.	Four	
microfinance	institutions	(MFIs)	in	Morocco	control	90%	of	the	microcredit	market:	
Al Amana, Zakoura, FONDEP370 and the Banque Populaire Foundation for microcredit 
(FBPMC) (Ibid.).371 Micro-credits for housing are still a minority of the portfolio of the 
Moroccan MFIs: in October 2010, Al Amana counted 49,000 micro-credits for housing 
on a total of 360,000 loans.372 FONDEP’s share is 7%.373 Moreover, the micro-credits 
for housing are limited to a maximum amount of 50,000 MAD. Nevertheless, the in-
habitants of the bidonvilles are a potentially valuable population for the MFIs because 
only 25% of them has a bank account (Ibid.). Yet, compared to FOGARIM, there are 
obvious limits to micro-credits. First of all, the amount of money you can borrow is 
never	enough	to	finance	a	new	apartment	or	a	plot	(with	the	subsequent	construction).	
The prise of state-subsidized social apartments (habitat social) vary between 140,000 
and 200,000 MAD (recently raised up to 290,000) within the framework of VSBP.374 
A state-subsidized plot still costs around 20,000 MAD, and the construction of a unit 
at least 40,000 MAD (i.e. the absolute basic construction) (Ibid.). Consequently, the 
majority of micro-credits are used for renovations. Secondly, the interest rate is much 
higher (around 12%). As a result, only those people who have a certain creditworthi-
ness	qualify	for	microfinance.	The	most	solvent	part	of	the	urban	poor	have	access	to	
these kinds of loans. This is also the case for FOGARIM, where loans are granted to 
those	who	are	deemed	to	be	able	to	pay	back.	As	such,	the	success	of	these	financial	
mechanisms	is	still	limited	and	often	too	expensive	for	the	poorest	among	the	benefi-
ciaries (Le Tellier, 2009a: 206-210).
The development of mechanisms such as FOGARIM and micro-credits for housing 
are crucial elements in what Ananya Roy calls the alliance that lies at the very heart of 
“poverty capital”. This alliance brings together those who “control access to the poor-
est”	(e.g.	microfinance	providers,	the	CAS	teams,	even	the	state,	etc.)	and	those	who	
“control	access	to	capital”	(e.g.	the	commercial	banks)	(Roy,	2010:	31).	The	financial	
architectures behind poverty capital have to explore and exploit “the new frontier of 
capital accumulation”, i.e. the inclusion of the urban poor in the urban economy; those 
369  Hicham Berra of ADS told me that this had to be signed by a representative of the state (the caid) who 
often exaggerated the exact revenue in order to make sure the person in question got his loan (Interview, 
Temara – 31/05/2010). 
370  Fondation pour le Développement Local et le Partenariat Microcrédit
371  In July 2009 Zakoura and FBPMC signed a merger agreement (IDMAJ): see websites of Zakoura and 
FBPMC:  http://www.zakourafondation.org/article.php3?id_article=331 and  http://www.fbpmc.ma/#fr_ac-
tualite1 (accessed 07/11/2010).
372  http://www.alamana.org.ma/images/Tab-bord-oct2010.pdf (accessed 07/11/2010) 
373  http://www.fondep.com (accessed 07/11/2010)
374  The latest Finance act has set the maximum price for a social apartment at 290,000 MAD (100sq me-
ters).
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people	who	hadn’t	been	served	by	financial	systems	and	markets	before	(Ibid.:	53;	see	
also Elyachar, 2002). The complex but crucial question at hand, according to Roy, is 
whether	poverty	capital	will	ensure	the	financial	inclusion	of	the	poor	on	fair	and	just	
terms,	or	whether	these	financial	innovations	are	just	new	ways	to	exploit	them?	More	
generally,	is	the	support	of	the	state	in	the	VSBP	–	via	subsidies,	tax-cuts	and	financial	
guarantees – a way to give the urban excluded a new hope for the future or is state sup-
port	a	rather	convenient	(class)	instrument	to	privatize	benefits	and	socialize	risks	and	
losses? 
Morocco’s construction sector, for example, experienced a slowdown in recent years 
after several years of rapid growth, especially in the sector of high-end urban develop-
ment.	As	a	result	both	state	officials	and	private	developers	are	looking	to	offset	the	
drop in demand for high-end development projects by stepping up their support for 
social housing projects.375 The constant high demand for affordable housing offers a re-
liable alternative to the business in high-end tourist and residential projects which have 
suffered	due	to	the	global	financial	and	economic	crisis.	To	address	the	demand,	the	
Moroccan government has strengthened its commitment to provide low-cost housing, 
hoping to promote the building of 150,000 new units a year by 2012. In February 2009, 
the government signed two new agreements, allocating a total of 52 billion MAD (4,7 
billion EUR) for social housing projects and liberating 3,853 ha of public land for the 
building of 200,000 units in 32 different cities across the country.376 In January 2011, the 
king himself has urged to increase the efforts and target 300,000 units a year between 
2011 and 2015 as it becomes more and more clear that the original targets of the VSBP 
are not going to be reached.377 According to the Oxford Business Group (OBG), a global 
publishing and consultancy company focusing on emerging markets in the Arab region 
and	Asia,	 finance	 programs	 such	 as	FOGARIM	and	other	 private	 initiatives	 are	 es-
sential to enable Moroccans to purchase homes and to “take advantage of the potential 
in the lower end of the market”.378	Still,	the	OBG	emphasizes	that	some	officials	have	
argued that even more should be done to encourage private investors if development is 
to really take off in the “lower end of the market”:
Deputy	and	parliamentary	committee	finance	member	Abdelhamid	Mernissi	told	
local media that the state should reduce land prices and increase bonuses from 
Dh30,000 (€2,665) to Dh40,000 (€3,553) for those who target social housing. 
Others have called on the government to ease its quantitative measurements for 
affordable	units.	Currently,	it	is	defined	as	properties	of	100	sq	metres	at	a	price	
of Dh200,000 (€18,000), while low total property value housing has a price of 
under Dh140,000 (€12,600) and an area of less than 60 sq metres. With space 
scarce in major cities, the area could be reduced to 40 sq metres, while the price 
could	be	raised	to	Dh300,000	(€27,000)	to	increase	developers’	profits.379    
The OBG’s advice is a typical example of a market-oriented development perspective 
375  Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: collaborative construction (25/08/09).
376  Ibid.
377  See article in the newspaper L’Economiste – “Logement social. Le Souverain reprend le dossier en 
main”. Available at : http://www.leconomiste.com (accessed 31/01/2011).
378  Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: collaborative construction (25/08/09).
379  Ibid.
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in which not so much the social needs of the slum dwellers are the main drive for the ur-
gency and success of programs like VSBP, but market opportunities. OBG continues:
Still, even without these added incentives, investing in the affordable segment 
seems like a solid option, despite lacking the same potential for high returns as 
more lucrative, high-end projects. Until the economy improves, and big risks 
once again offer the prospect of great rewards, social housing, and Morocco’s 
underprivileged	citizens,	stand	to	benefit	(emphasis	added).380
The 2010 Finance Act aimed to resurrect the sector of social housing. In 2008, some 
important tax exemptions that supported the sector were revoked. According to the 
Magharebia	press	agency	this	was	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	significant	drop	in	
constructions and new projects.381 Between 2008 and 2009 the construction of social 
housing plunged from 129,000 to 35,000 units. The new Finance Act of 2010 and the 
subsequent Act of 2011 created new tax exemptions in order to stimulate the sector. 
Also, the new maximum price for a social apartment was set at 290,000 MAD. 40,000 
MAD of that amount will be state-sponsored.382 The former 200,000 MAD benchmark 
dated	from	1995.	According	to	observers	this	price	raise	was	justified	because	the	price	
of land had increased by 50-100% over the last 15 years.383 What these new government 
decisions	 showed	first	 of	 all,	was	 that	 poverty	 capital	 is	 not	 only	 accumulated	with	
the support of the state by stimulating the demand-side (e.g. FOGARIM, micro-credit, 
etc.),	but	also	by	stimulating	the	supply-side	(tax	benefits,	price	regulation,	etc.).	
Development schemes such as VSBP and the reforms they bring forth, can thus be con-
sidered	as	new	frontiers	where	development	capital	and	financial	capital	merge	together	
and collaborate to delineate and open up new spaces of investment in order to solve fu-
ture “capital surplus absorption problems” (Harvey, 2010a, see also Roy, 2010). During 
an interview in August 2007, a staff member of Al Omrane in Rabat explained me and 
my supervisor that the semi-public company soon wanted to enter the stock-exchange 
market (which still hasn’t happened). When I interrupted him to ask whether this am-
bition wouldn’t jeopardize the social dimension of their work – after all, the stock-
market	is	driven	exclusively	by	the	profit	motive	–	he	answered,	a	bit	excited:	“no,	on	
the contrary (…) this social dimension is our competitive advantage (…) The social 
dimension [le social]	is	very	profitable.”384 Moreover, if we reconsider the AS-program 
for a moment, we can ask ourselves the question whether it is a methodology to assist 
the	urban	poor	in	finding	a	better	home	or	rather	a	(biopolitical)	governmental	method	
to enhance the market opportunities of poverty capital and accelerate the inclusion of 
the urban poor into the circuits of capital accumulation? Didn’t Foucault pointed out 
to us that the implementation of methods of biopower are crucial for the expansion of 
capitalism (Foucault, 1990)? This is no different in Morocco. I remember an interview 
with a staff member of Lydec in which she explained me the objectives of INMAE, 
380  Ibid.
381  http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2010/01/05/feature-01   
(Magharebia news agency, accessed 29/01/2011).
382  http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/01/14/feature-02 
(Magharebia news agency, accessed 15/01/2011).
383  Ibid.
384  Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – 27/08/2007).
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the social development program based on a PPP with the city of Casablanca and sup-
ported by INDH, and in which Lydec has to provide water and electricity to informal 
neighbourhoods and bidonvilles. It was her task, she explained, to make sure that these 
people were turned into customers. The social dimension of it all, she argued, was that 
Lydec,	at	the	moment,	didn’t	make	any	profit	with	INMAE	as	their	products	were	deliv-
ered under the market-price. Instead, INMAE incorporated a long term vision of Lydec, 
expecting these people to become valuable costumers in the long run.385          
The new politics of truth: neoliberal interpretations of participation and integration
The creation of poverty capital is established by methods of political intervention which 
aim to bring all human action into the domain of the market (Roy, 2010: 32).386 As such, 
poverty	capital	fits	in	the	wider	and	more	general	trend	of	the	marketization and priva-
tization of the social (Ismail, 2006: 67 & 87). This process implies the relocation of the 
centre of gravity of welfare and social development to the private sphere and private 
actors. The role of the state is still important but has shifted from providing welfare (the 
developmental state) to creating ‘a good business environment’ (the neoliberal state). 
The underlying idea (ideology) is that the poor are part of the solution and not neces-
sarily	the	problem.	According	to	influential	thinkers	such	as	Hernan	De	Soto	or	C.K.	
Prahalad, the poor dispose of an enormous amount of “dead capital” (De Soto, 2001) 
and there is a “fortune [to be made] at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 2004). 
Consequently, it is not so much the task of development schemes to provide these poor 
with charity but to give them the tools and help them to develop the entrepreneurial 
skills they actually already possess. In this perspective, the poor have assets and they 
are assets (Roy, 2010: 64). They are the so-called “last market” – here I refer to the 
documentary on the theories of Prahalad made for the program Tegenlicht on the Dutch 
national television. In this documentary Prahalad states that he had to draw the attention 
of the business world by saying and convincing them that the poor people of the world 
are an opportunity, a commercially viable operation: “I had to use the word fortune [re-
ferring to the title of his book] to say there is a real commercial opportunity here”. The 
poor in the eyes of Prahalad are an emerging consumer base that are both underserved 
and large. In the same documentary, the CEO of Philips in India stated that exploiting 
the markets at the bottom of the pyramid is: 
not	a	game	of	charity	at	all.	It’s	a	game	of	finding	business-models	where	trans-
national companies can repackage their technologies, can repackage their value 
propositions	and	find	a	profitable	way	of	serving	the	90%	of	the	global	popula-
tion they are not currently serving, because that is where the future is, that is the 
economy which is growing.387
Huge	profits	are	thus	to	be	made	with	the	poor.	The	same	development	logic	can	also	be	
found in Morocco today. Social development schemes such as VSBP are thus not only 
an initiative to improve poor people’s lives, but also political instruments to integrate 
385  Interview (Casablanca – 13/05/2008).
386  Here, Ananya Roy draws on David Harvey. It also resonates with what William Robinson has called 
the “intensive expansion of capitalism” (Robinson, 2004; see also chapter 2).
387  For more information on the documentary see: http://tegenlicht.vpro.nl/afleveringen/2006-2007/de-
laatste-markt.html (VPRO, De Laatste Markt, Tegenlicht). 
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that very attempt into a neoliberal project. This is the very essence of poverty capital. 
De Soto states that the poor are unable to access their wealth (i.e. what they own infor-
mally) because they do not possess formal deeds or property titles (Davis, 2006a: 72). 
Their capital is dead capital because “it exists in a universe where there is too much 
room for misunderstanding, confusion, reversal of agreements, and faulty recollection” 
(De Soto, 2001: 14). This capital is useless according to De Soto because it cannot be 
used as collateral to secure a bank loan, nor guarantee the payment of water, electricity 
and any other infrastructural services. Therefore, he pleads to give the poor legal land-
titles and property rights so they can put their assets to work in the capitalist market. De 
Soto’s idea of land-titling resonates with the idea of the VSBP to turn the slum dwellers 
into legal home-owners (thus with access to their wealth). But is there not a risk that 
the VSBP, with its emphasis on the promotion of ownership and resettlement, is actu-
ally setting in place the conditions for a future wave of accumulation by dispossession? 
First of all, the relocation of the urban poor out of the centres of cities like Casablanca, 
is	already	a	way	to	reclaim	that	centre	for	other	(more	profitable)	kinds	of	urban	de-
velopment (e.g. the project of the Royal Avenue). Secondly, the conversion of illegal 
slum	dwellers	into	legal	home-owners,	which	seems	laudable	at	first	sight,	could	have	
a negative impact in the long term, especially if social development programs don’t 
take into account the wider social dimension of their living situation – i.e. beyond the 
narrow focus on the creation of new frontiers of capital accumulation. In the past, it 
has been demonstrated that low-income populations are particularly vulnerable in pro-
cesses of capitalist urbanization and urban development. David Harvey gives a rather 
similar example of what happened in Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher:
In	Thatcher’s	case,	the	large	stock	of	social	housing	was	one	of	the	first	assets	to	
be	privatized.	At	first	blush	this	appeared	as	a	gift	to	the	lower	classes,	who	could	
now convert from rental to ownership at a relatively low cost, gain control over a 
valuable asset, and augment their wealth. But once the transfer was accomplished 
housing speculation took over, particularly in prime central locations, eventually 
bribing, cajoling, or forcing low-income populations out to the periphery in cities 
like London, and turning erstwhile working-class housing estates into centres of 
intense	gentrification	(Harvey,	2003:	158).			
Timothy Mitchell has critiqued De Soto’s ideas in a similar way, arguing that his con-
ception of how to bridge the so-called boundary between the capitalist economy (the 
formal economy) and the non-market world (the informal) is neglecting the underlying 
dynamics of powerful market forces and the effects of speculation. Mitchell argues that 
in the case of Egypt, the introduction of a modern system of private property (land-
titling) has been tried before in the 1850s and actually turned out to be a disaster for 
the small farmers who faced rapidly rising prices. Property titles were than the legal 
basis for creditors to seize the assets of those unable to keep up debt payments; this was 
the new power of foreclosure. According to Mitchell, the foreclosure decisions were 
a “machine for transferring the land from small farmers to the wealthy”. De Soto, he 
argues, ignores largely the history of dispossession that accompanied the development 
of formal property rights. Legality and the legalization of property titles often has the 
effect and drawback to make land unaffordable (Mitchell, 2004). Legal property rights 
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not only increases the access of the poor to their own assets, it also makes these assets 
visible and attainable for more powerful players in the market such as property and real 
estate developers, or simply urban middle classes with more material means than the 
urban	poor	(e.g.	gentrification).	Additionally,	the	massive	influx	of	legal	property	titles	
can involve a shift in the creation of wealth from productive labour (farmers, industry, 
etc.) to the unproductive labour of a rentier (e.g. real estate investors) (Ibid.). This is 
something that is already clearly visible in Morocco today. The Moroccan capitalist 
class is investing heavily in real estate, both in the so-called high-end and the lower end 
of the market. Consequently, Mitchell warns us that De Soto’s ideas can have the same 
effect on countries like Egypt or Morocco as in Britain:
De Soto’s plans envisage a vast creation of wealth, by the transformation of so-
called dead capital into live capital. In practice, the evidence suggests that this 
will produce not live capital out of dead, but a transfer of wealth from the less 
affluent	to	the	more	secure,	and	in	particular	serve	to	enrich	the	more	prosperous	
among the present generation at the expense of the future poor (Mitchell, 2004: 
no page number) 
Although	it	is	still	too	early	to	make	any	final	conclusions	on	the	effect	of	the	VSBP,	
it is probable that the process of ‘turning slum dwellers into legal home-owners’ can 
generate similar effects and open up opportunities for speculation, for the concentra-
tion of wealth and for the accumulation of rents (Ibid.). The assets of the poor are not 
the source of this process of wealth creation, as suggested by De Soto, but the means 
through which the reorganization and accumulation of wealth is carried out (Ibid.). The 
specific	strategies	to	accomplish	this	are	not	so	much	reflecting	a	free	market	but	rather	
a political project.   
For years, even decades, many slum dwellers in Morocco have lived outside the for-
mal market-economy. Many of them had no property rights, no regular job, no legal 
water	connection,	etc.	But	if	the	poor	were	not	finding	their	way	to	the	market,	the	new	
methods of social engineering, although still not widely applied, are now helping to 
bring the market to the poor.388 And, if necessary, the establishers of market integration 
will adapt the products to the capacities of the urban poor (and not necessarily their 
needs). The maximum price for a subsidized apartment is now set at 290,000 MAD 
(100sq meters) but over past few years the Moroccan government has sought to recruit 
developers who can built smaller apartments for only 140,000 MAD (60sq meters).389 
In May 2010, I had the chance to visit one of these social housing projects (the An-
nasr	project)	in	Temara,	a	city	close	to	Rabat,	together	with	militants	from	the	Unified	
Socialist Party (PSU), a small leftwing party in Morocco. Some inhabitants were so 
kind to invite me into their homes. Although I am not trained as an architect, I quickly 
noticed that these houses were constructed at an absolute minimum cost. After only 
two years in use, nearly all apartments already showed humidity stains everywhere and 
388  Or at least a particular kind of market because, of course, the slum space itself has never been a space 
free from any market-mechanism: i.e. the informal market, speculation with barracks, etc.
389  Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: collaborative construction (25/08/09). In spring 2009 
I met a Belgian businessman who was negotiating at that time with the MHUAE on a possible contract. I 
think,	in	the	end	these	specific	negotiations	were	without	result.	
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numerous cracks in the walls. On top of that, the sewage system was leaking which 
gave off a really unpleasant smell. The home-owners did the best they could to repair 
the damage themselves. In some apartments I noticed holes in the walls where they had 
to re-lay on electricity (while small children were running around). Despite their own 
inventiveness, the inhabitants assured me that this was normally the responsibility of 
the public operator – in this case Dyar Al Mansour – according to the agreements they 
had reached with them. 
In a country where the majority of the poor population still doesn’t have a bank ac-
count, concepts like debt and credit are introduced amongst the lower classes with 
instruments such as FOGARIM and micro-credits for housing. What will happen when 
they are not able to pay their loans anymore?390 After all, a new apartment implies a lot 
390  Until today, the number of people who are unable to repay their debts in housing remains very low (2% 
until	2009)	(Toutain,	2009b).	Nevertheless,	in	general,	2008	and	2009	were	difficult	years	for	MFIs	with	an	
increase of the high-risk group of clientele who were unsure to be able to repay their loans. In 2010 things 
seem to recover in the end (see article in l’économiste - Microcrédit: La crise s’éloigne, les impayés bais-
sent, available at: http://leconomiste.com (accessed 19/02/2011). Yet, during my visit to the Annasr project 
in Temara (spring 2010), I heard that a lot of people stopped paying their loans. The Annasr project is part 
of the VSBP and provided no less than 17% of all loans that were granted in 2008 (i.e. 2,700 loans in 2008). 
When I discussed the matter with Olivier Toutain, a French consultant for the VSBP, he taught it was im-
probable that the public authorities would allow the expropriation of the defaulters. It was unthinkable that 
people	would	be	evicted	in	a	time	where	the	VSBP	was	one	of	the	flagship	projects	to	demonstrate	Moroc-
The Annasr Project (May 2010) Humidity stains within the apartments (May 2010)
Humidity stains on the outside where the bathrooms 
are located (May 2010)
An	owner	tried	to	fix	an	electricity	problem	
(May 2010)
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of extra costs: property taxes, a legal connection to the electricity and water distribution 
networks, public transport, etc. This problem hasn’t been addressed properly until now 
at the political level. Insofar as the bidonville is seen to represent the ruralization of 
the city, the solution is presented as one of shepherding its inhabitants towards market 
integration. A staff member of Lydec, a subsidiary of the multinational SUEZ in Casa-
blanca, explained that delivering these people water and electricity also requires putting 
a lot of effort in education, learning them how to use their new assets and how to pay 
for them.391 Generally, the idea behind this conception of ‘integration’, as I was told by 
a	former	official	of	ADS,	is	that	once	people	are	good	costumers	they	will	eventually	
become responsible citizens with a proper job and a proper lifestyle.392 As such, the 
market	becomes	the	norm	by	which	good	citizenship	is	measured.	It	fits	within	the	neo-
liberal dogma of “helping the poor help themselves”, creating an illusion of self-help 
(Davis, 2006: 72). The VSBP aims to include the slums into the formal urban space 
where	 the	state	can	define,	defend	and	regulate	 the	norms	and	boundaries	 for	social	
life. Lamia Zaki has shown that this kind of approach creates new forms of exclusion: 
“It [transforms the slum dwellers] from citizens to consumers by replacing the notion 
of absolute (human) rights with that of a right to services”. Consequently, she argues 
that	privatization	tends	to	atomize	the	notion	of	right	by	creating	conflicting	interests	
between those who are able to afford market-inclusion and those who are simply too 
poor and thus remain excluded (Zaki, 2008: 134)
Following Zaki’s observation, the new development techniques and development vi-
sions that emerged with the debates on the social dimension of slum resetllement, the 
conceptualization of MOS and the implementation of VSBP (and also the INDH), not 
simply implied the production of new knowledge about urban poverty and life in the 
bidonvilles. This knowledge also became ‘the (new) truth’. In other words, these pro-
duced forms of knowledge came to be understood as certain, legitimate, and undeniably 
correct (Roy, 2010: 32). They inform us of the “best-practices” with regard to sustain-
able and social development, participation, good governance, etc… (cf. Navez-Bouch-
anine, 2007; Barthel & Zaki, 2011). The above mentioned evolution within the World 
Bank (from SAP to good governance), the newly created state-institutions and the new 
modes of state intervention – changes that took place since the mid-1990s – all contrib-
uted to the (re-)making or re-invention of social development in Morocco. This process 
was actively constructed through the deployment of new technologies and methods 
which I outlined above. It was based on new forms of risk-management. However, as 
Roy argues convincingly, this process also required the production of knowledge. Of 
course, global institutions such as the World Bank and UN Habitat play a crucial role 
in this production, but the neoliberal governmentality that underpinned this process of 
re-making development in Morocco was, as I have tried to demonstrate, based on two 
main “accomplishments of truth” (Roy, 2010: 56-62): the idea of the responsible or 
good citizen and the conception of urban integration.    
First,	both	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	as	well	as	influential	thinkers	such	as	De	
Soto, have been promoting the perception that access to land and assets was “essential 
co’s	commitments	to	the	fight	against	poverty.	In	any	case,	what	could	be	the	case	was	that	in	the	end	the	
state	would	have	to	step	in	and	protect	the	profits	of	the	private	investors	(Interview,	Rabat	–	21/05/2010).
391  Interview (Casablanca-13/05/08).
392  Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – 16/04/09)
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for the poor to become “active citizens, good clients and municipal taxpayers (…)”” 
(Werlin, 1999: 1531). With the intensive enlargement of capitalism and the success of 
neoliberalism in countries like Morocco, the question of poverty has been reformu-
lated along new lines that place the responsibility of getting out of poverty on the poor 
themselves (Ismail, 2006: 87). This is the principal idea behind the notion of self-help. 
The market provides the opportunities for the poor to take matters into their own hand 
and to break away from their dependence on the developmental state. As the USAID 
director of Democracy and Governance Programs told once me: “we [promote] trade 
not aid”.393 This is what neoliberals would euphemistically call “the democratization of 
social development” (Roy, 2010). The new governmental methods introduced under the 
VSBP	focused	specifically	on	the	responsibilization	of	the	slum	dweller	and	aim	to	turn	
him into a “good citizen” (Zemni, 2007). Good citizenship can in this sense be regarded 
as the result of the shift from the developmental state towards the neoliberal state in 
which the regulatory competence of the state has been complemented with and partly 
replaced by ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals who are supposed to be self-regula-
tive (Lemke, 2001: 202). The CAS teams, for example, receive the explicit mission to 
pay attention to the pedagogical role of their direct communication with slum dwellers: 
i.e. “the sensibilization and the responsibilization of the inhabitants” (USAID, 2007: 
87). As such, it is important to stress that public interventions such as AS involve both 
intervention and formation (Dikeç, 2007: 279). Slum dwellers are formed to comply 
with the norms of formal city-life. The eventual objective is to bring the slum dweller 
into	the	realm	of	the	market	where	he	would	then	profit	from	its	advantages	and	exploit	
its opportunities.  
This bring us to the second accomplishment of truth: the conception of urban integra-
tion. As I have argued, the conception of the integration or re-integration of bidonvillois 
into the urban fabric, or the formal city, is committed to market models and strategies, 
seeking	to	promote	new	circuits	of	investment,	speculation	and	profit	that	are	embed-
ded within the broader dynamics of capital accumulation (for a similar reasoning on 
microfinance	see	Roy,	2010:	43).	King	Mohamed	VI	leaves	no	doubt	about	it.	In	his	
speech at the national meeting of Local Governments on 12 December 2006 in Agadir, 
he stated: 
Our ultimate goals is not only to have cities without slums, nor is it to replace the 
latter with blocks of concrete that are soulless and socially insensitive. Rather, 
we intend to transform our cities into environments that are conducive to good 
living conditions, conviviality and dignity, to turn these spaces into hubs for in-
vestments	and	production,	and	into	cities	that	are	attached	to	their	specificity	and	
to the originality of their character (cited in Al Omrane, 2010a: 1).
Citizen empowerment is a notion that is often used to legitimate the social development 
rationality behind programs such as VSBP and INDH (cf. Chikhaoui, 2007). Yet, there 
is no doubt that the slum dwellers have very little to say in the whole process of their 
relocation. As a result, the latter obviously resist resettlement in some cases, which 
often slows down certain projects or even changes the eventual outcome of the resettle-
393  Interview (Rabat – 04/09/2007).
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ment operation in their advantage (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c; Navez-Bouchanine & 
Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005; Le Tellier, 2009b; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). In the end, how-
ever, slum resettlement has little to do with genuine ‘participation’ or ‘empowerment’. 
These notions are reduced to something that can be considered particularly relevant for 
a neoliberal market-oriented strategy of urban development. In the weekly magazine 
La Vie Eco, Nabil Kerdoudi of Al Omrane in Casablanca left no doubt about what he 
understood	by	citizen	participation	and	about	the	specific	practices	of	slum	dwellers	to	
resist resettlement:
The	households	have	retorted	by	allowing	a	densification,	even	inside	their	bar-
racks. The parents accommodate their children, but also their spouses and their 
descendents. In fact, while we propose them one plot or one apartment destined 
for an average household, they refuse and wait for a more interesting opportu-
nity in terms of surface. Despite the action of social accompaniment [le travail 
d’accompagnement social] provided by the ministry [MHUAE], which intends to 
convince them to accept resettlement [relogement], we found ourselves obliged, 
recently,	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 judiciary	 for	 those	cases	where	beneficiaries	 refuse	 the	
proposed accommodation (own translation).394    
In Moroccan slum resettlement operations the participation of the inhabitants in the de-
cision making process is reduced to a minimum, despite the promises that resulted out 
of the discussions on MOS. The implementation of VSBP is coordinated and imposed 
from above. Locally the VSBP is coordinated by public operators such as Dyar Al 
Mansour and Al Omrane, mostly in close cooperation with the walis and the governors. 
The	contribution	of	local	elected	officials	is	minimal	and	often	contradictory	because	
they fear to lose part of their electorate once a slum population is relocated (Zaki, 
2005; Toutain, 2008; Le Tellier, 2009a). Additionally, there is a real contempt for the 
slum dweller amongst the public and technical agencies (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-
Chikhaoui, 2005). The idea of the responsible or good citizen comes with the convic-
tion that the bidonvillois needs to be re-educated. To put it in the words of the technical 
director	of	Dyar	Al	Mansour:	“we	have	to	teach	them	a	new	way	of	life,	first	of	all	by	
learning them to live vertically instead of horizontally”.395 When talking to public of-
ficials	one	gets	the	impression	that	the	slum	dweller	is	not	capable	of	engaging	in	public	
life and that he himself is responsible for this situation. As a Dyar el Mansour staff 
member told me: “we have to guide them and be with them constantly. They are like 
babies.”396	An	official	of	Al	Omrane	complained	to	me	that	the	inhabitants	sometimes	
refuse to move to their new homes because living in a bidonville: “[is] a way of life, it 
is a social and cultural problem. There are people who like living in the bidonvilles”.397 
Another	Al	Omrane	official	confirmed	this,	stating	that	“the	[slum]	population	is	cultur-
ally	as	well	as	traditionally	difficult”.398 One of the objectives of the AS-programs is just 
to tackle and change this so-called problematic mentality of the slum dweller and learn 
him to adapt to a new mode of living. As a result, the individual slum dweller becomes 
394  In La Vie Eco, vol.53 ,n°4567, 9-15 July 2010.
395  Interview (Rabat – 01/07/2010)
396  Interview (Rabat-28/05/08) 
397  Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat-27/08/07).
398  Interview (Rabat-30/06/08).
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the politicized subject through programs like VSBP, while his own claims, demands 
and desires are very much depoliticized and reduced to a question of housing and prop-
erty right. Fundamental problems that are rooted in class relations and in differences of 
power are reduced “to purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the political 
arena” (John Harris cited in Roy, 2010: 68). As such, the right to the (formal) city is 
an enforced right for slum dwellers in which market-integration and responsibilization 
are considered crucial elements for success. Real problems like a lack of education, 
healthcare, employment, etc., are still largely ignored. To conclude with a quote of an 
inhabitant of Douar Al Kora (a slum on the coastline of Rabat): 
In a society the problems are social. In the hospital there are no doctors, no nurs-
es, there is a lack of medicines. (...) In education the teachers receive a very low 
salary. (...) The classrooms are to numerous, often 50 students. (…) [But] we 
don’t have a choice. They decide. If they give you two rooms, you don’t argue, 
you take it.399
The (anti-)political reorganization of the slum space
Before I can conclude this chapter, I want to come back to the issue of social control. 
The implementation of a program like VSBP is not just a way to exploit the lower end 
of	the	market.	The	specific	timing	reveals	that	it	was	also	a	new	way	to	control	the	slum	
population or at least an attempt to manage the future risks which this population can 
cause. Therefore, in the beginning of this chapter, I spoke of a double shift. The expan-
sion of capitalism in Morocco went hand in hand with the desire to control potentially 
“dangerous	 classes”	 and	manage	 them	more	 efficiently	 (Bayat,	 2000).	As	 such,	 the	
VSBP entailed also a political reorganization of the slum-space. The new methods of 
social engineering facilitated the entrance of governmental agency into the slums and 
eventually paved the way for the eradication of the slums and the resettlement of its 
populations. In the past, the bidonvilles had always been impenetrable spaces for vari-
ous governmental actors. The paths that divide the overload of barracks are very nar-
row,	often	unpaved,	and	therefore	inaccessible	to	fire	engines,	police	cars,	ambulances	
or army vehicles. The crisscross of aisles and barracks make the inhabitants almost 
invisible.	“The	bidonville	is	an	uncontrollable	site”,	argued	a	Dyar	Al	Mansour	official,	
“even the police couldn’t enter there”.400	Promoted	as	a	fight	against	poverty,	the	VSBP	
gives	the	authorities	the	legitimacy	to	finalize	the	deconstruction	of	these	impenetrable	
and ungovernable spaces. The daily presence of the CAS-teams ensures the embed-
dedness of governmental structures in the slums and facilitates the bureaucratic control 
over these populations. The CAS-teams inventory the population, they explain people 
how the resettlement project will proceed, they inform them of their next steps and as-
sist the population in all the necessary administrative procedures. In other words, the 
CAS are one of the crucial elements in the process of making the slums more transpar-
ent. They liberate the path for the eventual destruction of the slum-space. Before people 
are allowed to move to their new apartment their former barracks have to be destroyed 
in order to avoid that these will be occupied by newcomers again. Poverty was thus not 
only a market opportunity, as suggested by thinkers like De Soto and Prahalad, it was 
also an entry point for the state to enhance its bureaucratic control. James Ferguson 
399  Interview (Rabat-15/10/09).
400  Interview (Rabat-27/10/09)
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correctly observes that “although “development” discourse tends to see the provision of 
“services” as the purpose of government, it is clear that the question of power cannot be 
written off quite so easily” (Ferguson, 2006: 271). “Government services”, he argues, 
“are never simply services” (Ibid.).
The	social	effect	of	the	VSBP	is	rather	ambiguous.	Despite,	the	deficiencies	I	saw	in	
Annasr in Temara, one cannot deny that the physical living conditions of most people 
who	were	resettled	has	improved	significantly.	Aesthetically,	one	could	argue	that	the	
new social housing projects are an improvement for the city’s image compared to the 
chaotic and miserable image of bidonvilles. Regular access to water, electricity and the 
construction of sewage systems has obviously improved the conditions of hygiene and 
security. Yet, the overly positive picture 
of the social impact of the VSBP, as it is 
often	presented	by	state-officials	and	of-
ficial	documents,	 should	be	nuanced.	 In	
the end, the goal is simply to eradicate 
the slums and relocate the slum-popula-
tion. The new housing blocks are careful-
ly	parcelled	to	fit	as	many	people	as	pos-
sible. The apartments are often too small 
for the larger families. People are often 
relocated far from their original resi-
dence and detached from their original 
living environments. This brings along 
new social and economic implications. 
First of all, many of the inhabitants are 
dependent on their original living place 
for petty trade activities and work in the 
informal sector.401 The new estates are 
often far less dynamic and economically 
interesting. Moreover, the presence of a 
souk in the centre of the city offers a lot 
401		Interview	with	MHUAE	official	(Rabat-23/05/08).	She	had	done	research	on	a	slum	resettlement	
operation in Salé. 
Destroyed barracks in Douar Skouila from people 
who were resettled (May 2008)
Others are still living in between the ruins (May 
2008)
A former owner had to make a hole in the wall to 
prevent somebody else from occupying his barrack. 
His neighbour still lives on top (May 2008) 
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of opportunities to the inhabitants which they miss out on once they are resettled. Sec-
ondly, as a mentioned before, moving brings forth new costs which pressure the already 
modest family budgets. People have to pay new taxes, water, electricity and public 
transport (if available). As such, the transfer often comes with a decline in revenues and 
an increase in expenses. As a result, it is not uncommon that families are compelled to 
cut expenses in for example the education of their children.402 
Thirdly,	those	people	who	are	beneficiary	in	an	operation	of	recasement often have to 
find	a	transit	home	to	overlap	the	time	between	the	obligatory	destruction	of	their	bar-
rack and the construction of their new apartment (Le Tellier, 2009a). These extra costs 
are	often	too	much	to	bare	which	often	causes	people	to	re-sell	their	plot	and	find	a	ref-
uge in another bidonville or an informal neighbourhood (HC); these are what they call 
the cases of “glissements”, those people who return to the informal urban areas because 
they cannot afford life in the formal city.403 Fourth, the transfer often implies the break-
ing up of solidarity networks that existed in the bidonvilles before resettlement (Iraki, 
2006b). Slum dwellers usually don’t want to be displaced: it disrupts existing commer-
cial and social networks, raises housing costs, lengthens commuting times, etc… and 
this is not only the case in Morocco (on Morocco see Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c; Le 
Tellier, 2009a; on other cases see Milbert, 2006; Gilbert, 2007; Huchzermeyer, 2008). 
Finally, aesthetically, socially and geographically there are also some additional con-
siderations to be made. I once drove through Sidi Moumen together with a Moroccan 
journalist of the weekly magazine Le Reporter who used to live in the bidonvilles. He 
had experienced the transformations of this neighbourhood over the years. One of the 
main problems, according to him, was the lack of public space in this district and the 
lack	of	attention	given	to	a	form	of	spatial	planning	that	is	not	only	concerned	with	“fit-
ting in as many people as possible”. “Everything has been build over with apartments”, 
he regretted, “there is no space provided for green spaces, parks, trees, for playgrounds, 
youth centres and other places where people can meet each other”.404 Many of these 
new social housing projects and resettling operations transform the urban periphery in 
a monotonous mass of low-cost apartments. A district like Sidi Moumen in Casablanca 
lacks public space and opportunities for leisure and gathering. According to the Moroc-
can economist Driss Benali “[Morocco is] making the same mistakes as the French. We 
are creating banlieues”.405
If one judges the VSBP for its social development objectives and its actual social im-
pact than it is obvious that serious questions still arise about whether the program really 
gives the inhabitants of the bidonvilles a better future in the long term. Some critical 
perspectives	will	probably	argue	that	this	was	never	the	intention	in	the	first	place.	Oth-
ers will maybe suggest that the program fails to implement the best practices the way 
they are supposed to. Either way, whether the social effects of the VSBP are the result 
of mere unfortunate technical mistakes or whether they are the result of a strategically 
market-oriented business models put in place to exploit the last market, there is also 
402  Ibid.
403  Besides the cases of ‘glissements’, you also have the ‘reliquats’ [remainders]. Those people who refuse 
to	leave	or	who	are	unable	to	start	the	procedures	of	moving	out	in	the	first	place.
404  Interview (Casablanca, 16/05/2008).
405  Interview (Rabat-26/10/09).
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another far-reaching and powerful effect related to the VSBP. One of the principal ef-
fects of development schemes like VSBP is the expansion and entrenchment of state 
power (Ferguson, 2006). VSBP was instrumental in establishing new technologies and 
methods of administration and in strengthening the presence of the Moroccan state in 
the bidonvilles (there where it was previously absent). Similar to Ferguson’s analysis 
of the development apparatus in Lesotho, the VSBP apparatus may than not necessarily 
be a “machine” (to use Ferguson’s word) for eliminating poverty, which incidentally 
coincided with more state-bureaucratic presence, but rather a machine to reinforce and 
expand the exercise of bureaucratic state power which incidentally takes poverty as an 
entry point (Ibid.: 273). The result, Ferguson argues, may be that state intervention has 
no real effect on poverty, at least not a sustainable effect, but that doesn’t mean that it 
doesn’t have concrete other effects. The strategically coherent and/or intelligible whole 
of these “instrument-effects” of development projects such as VSBP – and by exten-
sion INDH – form an “anti-politics machine” (Ibid.: 273). Consequently, far from being 
implemented to enhance people’s participation or empowerment, such development 
schemes	are	taken	up,	first	and	foremost,	“for	institutional	aggrandizement”	(Kapoor,	
2008: 68). The effect is two-fold. Besides the institutional expansion of state power in 
certain areas and the changing modes of governmental intervention, there is a second 
effect which involves the depoliticization of both state-presence and the question of 
poverty (the second effect is mainly the result of the new politics of truth). As such, the 
picture of the political reorganization of the slum-space becomes a complicated one 
because within the framework of the VSBP it is never formulated as political:  
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promis-
ing technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the 
hegemonic problematic of “development” is the principal means through which 
the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today. At the same time, by 
making the intentional blueprints for “development” so highly visible, a “devel-
opment” project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations 
involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost 
invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object 
(Ferguson, 2006: 273).
As I discussed already in the second chapter 3, the so-called period of the of the Post-
Washington Consensus is in itself of course a political program or project (Lemke, 
2002).406	Additionally,	Ferguson	also	refers	specifically	to	“bureaucratic	state	power”	
because	he	does	not	want	to	refer	to	a	specific	entity	possessed	of	power	(e.g.	the	state)	
but to “a characteristic mode of exercise of power, a mode of power that relies on state 
institutions, but exceeds them” (Ferguson, 2006: 282). 
A	final	important	insight,	delivered	by	Ferguson,	is	that	the	expansion	of	certain	forms	
406  Nevertheless, Ferguson refers explicitly to instrument-effects because he thinks it would be wrong to 
see these development interventions as some kind of conspiracy. According to him, it is just the way things 
happen to work out: “But because things do work out this way, and because “failed” development projects 
can so successfully help to accomplish important strategic tasks behind the backs of the most sincere par-
ticipants, it does become less mysterious why “failed” development projects should end up being replicated 
again and again” (Ferguson, 2006: 273-274). 
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of “state power” does not necessarily mean that “the state” as such has more power 
(Ibid.). The expansion of state-control through biopolitical methods of government 
does not necessarily imply that the Moroccan state has managed to increase its control 
over the slum population by integrating them in some kind of totalizing panoptic con-
trol project. People do resist resettlement. The ordinary still quietly encroaches upon 
the ruling classes and the underlying root causes for political instability are still not 
taken away (cf. Bayat, 2000; 2002). The problem of urban poverty will not be solved 
by the VSBP, it will just be moved around and away from the city-centre. The question 
will then be how the management of future risks will continue to look like in the future? 
Will there be other outbursts of violence that threaten political stability in Morocco?407 
Will this affect the position of ruling elites? Will it affect the capacity of state institu-
tions to control the population or certain segments of that population? Consequently, 
although schemes such as the VSBP may have provided entry points to expand state 
control and state presence, this not necessarily means that it will also be effective. As 
James Ferguson (2006: 282) has pointed out in his own work on Lesotho were he ob-
served expanded bureaucratic state control as an effect of development projects:               
The expansion of bureaucratic state power then, does not necessarily mean that 
“the	masses”	can	be	centrally	coordinated	or	ordered	around	any	more	efficient-
ly; it only means that more power relations are referred through state channels 
– most immediately, that more people must stand in line and await rubber stamps 
to get what they want. What is expanded is not the magnitude of the capabilities 
of “the state,” but the extent and reach of a particular kind of exercise of power 
(Ibid.) 
In other words, although state control may be expanded through various methods and 
institutions in a quantitative manner, this does not necessarily means that the methods 
implemented under VSBP have automatically also a qualitative effect (when it comes 
to	control).	This	qualitative	aspect	is	of	course	much	more	difficult	to	determine.	Fer-
guson warns us that because of this subtle difference, the way in which power is linked 
up with the state in different countries (especially in non-Western countries) can differ 
from the model and impact of biopower that Foucault has described for the modern 
Western societies (Ibid.; see also Foucault, 2007, 2008). Of course, urban planners, 
social development agents, and many other agents of the Moroccan state may aspire to 
control and administer the lives of their population in the same way as in other, more 
wealthier, capitalist countries and set out to make life more healthy, productive and 
obliging. But the simple empirical fact is that the methods applied simply don’t always 
have the same qualitative effect (Ferguson, 2006). Ferguson seems to suggest that the 
efficiency	of	control	will	be	greater	in	more	developed	Western	countries	than	in	the	
rest of the world. I can only say that in the case of Morocco a program such as the 
VSBP has certainly expanded bureaucratic control in many ways, but I doubt whether 
it has enhanced the control (from a security perspective) over the slum population in 
a qualitative way. The root cause for political instability – inequality – has just been 
displaced.
407  Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries show that the pressing socio-economic and 
political problems of many people – especially young people – are driving them to the streets (and with sig-
nificant	success)	to	openly	protest	the	class	politics	(not	only	the	authoritarian	politics)	of	the	Arab	regimes.	
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Conclusion
The	predominant	focus	of	this	chapter	was	on	methods,	more	specifically	the	different	
methods of power that were implicated in the control and government of the urban 
space. Evidence was drawn predominantly from the case of Casablanca. The city has 
always been a laboratory for new governmental methods. Moments of violence and 
concerns for security were important accelerators for the generation and introduction of 
new governmental methods. In order to anticipate future risks these methods intended 
to open up the urban space and make it more transparent. As such, I argued that con-
temporary urban restructurings in Morocco reveal – as Mike Davis pointed out in the 
opening	quote	–	the	simultaneous	attempt	to	maximize	profit	and	social	control.	Yet,	
the	specific	methods	to	achieve	these	two	objectives	have	differed	over	time	and	were	
determined	by	the	then	neoliberal	governmentalities.	The	specific	impact	of	the	transi-
tion	from	roll	back	to	roll	out	neoliberalism	in	Morocco	and	its	translation	into	specific	
methods of urban planning and urban government can be best described with the dis-
tinction made by Mariana Valverde between sovereign city planning and techniques of 
security. Whereas sovereign city planning in the 1980s dealt with individuals as a set 
of legal subjects within a designated territory and relies predominantly on techniques 
that capitalize that territory, emphasizing for example monumental state architecture 
in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign, the technologies of security developed in the 
2000s	will	precisely	constitute	and	target	a	specific	population, i.e. the slum population, 
and	involve	specific	planning	and	techniques	that	are	more	concerned	with	the	biopo-
litical management (or administration) of urban life – i.e. the lives of slum dwellers in 
this case – and the future risks related to that life. Of course the distinction between 
the two modalities of urban planning is not absolute. It is only a way to distinguish the 
predominant focus of how power was rationalized and implemented.
The 1981 riots implied the end of a tolerance or benign neglect of informal urban 
expansion and marked the beginning of a period of expanded territorial control. The 
political reorganization of urban space after the riots was predominantly concentrated 
on controlling the physical environment through which people – especially the urban 
poor – move. The cutbacks on welfare policies and the direct disengagement of the state 
in the economic sphere were compensated by the strengthening of state control over 
the urban territory, the introduction of monumental state architecture like the Mosque 
Hassan II and the deconcentration of state power through for example the wilaya and 
the AUC (in the case of Casablanca). The centralization of state power on the urban 
scale and the implementation of sovereign power were inspired both by economic ne-
cessities and objectives as well as by the desire to assure political stability. Yet, in the 
end, the deployment of techniques of sovereign power did not lead to a sustainable 
solution for the slums. This period of roll back neoliberalism was followed by a rolling 
out of (state) power into new governmental methods, arrangements and techniques. 
This transition started already during the 1990s and was inspired by a global transition 
(i.e. from the Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus). Yet, again, a 
violent moment – the Casablanca suicide attacks of 2003 – accelerated this particular 
shift in Morocco. The transition entailed that the exercise of government was now be-
ing channelled through a multiplied and different set of arrangements, agencies and 
networks	that	intervened	more	specifically	at	the	level	of	the	individual	and	targeted	
the slum population as a whole within a general strategy of administrating life conform 
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neoliberal ‘market requirements’. State power became more actively involved in the 
economic sphere to alleviate social inequality caused by market-oriented restructuring 
(e.g. by supporting and subsidizing both the demand-side and supply-side of social 
housing). The discussed VSBP is one obvious project that introduced new institutional 
arrangements and resulted in what Salwa Ismail called in her work on Egypt the in-
creasing “marketization of the social” (Ismail, 2006: 67). 
The development of new technologies of power in the beginning of the 21st century, 
which tried to rationalize the slum-space and make it more governable, was equally 
inspired by the double shift. First of all, the increasing administration of life in the 
slums	and	the	focus	on	citizen	participation	(under	specific	top-down	conditions),	were	
dictated by the exploitation of poverty capital. If Erik Hobsbawm still referred to the 
poor	as	an	unprofitable	market	(see	opening	quote),	biopolitical	techniques	made	them	
profitable.	As	such,	biopolitics	were	necessary	for	the	intensive	expansion	of	capital-
ism. New frontiers of capital accumulation were explored with the development of new 
methods of social engineering. The intention of the VSBP was to integrate the slum 
dweller into the formal market, facilitate his access to credit, accompany him during 
all	the	steps	of	this	integration	and	finally,	responsibilize	him	to	become	a	good	citizen	
so	he	could	profit	from	market	opportunities	and	manage	his	own	development.	The	
emphasis on integration – in the view of integrating the slum dweller into the formal 
city – is actually quite ironic if we keep in mind the argument of Ray Bush who stated 
that (urban) poverty was not so much the result of a lack of integration but rather the 
result of a particular kind of integration (Bush, 2004; see also chapter 2). It is their spe-
cific	kind	of	integration	that	has	been	refined	and	redefined	by	biopolitical	techniques	
and, in the end, these techniques will more likely reproduce, instead of alleviate, urban 
poverty. 
Secondly, the technologies of power invested in the VSBP also re-organized the slum-
space	and	expanded	bureaucratic	state	power	over	the	slums.	Poverty	was	the	specific	
entry point for the attempt to reinforce of social control. The particular shift from sover-
eign city planning to techniques of security implied that measures of urban restructuring, 
to use the words of Foucault, were no longer implemented in the name of a sovereign 
who must be defended (e.g. the monarchical order), but they were now implemented 
on behalf of the existence of everyone, the welfare of an entire population (e.g. poverty 
alleviation).408 General welfare, development and social responsibility are the discur-
sive cornerstones of the contemporary neoliberal politics of truth. Furthermore, the 
focus on “good citizenship” implies the substitution of a political question with a moral 
question. This distinction between good and bad – especially with regard to the cultural 
stigmatization of the slum dweller who needs to be “re-educated” – hides the underly-
ing class divisions and depoliticizes class struggle. Consequently, poverty and social 
inequality are mere technical problems that can be resolved through a market-oriented 
approach	that	reflects	the	requirements	of	efficiency,	expertise	and	the	best	cost-benefit	
408  Here I based my reasoning on the example which Foucault gave on the difference in waging wars 
between pre-nineteenth century and post-nineteenth century European politics: “Wars are no longer waged 
in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; 
entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: mas-
sacres have become vital (Foucault, 1990: 137). 
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analysis. The social problems of slum dwellers have been reduced to a housing problem 
that can be measured and calculated. Poverty is in this regard a market opportunity. 
But as I have shown, this evolution itself is far from a-political. In the end, the new 
governmental	 techniques	are	 instrumental	 to	 specific	political strategies as the slum 
population is being reassembled and re-integrated to suit the conditions of a particular 
kind of political and social life (Parker & Debruyne 2011). Unfortunately, this often 
implies that the real reasons for poverty (unemployment, education, health care) are ne-
glected. In the end, the VSBP will probably only succeed in moving the pressing social 
problems out of the city-centre. And this particular “effect” can be closely related to the 
subject of the following and last chapter of this project.
 241
         Chapter 5 
[The city is] man’s most consistent and on the whole, his 
most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in 
more after his heart’s desire. But, if the city is the world 
which man created, it is the world in which he is hence-
forth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any 
clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man 
has remade himself (Robert Park cited in Harvey, 2006: 
89).
We have, however, largely surrendered our own individual 
right to make the city after our heart’s desire to the rights 
of property owners, landlords, developers, finance capital-
ists and the state. These are the primary agents that shape 
our cities for us and thereby shape us. We have abrogated 
our right to make ourselves to the rights of capital to make 
us through the passive acceptance or mindless embrace 
of the restructuring daily life by the projects of capitalist 
class interests (Harvey, 2006: 89).
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This	final	chapter	builds	upon	issues	of	neoliberal	urbanism	that	were	already	elabo-
rated to some extent in chapters 2 and 3.409 Here, I want to focus on a particular case 
of actually existing neoliberalism and highlight some of the dynamics of the political 
structures and agency behind the making of actually existing neoliberalism in Morocco. 
My case study, an urban development scheme in the Bouregreg river valley between 
the twin cities of Rabat and Salé, is an extraordinary model of neoliberal urbanism in 
Morocco.	It	is	one	of	the	flagship	projects	of	Morocco’s	urban	revolution.	Although	the	
particular	socio-political	configuration	of	the	project	may	still	be	an	exception	in	Mo-
rocco, it already reveals that the characteristics of political change in the Arab world are 
not so exceptional as they are often presented. As such, this chapter deals with critical 
perspectives to rethink the nature of the Arab state and different forms of state agency, 
this time not so much in terms of its biopolitical methods but rather in terms of its 
institutional	and	social	character.	More	specifically,	I	want	to	draw	attention	to	the	in-
stitutional	transformation	of	the	Moroccan	state	and	the	specific	assemblages	of	power	
and	agency	that	are	gathered	within	new	institutional	configurations	that	are	involved	in	
the (re-)production of capitalist space. Also, in contrast to chapter 4, this chapter sheds 
light on the other end of the Moroccan geography of uneven development: high-end 
urban development. 
By drawing on the case of the Bouregreg project this chapter investigates the dynamics 
of agency formation implicated in the creation of a new state space and considers what 
it reveals about state respatialization and the rise of new governmental arrangements 
outside the scope of traditional state arrangements. The Bouregreg project is a salient 
example of what Harvey (1989b) understands as urban entrepreneurialism and of how 
the local can be an agent in the making of the global (Massey, 2005). But Harvey warns 
us not to reify the city itself when considering the urban process as an active, rather 
than a passive aspect of political-economic development. It would be a mistake to see 
the city as an ‘agent’ in itself. In contrast, Harvey views the city as a mere thing and 
stresses that urbanization should rather be considered as a spatially grounded social 
process in which a wide range of actors – both foreign and domestic – with different 
objectives and agendas give shape to the city, and in return, are shaped by the city as 
well (those who shape the urban are in the end also constrained by their own creations) 
(Harvey, 1989b). Following up on Harvey, two main questions are central in this chap-
ter. First, where is political power located? And secondly, how is power assembled 
within particular sites and interlocked through particular combinations of agency? The 
specific	process	of	establishing	new	state	institutions	and	new	state	spaces	reveals	an	
underlying	feature	of	modern	geopolitical	organization	that	undermines	fixed	notions	
of	state-territoriality.	As	in	chapter	4,	my	concern	here	is	to	suggest	the	significance	of	
these changes for the government of people and places in contemporary Morocco; and 
– scaling up – to think about what these changes might imply for mainstream accounts 
of Arab political life, which often remain locked in debates on mere endogenous politi-
cal trajectories of regime change, democratic transition and authoritarian persistence 
(cf. chapter 1).
409  This chapter is an more detailed elaboration of an article that was accepted for publication in the Jour-
nal Urban studies (cf. Bogaert, 2011a). 
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Beyond nation state-centrism: neoliberal urbanization and the formation of the 
new state space of the Bouregreg Valley
The period of roll out neoliberalism and political reform (alternance) did not only 
brought forth new visions on government and new schemes of social development. The 
post-structural adjustment era in Morocco also involved the mobilization of qualita-
tively new forms of state intervention in order to enhance growth-oriented and market-
driven high-end urban development strategies. Economic growth is often considered 
as the key for the creation of general welfare and social development. The World Bank 
recommended an annual economic growth rate of 5-6% in order to reduce unemploy-
ment and poverty in Morocco. The absence of such growth, the Bank argued, would 
potentially increase socio-political tensions (World Bank, 2006b). And as the Moroc-
can cities had gradually became the centre focus of the makhzen during the 1980s and 
the 1990s, new approaches of urban government were generated in order to meet the 
requirements of market-oriented growth. Neil Brenner describes these new approaches 
as “locational policies”. The essential feature of these policies is their goal to enhance 
the economic competitiveness of particular places and territories in relation to broader, 
supranational circuits of capital accumulation (Brenner, 2004: 202-203). Locational 
policies	 intend	to	lure	investments	 to	specific	places	in	order	 to	stimulate	general	or	
national economic growth. Brenner highlights that it was only since the 1980s that 
Western European states began to deploy locational policies extensively at the urban 
scale. Before, such policies were most frequently mobilized and situated at the national 
scale, in conjunction with the national-developmentalist strategies of industrialization 
and wealth redistribution under the Keynesian welfare regime. A similar argument can 
be made with respect to ISI-strategies and the nature of the developmental state in 
the Third World. Growth-strategies of rapid industrialization, massive public spending 
and the expansion of state bureaucracies in that part of the world were also organized 
mainly at the national scale. Yet, since the 1980s, Brenner argues, urban locational 
policies have been mobilized aggressively in Europe by national, regional and local 
state	institutions	in	order	to	promote	the	specific	competitive	advantages	of	strategic	
cities and regions in relation to global spaces of economic competition (Ibid.: 203). In 
the third chapter I highlighted already that king Mohammed VI has followed the same 
path by commanding large-scale urban and regional development programs such as the 
Tanger Med industrial port; the promotion of offshore facilities in Casablanca, Fez and 
other major cities; and last but not least, the development of the Bouregreg river valley 
between the twin-cities of Rabat and Salé. The latter is a typical example of an urban 
mega-project.
The whereabouts of (state) power: a perspective on the hierarchical powers of reach
As mentioned in chapter 1, there is a tendency in mainstream accounts on political life 
in the Arab World that typically views the state’s power as something congruent with 
its cartographic boundaries. Power emerges from an institutional core – the regime 
– which exerts, via direct intervention, its hegemony over subordinated institutions, 
spaces and scales. At the core of this particular perspective, the Arab state has been 
monopolized by the regime. Additionally, the particular territory in which the regime 
operates	has	been	often	reified	as	a	fixed	unit	of	sovereign	space	(Agnew,	1994;	Allen,	
2004). As such, the Arab regime presents itself as the privileged site of political forma-
tion, intervention and inquiry. Political change – or the lack of change – are then mostly 
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explained in terms of endogenous political legacies (Parker, 2009). Insofar as the image 
is maintained that distinguishes between an internal, domestic space, in which national 
governments exercise power in an orderly fashion and hold the monopoly of violence 
over	 a	 defined	 territory	 and	 its	 population	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 an	 external,	 rather	
anarchic and disordered space of inter-state relations on the other hand, the territorial 
state is represented as a homogenous and endogenous political entity maintained and 
controlled	by	an	identifiable	centre	or	regime	(Allen,	2004:	21;	see	also	Agnew,	1994).	
This kind of perception of state territoriality and the particular association between the 
state and the regime often generates two misconceptions. First of all, this dominant im-
age presupposes a clear boundary between the domestic regime on the one hand, and 
global political actors (intervening from the outside) on the other hand. Secondly, the 
perception of the regime as a power centre also suggested that the state it controlled was 
organized as a national state, and, by implication, that state-territoriality and state-sov-
ereignty are consequently bundled together at the national scale (Brenner, 2004: 80). 
This kind of “territorial trap” of the nation-state (Agnew, 1994), resulted in a body of 
scholarship on the Arab state that has largely neglected the locational urban policies 
of the last decades and the dynamics of new state space formation (Brenner, 2004). 
However, once we trace the different political practices on the ground, both the bound-
edness of the Arab regime and the coherence projected by the homogenous state image 
disappear (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). The privatization of the state, the prolif-
eration of new regulatory state-arrangements and the multiplication of political actors 
(both	domestic	and	foreign)	that	influence	the	Moroccan	neoliberal	project	have	made	
it	 extremely	difficult	 to	 actually	pin	down	 the	 institutional	geography	of	power	 and	
decision-making (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). The actual modern capitalist state is em-
bodied within an increasingly dispersed ensemble of institutional practices, political 
agency and techniques of government, not at all matching the commonly perceived 
and generally accepted idea of the state – or even the regime – as a coherent unit act-
ing upon society (cf. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). The Bouregreg Vally is a salient case 
which argues for a more complex understanding of the nature of the Moroccan state, 
and by extension, the Arab state in general. In other words, the evidence presented 
here urges upon an understanding of political agency which recognizes the continuous 
transformative character of the state and the particular ways in which state power can 
be geographically dispersed and deployed differently.
The political and strategic shift at the end of the 1970s towards neoliberal forms of gov-
ernment had obviously its effect on the institutional organization and location of state 
power. As I already argued in chapter 2, both in the US and Europe (Keynesianism) and 
in many former Third World countries (developmentalism) the crisis of state develop-
mentalism in the 1970s and the 1980s gave way to a process of ‘glocalization’ which 
resulted in a rescaling of politics and a restructuring of the institutional state space from 
the national scale both upwards and downwards (Swyngedouw, 2004). There are im-
portant differences between developmentalism and neoliberalism which have produced 
their	own	specific	spatial	outcomes.	In	contrast	to	the	more	redistributive	agenda	asso-
ciated with Keynesianism and the developmental state, the neoliberal state attempted to 
promote economic growth and welfare by stimulating the competitive advantages of its 
most strategic territories. The general idea behind earlier modes of capitalist regulation 
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was thus reversed. While Keynesianism and developmentalism supported the premise 
that	general	welfare	and	a	minimum	guarantee	of	social	security	would	benefit	capital-
ist development, neoliberalism was based on the conviction that the prioritization of 
capital	accumulation	and	profit	maximization	would	eventually	lead	to	general	welfare	
(e.g. through a trickle-down effect). Additionally, developmentalism takes the national 
economy and the national territory as the target of comprehensive state action and state 
regulation, while neoliberal state strategies are more dispersed and do not necessarily 
treat the national territory as a uniform political space (Brenner, 2004; Ong, 2006). 
Consequently, at the level of the city, the transition towards “urban entrepreneurial-
ism” turned particular strategic localities into self-promoting islands of entrepreneur-
ship (Harvey, 1989b; Brenner, 2004). Today, the urban scale represents the strategic 
institutional arena in which current neoliberal forms of entrepreneurial government are 
unfolding. In this process, the state, as the primary institutional mediator of this geog-
raphy of uneven development, has been rolled out into new institutional arrangements 
in order to turn urban territories into developable assets and market-opportunities. Just 
like capitalist companies, urban territories entered into a competitive logic to maximize 
economic growth and capital accumulation. In Morocco, the coastal cities (Casablanca, 
Rabat, Tangiers, etc.), especially because of their location, are now considered to be 
key sites to generate national economic growth. 
“Neoliberal reason”, Aihwa Ong, argues, “has taken economic rationality in a highly 
flexible	direction	that	does	not	use	the	national	territory	as	the	overriding	frame	of	ref-
erence for political decisions” (Ong, 2006: 76-77). To the contrary, the neoliberal adage 
of economic and free market “borderlessness” has fragmented the national territory 
and generated the creation of multiple political spaces and techniques of government 
spread within the national territory (Ibid.: 77). As a result, some places and regions 
are systematically privileged over others. Structurally, this (urban) transformation has 
manifested itself for instance through what Neil Brenner calls “new state spaces”. In 
order to support and even direct private enterprise, state power has been rescaled and 
reterritorialized	into	new	institutional	configurations	of	sovereignty	which	attempt	to	
directly	influence	the	geography	of	capitalist	accumulation.	As	a	result,	a	more	complex	
geography of state power is presented, where it is seen to be resituated and displaced 
at various – both sub- and transnational – scales of economic and political activity (cf. 
Brenner, 1998; 1999; 2004; see also Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004).410 However, we should 
not fall into the trap of reifying these new state spaces in the same way that the nation-
state	has	been	reified	in	the	past.	In	that	case	a	rescaling	or	re-institutionalization	of	
politics would present a picture of state power that has just been exchanged or replaced 
more or less intact between different scales, territories or zones (Allen, 2004). In this 
view, the new state space framework can seem rather structuralist, allowing little scope 
for questions of agency, strategy and distinctive local politics (Mackinnon & Shaw, 
2010).411 Yet, the creation of a state space such as in the Bouregreg Valley is more than 
410  For Brenner, rescaling refers to hierarchical nesting of state power among different levels of govern-
ment,	while	reterritorialization	refers	to	the	specific	articulation	of	state	policies	and	institutions	across	
different locations, places and regions within a given territory (Brenner, 2004: 94-104) The “rescaling” 
literature	specifically	focuses	on	the	transfer	of	certain	functions	and	responsibilities	between	different	ter-
ritorial ‘scales’ of state organization (MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010).  
411  This was brought to my attention by one of the anonymous reviewers for my article in Urban Studies 
(cf. Bogaert, 2011a).
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just a top-down transmission of state power to lower or higher echelons or scales. An 
important critique comes from advocates of relational thinking, emphasizing the open-
ness and multiplicity of space as a product of interrelations (Massey, 2005; Allen & 
Cochrane, 2010). In contrast to a topographic (scaled) understanding of state power, 
John Allen and Allan Cochrane advocate a topological account of state spatiality (Allen 
& Cochrane, 2010). From this point of view, they argue that what states or state spaces 
possess in terms of power is “reach, not height”:
Topological thinking suggests that the powers of the state are not so much “above 
us” as more or less present through mediated and real-time connections, some 
direct, others more distanciated. Indeed, what is arguably novel about the state’s 
spatiality in the current moment is its ability to exercise its hierarchical powers 
of reach	in	ways	that	reflect	a	topological	appreciation	of	space	and	place	(Ibid.:	
1073)
As such, they argue that new arrangements of state power are to be viewed based upon 
an assemblage of different actors (public and/or private) “where elements of the central 
and local state are “lodged” within the region” or new state space (Ibid.).412 A new state 
space such as the Bouregreg Valley should not only be viewed in terms of a rescaling 
of state power but also as a reassemblage of state power in terms of “spatial reach” 
(Ibid.).
With this approach, Allen and Cochrane do not necessarily dismiss the existence of 
“a central state apparatus, whether unitary or otherwise, in possession of far-reaching 
powers” (Ibid.: 1073). To the contrary, central state power has not been undermined, 
only	redefined.	This	is	also	important	to	understand	the	case	of	Morocco.	A	topological	
view of state power in Morocco does not discard the centrality of the Moroccan monar-
chy	or	the	significant	power	of	the	makhzen. Following Allen & Cochrane’s topological 
approach	 to	 the	geography	of	 state	power,	 the	 redefinition	of	 state	power	 should	be	
understood in two ways. First of all, what they mean by “reach” or “far-reaching pow-
ers” should not be understood in terms of a distance that can be measured in kilometres. 
This (topographic) view would imply an extensive reach of state power. In contrast, 
they argue that their approach rather looks at the “reach of government” in terms of its 
ability to permeate everyday life (Painter, 2006), govern “at a distance” (Rose, 1999), 
and produce “politics of truth” (Lemke, 2002). In this view, reach is understood as an 
intensive process which cannot be separated from the social relations that comprise it 
(Allen & Cochrane, 2010: 1074). It is obvious that “reach” refers here to the impact of 
technologies of government, and that government is understood as a form of power that 
makes up the “tangled hierarchies of state decision making, where authority is shared 
between public and private agencies” (Ibid.; see also Foucault, 2007).   
412  This critique on Brenner should be considered as a complementation to his valuable insights on new 
state spaces and therefore I wish to keep his concept of ‘new state space’ to describe the particular trans-
formation of the Moroccan state through the establishment of the Bouregreg project. The new state space 
framework remains valuable to inform analysis of the historically embedded and changing geographies of 
state restructuring and government (MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010). Nevertheless, it is very useful to comple-
ment this framework with the insights of relational thinking in order to pinpoint the contingency and open-
ness of emerging developments and future strategies. These developments and strategies depend, after all, 
on the negotiation and cooperation of a multiple and complex set of actors (see also below).  
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Secondly, considering state power in terms of “spatial reach” does not necessarily imply 
that power and authority are slipping away from the traditional power centre in times of 
neoliberal globalization, but rather that state power is subject to constant renegotiation 
and displacement by the particular actors drawn within reach (Allen & Cochrane, 2010: 
1074). Especially, this second consideration will be the framework to interpret the case 
of	the	Bouregreg	Valley.	In	the	sense	that	states	are	important	fields	of	class	relations,	
the globalization of capital not only draws foreign capital to a certain territory (urban, 
regional	or	national),	but	also	includes	it	as	a	player	on	the	institutional	field	of	the	state	
(local or national) (Panitch, 1998). Therefore, Allen and Cochrane argue that in order 
to understand the different hierarchies of decision-making and the spatial reach of state 
power	we	have	to	pay	attention	to	its	specific	and	variegated	institutional	manifesta-
tions.	What	matters	is	not	only	the	specific	scale	at	which	manifestations	of	state-power	
take	place.	To	the	contrary,	what	really	matters	is	not	so	much	the	scalar	configuration	
of	power,	but	rather	 the	institutional	configurations	of	power	which	assemble	differ-
ent actors and which are situated of course at various scales.413	These	configurations	
are what Allen and Cochrane describe as “assemblages of state power”. In many ways 
their view resembles Parker’s conception of “complexes of power”. Parker argues that 
understanding contemporary political change in the Arab world “requires attention to 
power effects that arise, inter alia, in the interplay between “globalization” and sub-
national structures of accumulation, domination, and legitimation (authority and redis-
tribution)” (Parker, 2004: 6). As a result, both Allen and Cochrane and Parker consider 
these new assemblages or complexes of power as somehow decentred, but at the same 
time not disconnected, from the regulatory scope of national state institutions and the 
institutional hierarchy within the general state apparatus (Ibid.: 35; Allen & Cochrane, 
2010:	1075).	In	other	words,	a	specific	assemblage	of	power	within	the	urban	scale	will	
not necessarily be disconnected from national decision-making processes but relatively 
autonomous (cf. Panitch & Gindin, 2005). The Bouregreg state space is a space where 
such an assemblage unfolds. Authority is shared and negotiated between state-agents 
and, in this case, private investors, external consultants, architects and urban designers. 
While a project such as in the Bouregreg Valley may still be largely state-controlled, the 
detachment and the displacement of decision-making powers opens up new space for 
negotiation. Private investors, for example, have their own interests and the Bouregreg 
project would not be possible without their involvement. Yet, state-agents on the other 
hand,	still	have	power	and	control	over	who	they	assemble	within	a	certain	configura-
tion and in which conditions the negotiations take place. 
The (contingent) patterning of place and agency within this process of state reforma-
tion results in what Aihwa Ong terms as “graduated sovereignty” (Ong, 2006). It is the 
effect	generated	by	neoliberal	state	reformation,	flexible	management	and	the	reorga-
nization of political spaces in relation to the interests and dynamics of global capital, 
global	production	processes	and	global	financial	circuits.	Forms	of	graduated	sover-
eignty	 are	 state-produced	 exceptional	 zones	 of	 government	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 private	
(multinational) capital that exist inside or alongside zones of conventional government 
(e.g.	the	national	territory,	a	region,	a	city).	Special	Economic	Zones	(SEZs),	Qualified	
413  In a way, authors like Neil Brenner have also attempted to grasp this institutional character, but in a 
specific	(scalar)	vocabulary	which,	according	to	Allen	and	Cochrane,	tends	to	obscure	some	of	its	complex-
ities and different agencies (Allen & Cochrane, 2010; see also MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010).  
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Industrial Zones (QIZs), free trade zones, offshore zones and urban development zones 
– to be found in countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, 
etc –  are some of the characteristic territorial and topological products that emerged in 
the Arab region over the last two decades and resulted in particular regimes of gradu-
ated sovereignty in which populations and labour forces are often subjected to diverse 
modes of government (cf. Davis, 2006b;  Sidaway, 2007; Parker, 2009). Sovereignty, 
defined	by	thinkers	such	as	Carl	Schmitt	and	Giorgio	Agamben	as	the	ultimate	power	
to call a state of exception to the law or norm, should be interpreted here in the positive 
or productive sense: i.e. as the power to create exceptional opportunities, usually for a 
privileged minority, to pursue those political goals and enjoy those political advantages 
that are not valid in the rest of the national territory and which are not granted to the 
majority of the population (Ong, 2006: 101; see also Agamben, 1998; 2005). As men-
tioned already above, within this framework of graduated sovereignty, the state or its 
dispersed state-agents are not the only political actors. Particular privileges, the state-
institutional	playing	field,	authority	and	governmental	power	are	shared	and	negotiated	
with non-state actors: e.g. NGOs, private investors, multinational corporations, supra-
national and interstate institutions (Allen, 2004; Ong, 2006; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). 
The creation of spaces of graduated sovereignty were particular neoliberal class strate-
gies to undermine the very class compromises that were embedded in previous de-
velopmentalist capitalist regimes. It allows the capitalist classes to connect and seize 
upon the opportunities of neoliberal globalization and the global mobility of capital. 
Additionally, this perspective on graduated sovereignty exceeds more simplistic binary 
conceptions of state power in relation with these capitalist processes; i.e. viewing the 
state as either the sole sovereign actor within its own territory or as a powerless entity 
dictated by neoliberal globalization. The real picture is thus more complex. It may be 
true that weak and debt-ridden economies of many third world countries left political 
rulers vulnerable and dependent on outside economic forces (e.g. the US, IMF, World 
Bank, multinational corporations, etc.). Yet, despite their vulnerability and the pressures 
of global market forces, the ruling political alliances in any state still had the capacity 
to manipulate and regulate global market relations and remodel these relations to their 
benefit	within	their	societies	(Ong,	2006:	76).	As	such,	 the	particular	ways	in	which	
global market integration is established, are still based on particular political choices. 
The fragmentation of national economies and the establishment of forms of gradated 
of sovereignty are the result of deliberative neoliberal calculations. At the urban scale, 
these forms of graduated sovereignty should be regarded as spatially grounded social 
processes in which a wide range of different actors – both domestic and foreign – with 
different objectives and interests are assembled and interact with each other to impact 
upon the processes of urbanization and the production of urban space (Harvey, 1989b). 
The new state spaces that result out of neoliberal calculations are not themselves the 
agents in globalization, but rather represent the institutional arrangements which as-
semble particular agents.  
In order to better understand and visualize these kinds of state-promoted uneven devel-
opment at the urban scale, we may have to adjust our image of capital flow in contem-
porary neoliberal globalization. As James Ferguson stated: 
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It is worth noting that the movement of capital […] is “global” in the sense that 
it crosses the globe, but it does not encompass or cover contiguous geographic 
space. The movements of capital cross national borders, but they jump point to 
point,	and	huge	areas	are	simply	bypassed.	Capital	does	not	“flow”	from	London	
to Cabinda; it hops, neatly skipping over most of what lies in between (Ferguson, 
2005, p.379). 
The hopping of capital between “separately administered enclaves” leads to situations 
in which some people are exploited, others ignored or even dispelled, and again others 
able to enrich themselves with state-support. The Bouregreg Valley in Rabat is such 
an enclave. Chosen to be developed as a tourist and commercial hub, the valley now 
constitutes a local destination ready to be connected to the global chain of capital. As 
such, the development of the Bouregreg Valley is a salient example of how cities are 
redesigned	to	the	desires	of	property	owners,	landlords,	developers	and	finance	capital-
ists by transferring particular political powers and competences into a new state space. 
Additionally, these kind of large urban development schemes create new spatial logics 
in the regulation of capital, investment and labour. They alter the motion of goods and 
people in the city permanently. As class projects they tend to privilege global capital 
interests over the pressing demands and social needs of the majority of its urban resi-
dents.
Mapping the new state space of the Bouregreg Valley
In her famous book ‘Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco’, Janet Abu Lughod empiri-
cally analysed the historical and genealogical roots of urban planning in Morocco and 
the historical conditions of current uneven urban development (Abu Lughod, 1980; see 
also Rabinow, 1989). French colonialism and Morocco’s integration into the French 
capitalist	sphere	of	influence	required	massive	investments	in	urban	development.	Back	
then, (French) investment capital already hopped over certain areas of the city (e.g. the 
indigenous parts of the city) and accumulation was mainly restricted to the develop-
ment of the ville nouvelle and the European industrial interests. From the very begin-
ning of Morocco’s capitalist urban development until today, large parts of the city and 
its population – the bidonville, the informal expansions and in some ways the medina 
–	were	either	neglected	or	integrated	under	specific	uneven	conditions	(in	the	form	of	a	
mass labour reserve force or more recently in the form of poverty capital). One of the 
most important conclusions to be drawn from Abu Lughod’s work is that the conditions 
for uneven urban development were politically planned and implemented. This was the 
case during the Protectorate and is still the case today. The city of Rabat played an im-
portant role in the history of urban development and planning in Morocco. Confronted 
with heavy opposition from the traditional urban elites in Fez, resident-general Lyautey 
chose Rabat to be the capital of the French Protectorate. As a result the city began to 
grow at a fast rate and would eventually, many years later, even overtake cities like Fez 
and Marrakech in size (i.e. if you consider Salé as part of the larger urban agglomera-
tion). 
The Protectorate became a crucial factor in the reorganization of the urban hierarchy of 
Morocco. While former Moroccan capitals Fez and Marrakech had always been much 
larger than the coastal towns before French rule, the development of colonial centres 
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in Rabat (as administrative capital) and Casablanca (as economic capital) irreversibly 
changed the urban hierarchy from the interior cities to the coastal cities (Abu Lughod, 
1980).414 Ironically, for a long time, urban planning in Rabat, despite its location and 
despite its connotation as a ‘coastal city’, had turned its back to the seashore and wa-
terfront development. This would radically change with the accession to the throne 
of	Mohamed	VI.	Under	his	reign,	urban	government	in	Morocco	definitely	adopted	a	
more business-like character in order to stimulate the urban economy. Especially, the 
sea-shores of the coastal cities became an important asset in this endeavour. Addition-
ally, Mohamed VI was known to be a real rbati and it was said that he privileged the 
development of the Moroccan capital over other cities in the country.415 For example 
in the case of the Royal Avenue in Casablanca, it was said that one of the reason for 
the impasse of this project was that Mohammed VI didn’t have the same interest in the 
project as his father did. He rather preferred that available state resources went primar-
ily to urban mega-projects he launched, such as for example the Bouregreg project. 
Mohamed VI wanted to change the image of Rabat from being a rather boring, mainly 
administrative centre, into a dynamic and vibrant destination which meets the interna-
tional standards of global city consumption and investment (Bargach, 2008). 
In the wake of the urban entrepreneurial transition stimulated by the monarchy, the 
involvement of the state in urban restructuring has increased rapidly. As I mentioned 
earlier, the increasing mobility of global capital worldwide implied that investors 
carefully search out for the most favourable conditions and their intention to capture 
the best value-added investments has resulted, also in Morocco, in the creation of an 
“archipelago of specialized ‘clusters’” spread around the national territory (M Davis, 
2006b: 62). This “spatial selectivity” is produced by state power by ways in which state 
policies target particular kinds of investments in particular zones and spaces (Bunnel & 
Coe, 2005: 834; see also Brenner, 2004). The Bouregreg Valley is one of the icons of 
Morocco’s commitment to waterfront development and “showcase urbanism” (Barthel 
and Mouloudi, 2009: 56).416	On	7	January	2006,	Mohamed	VI	officially	launched	the	
ambitious project for the restructuring of the valley. This royal project is situated strate-
gically alongside the Bouregreg estuary within the valley between the twin-cities Rabat 
and Salé. It covers a territory of approximately 6,000 hectares (amongst others public 
beaches and Salé’s former military camps). Before the beginning of the project, the 
valley was largely unpopulated and left fallow, despite the fact that more than 50% of 
the territory was privately owned. Moreover, 70% of the area of the project is actually 
located on the territory of the city of Salé. According to the Bouregreg news brochure 
the valley constituted a marginalized area between the two cities. Some terrains were 
used as a dumping ground for household refuse and waste water. Other areas were oc-
cupied by bidonvilles and informal housing, etc. From the perspective of the initiators 
of the project, the accumulation of these “nuisances” caused the severe degradation 
of	the	area	and	had	to	be	fixed	(AVVB,	2008).	Promoted	as	an	“opportunity	(...)	for	
all the actual and future inhabitants” of the two cities, the project tries redevelop this 
414  Already in 1936 Casablanca, previously a very modest town, became the largest city with more than a 
quarter of a million residents.
415  This is based on perception of course. Other sources argue that Mohamed VI is also particularly fond 
of Tetouan and that spends a lot of time in and attention to that city.  
416  In original: “urbanisme de vitrine”.
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wasteland and invigorate the capital’s prestige as an attractive destination in the Medi-
terranean area.417 
The whole project will be implemented in six stages. Over the course of these stages, 
the project foresees the construction for instance of a port for cruise ships, two marina’s, 
luxury hotels, apartments, villas, commercial centres, a conference centre, a museum, a 
theatre,	offices,	an	amusement	park,	a	technopolis,	a	golf	course	and	eco-tourism	facili-
ties.	The	first	stage	‘Bab	al	Bahr’	(gateway	to	the	sea)	and	the	second	stage	‘Amwaj’	
(the waves) are already elaborated and under construction. The four other stages are 
still in their study phase.418	On	12	may	2009,	the	construction	works	of	the	first	stage	
started	and	are	scheduled	to	be	finished	by	2013.	Bab	al	Bahr	is	located	at	the	mouth	of	
the Bouregreg river. It is bordered by the two ancient medinas of Rabat and Salé and 
the historical fortress of the Oudaya, which is located in front of the medina of Rabat 
at the seashore and dates back to the 12th	century.	This	first	stage	covers	a	surface	of	
70 hectares and comprises a real estate program of 540,000 square metres, including 
1,700 residential units, hotels and various commercial, tourist, cultural and business 
facilities.419 The total costs of this particular urban development project are estimated at 
750 million USD. Bab al Bahr is presented as a city between two cities and it has been 
designed around seven districts: Marina and River Front, Arts District, Central District, 
Jewel District, Cultural District, Salé Wall District and the Business District. Since the 
beginning of 2010, sales are open and apartments can be purchased. On the website of 
Al Maabar – the international real estate investment company from Abu Dhabi and one 
of	the	partners	in	the	Bab	al	Bahr	project	–	the	investor	confirmed	that	following	the	
launch of the sales in February 2010, 40% of the available units were already sold.420 
417  Film institutionnel du projet Bouregreg – introduction, http://www.bouregreg.com (accessed 15/03/10 
– own translation).
418  For more detailed information see http://www.bouregreg.com (accessed 26/11/2010).
419  For more detailed information see http://www.babalbahr.ma (accessed 26/11/2010).
420  http://www.almaabar.com/en/news/media-center/news-archive/morocco-units-in-al-maabar-project-40-
sold.html (accessed 26/11/2010)
The project of the Bouregreg Valley. The red frame delineates 
the Bab el Bahr stage © Beatrice Platet
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Together with Bab el Bahr, a new bridge (Moulay Hassan), two tramlines and a tunnel 
underneath the historic fortress of the Oudaya are under construction in order to im-
prove the mobility between Salé and the Moroccan capital and reconcile the twin cities 
symbolically after centuries of historic rivalry (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980). The public au-
thorities are committed to invest at least 3,25 billion MAD in infrastructural improve-
ments (1,5 billion from the state budget, one billion from the Hassan II fund and 1,25 
billion from the General Direction of the Local Communities).421 These infrastructural 
endeavours	are	planned	to	be	finished	in	2011.	The	improvement	of	the	mobility	be-
tween the two cities formed an important part of the marketing and the promotion of 
the project. Many residents, especially from Salé who travel every day to the Moroccan 
capital for their work, consider this part of the project an important step forwards. Ev-
ery day, 650,000 people cross the Bouregreg river to go to work or for other purposes. 
In the long term, there are two or three extra tramlines planned to connect the two cities 
with the subsequent stages of the project. The two existing tramlines will eventually 
also enlarged to connect the city of Temara with Rabat. 
421  Lemghari Essakl, director of AAVB, in an interview at the Moroccan television. The inter-
view can be watched on the website of the project (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.
php?Id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4) (accessed 26/11/2010).
The Bab el Bahr sequence with the new transport infrastructures. 
Source: AAVB (2008: 18-19)
Map of the two current tramlines and the two future trajectories. Source: 
Dossier de présentation Tramway de Rabat-Salé
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The second stage (Amwaj) comprises a high class residential islet located right behind 
the new bridge Moulay Hassan. According to the initial design, the islet will be built 
– Venetian style – along both sides of the river banks and subdivided in smaller wa-
terways. The residents will be able to reach their villas by boat.422 The total cost of this 
stage was estimated at 2.5 billion USD. The excavation works started in 2006. At the 
moment, however, the project is on stand-by as one of its main investors, Sama Dubai, 
a subsidiary of the sovereign wealth fund Dubai Holding, withdrew from the project 
due	to	the	global	financial	meltdown	in	2008.	
A mega-project such as the Bouregreg project has to accelerate the rhythm of invest-
ments in countries such as Morocco. Especially, after the events of 9/11, the Ameri-
can	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 	 the	European	 suspicions	 vis-à-vis	 oil-rich	 countries	 and	
investors from the Gulf has compelled these wealthy and powerful actors to look for 
new investment outlets. Morocco has willingly presented itself to these investors as a 
reliable alternative and currently manages to attract 80% of all Middle Eastern invest-
ments in the Maghreb region (Vermeren, 2009: 264). The Bouregreg-project is not the 
only example. The Saphira project for example, also in Rabat, aims to redevelop the 
11 km long coastline of the city and involves Emaar properties, another Dubai based 
real estate developer (Mouloudi, 2009). Other projects in Tangiers, Casablanca and 
Marrakech have also attracted real estate developers from the gulf (cf. Barthel, 2008; 
Barthel & Verdeil, 2008; Barthel & Mouloudi, 2009; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009; Barthel 
& Planel, 2010; Kanai & Kutz, 2010). The predominant strategy to attract foreign in-
vestment is centred on urban infrastructure and real estate. The enhancement of the 
urban competitive advantage is seen as largely dependent on improving and adapting 
the built environment to the accumulation strategies of key elites (Swyngedouw, 2007: 
61). As such, Swyngedouw argues, the physical reconstruction of the city and strate-
422  The project resembles strongly with some of the island projects in the Gulf. For example the Amwaj-
Islands in Bahrain (http://www.amwaj-islands.com, accessed 26/11/2010). 
The Amwaj sequence. Sources: http://www.culturategic.com/the-real-
estate-in-morocco-keeps-bubbling-up (accessed 22/11/2010) and AAVB 
(2008: 22-23)
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gies of economic growth tend to go hand in hand, and are very often even perceived as 
a quasi simultaneous process (Ibid.). Strategic locations within cities are appropriated, 
liberated	and	reconfigured	to	be	presented	as	excellent	market	opportunities	for	those	
investors who look for new capital surplus absorption possibilities on the one hand, and 
those consumers who wish to take advantage of the new cosmopolitan lifestyle on the 
other	hand.	The	public	authorities	in	Morocco	have	stimulated	FDI	with	fiscal	benefits	
of approximately 2 billion USD per year between 2001 and 2006 (Vermeren, 2009: 
262). As a result of the improved business climate, two private equity funds, Attijari 
Invest and Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) created a joint venture in December 2006 
and established the Moroccan Infrastructure Fund (MIF) in order “to capitalize on the 
ongoing reforms designed to spur economic growth”.423  
To	 secure	 and	maintain	 the	flow	of	 foreign	 investments	 and	 to	 exploit	 the	 strategic	
locations Morocco has to offer, political facilitation and intervention is required. The 
preparations for the Bouregreg project started back in 2001 when Mohamed VI ex-
pressed his explicit wish to develop the Bouregreg Valley. As such, the project became 
a royal priority. On the initiative of the late Abdelaziz Meziane Belfqih, one of the 
most	influential	royal	advisors,	and	under	the	direction	of	Lemghari	Essakl,	the	‘So-
ciété d’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg’ (SABR) was established with the 
specific	assignment	to	work	out	a	plan	for	the	future	of	the	Valley.	SABR	was	a	branch	
of the CDG. By then, CDG had become already Morocco’s largest publicly owned 
investment bank and is currently a major stakeholder in several urban and regional 
development programs across the country (amongst others the Casanearshore park and 
Casa-Marina).	The	monarchy	holds	firm	control	over	these	economic	institutions.	Both	
the director of SABR and CDG are directly appointed by the king. However, the actual 
implementation	of	the	project	could	create	difficulties	or	at	least	a	delay	as	the	project’s	
designated territory was part of the jurisdiction of six urban districts (three in Rabat and 
three in Salé) and fell under the authority of both the locally elected City Councils of 
Rabat and Salé.424 After all, with the municipal reform of 2002, local City Councils had 
gained some considerable control over construction licenses, spatial planning and local 
government (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007; see also chapter 4). In order to avoid a 
potential institutional battle, SABR was resituated and became a branch of a newly cre-
ated autonomous governmental agency, the Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée 
du Bouregreg (Agency for the development of the Bouregreg Valley) (AAVB). 
The AAVB was established by law 16-04 and promulgated by dahir on 23 November 
423  http://www.ecpinvestments.com/fund.xml?id=1008&p&d (accessed 26/11/2010). For more informa-
tion see websites of MIF and ECP: http://www.mif-pe.com and http://www.ecpinvestments.com. Attijari 
Invest is the private equity arm of Attijariwafa bank, one of Morocco’s largest bank and the 8th largest bank 
in	Africa.	ECP	is	the	first	private	equity	group	to	raise	more	than	1,8	billion	$US	for	investment	companies	
across Africa and the Middle East. On ECP’s website you can read that the company’s “investment strategy 
is focused on delivering consistently above-market returns to investors that are uncorrelated to the U.S. and 
other global economies”. The fund already invests in the Moroccan mining industry and public infrastruc-
ture works such as dams, airports, etc.. Eventually, the fund also aspires to take participations in infrastruc-
tural and other related services such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, natural resources, public 
services, etc. 
424  Since the 2002 Communal Charter, the separate urban districts in cities of more than 500,000 residents 
are fused together into one city council with an elected president (Catusse, Cattedra, Janati, 2007; see also 
chapter 4).  
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2005.	The	new	state	agency	received	the	specific	mission	to	develop	the	Valley.	This	
reform did not happen without the necessary transfers of political power. Article 26 
of law 16-04 dictates that the AAVB “takes all necessary measures for the realization 
and the honouring of the development plan”.425 Basically, law 16-04 further prescribes 
that the agency has exclusive authority over the project within its legally determined 
territorial boundaries. Moreover, all public competences related to the Urban Planning 
Agency of Rabat-Salé (AURS), the prefectures and the local municipalities are trans-
ferred to the new state agency. Indeed, the AAVB is responsible for the studies, the 
‘Special	Development	Plan’	and	the	contracting	of	investors	and	partners	to	finance	and	
develop the different stages of the project. The AAVB autonomously decides how the 
project has to evolve, what needs to be done and who will be integrated. For example, 
the particular decision on who would participate as private investment partners in the 
project (the investors from Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai) was not based upon a call for 
tender, but agreed by mutual consent be-
tween the agency and the investors (Mou-
loudi, 2010). The only exception or limi-
tation to its power is that the AAVB does 
not	officially	appropriate	the	territories	of	
the two municipalities and local taxes are 
still due to be paid to the proper munici-
pality.426 However, in a particular case, 
the authority of the AAVB even extends 
beyond its legally determined jurisdic-
tion. One of its subsidiaries, the Société 
du Tramway de Rabat-Salé (Rabat-Salé 
Tramway	 Company)	 (STRS),	 has	 offi-
cially received a mandate from the two 
City Councils to coordinate and manage 
the development of the tramway on the 
territory of the two cities.427 The STRS is 
responsible	for	the	design,	the	financing	
and the realization of the construction 
works as well as the direct and indirect 
exploitation of the tramway together 
with its foreign partners (STRS, n.d.).428 
In	order	to	fulfil	its	mission,	the	AAVB	is	authorized	to	deliver	construction	permits,	
regulate all deeds of sale, buy land and expropriate private landowners within its terri-
tory. “We are the state in this site”, as the director of Bouregreg Marina, another AAVB 
branch, made it clear to me.429 In some cases the powers of the AAVB even exceed 
425  Dahir n°1-05-70 (23/11/2005): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C2005%5CBO_537
4_fr.pdf (own translation).
426  Interview with Lemghari Essakl, general director of the AAVB (Rabat – 18/05/2010).
427  Interview with the director of the STRS (Rabat – 26/05/2010).
428  The AAVB owns a 99,99% share in STRS. The two municipalities each own one symbolic share, the 
Moroccan state owns two (interview with the director of STRS (Rabat – 26/05/2010)).  
429  Interview (Rabat, 20/05/2010)
The boundaries of the Bouregreg state space as 
determined by law 16-04. Source: http://www.boure-
greg.com (25/11/2010)
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those of traditional state institutions that are subjected to public law. The most obvious 
example is the special expropriation procedure adopted in law 16-04. Before the launch 
of the Bouregreg project, 44% of the designated territory was publicly owned (10% by 
the state, 10% by the two municipalities and 24% was Habous).430 This territory was 
immediately put at the disposal of the AAVB. 56%, however, was in private hands. 
Morocco’s compulsory purchase act states that expropriation can only occur when its 
purpose is declared as a public interest (d’utilité publique). In accordance with this act, 
Law 16-04 (article 34) and decree 2-05-1514 (article 10) make it possible for the AAVB 
to declare those territories that are integrated in the urban planning zone of the Boure-
greg Valley and the Special Development Plan as a public interest. If an agreement with 
the private landowner cannot be found, the agency can proceed with the expropriation 
of his property.431	Furthermore,	law	16-04	has	modified	some	of	the	expropriation	con-
ditions compared to the normal procedures in order to speed up the process of expro-
priation.432 The AVVB can wait until 10 years after the announcement of expropriation 
to proceed with the actual purchase of the expropriated territory (while the normal term 
is	2	years).	Additionally,	the	indemnification	for	the	expropriated	is	fixed	at	the	value	
of the property at the moment of the publication of law 16-04 (1 December  2005).433 
Anticipating my question what the public interest was in the construction of a marina, 
luxury	apartments	and	five	star	hotels,	the	Head	of	Corporate	Finance	&	Partnerships	
of the AAVB answered: “creating wealth is also a public interest”.434 The question is of 
course for whom?
     
According	to	Mohamed	Souafi,	a	former	high-ranked	official	within	the	MHUAE	and	
currently working for the national Institute of Urban Planning (INAU), the creation of 
the AAVB had the explicit intention to exclude the locally elected municipal councils 
and centralize the political decision-making process.435 The AAVB is placed under the 
direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior, governed by an administrative council 
and directed by the former director of SABR, Lemghari Essakl, who was appointed by 
the king.436 The administrative council is represented by all important local and national 
government	officials,	amongst	others,	 the	Minister	of	Interior,	 the	wali	of	the	region	
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer, the governors of the prefectures of Rabat and Salé, the di-
rector of the AURS and even the presidents of the locally elected City Councils of Ra-
bat and Salé. Nevertheless, according to a former consultant of the Bouregreg project, 
430  Habous is an Islamic legal institution of religious mortmain property. The property is administered by 
the Ministry of Habous. 
431  There was a particular case in which the former mayor of Salé was expropriated. He owned a tourist 
complex (Le temps Vert) which was located on the territory of Salé but within the boundaries of the Boure-
greg project. According to Lemghari Essakl, the general director of the AAVB, the constructions of the 
tourist complex “did not correspond to the architectural orientations and prescriptions” of the project and 
the AAVB took the decision to acquire the properties of the former mayor of Salé. See television interview 
with Lemghari Essakl (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.php?Id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4) 
(accessed 26/11/2010). 
432  See Dahir n°1-05-70 of 23 November 2005 and Decree n°2-05-1514 of 25 November 2005.  http://
www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C2005%5CBO_5374_fr.pdf
433		Interview	with	AAVB	official	(Rabat	–	20/06/2010).	
434  Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
435  Interview (Rabat – 07/05/2009).
436  See Dahir n°1-05-70 of 23 November 2005 and Decree n°2-05-1514 of 25 November 2005.  http://
www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C2005%5CBO_5374_fr.pdf
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this administrative council should be seen as “divided between those members directly 
appointed by the king who make the important decisions and those who are there just 
to nod their heads and approve the made decisions”.437 Whatever the precise balance 
of power really is in the administrative council, there is little transparency about the 
final	decision-making	process.	As	such,	due	to	its	particular	legal	status,	the	AAVB	is	a	
rather exceptional case of deconcentration. Exceptional in two ways. First of all, there 
is no identical form of state-agency to be found in Morocco. Secondly, it is also an 
exceptional form of deconcentration as it leaves room for and depends on negotiation 
with	other	specific	(non-state)	actors	within	the	newly	constituted	assemblage	of	(class)	
power.	The	Bouregreg	state	space	is	not	only	place-specific	and	autonomous	vis-à-vis	
all other deconcentrated institutions and spatial scales (e.g. the Wilaya, the prefectures 
and the provinces), it also involves more than just a top-down hierarchical link to cen-
tral powers: i.e. the Ministry of Interior and the makhzen (see below).
A common explanation for these kinds of reforms is that Morocco must compete with 
other countries in the region to attract foreign investments and adapt to a global com-
petitive climate. Morocco cannot afford to standstill and has to take constant measures 
to	maintain	 and	 increase	 the	 investment	 flow,	 especially	 from	France	 and	 the	Arab	
Gulf (after 9/11), two of the most important business partners. But in order to secure 
this	flow	the	AAVB	is	a	salient	example	of	a	structure	that	–	to	quote	the	Moroccan	
geographer Aziz Iraki – “concentrates only on the attraction of capital (...): it’s central 
power adapting itself to the economic context”.438	Speed,	efficiency,	economic	neces-
sity and the incompetence of locally elected governments are some of the main, openly 
admitted, reasons for the legitimation of by-passing more democratic procedures and 
reforms.	As	an	official	of	the	AAVB	argued:	“the	people	that	govern	[the	zone	of	the	
project] are not elected and that is why we can work in the long run without indulgences 
to any political colour”.439 The former mayor of Rabat, Omar El Bahraoui, emphasized 
this necessity and legitimized the establishment of the AAVB in a documentary on the 
Bouregreg project at the Moroccan television: 
We consider that it is the only way to proceed more quickly, to proceed very fast 
[...]	and	 to	 transcend	all	 the	difficulties	and	 the	administrative	procedures	 that	
are very slow. [...] We have seen several projects that are completed, whether 
in Paris, London, Rome, Dubai... Well, they all have created an institution that 
enables the concentration of all competences in order to be able to authorize very 
quickly.440 
When confronted with this reorganization of state power and the attribution of enor-
mous powers to the AAVB, the general director of the state-agency, Lemghari Essakl, 
answered, in an interview for the Moroccan television, that:
We have to remember one important thing. We are in a very sensible location. 
We are in a very complex administrative arrangement: three urban districts on 
437  Interview (Rabat – 12/05/2010).
438  Interview (Rabat – 19/10/2009).
439  Interview (Rabat – 18/05/2010).
440  www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjcyctKYnsI&feature=related (accessed 13/03/2010; own translation).
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the right bank, three urban districts on the left bank. To give the opportunity to 
investors tomorrow, to have just one party to negotiate with, we had to create a 
unique structure, one single operator. This is the agency [AAVB]. (…) It is going 
to be the main partner for the investors and it is going to be the facilitator of all 
the development operations.441
During that interview, the journalist asked Essakl how the two mayors of Rabat and 
Salé responded to the decision to be dispossessed of some of their prerogatives. Wasn’t 
the AAVB infringing upon their competences, she asked: 
We do not infringe upon their prerogatives. We are going to help the municipali-
ties to do development. Today, we have a particularly good relationship with the 
mayor of Rabat, the mayor of Salé. In reality, we recuperate ‘some’ prerogatives. 
The	fiscal	receipts,	for	example,	that	return	to	the	urban	districts	on	the	right	bank	
and the left bank will continue to go to these urban districts. We are not going to 
take possession of the whole territory of Rabat or the whole territory of Salé. We 
are	specifically	intervenient	in	a	site	well	delimited.442
As	we	can	see,	displaced	forms	of	state	power	or	reconfigurations	of	state	sovereignty	
like the example of the Bouregreg are often legally and practically disconnected from 
the discursive realm of politics and resituated within a more politically-neutral discur-
sive of economic growth and technocratic management. As the director himself stated 
so clearly, the AAVB only “helps to do development”. Of course, the production of the 
Bouregreg space is far from a-political or a-ideological. The development zone is not 
only put into the hands of a separate agency, the project itself will more than likely have 
vast	consequences	for	the	city	as	a	whole.	The	specific	locality	of	the	Bouregreg	Valley	
has been turned into a self-promoting island of entrepreneurship (Brenner, 2004). But 
the island itself will become a motor and a benchmark for the future development of the 
two cities (at least if we have to believe the advocates of the project). It is beyond doubt 
that such an immense project will determine and impact upon future city-life. Neverthe-
less, there is also little doubt about who gets to participate in this future. The Bouregreg 
space has become a privileged and almost exclusive space for technocrats and investors 
and this complicates, in the end, the potential for political struggle and the possibility of 
those who most immediately depend on the city for their existence to formulate antago-
nistic demands. Especially in the case of the Bouregreg project there is very little open 
opposition.	As	a	royal	project,	opposition	would	be	considered	equal	to	the	defiance	of	
the king’s will, which is of course not done in Morocco. The project therefore enjoys 
extra symbolic prestige and inviolability and the only opposition until now is framed in 
terms of extra-related issues (e.g. protest against expropriation or the denouncement of 
the relatively low compensations for expropriation – cf. Mouloudi, 2010).
441  The television interview with Lemghari Essakl can be watched on the website of the Bouregreg 
project:  (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.php?Id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4) (accessed 
26/11/2010; own translation).
442  Ibid.
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New state spaces and the production of uneven urban development 
It	 is	 still	 too	 early	 to	make	final	 conclusions	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 project	 such	 as	
the Bouregreg project. Nevertheless, there is an extensive body of literature which is 
highly sceptical about the outcome of these kinds of mega-projects. Before elaborating 
on some critical observations, there are two important points to remember in order to 
better understand the dynamics and outcomes of such projects. First off all, by taking 
into consideration the more complex and relational construction of (urban) spaces, or in 
other words, the assemblage of different actors (both public and private) that are drawn 
in and lodged within a particular state space or institutional arrangement, we are con-
fronted with a more complex and variegated politics. Also departing from a topological 
approach, Doreen Massey argues that we should try to understand how different places 
are standing in contrasting relations to the global. “On this view”, she argues, “local 
places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor are they always politically 
defensible redoubts against the global” (Massey, 2005: 101). To Massey, local places, 
like for example the Bouregreg Valley, are the sites in and through which neoliberal 
globalization is produced. Of course, places like the City in London, Manhattan in New 
York, or even Dubai in the Arab Gulf will have a much greater impact upon the con-
stitution and direction of the processes of contemporary globalization. Yet, if we want 
to	understand	and	locate	the	specific	agency	behind	these	processes,	it	is	not	enough	to	
point to a few global cities, centres, institutions or even a few powerful men to which all 
other localities are subordinated, left out or rise against.443 What Massey and others de-
nounce is the overwhelming tendency “to imagine the local as the product of the global 
but to neglect the counterpoint to this: the local construction of the global” (Ibid.). As 
argued earlier, this local construction is a continuous open production of space, subject 
to renegotiations and displacements of power and authority by the various different 
political actors that are drawn within reach (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). 
Secondly, when studied more closely, and looking beyond the euphemistic and often 
dazzling discourses and images that coincide with these kinds of mega-projects, it be-
comes obvious rather quickly that the local agency behind these projects has little to do 
with	the	commitment	of	“a	modern	Morocco	that	fights	against	poverty”	–	as	I	was	ex-
plained by the director of the Bouregreg Marina – but more with a totally different kind 
of political choice.444 In the process of producing the city within the capitalist system the 
use value of the city has often been subordinated to its exchange value (Lefebvre, 1996: 
67). Especially, in current times of city-marketing and urban real estate development, 
the aesthetic qualities of the urban centres play an important role in the strategies of ur-
ban development. As Henri Lefebvre remarked long time ago, the city has become “an 
object of cultural consumption for tourists, for a estheticism, avid for spectacles and the 
picturesque” (Ibid.: 148). Within this logic, the city-centre or other strategic locations 
within the city are high quality consumption products for foreign private investors, 
and therefore need to be inserted in the commercialization of the urban space. Yet, the 
exploitation of the exchange value of the city has its obvious consequences for those 
people who are dependent on the city for their daily lives. However, the assemblages 
of power behind urban mega-projects tend to disregard this latter aspect or at best hope 
443  Although cities like Casablanca and Rabat may not be genuine global cities, similar political arrange-
ments as in the world’s current global cities can be situated in “smaller” urban areas as well. 
444  Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010). 
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for a proportional correlation between urban exchange and use value.      
The privatization of public space: assemblages of (class) power redesigning urban life
While having an obvious economic purpose, a project like the Bouregreg project, is not 
just some other vehicle for capital accumulation. These infrastructural endeavours lay 
down certain patterns and structures within the cityscape that will determine the mobil-
ity	and	movement	of	people,	goods	and	capital	for	the	coming	decades.	Once	finished,	
the estuary will be transformed into a space of high-income consumption and tourism. 
It	will	attract	a	specific	kind	of	people,	forge	new	connections	and	social	relations.	The	
tramway, for example, will cut through Rabat and Salé and drastically change the mo-
tion	and	flow	within	and	between	the	twin	cities.	The	numerous	petit taxis (city-taxis) 
will have to compete with this new means of transport or turn to alternative routes. The 
Bouregreg	project	will	also	contribute	to	the	projection	of	a	specific	image	of	the	Mo-
roccan capital. As Darel Paul observed, such projects “narrate and advance a particular 
definition	 and	 interpretation	 of	 the	 city”.	The	 political	 power	 behind	 such	 a	 project	
imposes its vision of “cosmopolitanism, global connectivity and wealth embodied in 
transnational capital” upon urban space and tries to cultivate it in the minds and actions 
of its residents (Paul, 2004: 575). As such, the planned built environment in the Boure-
greg	Valley	with	its	specific	architecture	can	be	considered	a	“statement”	of	a	certain	
discursive formation and its underlying power relations (Hirst, 2005: 156-158). Paul 
Hirst, draws the connection between a discursive formation, the institutional conditions 
in which it becomes a practice and the productions of that practice (Ibid.: 158). In this 
regard, the slogan “redefining skylines, redesigning lifestyles” of Sama Dubai, one of 
the ex-partners in the Amwaj-project, should be taken almost literally.445 The valley is 
to represent a “new style of living” according one of the billboard slogans promoting 
the Amwaj project. Or even a “celebration of life” if we are to believe the discursive 
imagery behind the Bab al Bahr project.446 As a result, localized versions of neoliberal-
ism are often being aligned with local structures of meaning and become part of a self-
cultivating and entrepreneurial version of Morocco’s so-called modern identity. “To be 
muthaqqaf (“cultured,” “civilized”)”, writes Ahmed Kanna in the case of Dubai, “is to 
subscribe and conform to the self-regulating injunctions of neoliberal state institutions” 
and to discard “those aspects incapable of resolution with the neoliberal universal” 
(Kanna, 2009: 207,215). 
The unique selling position of the city depends thus heavily on an attractive urban imag-
inary	(Harvey,	1989b).	It	was	striking	that	in	several	interviews	with	AAVB-officials,	
the project was presented as a counterbalance to the image of a “Maroc Islamiste”.447 
And this urban attractiveness is not only to be found in material luxury and top-notch 
architectural design. As the delegate for commercial development of Bab al Bahr told 
me: “we are not only a real estate project, there is a strong social and economic dimen-
sion present [in the project].”448 In the same way as the director of the Bouregreg Marina 
445  See http://www.dip.ae (accessed 15/03/2010). 
446  See http://www.babalbahr.ma/location_gb-90.html (accessed 29/11/2010).
447  Interview with the director of the Bouregreg Marina (Rabat – 20/05/2010), I heard a similar message in 
interviews with the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships and the director of Juridical Affairs (Rabat 
– 20/05/2010).
448  Interview (Rabat – 28/05/2010).
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tried to convince me that the Bouregreg project is much more than just a construction 
project	(it	was	a	fight	against	poverty),	the	delegate	of	Bab	el	Bahr	also	tried	to	legiti-
mize the project by referring to its wider social, economic and even cultural implica-
tions for the cities of Rabat and Salé. This was a kind of argument that I heard several 
times	during	my	interviews	with	officials	of	the	AAVB:
The	project	 is	a	fight	against	poverty,	 informal	housing	[habitats clandestins], 
(…) and for the development of the country. We give Salé a new face. In the past, 
Salé was only known for its prison, its hospital, the bidonvilles and the habitats 
clandestins. Even the airport of Salé is systematically referred to as the airport of 
Rabat. (…) The Bouregreg [project] thus actually serves a noble purpose. [The 
area]	used	to	be	a	floodplain	which	was	enormously	polluted	(…).	It	was	an	agri-
cultural area which wasn’t used to its full capacity just because of the pollution. 
A lot of the housing in the area was also responsible for this pollution. There were 
no	sanitary	fittings	and	people	dumped	their	waste	in	the	river.449   
Besides some sceptical remarks that can be added here, it should be clear that in many 
cases the socio-economic promises that are wrapped up and presented in these dis-
courses are not just part of a woolly discursive picture trying to cover up other and 
wider interests, but form part of a deeply entrenched governmentality and a politics of 
truth.	Many	officials	of	the	AAVB	(and	beyond)	sincerely	believe	that	they	are	doing	
something good for the city, the country and the economy. Moreover, they are using 
their	powers	 and	 influence,	 their	 class	 status,	 to	defend	and	produce	 those	believes.	
Yet, the very “imagineering” of the Bouregreg project cannot be separated from the 
power behind it.450 Imagineering is a political act (Paul, 2004: 574). The dreams, desires 
and objectives behind the Bouregreg project are not universal, but represent the ideas 
and beliefs of a particular group or class that endorses a particular political ideology. 
Nevertheless, these promoted visions make an appeal to the global and to the universal 
through their particular linguistic usage.  
Four central concepts form part of the project’s vision and are integrated in the logo 
of the AAVB: environment, citizenship, history (mémoire de lieu) and transport. The 
concept	of	environment	refers	to	the	conservation	of	the	site	and	the	fight	against	envi-
ronmental pollution (e.g. the clean-up of the dumping ground). Citizenship points to the 
fact	that	the	project	is	“first	of	all	a	project	for	the	citizens	(un projet citoyen)” (AAVB, 
2008: 28). It is said that the made investments will offer a better future for the future 
generations, “a clean and pleasant city for the inhabitants of Rabat-Salé” (Ibid.). Part of 
this commitment entails the rehabilitation of the ancient medina of Rabat – or at least 
the area in front of the project – and the resettlement of its 152 families, 55 individuals 
and	52	small	businesses.	Another	objective	is	to	keep	the	fishermen	at	the	site	and	built	
them	a	new	fishing	port.	The	decision	was	taken	because	they	are	a	part	of	the	“charm	
449  Interview with the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
450  The term “Imagineering” was coined by the Walt Disney Studios to combine the way of imagination 
with engineering (Paul, 2004: 574). “Walt Disney Imagineering is the master planning, creative develop-
ment, design, engineering, production, project management, and research development arm of The Walt 
Disney	Company	and	its	affiliates”	(http://corporate.disney.go.com/careers/who_imagineering.html - ac-
cessed 30/11/2010).     
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of the site”.451 The concept of history refers to the respect and the harmony of the project 
with the historical sites and monuments in its surroundings (i.e. the Oudaya, the Tour 
Hassan and the mausoleum of Mohamed V and the Chellah). Several initiatives will be 
taken to renovate these sites. Additionally, the architecture of the different real estate 
projects in the Bouregreg Valley all claim to be a harmonious symbiosis between Mo-
rocco’s cultural past and its modernizing aspirations. As such, according to its website, 
the Bab al Bahr project “draws inspiration from the ancestral Moroccan way of life that 
revolved around community spirit, well-being and serenity”. Through their designs the 
imagineers wish to pay “tribute to the past and present by creating a synergy between 
[the] old world and progressive new ideas”.452 This is an example of how local versions 
of neoliberalism are aligned with local structures of meaning (Kanna, 2009). Finally, 
the concept of transport refers to the construction of the bridge, the tunnel and the 
tramway and the desire to increase and facilitate the mobility between the two cities 
and its populations. The language and images that are reproduced by these four core 
values of the project are presented in such an a-political and a-ideological way that no 
one can really object. Yet, underneath this universal and internationalist discourse, the 
contours of a hegemonic project are being drawn which seeks to attach the valley to the 
consumerist cosmopolitanism of global neoliberalism (Paul, 2004). 
If we look at some of the pictures that present the Bouregreg project, they clearly re-
semble with other projects in the wider Arab region, for example in Dubai, Amman, 
Aqaba, Beirut, Algiers, etc. (cf. Davis, 2006b; Parker, 2009; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; 
Zitoun, 2010). Moreover, these Arab mega-projects are clearly following a more global 
trend. Public investments in mega-projects have been going on in the rest of the world 
for a longer period (Flyvbjerg, e.a. 2003). The produced universalist knowledge that 
coincide with such mega-projects, “the politics of truth” as it were (Lemke, 2002), 
are embedded within complex assemblages of power which are stretching beyond the 
national borders of the Moroccan state and give image to what Perry Anderson meant 
with neoliberalism’s ‘universalist doctrine’ (cf. chapter 2). This culture of neoliberalism 
brings forth, amongst other cultural effects, a whole new style of governing (the man-
agement style). As a public agency, the AAVB is funded by public money but operates 
in reality as a private company. The AAVB is permitted by law 16-04, to participate in 
private enterprises within its designated area when it is conform to the mission state-
ment	of	the	project.	As	such,	the	first	stage	of	the	Bouregreg	project,	Bab	al	Bahr,	is	de-
veloped by the Bab al Bahr Development Company, a joint venture between the AAVB 
and the Abu Dhabi based property development company Al Maabar. The second stage 
of the project, the development of the Amwaj residential isle, was a joint venture be-
tween a branch of the sovereign wealth fund Dubai Holding, Sama Dubai (50%), CDG 
(20%), the Moroccan public pension fund (10%) and the AAVB (20%). Due to the 
financial	crisis,	however,	Sama	Dubai	could	not	live	up	to	its	commitments.	This	has	
caused	a	conflict	between	them	and	the	AAVB	and	resulted	finally	in	the	expropriation	
of the properties (200ha) of Sama Dubai.453 Furthermore, in 2007, the AAVB created a 
451  See interview with Essakl: (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.
php?Id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4). (accessed, 26/11/2010).
452  See http://www.babalbahr.ma/the_project_gb-78.html (accessed 22/11/2010).
453  Weekly magazine La Vie Eco: Amwaj: bye-bye Sama Dubai, le projet saucissonné (14/06/2010). 
Available at: http://www.lavieeco.com/economie/16861-amwaj-bye-bye-sama-dubai-le-projet-saucissonne.
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subsidiary to exploit the marina and in 2009 the STRS was created to coordinate and 
commercialize the tramway project. Besides public funding, this tramway project is 
also	financially	supported	by	the	European	Investment	Bank,	the	EU	and	the	French	
Development	Agency	 (AFD).	Additionally,	 several	French	commercial	firms	are	 in-
volved in the construction of the Tramway (e.g. Alstom).454	When	finished,	the	Tram-
way will be exploited by another French multinational: Veolia-Transdev.455
As a consequence, government in these urban spaces becomes accountable to inves-
tors	over	and	above	the	citizens	whose	lives	are	influenced	by	their	operations	(Parker,	
2009: 115). This is a salient feature of the neoliberal urban logic. Urban entrepreneur-
ialism typically rests on public-private partnerships focusing foremost on the specula-
tive construction and upgrading of places rather than on the amelioration of the living 
conditions of the original inhabitants (Harvey, 1989b). In other words, the urban space 
is reshaped more by the logic of the market then by the needs of its residents (Bayat 
and Biekart, 2009: 817). Ironically, as Bayat and Biekart (Ibid.: 818) point out, “many 
of the agents of change (such as global capital) are not even residents of these cities”. 
Many foreign investors and corporations, from France, Italy (in the case of the tunnel) 
and especially from the Arab Gulf, are contributing to the spectacular change of the 
urban landscape between Rabat and Salé and benevolently join in the privatization of 
public space. As a result, the design of this new urban landscape is foremost determined 
by	private	capital	and	worked	out	by	prestigious	architectural	firms	like	for	example	the	
UK-based Foster and Partners (consultants for Bab al Bahr). The private interests of 
for example Al Maabar, a partner in Bab al Bahr, do not necessarily correspond to the 
public interest. The message of the managing director of Al Maabar on the company’s 
website is very clear in this regard: “our focus is to create landmark properties which 
provide a maximum return on investment to our stakeholders”.456 The buyers guide of 
the Bab al Bahr sequence, not only recommends the attractive Moroccan tax-system, 
especially for Moroccans abroad who want to invest in their country of origin, but also 
promotes the Moroccan real estate market as a reliable alternative to the gloomy invest-
ment outlooks of the European markets at this moment.457 What’s left for the ordinary 
citizens is the promise of a better world, intimately related to the self-regulating utopia 
projected by neoliberal theory. While visiting the promotional websites of Bab al Bahr 
and the Bouregreg project one can see Rabat pictured as a future fairy tale, a real fan-
tasy world. Within this neoliberal dream world, the poor are believed to be dependent 
on these projects as leverages of economic growth (the notorious trickle-down effect). 
It is assumed that these projects are to provide jobs and attract tourists, who, for their 
part, will bring more money in circulation. 
html (accessed 25/11/2010).
454  For a list of the foreign partners and more detailed information, see: http://www.tramwayrabatsale.com 
(accessed 30/11/2010).
455  There were talks for a fusion at the end of 2010 between Transdev and Veolia Transport. When com-
pleted they will be one of the leaders in public transport worldwide and operate in more than 30 countries. 
Veolia Transport is part of the Veolia environment group, see: http://www.mobilicites.com/fr_actualites-
veolia-transdev---naissance-d-un-geant-du-transport-public_77_711.html (Accessed 10/01/2011). 
456  See http://www.almaabar.com/en/section/about-al-maabar (accessed 05/04/2010).
457  See http://www.babalbahr.ma/mediatheque/upload/gb_guide_de_lacquereur_babalbahr.pdf (accessed 
30/11/2010).
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Doreen Massey has argued that the decline or the privatization of public space involves 
the increasing control over urban spaces in the hands of non-democratically elected 
owners and, subsequently, may involve the exclusion of certain social groups who we 
might have expected to be allowed there if these spaces were publicly owned.458 As a re-
sult, the Bouregreg Valley may be a globalized space but this doesn’t mean it is an open 
space (Massey, 2005: 152, 190). In addition, the real socio-political question, accord-
ing to Massey, “concerns less, perhaps, the degree of openness/closure (and the con-
sequent question of how on earth one might even begin to measure it), than the terms 
on which that openness/closure is established” (Ibid.: 179). The real estate developers, 
the designers and architects, the technocrats of the AAVB, etc., are the local agents in 
globalization. What comes to the fore in the Bouregreg project is less the transmission 
of state power in a downwards movement, but rather the complex interplay between 
agents of the state and their non-state partners lodged within a territory of 6000ha. State 
hierarchies are constituted here together with the investors from Abu Dhabi, France, 
Italy,	etc.,	and	it	resulted	in	a	specific	configuration	of	sovereignty,	a	particular	geo-
graphical assemblage of distributed authority, which has been continuously negotiated 
and renegotiated – the struggles between AAVB and Sama Dubai being the most recent 
example (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). Private investors such as Al Maabar in the Bab al 
Bahr sequence, reach into the political decision-making process through for example 
the establishment of a joint venture such as the Bab al Bahr Company. Both the AAVB 
and	Al	Maabar	are	business	partners	with	a	significant	political	outreach	on	the	cities	
of Rabat and Salé, and by extension, the wider coastal region. While these politics may 
take place at the local level, they are not local politics at all, “but the localization of 
wider political games involving regional, national or global actors who have found lo-
cal venues to mine and local actors to express their interests” (MP Smith, 1998: 40). As 
a result, the pressures that the ordinary citizens of Rabat and Salé are subject to, pres-
sures of uneven development produced by the Bouregreg project, are not simply ema-
nating from above, from an institutional core, e.g. the “Arab regime”, but are shaped 
and	designed	by	particular	interest	groups,	private	actors,	etc.	with	sufficient	reach	and	
influence	to	engage	the	assembled	political	forces	in	a	particular	locality,	in	this	case	
the Bouregreg Valley (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). 
There are thus obvious limits to this kind of enclavization of international investments. 
458  Here, the privatization of public space should not be considered in the same way as Hibou’s concept of 
the privatization of the state. It only refers to the mere appropriation of public property private interests. 
Image of an apartment in Bab al Bahr. Source: 
http://www.babalbahr.ma (28/11/2010)
The future Place Bleue in Bab al Bahr. Source: 
http://www.babalbahr.ma 28/11/2010)
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While it is still too early to evaluate the overall social impact of the Bouregreg project, 
some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Sala al Moustaqbal (the future of Salé), an as-
sociation that tries to provoke a critical debate on the project, has gathered a round table 
on the Bouregreg project in 2005 and formulated some major concerns. First of all, they 
argue that the project turns its back on the historical medina of Salé and creates a barrier 
between	the	city-centre	and	the	riverside.	The	first	stage,	Bab	al	Bahr,	is	built	right	next	
to the ancient medina of Salé. But the height of the planned buildings actually hides 
the medina from the view of people looking from the quay of Rabat. This is already 
clearly visible today when one visits the construction site. The Bab al Bahr construction 
are R+3 (three stories high), probably even going to be R+4, while the urban area just 
behind it is on average only two stories high.459 As a result, the constructions of the Bab 
al Bahr sequence are forming a huge physical wall that separates the medina of Salé 
from the quays of Rabat and the Oudaya. The Bab al Bahr sequence is not the only stage 
which incorporates architectural and physical barriers. If one looks closely to the plans 
of the second sequence (Amwaj), one notices that the project is cut-off from the rest 
of the urban areas with natural and built in barriers (e.g. the river, roads, roundabouts, 
colonnades of trees, etc.). 
 
Secondly, the medina of Salé is an impoverished area that lacks access to collective 
services. When one walks through this medina, one quickly notices that it bears little 
resemblance to some of the more romantic alleys of the medina of Rabat or the well 
known medina of Marrakech with their specialized shops in Moroccan arts and arti-
sanal products. In fact, many of the historical medina’s in Morocco, also in Rabat and 
even in Marrakech, have socially degraded over the years. They have become transit 
zones for rural migrants and are therefore inhabited by many poor tenants (Balbo and 
Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; Ameur, 2000).460 As such, the social constitution of the urban 
area immediately surrounding the Bouregreg project will contrast strongly with the 
lifestyle and prestige promoted by the private developers. In the case of the medina of 
459  Interview with a French architect working on the Bab al Bahr stage for her masters’ degree (Rabat – 
14/04/2009, conducted together with Sami Zemni). 
460  Actually, the whole population of the city of Salé is generally much poorer than the population in 
Rabat. Salé is known for its bidonvilles, informal neighbourhoods (HC) and social housing (Allain-El 
Mansouri, 2006). The pressing question is what the effect of the prestigious Bouregreg project will be in the 
long term for the city of Salé and its population. 
The Bab al Bahr project seen from the quays of 
Rabat (May 2010)
The Bab al Bahr project seen from the Oudaya 
(May 2010)
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Salé, it will be literally enclosed by luxury and its corridors, with Bab al Bahr on one 
side and the bridge and the tramway on the other. Just as the French have built their new 
modern cities around the Arab medina during the Moroccan Protectorate, imposing a 
design of spatial and social segregation, the current project imposes an almost similar 
segregation (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980). As a result, the project “turns its back on the his-
toric patrimony of Salé” and will most likely turn out to be the creation of “heaven next 
to hell”, as I was told by the Moroccan architect Nabil Rahmouni, one of the initiators 
behind Sala al Moustaqbal.461 
Third, according to the latter, the creation of a ‘city of arts’ in Bab al Bahr, where ar-
tisanal products will be promoted and sold, will likely cause competition with many 
small businesses in the medinas of Rabat and Salé who depend on this economic sec-
tor for their livelihoods. However, this critique was contradicted by the delegate for 
commercial development of Bab al Bahr. He stated that the city of arts will only house 
museums and galleries where artisanal products will be presented. The production of 
handicrafts would still take place in the medina and its immediate surroundings. Never-
theless,	it	will	be	a	task	for	future	research	to	find	out	what	the	exact	impact	will	be	of	
the Bouregreg project with its commercial centres and activities, on the small-scale and 
even informal businesses of the medina. It also remains to be seen whether the informal 
businesses	in	the	surrounding	area	will	still	be	tolerated	once	the	project	is	finalized	and	
its new population settles in.    
Finally, some serious questions and scepticism should be put forward about the so-
called social and public dimension of the project. Rahmouni denounced the fact that the 
AVVB also expropriates land for private purposes (e.g. for the construction of hotels, 
marinas and apartments) because it had little to do with the public interest. This par-
ticular form of accumulation by dispossession can also be seen as a way to socialize the 
risks	related	to	the	development	of	the	Bouregreg	Valley	and	privatize	the	benefits.462 
It	is	thanks	to	public	funding	that	the	former	marshland	area	of	the	first	sequence	was	
made suitable for building and that it was provided with all the necessary physical 
infrastructure	(e.g.	quays,	tunnel,	bridge,	etc.)	in	order	to	make	it	a	profitable	site	for	in-
vestment.463 Additionally, the same principles about re-integration and participation (i.e. 
accompagnement social) were applied to resettle the bidonvilles and informal neigh-
bourhoods located on the Bouregreg site. As such, 137 households were resettled to 
make place for a maintenance centre for the tramway on the side of Salé. As mentioned 
above, a total of 259 households and small businesses in the ancient medina of Rabat 
were resettled or compensated for their expropriation. In these operations, the AAVB 
works together with Al Omrane. Also within the AAVB, the vision on ‘participation’ 
461  Interview (Rabat – 27/04/2009).
462		Another	example	is	the	fact	that	the	AAVB	received	public	support	to	provide	the	fishermen	with	new	
fishing	boats.	These	boats	are	largely	sponsored	by	the	INDH-program	(Interview	with	official	of	depart-
ment of social affairs (Rabat – 30/06/2010)). The Bouregreg project is for that matter not the only large 
urban development scheme that is partly supported by INDH. Tanger Med has its own department that is 
allied with INDH (Barthel & Planel, 2010).   
463  The tramway alone costs approximately 3,8 billion MAD. Recently, the AAVB announced that they 
will	inject	an	extra	518	million	MAD	to	finance	the	constructions.	See	weekly	magazine,	La	Vie	Eco	
(19/07/2010), article available at: http://www.lavieeco.com/economie/17203-mega-augmentation-de-capi-
tal-pour-la-societe-de-tramway-de-rabat-sale.html (accessed 25/11/2010).
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in AS-programs resembles a lot to the visions at Al Omrane and Dyar Al Mansour. An 
official	from	the	department	of	social	affairs	gave	me	his	own	opinion	on	AS:
We also do psychological guidance [accompagnement psychologique] [besides 
adminsitrative guidance]. There are households who are use to live in a barrack. 
They don’t have the habit to pay for water and electricity. We have to learn them 
how to live a new live. (…) The end goal is human development. If we hadn’t 
human development as our objective, why would we otherwise carry out such a 
project?464
 And the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships explained to me that:
To solve the problem of the habitats clandestin, the AAVB works closely to-
gether	with	the	qualified	authorities,	like	the	ministry	of	housing,	the	wali	and	
the authorized operators [Al Omrane]. The AAVB even has its own department of 
social affairs [Direction des affaires socials]. We have to explain it [the project] to 
the people. It is not that they don’t participate, but sometimes they just don’t un-
derstand. In the long term they will realize it. (…) We have to be didactical. (…) 
We always have to be close to the people, even if the people do not understand.   
To my own amazement, I must say, he went on to compare inhabitants of Foundouk 
Mestiri, one of the informal communities in the ancient medina of Rabat, with the Gaul-
ish village from the comic books of Asterix and Obelix. They had resisted civilization 
in a similar way, he argued.   
In general, the infrastructural project of the Bouregreg project will set out and defend 
the demarcations between those who can afford to invest, live and consume in these 
newly created consumption spaces and those who fall by the wayside. The project will 
be responsible for the creation of new spatial boundaries, including a privileged few 
and excluding the grand majority of people living in the surrounding areas. Accord-
ing to Jamila Bargach, it is obvious that the whole logic of the project, the marina, the 
practice of equipment-oriented nautical sports, the high-end luxury apartments of Bab 
al Bahr, as well as the business facilities “will mark the Bouregreg Valley as a space 
belonging to the wealthy” (Bargach, 2008: 114). The result will be most likely – and 
this is becoming clearly visible today – a spatial segregation between an enclave that 
is	 tailored	 to	 the	benefit	of	 international	 investors	and	 rich	 tourists,	 and	 the	average	
Moroccan citizen who will be largely absent from this area or, at best, be invisible in 
the role of one of the serving jobs such as waiters, receptionists, cleaners (Zemni & 
Bogaert, 2009). Urban development strategies such as the Bouregreg project lead to the 
juxtaposition of privileged zones of inclusion where capital can design luxury and gran-
deur into its space, and the outside spaces where urban poverty and exclusion constitute 
the	flipside	of	this	spatial	division	of	consumption.	When	talking	to	local	inhabitants	
about the project, many suspicions bubble up. I once asked a car-park attendant on the 
construction site of Bab al Bahr what the advantage of the project was for the people 
of Salé. “We don’t earn money with the bourgeois”, he said, “they want to stay in their 
464  Interview (Rabat – 02/06/2010).
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hotels with hotelkeepers with diplomas. But we don’t have diplomas. They are not go-
ing to come to our hotels”. A young guy who used to live in the Oudaya looking over 
the Valley, told me that Bouregreg was “a project of false promises (…) it’s a project 
merely for the rich while the ordinary Moroccan will be victim of this project”. On the 
other side of the social ladder, the director of the Bouregreg Marina complained that 
the two cities still didn’t had enough hotels to host all future tourists. “We only have the 
Hilton in Rabat and Salé has no hotels”.465 When I asked him about some other hotels 
that came to my mind, he answered “oh yeah… we have also the Tour Hassan and the 
Golden Tulip is getting there”. The enumerated hotels are very luxurious and it gives 
some kind of indication of the kind of tourist they want to attract. 
A	final	point	that	is	important	to	mention	when	we	look	at	some	of	the	effects	of	high-
end urban development projects in other countries and other regions of the world, is the 
likeliness	of	a	process	of	gentrification	in	the	surroundings	of	the	Bouregreg	project.	
Gentrification,	a	process	where	working-class	areas	and	poor	urban	neighbourhoods	are	
invaded by substantially wealthier social classes and, consequently, cause a rise of the 
cost of living in the neighbourhood (e.g. rising housing prices, new commercial activi-
ties directed towards the newcomers, etc.), has been another central and global feature 
of entrepreneurial urbanism (cf. Smith, 2002). While it is of course still too early to 
draw	any	definite	conclusions	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Bouregreg	project,	and	while	some	
would claim that the project is not actively gentrifying anyone – as the project is situ-
ated largely on unpopulated terrain (the few hundred expropriated households living in 
informal houses who have been resettled or compensated put aside) – it is not unlikely 
that	a	process	of	gentrification	will	affect	the	surrounding	urban	areas	and	the	neigh-
bourhoods alongside the new tramway. The fact that the AAVB suspended all private 
real estate transactions within the developing zone after the publication of law 16-04 
until	 the	definite	approval	of	 the	‘Special	Development	Plan’	 in	2009,	 indicates	 that	
the state agency wanted to control possible speculation (Mouloudi, 2010). Especially, 
in the historical fortress of the Oudaya, the AAVB attempted to stop speculation on the 
sale of houses.466 The Oudaya is located right next to the project at the mouth of the 
river. It has an exclusive view on the project and since the announcement of the project 
in 2004 some houses had already been purchased by foreigners or wealthy Moroc-
cans	(Saaid,	n.d.).	Other	indicators	are	also	pointing	in	the	direction	of	gentrification.	
Alongside the trajectory of the tramway, new apartments are being build and new shops 
and	restaurants	emergence	that	are	clearly	targeting	a	more	affluent	consumer.467 In any 
case, the prices of the residences that are being built or planned within the framework of 
the project leave little or no doubt that within a few years a wealthy class will come to 
live in the valley. According to weekly magazine, La Vie Eco, prices for apartments in 
465  Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
466		Interview	with	Fatima	Zohra	Saaid,	who	has	worked	on	gentrification	in	the	Oudaya	(Rabat	–	
12/05/2008). 
467  This is merely based on observations and pictures taken during the four years that I frequented Rabat. 
No	specific	research	has	been	done	to	confirm	these	observations	so	they	have	to	be	taken	with	caution.	
Also,	on	a	specific	internet	blog	you	can	see	a	bar-owner	complaining	about	the	fact	that	many	former	
owners	have	difficulties	at	the	moment	to	maintain	their	customers	due	to	the	construction	works	of	the	
tramway and see little options but to sell their business.  See: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x93jdh_
tramway-a-rabat_travel (accessed 25/11/2010).  
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Bab al Bahr will vary between 14,000 and 27,000 MAD/m².468 The smallest surface of 
an apartment will be 90m² which means that the cheapest possible apartment will cost 
1,260,000 MAD (to compare: the cost of a social apartment varies between 200,000 
and 290,000 MAD).469	A	former	official	of	 the	AAVB	even	 told	me	 that	 the	average	
price for a villa in the Amwaj sequence was estimated to be around one million USD 
(this was before Sama Dubai withdrew of course).470 
It looks thus highly probable that the Bouregreg project will follow similar trends that 
were	manifest	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	Processes	of	gentrification,	especially	since	
the 1990s, were linked very often to large-scale capital, as large real estate developers 
reworked entire urban neighbourhoods in cities like New York, London, etc. (Hack-
worth & Smith, 2001). According to Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith, a typical feature 
of	the	gentrification	processes	of	the	last	20	years	was	the	return	of	heavy	state	inter-
vention	in	the	process,	more	specifically	in	the	form	of	PPPs.	According	to	the	latter,	
gentrification	had	even	become	one	of	 the	central	urban	policies	 in	 some	countries,	
for example to collect more tax revenues from wealthy property owners and consum-
ers	(Smith,	2002).	It	is	clear	by	now	that	if	a	gentrification	process	would	develop	in	
the area of the Bouregreg, it would be state-led (i.e. in the form of the politics of the 
AAVB). It will push poor populations – especially those residing in the two ancient 
medina’s – further towards the outskirts of the cities of Rabat and Salé. The expected 
influx	of	wealthy	tourists	and	high	class	consumers	will,	no	doubt,	push	up	prices	of	
consumption goods and real estate (for a similar argument see also Hackworth, 2007). 
As such, despite the fact that the billboards that surround the project announce the ad-
vantages of the tramway and project a promising future for the two cities, it is highly 
probable that many will be excluded from this fortune. The Bouregreg Valley will be 
in all probability a globalized space but not an open space. The security guards at the 
gated entrance of the Bouregreg Marina, carefully screening everybody who enters, lift 
only a corner of the veil of what can be expected in the near future. 
Creative destruction and the current urban spatial fix in Morocco
As	a	specific	kind	of	institution,	the	AAVB	is	still	an	exception.	There	is	no	other	public	
institution in Morocco with such a local particularity. However, this doesn’t mean that 
there are no other forms of graduated sovereignty. The international port of Tangi-
ers,	for	example,	is	governed	by	a	comparable	powerful	institutional	configuration,	the	
Tanger Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA), which was established in 2002 (cf. 
Planel, 2009; Barthel & Planel, 2010). To a similar degree, TMSA is responsible for 
the planning, developing and managing of both the Tanger Med complex and the TFZ, 
the industrial hinterland of the port. Nevertheless, although TMSA has considerable 
powers and autonomy to govern the port and the surrounding special economic zone, it 
doesn’t dispose of all the extensive prerogatives that are attributed to the AAVB. TMSA 
works for example not outside the jurisdiction of the prefectures. To the contrary, to 
improve	the	governmental	efficiency	of	the	zone,	a	new	prefecture,	Fahs-Anjra,	was	
468  See http://www.lavieeco.com/economie/15898-14-000-a-27-000-dh-le-m2-pour-un-appartement-a-
bab-al-bahr.html (accessed 25/11/2010).
469  The most expensive apartments will be around 6,7 million MAD.  
470  Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – August 2007).
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created.471 The most important difference between the AAVB and TMSA is that the 
latter is a public limited company controlled by the state and endowed with public 
authority	prerogatives	while	the	first	is	a	complete	public	agency	that	replaces	all	other	
governmental institutions. TMSA is indirectly state-owned via the participation of the 
CDG and the Hassan II fund for social and economic development. According to its 
website, TMSA is “a public-owned structure based on private companies’ governance 
mechanisms”.472 Yet, on the ground both agencies (TMSA and AAVB) represent new 
state spaces in which governmental resources are mobilized outside more traditional 
government structures and in which particular assemblages of power unfold to create 
new opportunities and political goals for privileged corporate interest groups. The spe-
cific	institutional	and	practical	differences	between	these	two	state	spaces	are	the	result	
of	rather	ad	hoc	governmental	attempts	to	think	about	and	act	upon	specific	challenges	
and problems in a particular locale (Ong, 2006). That’s the contingency behind the con-
temporary “zoning technologies”. In other words, the particular political strategies that 
attempt	to	create	spatially	delineated	and	distinctive	enclaves	depending	on	the	specific	
objectives and strategies that are envisioned for a certain place (Ibid.: 97-118).      
Although	 the	 specific	 level	 of	 graduated	 sovereignty	 applied	 both	 in	 the	Bouregreg	
and the Tanger Med zones haven’t been duplicated (yet) in the rest of the country, 
other prestigious projects, especially in Casablanca, such as Casa-Marina, the Royal 
Avenue and Casanearshore are coordinated and developed by some form of case-spe-
cific	authority,	mostly	in	the	form	of	public-private	partnerships.	Nevertheless,	if	the	
Bouregreg project proves its success, it is not unlikely that its institutional design could 
become a model for future development schemes, as I was told by several people within 
the	agency.	So,	despite	its	still	unique	configuration,	the	AAVB	gives	an	indication	of	
how state power in Morocco is being reshaped and respatialized at the urban scale and 
how real decision-making power is being shifted from more traditional state institu-
tions – that are under pressure for democratic reform – to new state spaces that are not 
at	all	subjected	to	popular	control.	The	local	specificity	and	contextual	embeddedness	
of new state arrangements such as the AAVB and also the TMSA urge for a theoretical 
rethinking of the modern Arab state (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). Because, obvi-
ously,	these	zoning	technologies	are	not	confined	to	the	Moroccan	case,	let	alone	the	
Arab region. In Jordan, for example, the special economic zone of Aqaba, inaugu-
rated in 2001, is governed by the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) 
(Debruyne, 2009a; 2009b). Six ministerial-level commissioners, each responsible for a 
specific	area	of	regulatory	or	operational	activity,	govern	the	special	economic	zone.473 
Parallel to the Bouregreg Valley, the Aqaba zone is not just a place where mere indus-
trial activities are exploited and where a competitive restructuring of labour regulations 
have to lure in new investors. The zone is also populated by over 100,000 residents 
which implies that not only labour, but every aspect of human life in the Aqaba zone 
is subject to different modes of government and administrative techniques. Similar to 
471  Interview with a former consultant for the TMSA (Rabat – 12/05/2010). 
472  See http://www.tmsa.ma/index.php?Id=6&lang=en (accessed 03/12/2010). Furthermore, TMSA is 
subdivided in several subsidiaries (Tanger Med Port Authority, Tanger Free Zone, Med Hub, Cires Telecom 
and TMSA Holding) who each manage different activities and territories within the development zone of 
Tanger Med.
473  See website of ASEZA: http://www.aqabazone.com/?q=node/233 (accessed 03/12/2010).
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the concept of graduated sovereignty, Ong refers to this reality as forms of “graduated 
citizenship” (Ong, 2006: 78). This is a typical characteristic of the biopolitics of neo-
liberalism: different populations are subject to different technologies of disciplining, 
administration, regulation and control, and as a result, also subject to different social 
fates (Ibid.: 79). 
Another	well	 known	 example,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 first	 products	 of	 zoning	 technologies	
in the Arab world, was the post-war reconstruction of the historic centre of Beirut in 
Lebanon. The jurisdiction over the management and planning of the area was given to 
a	private	real	estate	company,	Solidere,	while	at	the	same	time,	this	company	benefited	
from important public subsidies (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). In their research, Krijnen 
and Fawaz demonstrate how, also in Lebanon, the delegation of planning responsibili-
ties are enabling private developers to take part in the making of the city, and in the 
making of a legislative environment which serves their own interests. Other examples – 
this time related more to mere industrial activity and labour regulation – are the various 
SEZs and QIZs in the Arab region that are governed by their own territorial authorities 
(e.g. ZonesCorp in Abu Dhabi). Given these examples, whether in Morocco or else-
where, state power cannot just be related to a uniform territorial entity, but participates 
in the constitution of differentiated state spaces spread around its territory, connecting 
local places with the outside world in various ways. As such, as I stated already in 
chapter 2 and demonstrated with the example of the Bouregreg Valley, the growing 
reliance on market-oriented policies not only entailed processes of deregulation and 
de-institutionalization – in the form of rolling back certain developmental state func-
tions and privatizing other state functions – but also led to the re-regulation and the re-
institutionalization of certain aspects of social and political life across an increasingly 
variegated landscape of spaces to be governed. These forms of graduated sovereignty 
give a new content to the notion of authoritarian governmentality (Dean, 1999), and 
produce new diffuse authoritarian representations of the Arab state (Parker, 2004). 
The	different	configurations	of	(state-)power	within	the	neoliberal	city	in	the	Arab	world	
are radically changing the cityscape. As I mentioned, cities like Casablanca, Rabat, 
Tangiers and Marrakech are being redesigned and restructured to satisfy the desires and 
interest	of	global	capital.	The	specific	changes	that	are	etched	into	to	the	cityscape	can	
best	be	described	by	two	concepts:	first,	the	neoliberal	(urban)	spatial fix, and secondly, 
the process of creative destruction.	I	mentioned	these	two	concepts	already	briefly	in	
chapter	2.	Let	me	first	elaborate	on	the	neoliberal	spatial	fix.	David	Harvey	was	one	of	
the	most	prominent	thinkers	who	theorized	the	spatial	fix	of	contemporary	capitalism.	
The	word	‘fix’	or	the	verb	‘to	fix’	can	be	interpreted	in	two	ways	(Harvey,	2001).	First	
of all, it can be interpreted in the meaning of to pin something down and secure it in a 
particular	locus.	Secondly,	‘to	fix’	can	also	indicate	the	attempt	to	find	a	(temporary)	
solution	to	a	problem	(i.e.	fixing	a	problem).	For	example,	a	typical	problem	that	needs	
to	be	fixed	by	capitalists	entrepreneurs	is	the	capital	surplus	absorption	problem	(Har-
vey,	2010a).	 In	 this	sense	 the	concept	of	spatial	fix	refers	 to	“capitalism’s	 insatiable	
drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical 
restructuring” (Harvey, 2001: 24). After all, according to Harvey, capitalism is addicted 
to geographical expansion as much as it is addicted to technological change and eco-
nomic growth. At the larger scale contemporary globalization can be viewed as the 
272 Redesigning urban life and the formation of new state spaces in Morocco
process	driven	by	capitalism’s	never-ending	search	for	a	spatial	fix	(Ibid.).	Spatial	fixes	
shape both the extensive and intensive processes of capitalist enlargement (cf. Robin-
son, 2004; see also chapter 2). 
With	regard	to	the	first	meaning	of	fixity,	Harvey	has	observed	that	capitalism	also	has	
to	fix	space.	In	other	words,	to	pin	down	and	secure	its	contradictions	and	overcome	
capitalism’s main problems related to space and distance. Capitalism has to overcome 
space, ensure the mobility of capital and enlarge the possibilities for accumulation by 
bringing down the frictions of distance and create the conditions for economic growth 
(e.g. through urbanization). As such, some (considerable amount of) capital needs to 
move into the formation of fixed capital (Harvey, 1989a: 64). Fixed capital, Harvey 
argues, can be produced in the normal course of capitalist commodity production, but 
they are mostly used as aids to the production process (Ibid.: 64). Examples are invest-
ments in transportation and communication networks, road-networks and highways, 
land, water and electricity supplies, houses and other kinds of physical infrastructure. 
These	investments	in	the	built	environment	or	fixed	(immobile)	assets	are	part	of	a	pro-
cess	of	capital	flow	which	Harvey	describes	as	the	secondary circuit of capital (Ibid.: 
64).474 
The	primary	idea	behind	the	theory	of	a	spatial	fix	was	twofold.	First,	Harvey	wanted	
to show that capitalism could not survive without being geographically expansionary. 
Secondly, in order to expand, major technological innovations and infrastructural in-
vestments were required (Harvey, 2001). Hence, the typical emphasis on technologies, 
methods and procedures to speed up processes of capital accumulation and absorption. 
This is, of course, also discernible within the discourses and rationalities that support 
mega-projects such as the Bouregreg project. In most of his work, Harvey has focused 
upon the urban production of space and the contradictions of capitalism at work in the 
city (Ibid.). Through the process of urbanization, he sees the dialectical coming to-
gether	of	the	two	kinds	of	meanings	behind	fixity	–	that	meaning	which	seeks	to	solve	
the	crisis	tendencies	through	expansion	and	that	notion	of	‘fixing’	which	is	about	the	
tying up and pinning down of large amounts of capital in a particular place through the 
production	of	fixed	and	immobile	capital	within	the	secondary	circuit	of	capital;	i.e.	the	
built environment (roads, airports, harbours, state buildings, etc.) (Ibid.: 28). Within 
this dialectic there hides a contradiction: 
Here,	the	two	kinds	of	fixes	both	feed	off	each	other	to	stimulate	symbiotic	forms	
of accumulation (suburbs need cars and vice versa) and collide to form a poten-
tially serious contradiction. Globalization in its present guise has entailed, among 
other	things,	the	pursuit	of	a	whole	series	of	spatial	fixes	to	the	crisis	that	erupted	
around 1973. Capital, most would agree, has since become much more global in 
all	of	its	forms	of	production,	commerce,	merchanting	and	finance.	It	has	shifted	
474  The primary circuit of capital accumulation is capital that moves into and out of manufacturing and 
industrial production. In order to complete the picture, Harvey describes the tertiary circuit of capital as the 
process	that	comprises,	first,	the	investment	in	science	and	technology	(in	service	of	innovation	in	order	to	
revolutionize the productive forces and bring down geographical and spatial frictions) and second, a wide 
range of social expenditures that relate primarily to the reproduction of labour (e.g. education, health care, 
but also investments in related to the cooptation, integration and even repression of the labour force by 
ideological, military and other means) (Harvey, 1989a: 59-66).   
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rapidly (and often with considerable volatility) from one location to another. At 
the same time massive amounts of capital and labor have been invested in the 
sorts	 of	 immobile	 fixed	 capital	we	 see	 in	 airports,	 commercial	 centres,	 office	
complexes,	highways,	suburbs,	container	 terminals,	and	 the	 like.	Global	flows	
have been in part guided by such investments but at the same time these invest-
ments	 are	 speculative	 developments	 that	 depend	 for	 their	 profitability	 upon	 a	
certain	expansionary	pattern	of	global	flows	of	commodities,	capital	and	people.	
If	the	flows	fail	to	materialize,	then	the	fixed	capital	stand	to	be	devalued	and	lost	
(…). The production of space under capitalism proceeds under the shadow of this 
contradiction (Ibid.: 28-29).               
In addition to the kind of investments in the built environment that try to support capi-
talism as a system, the secondary circuit of capital can also serve as a buffer to crises 
of over-accumulation in manufacturing and industrial production. In other words, the 
secondary	circuit	 itself	can	prove	to	be	a	solution,	a	spatial	fix,	to	capitalism’s	inner	
crisis tendencies. Henri Lefebvre already argued in the 1970s that when the primary 
circuit of capital slows down, capital tends to shift towards the secondary circuit, the 
real	estate	sector,	for	accumulation	and	profit	purposes	(Lefebvre,	2003).	“It	can	even	
happen”, he argues, “that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for the 
formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value” (Ibid.: 160). This shift 
can be observed more and more through the processes of neoliberal urbanization and 
the	global	shift	towards	finance	capitalism.	Urban	space	and	real	estate	turned	to	be	a	
direct opportunity for capital accumulation in order to create “liquidity out of spatial 
fixity”	(Gotham,	2009).	Yet,	mega-projects	in	Morocco	such	as	the	Bouregreg	project,	
Casa-Marina,	Tanger	City	Centre,	etc.	are	not	only	profitable	avenues	for	commercial	
investment,	they	have	also	a	specific	spatial	effect	on	Moroccan	cities	which	is	similar	
to the effect witnessed in other neoliberal cities around the globe, but quite differ-
ent from the urban effects of earlier regimes of capitalist production and regulation. 
In	contrast	to	the	neoliberal	spatial	fix,	the	spatial	fix	of	Keynesian	urbanization	was	
predominantly a centrifugal one, implicating massive suburbanization and economic 
growth on the peripheries (Hackworth, 2007: 95). As a result, economic decline spread 
in many inner-city locations while locations of heavy industries and suburbs prospered 
in Europe and the US under the Keynesian welfare regime and its supportive policies of 
mass consumption. In the case of Morocco, I argued in earlier, that the public authori-
ties didn’t really had a coherent and developed urban development strategy before the 
1980s.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	compare	Moroccan	urbanization	in	those	decades	with	
European or American trends.475  
 
Nevertheless,	on	a	global	scale,	we	could	argue	that	the	Keynesian	spatial	fix	largely	
made	place	for	a	neoliberal	spatial	fix.	As	I	described	in	chapter	2,	the	global	liberation	
of capital and the de-industrialization of the urban centres, especially in the advanced 
capitalist societies, was followed by a spatial reorganization of the city. In contrast to the 
Keynesian or developmentalist period, the pattern of urbanization has coincided with 
massive inner-city reinvestment and urban centre renovation (Ibid.: 96). The city centre 
475  However, there were some indicators and isolated examples: the planning of the urban neighbourhood 
of Hay Riad in the 1970s, a high-end residential and governmental district, was clearly inspired by subur-
banization policies and a move away from the urban centre of Rabat.
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became the primary locus for niche real estate, service sector employment, tourism, and 
other replacements for heavy industry and manufacturing (Ibid.). Finance capitalism 
entailed the switch into banking, real estate, etc. which depended largely on the city’s 
‘unique selling position’. In the Arab region, this selling position not only focused on 
the inner (historical) city centres but also on waterfront development. The association 
with barren desertlike landscapes are an essential part of the marketing strategies which 
make the architectural endeavours of the Dubai copycat projects seem like oases of 
peace and prosperity in the midst of a region which has been mainly the seat of a war on 
terror and the victim of prejudices of cultural backwardness. Prestigious project such 
as Alger Medina, Lake Tunis, Saraya Aqaba and Solidere in Beirut are promoting the 
shorelines of some of the most important Arab cities, focusing predominantly on tour-
ism and luxury consumerism to secure a return on investment. 
In	Morocco,	the	creation	of	six	residential	sea-side	resorts	(Plan	Azur)	testifies	to	this	
kind	of	coastal	spatial	fix.	Furthermore,	the	restructuring	of	cities	like	Rabat	demon-
strate the attention given to coastal redevelopment. The Bouregreg project, and also 
the	planned	Saphira	project,	are	definitely	going	to	change	the	image	of	the	historical	
centre and its bordering coastline. Casablanca is an even more revealing example. In 
an interview with weekly business magazine Challenge, Mohamed Charif Houachmi, 
former associate Sales Manager at Sama Dubai and current partner at the Moroccan 
real	estate	firm	Business	Realties,	emphasized	the	importance	of	the	city-centre	and	the	
urgent necessity to rethink the centre of Casablanca according to a global logic:
The international experience has demonstrated that the city-centre has always 
represented a secure value, considering its historical and urban importance. This 
said, the city-centre of Casablanca should be continuously rethought in resem-
blance to the image of large European metropolises like London and Bordeaux, 
and Asian ones like Seoul, who are at the moment in the middle of a process of 
urban revaluation.476
The current master plan for Casablanca (the SDAU of 2008) clearly states the ambition 
to turn the city of Casablanca into a global city. Inner-city renovation, planning and de-
velopment are crucial strategies to accomplish this. According to the Casablanca master 
plan, large-scale urban development projects are crucial to “embellish the image of the 
city” (SDAU Casablanca, 2008: 146, own translation):
Big urban projects are powerful instruments for urban regeneration and the cre-
ation of a modern offer of housing, facilities, activities and services. These proj-
ects are for the cities what the large reforms are for those countries who wish to 
advance and adapt to the modern world. It is with these kinds of projects that cit-
ies like Barcelona, Marseille, London, Berlin and many others have established 
their mutation and adapted the urban offer to the economic, social and environ-
mental requirements of this early 21st century (Ibid: 163, own translation).
The current restructuring of Casablanca’s coastline is characteristic for the Moroccan 
476  Weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 36.
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neoliberal	 spatial	fix.	 It	 involves	projects	 like	 the	Marina,	Anfaplace	Living	Resort,	
El Hank and the Morocco Mall to redesign the entire coastline. With a surface of 10 
hectares the Morocco Mall – with the telling slogan “all for you” – is the largest shop-
ping mall project in North Africa.477 It is scheduled to contain more than 250 shops and 
food outlets, additionally featuring a huge aquarium and an IMAX Cinema.478 Monu-
ments and real estate spectacles such as the Mosque Hassan II, the Avenue Royale, 
Casa-Marina, the peninsula of El Hank and the rest of the planned redevelopment of 
the coastline will form the “hyper centre” of Casablanca; the “constituted city” which 
will locate the necessary prestige facilities and give the city its international aura (Ibid.: 
198). Yet, a closer look at the websites of a few of these projects quickly reveals that 
ordinary Moroccans are likely to be excluded from this new reality as they are far from 
being able to meet up with the promoted living standard.479
This kind of consumption of space with the objective to turn it into a space of consump-
tion does not take place without a considerable impact on the city and its social struc-
tures.	The	neoliberal	spatial	fix	therefore	also	implies	a	phase	of	“creative	destruction”.	
First of all, neoliberal restructuring in Morocco has profoundly reworked, and in many 
cases destroyed, the institutional infrastructures upon which the Moroccan developmen-
tal regime or pre-neoliberal state was grounded (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Secondly, 
these institutional frameworks were than renovated or replaced by new ones, such as 
for example the new state space in the Bouregreg Vally and many other examples of 
graduated	sovereignty,	in	order	to	fix	capital.	Additionally,	the	moments	of	creative	de-
struction can also have a broader meaning when it comes to urban renewal according to 
477  Mega-malls are the model of how public spaces are privatized. They are designing a new reality (often 
mixed with a manufactured authenticity – a ‘Moroccan authenticity’), organized and monitored, as it were, 
on the principles of Bentham’s panopticon (Marsden, 1999).
478  Oxford Business Group newsletter: Morocco: Positive tail for retail (09/12/2010). The opening of the 
mall is scheduled for February 2011.
479 See http://www.moroccomall.net; http://www.casablancamarina.ma; http://www.anfaplace.com, (ac-
cessed 18/11/09).
The restructuring of the Casablanca shoreline. Source: SDAU (2008)
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neoliberal strategies. The process of renewal then often implies the very destruction of 
actual existing livelihoods and urban landscapes in order to make room for new life and 
new	urban	designs	that	are	embedded	in	the	neoliberal	spatial	fix	(Chatterjee,	2009).	As	
such,	moments	of	creative	destruction	reflect	capital’s	need	to	create	an	(urban)	land-
scape adequate to accommodate its own interests and requirements at one point in time, 
only to revolutionize it at a later point in time in order to maintain the rate of growth and 
accommodate the possibilities for further accumulation (Harvey, 2010a: 86).
From that perspective, the bidonvilles are not so much excluded from renewal but an 
essential	element	of	the	neoliberal	spatial	fix.	Especially	those	located	in	the	urban	cen-
tre. They reveal types of urban infrastructure and built environment which are deemed 
unsuitable for the commercialization and consumption of urban space. In that sense, 
the slums represent that part (or a part) of the existing real estate that can also be a 
barrier for capital accumulation (Gotham, 2009). As a result, the predominant focus 
on the commercialization of urban space reveals the very tension, embedded within 
the	neoliberal	spatial	fix	and	capitalist	urbanization,	between	the	exchange	value	and	
the	use	value	of	urban	space	(with	the	first	of	course	being	privileged	over	the	second).	
Consequently, the resettlement and relocation of slum dwellers implies the destruction 
of	their	former	habitat	in	order	to	create	something	new	and	more	profitable.	“Violence	
is required to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old” (Harvey 2008: 
33). When David Harvey sees violence in the creation of a new urban world,  he refers 
to the Haussmann period where the old Parisian slums were torn down in the name 
of “civic improvement and renovation”, resulting in the removal of the working class 
from the city-centre (also because they were a threat to public order) (Ibid.). Before 
Paris became the ‘city of light’, the great centre of consumption, pleasure and tourism, 
aggressive and violent public works were implemented, especially during the mid-19th 
century, to transform the cityscape to its current constellation. This is the dark side of 
neoliberal urbanization. Moments of creative destruction therefore incorporate nearly 
always a class dimension, because the urban poor and those marginalized from politi-
cal	power,	whether	in	Paris	back	then	or	in	Casablanca	today,	suffer	first	and	foremost	
from this process (Ibid.; see also Lefebvre, 2003: 160). Creative destruction often goes 
hand in hand with an accumulation by dispossession. It is the process by which the 
city-centre is being reclaimed by global capital and the (poor) obstacles are removed 
because	it	is	not	profitable	to	leave	them	where	they	are.			
In chapter 4, I already argued that the strategies to relocate the urban poor are not so 
much resolving the problem of poverty but merely displaces it to other areas. This lies 
at the core of capitalist urbanization. Harvey, citing Friedrich Engels, argues that, in 
reality, the capitalist and political classes have only one method of solving the housing 
question: “that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution continually repro-
duces	the	question	anew”	(Harvey,	2008:	33).	The	spatial	fix	of	neoliberal	urbanism	
is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond a simple (re-)claim on the urban centre.480 
In Morocco (and also in general), suburbanization still continues at a rapid pace under 
480  One remarkable policy is the creation of six “new cities” (villes nouvelles) in the surroundings of large 
cities such as Rabat, Casablanca and Tangiers. These satellite cities, such as Temesna at 10 km from Rabat, 
are built entirely from scratch, mainly to unburden the large urban areas from the ongoing demographic 
pressures. 
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neoliberal urbanism. Yet, it is quite different from Keynesian patterns. Current urban 
outgrowth is deeply connected to broader social polarization and uneven development 
(Hackworth, 2007: 96). On the one hand, the priority given to homeownership in social 
development projects such as the VSBP and the resettlement of the slum dwellers are a 
valuable source of poverty capital	and	a	profitable	avenue	for	commercial	investment	
in the mass consumption of social houses. These investments are even a valuable alter-
native to high-end urban development when the latter is recovering from an economic 
shock. In that sense, and with the necessary help of the state, suburban growth in the 
form	of	mass	social	housing	can	fix	 the	capital	surplus	absorption	problem	in	many	
Third World countries due to its constant and high demand. On the other hand, other 
forms of planned suburban growth are often places where second homes, tourist facili-
ties and leisure activities dominate (Ibid.). The tourist resorts and gated communities 
that are popping up in the periphery of popular attractions such as Marrakech are some 
of the most obvious examples in Morocco. As a result, in the future, it is possible that 
the	upper	classes	and	the	wealthy	in	Morocco	will	either	reside	in	the	gentrified	neigh-
bourhoods of the historic urban centres, or retire in the gated ones of the exurbs and 
that uneven development will be even more clearly and openly designed into the urban 
landscape. In the end, the state – through the formation of new state spaces and new 
configurations	of	graduated	sovereignty	–	plays	a	key	role	in	the	dialectics	of	neoliberal	
spatial	fixity	and	creative	destruction.	Through	new	regulations	and	market-oriented	
policies public authority in Morocco currently socializes the risks and privatizes the 
benefits	of	neoliberal	urbanization.		
Conclusion
Parker concludes that “contemporary theories of transition can accommodate the idea 
of multiple pathways to the global, but have more trouble with the possibility that the 
global might refer to a variety of heterogeneous and even contradictory destinations”. 
General relocation plans for the slums of Casablanca. Source: Cluzeau & Benchakroun (2009).
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Likewise, he states that “accounts concerned with the non-occurrence of regime transi-
tions in Arab political life typically follow the map of globalist assumptions, but ignore 
scope	and	significance	of	boundaries	and	connections	being	etched	into	the	terrain	it-
self” (Parker, 2009: 119). In this chapter, I tried to shed light on the new boundaries 
and	connections	 that	are	etched	 today	 into	Moroccan	cities,	more	specifically	Rabat	
and Salé, and I highlighted the particular political narrative behind its urban meta-
morphosis. Two important observations can be made. First of all, by drawing on the 
work of various critical thinkers, I demonstrated that uneven development, inherent to 
the capitalist system, is not only expressed and manifested socially, but also spatially, 
through the polarization of development among different territories, places and spaces 
(Brenner, 2004: 13). Secondly, it is important not to reify the spatial structures and 
scales through which capitalist transformations takes place, but emphasize the class-
bound alliances behind them and assembled within them. The current political trans-
formations	 in	Morocco	are	 intimately	 related	 to	 the	power	configurations	and	social	
contradictions that are embedded within the contemporary neoliberal capitalist logic. 
As a result Moroccan cities are more and more turned into spaces of extremes and the 
ruling elites are making this choice consciously. Consequently, in contrast to a notion 
of globalization that is often presented by neoliberal development discourses as an in-
evitable force – and hence beyond the scope of national political agency – the various 
projects involved in its making are actually not so politically neutral as they appear to 
be (Parker, 2009: 113). Various actors – often extending far beyond national boundar-
ies – are forming new assemblages of (class) power that are involved in the (re)shaping 
of	the	urban	space	and	the	reconfiguration	of	the	urban	economy.	If	we	wish	to	avoid	
reifications	of	the	state,	seemingly	located	“up	there”,	and	as	a	result	of	certain	“state	
effects” (Mitchell, 1991; 2006; see also Bogaert & Emperador, 2011), we have to trace 
the different lines of authority, negotiation and engagement, and the ways in which they 
criss-cross	one	another	 through	various	distinct	spatial	configurations	of	sovereignty	
(Allen & Cochrane, 2010). 
 
Forms of graduated sovereignty, as Ong terms it, are shattering our Weberian model of 
nation-state sovereignty. From this perspective, sovereignty is not so much a uniform 
effect of state rule, but rather the result of contingent and differentiated outcomes of 
various strategies and assemblages of power (Ong, 2006: 100). Following up on Ong, 
the	configuration	of	sovereignty	in	the	Bouregreg	Valley	contains	that	contingent	ele-
ment, as a new way of governing, invented in a rather ad hoc way, based on a royal 
initiative. In her words, the Bouregreg project is a practical attempt to think about and 
act	upon	a	specific	problem	in	a	particular	locale	(Ibid.).	The	AAVB	is	a	salient	example	
of how political power has been resituated and assembled in order to pursue strategic 
development choices. As an institution and a new state space it replaces traditional state 
institutions – that are still the dominant focus of studies on Arab democratization – and 
it greatly impacts on the daily lives of urban residents. In the case of the Bouregreg 
project, all public competences are gathered – and enforced by law – into one tech-
nocratic entity that operates outside the scope of traditional government institutions. 
The AAVB is at the same time urban planner, developer and private investor. “It is the 
flexibility	of	 the	private	 sector	 conjoined	with	public	prerogatives”,	 as	 I	was	 told.481 
481  Interview with the director of the Bouregreg Marina (20/05/2010).
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Its	specific	modality	of	state	respatialization	clearly	illustrates	the	apparent	prioritiza-
tion of economic imperatives over the right to the city of ordinary citizens. Obviously, 
such schemes of state power transfers are not unique to the Moroccan case. The global 
reconfiguration	of	capital	and	 labour	produced	changing	geographical	and	 territorial	
forms of organization and rescaled forms of government and regulation everywhere in 
the	world	(Swyngedouw,	2000).	To	capture	global	flows	of	capital	within	a	globalized	
production chain, national states are increasingly transferring responsibility and regu-
latory capacities to new urban and regional governmental arrangements for tasks such 
as economic development, services, and infrastructural restructuring (Martin, McCann 
& Purcell, 2003: 115). But the exceptional amount of legal autonomy still makes the 
Bouregreg case an exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, as I was explained by 
one	official,	the	model	of	the	AAVB	is	a	test-case,	“a	laboratory	to	test	certain	issues	
which fail based on private initiative alone”.482 By examining the various technolo-
gies	applied	to	create	place-specific	configurations	of	sovereignty,	Ong	argues	that	we	
begin to see a more dynamic process of sovereignty than the abstract picture we often 
get from mainstream analyses that depict sovereignty in terms of broad labels such as 
‘liberal’, ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’ (Ong, 2006: 102).
The	 neoliberal	 spatial	 fix	 privileges	 foremost	 the	 inner-city	 centre	 of	 the	Moroccan	
coastal cities. Urban renovation and waterfront development are essential components 
of neoliberal economic growth strategies. Yet, urban development schemes such as the 
Bouregreg project also strongly enhance and reproduce the urban geography of uneven 
development that has struck so many developing countries for decades. The economic 
reforms that are promoted by actually existing forms of neoliberal agency are not lead-
ing to more general welfare. To the contrary, they hinder and prevent the progress of all 
members of a society, for the mode of accumulation that it imposes actually excludes 
the	possibility	of	 the	majority	of	 the	population	to	benefit	from	accumulation	strate-
gies. Government in Morocco privileges the desires of private capital at the expense of 
some of the pressing social needs such as youth unemployment, the crisis in education, 
(urban) poverty and the poor quality of public health care. In addition, the neoliberal 
spatial	fix	also	implies	a	certain	violence.	The	direct	and	subjective	violence	in	tearing	
down a building, or even a whole neighbourhood, is obvious. It is incorporated as a 
form of creative destruction. But the violent aspect of neoliberal urbanization does not 
end	 there.	Highways,	majestic	edifices,	waterfront	 luxury	estates	and	other	 forms	of	
concrete barriers are built on the wreckage of what was there before. Yet after a while, 
the remembrance of its destruction fades and the new urban structures – as results of 
struggles and negotiations between different assemblages of power – become the (new) 
normal state of things. It determines city-life for the coming decades. To draw on the 
opening quotes, in making the city man has been remade. This is the socio-spatial 
dialectic (Soja, 1980). Edward Soja argues that space and the political organization 
of space are the result of particular social relations but also react back on these social 
relations. In other words, the relationship between man and space is dialectical in the 
sense that man organizes and produces his environment on the basis of multiple social, 
economic and political values, norms and conditions that are than inscribed in space. 
In	return,	the	spatial	environment	exercises	an	influence	on	human	behaviour	and	the	
482  Interview with the Head of Corporate Finance & Partnerships of the AAVB (20/05/2010).
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human condition (Nachoui, 1998: 119). Power plays a crucial role in this dialectic. 
As Harvey pointed out, the primary agents that shape the Moroccan cities (property 
owners,	 landlords,	developers,	finance	capitalists	 and	 the	 state)	 are	also	 shaping	 the	
residents	of	that	city.	Their	creations	are	‘statements’.	Symbols	of	a	specific	govern-
ment and life-style.
But also violence characterizes the socio-spatial dialectic. Once built, the physical in-
frastructure of the Bouregreg Valley requires a “permanence” of physical form (Harvey, 
2006:	147).	They	are	material	 reflections	of	 the	more	abstract,	objective	and	anony-
mous systemic violence inherent to a capitalist hegemony. And while these physical 
forms are always open to a re-conceptualization of the material form, so that eventually 
people can experience and live them differently, the sheer materiality of the construc-
tions	of	 the	Bouregreg	Valley	and	other	materializations	of	 the	neoliberal	spatial	fix	
will always carry their own weight and authority as forms embedding an objective 
force,	 or	 even	 “objective	 violence”.	Objective	 violence,	 according	 to	 Žižek	 (2008),	
has an invisible character because its ‘normality’ becomes the standard against which 
we perceive outbursts of subjective violence.483 Yet, if one wants to make sense of the 
social tensions and struggles within contemporary urban space (e.g. a riot, a terrorist 
attack, etc.), one also has to take into account the objectivity of what I would call, in 
the case of contemporary urban renewal projects, a kind of spatial violence. According 
to Michel de Certeau (1984: 98) “a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities 
(e.g. by a place in which one can move) and interdictions (e.g. by a wall that prevents 
one from going further)”. If, from the perspective of a socio-spatial dialectic, social 
relations can incorporate a certain violence (e.g. creative destruction), spatial structures 
and relations can do so as well. As such, the spatial orders of neoliberalism are carrying 
in them a form of objective violence. The impact of space on man is not only the result 
of the mere materiality itself, but also of the values, ideologies, discourses, knowledge 
and images that represent and are represented by space (cf. Lefebvre, 1991). Yet, in the 
end, the combination of the continuous securitization of urban space, the protection 
of privileged class subjects and their values, ideas and norms, the roll back of state 
developmentalism and the particular inclusion of the poor in the form of for example 
poverty capital can never be a stable and sustainable status quo. It is maybe within this 
framework of tension between objective and subjective violence, embedded within the 
neoliberal order, that we should try to understand the dynamics of recent outbursts of 
social protest in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Because, in many cases, pro-
testers did not just rise up against the cruel dictator, but also against the fundamentals 
of what many of us would perceive as the “normal state of things”.  
To conclude, there is one rather simple question that remains to be answered: who will 
pay for all the mega-projects currently under way in Morocco? Speaking at the World 
Economic Forum held in October 2010, the Moroccan minister of equipment and trans-
port, Karim Ghellab, announced that Morocco has earmarked 11 billion EUR for trans-
port improvements alone between 2008 and 2011 (amongst others for the tramway in 
Rabat and Salé, but considerable investments went also to the tramway project in Casa-
483		Slavoj	Žižek	(2008:	2)	describes	subjective	violence	as	a	“perturbation	of	the	“normal”,	peaceful	state	
of things” – e.g. the act of demolition – while he sees in objective violence “precisely the violence inherent 
to this “normal” state of things”.
Redesigning urban life and the formation of new state spaces in Morocco 281
blanca and the high-speed train rail between Casablanca and Tangiers).484 According to 
Ghellab, Morocco quadrupled its investments over the last ten years. He told the press 
that the country “is capitalizing on infrastructure because improving infrastructure is 
likely to contribute to both economic and human development”.485 However, in the sum-
mer of 2010, monthly magazine Entreprise et Economie, seriously questioned the abil-
ity	of	the	Moroccan	state	and	its	affiliated	investments	banks	and	funds,	such	as	the	
CDG	and	the	Fund	Hassan	II	to	keep	financing	the	enormous	infrastructural	endeavours	
in which they are currently involved, especially given the global economic uncertainty 
since	the	financial	meltdown	of	2008	and	the	hesitancy	amidst	large	foreign	financial	
groups and real estate developers to maintain the current pace of investment.486 In the 
case of the Bouregreg project, the withdrawal of Sama Dubai is planned to be taken 
over (partly) by the CDG, but the latter is already implicated in numerous other projects 
such as Casa-Marina, the Avenue Royale, Tanger Med, etc. Not surprisingly, in its is-
sue of May 2010, Entreprise et Economie critically discussed the recent restructuring 
within the CDG itself (and the change of directors).487 Rumours circulated that the CDG 
experienced	financially	difficult	 times	and	 that	new	strategies	were	 required	 to	keep	
the	bank	afloat.	In	addition,	and	from	a	broader	perspective,	research	on	preceding	so-
called megaprojects has shown that in most cases the added-value is heavily overrated 
(Flyvbjerg, 2005). It thus remains to be seen whether the Bouregreg project will even 
fulfil	its	promises	to	its	investors.	After	all,	how	many	successful	competitive	cities	can	
there be in the world (Harvey, 1989b)?
484  Oxford Business Group newsletter: Morocco: Paths to progress (06/12/2010). 
485  Ibid.
486  See Economie/Entreprise, Crise de liquidité, July-August 2010, n°128. Also available at: http://www.
economie-entreprises.com/sommair.php?dat=07/10 (Accessed 06/12/2010).
487  See Economie/Entreprise, L’âge de raison, May 2010, n°126. Also available at: http://www.economie-
entreprises.com/sommair.php?dat=05/10 (accessed 06/12/2010).
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The large city, monstrous and tentacular, is always politi-
cal. It serves as the most favorable environment for the 
formation of authoritarian power. It is characterized by 
organization and overorganization. Large cities legitimize 
inequality. Faced with a choice between an overbearing 
sense of order and the everlasting threat of chaos, pow-
er, any power, state power, will always choose order. The 
large city has but a single problem: number. A mass soci-
ety is established within its circumference, which implies 
that these masses be constrained and implies therefore, the 
existence of a permanent state of violence and repression 
(Lefebvre, 2003: 92).
But where consumption is the objective, coercive security 
would be a reminder of the fragility and futility of attempts 
to consume one’s way to pleasure. Hence control must be 
designed-in, embedded in the very structuring of time, 
space and the environment. (…) The Third World prole-
tariat who service these spaces of consumption are herded 
into ghettos and barrios in the public housing zones that 
are expelled to the outer rings of the city. And the poor, 
‘street people’, the homeless and workless are expelled 
to spaces outside the urban enclave, spaces which are in-
creasingly avoided and feared by those who used to walk, 
shop and visit there (Rose, 1999: p.251). 
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I started this project with a seemingly simple question: how do we interpret political 
change in the Arab World today? The answer to that question, however, is far less 
simple. In this study I explored some of the directions and perspectives that enable us 
to understand political change as a process that is, without a doubt, intimately related 
to the changes and shifts within global capitalism. As such, this study departed from 
the argument that the key to understand political change cannot be contained by mere 
endogenous political legacies or the black box of the “Arab regime” (Parker, 2006). On 
the other hand, what I tried to outline and explain in this project does not necessarily 
provide	a	new	definite	alternative	key	or	key	perspective.	In	matter	of	fact,	maybe	there	
is no “key” at all? And consequently, there is maybe no key-perspective from which 
we can depart. Instead of looking for one, we should rather pay attention to both the 
historical embeddedness and contingent dynamics of contemporary processes of politi-
cal transformation in a constantly changing world. To do so, our theoretical frameworks 
and perspectives to understand and explain “change” have to be inherently connected to 
that historicity and contingency. Critical theory is therefore not necessarily an outside 
view on society as it is, undoubtedly, a product of society and a result of engagement 
with society. Theoretical explanation is vital, but its viability lies only in the complex-
ity of the case (or social reality), and is embedded within the particular moment of 
history. 
In	order	to	explore	both	the	historical	influences	and	contingent	character	of	political	
change in the Arab World today, I suggested critical perspectives which take into ac-
count the question of “space”. A critical spatial perspective looks at the relational, in-
terruptive and dislocating consequences of contemporary politics. In this view, politics 
are not necessarily unpredictable but certainly open-ended. In other words, “transition” 
cannot be seen as the outcome of a single totalised and predetermined history within 
which every part is expressive of the whole (Massey, 2005: 41). Critical analysis should 
not be constrained by – or should try at least to avoid it as much as possible – a reading 
of history in terms of a-spatial narratives that are framed within temporal sequences 
or sequential stages (e.g. developing/developed; authoritarian/democratic; traditional/
modern, etc.) which ignore to a large extent the contingency of political trajectories. In 
contrast, a critical spatial perspective preserves the possibility of an open future and at-
tempts to recognize, discover and understand the very politics behind “change”.488 This 
doesn’t mean that we should view politics and change as something that can be reduced 
to mere contingency. To the contrary, contingency does not mean that understandings of 
structural causes and logics are inapplicable to explain politics. It only means that poli-
tics may be constrained by structural dynamics, but are never reduced to them. Contin-
gency and structure are not mutually exclusive (Parker (2009) also makes this point). 
If this would be the case, there would be little room for agency (and consequently it 
wouldn’t be politics) (Massey, 2005). That is why – and here I draw again on Massey – 
space itself cannot be understood without understanding the “life in space”.489 Moments 
488  That is why I preferred to use the concept of “change” instead of the concept of transition when dis-
cussing ongoing processes of formation and transformation. 
489  Referring to the importance of considering life in space, Massey writes that “conceiving of space as a 
static slice through time, as representation, as a closed system and so forth are all ways of taming it. They 
enable us to ignore its real import: the coeval multiplicity of other trajectories and the necessary outward-
lookingness of a spatialised subjectivity. (…) If time is to be open to a future of the new then space cannot 
be equated with the closures and horizontalities of representations. More generally, if time is to be open 
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of violence, personal objectives or strategic relations are some of the rather contingent 
dynamics of that life that can redirect territorial and/or capitalist logics of power (cf. 
Harvey, 2003). As such, this study hasn’t been searching for a timeless truth, only at-
tempted to provide epistemic gain to understand the political impact of contemporary 
globalization	in	the	Arab	World	(Morocco	more	specifically).
If we consider the political impact of contemporary globalization, Ray Bush argues 
that there seem to be two narratives on the future of the MENA-region. One narrative 
proclaims the end of the national economy and the dominance of the globalization. 
Often,	 the	 story	 then	 goes	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 poverty	 reduction,	 economic	 growth,	
modernization and democratization can only be delivered if the countries of the region 
open	up	their	economies	to	the	virtues	of	free	market	trade	and	financial	capital.	Press-
ing socio-economic problems related to poverty, unemployment, social exclusion are 
often presented as either mere economic problems (e.g. a lack of economic growth, a 
question of economic exclusion, not enough trade liberalization, etc.) or as mere tech-
nocratic problems (e.g. institutional failure, ‘bad’ governance, etc.). Another narrative, 
one	I	presented	in	my	work,	strongly	contradicts	the	first	one	and	claims	that	contem-
porary	globalization	actually	entails	the	continuation	and	intensification	–	albeit	in	new	
ways – of capitalist uneven development (Bush, 2004). I demonstrated that, in reality, 
the root causes of (and solutions for) the pressing socio-economic problems in a coun-
try	as	Morocco	are	in	the	first	place	political. Moreover, today, these socio-economic 
problems are not so much the consequence of an ‘incomplete implementation’ of neo-
liberal reforms (e.g. Dillman, 2002), but rather an essential part of the inherent logic of 
neoliberal politics tout court. To explain this, I have looked at and studied Morocco’s 
contemporary urban politics.490 The urban space is a primary arena of political struggle 
in current times of neoliberal globalization. And as the French philosopher Henri Lefe-
bvre	reminded	us,	the	material	constitution	of	the	urban	space	is	always	a	reflection	of	
the current and historical balances of political power (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; 1996; 2003). 
The results of that power have been etched into the spatial forms of the Moroccan city. 
As such, I considered the Moroccan city as the primary object of a – not necessarily 
coherent nor rational – political project of actually existing neoliberalism. 
More	specifically,	I	considered	two	cases	of	urban	politics	that	exemplify	the	neoliberal	
urban extremes. First of all, I looked at different techniques and methods to govern the 
slums. In the history of Moroccan urbanization, the slums and their population have 
often posed a threat to the hegemonic political order. During Morocco’s three decades 
of	neoliberal	restructuring,	two	specific	moments	of	violence	in	the	city	of	Casablanca	
(the 1981 riots and the 2003 suicide bombings) have accelerated and determined the 
elaboration of particular techniques of government in order to securitize the city. These 
techniques originated within the framework of the then prevalent neoliberal govern-
mentality and have been described as techniques of sovereign city planning (1980s) 
then	space	must	be	open	too.	Conceptualising	space	as	open,	multiple	and	relational,	unfinished	and	always	
becoming, is a prerequisite for history to be open and thus a prerequisite, too, for the possibility of politics” 
(Massey, 2005: 59).  
490  As I mentioned in the introduction, I followed David Harvey’s conception of urban politics, namely 
“the	broad	sense	of	political	processes	at	work	within	a	fluidly	defined	but	nevertheless	explicit	space”	
(Harvey, 1989a: 127).
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and techniques of security (2000s). Relying on Foucauldian notions of power, Mari-
ana Valverde has argued that the conception of “sovereign city planning” describes 
techniques that capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture in 
order to incite loyalty to a sovereign. In contrast, the conception of “cities of security” 
describes particular techniques that are more concerned with the biopolitical manage-
ment of the urban population and the future risks related to that population. Within the 
framework of this theoretical distinction, I have shown that the methods developed 
after the 1981 riots attempted above all to strengthen state power at the urban scale 
in order to improve social control over the physical environment (the urban territory) 
through which people move. This coincided with a phase of roll back neoliberalism in 
which certain functions of the state were rolled back (i.e. the redistributive and welfare 
providing functions). The negative social outcomes of economic austerity and the roll 
back of direct state-intervention in economic affairs urged the re-centralization of state 
power in other domains (administrative territorial control, police control, the power of 
symbolic monuments and state architecture, etc.). 
Subsequently, in the 1990s, the governmental rationalities in Morocco – which evolved 
together with a global transition from the Washington Consensus to a Post-Washington 
Consensus – attempted to address the meagre socio-economic results of orthodox neo-
liberal recipes (structural adjustment). This has led to a shift in development policies. 
It was clear that mere economic deregulation was not enough to spur economic growth 
and the idea grew stronger that a liberal market-economy required strong technocratic 
state-support. Again, a violent moment accelerated the elaboration of new governmen-
tal methods and the roll out of new institutional arrangements to support the integra-
tion of slum dwellers in the formal market-economy. Social exclusion and economic 
marginalization were considered the breeding ground for radicalization and extremism 
and state-led and state-sponsored market-integration was the obvious solution. New 
methods to improve the urban citizen’s participation in slum relocation projects (AS) 
and	specific	arrangements	to	improve	his	access	to	capital	(FOGARIM,	micro-credits)	
were some of the main techniques of social engineering that characterized governmen-
tal intervention at the level of the individual slum dweller. This time, not so much the 
urban territory but the (slum) population itself became the primary target to improve 
social control over the urban space. The idea was to responsibilize the slum dweller and 
turn him into a good citizen. Of course, the market was the main model for individual 
self-regulation and the exploitation of poverty capital (i.e. the exploration of new fron-
tiers of capital accumulation) equally provided the incentives and rationalities for the 
invention of new modalities of state intervention. 
 
In a second case study, I looked at an example of an urban mega-project. More precisely, 
I focused on the Bouregreg project, a high-end waterfront development project of 6,000 
ha in the valley of the Bouregreg river between the cities of Rabat and Salé. These kind 
of urban development schemes are often presented as important strategies to promote 
economic growth, strengthen the urban competitive position and demonstrate a ‘devel-
oping’ country’s willingness to engage in global capitalism. The Bouregreg project has 
to accelerate the rhythm of (foreign) investments and promote the cities’ unique selling 
position. Politically, the Moroccan state intervened in the urban economy by rolling 
out new institutional arrangements that exemplify, in this particular case, the forma-
Concluding remarks 287
tion of “new state spaces”. These state spaces are forms of “graduated sovereignty” in 
the course of which state power has been displaced to and renegotiated in exceptional 
zones that exist inside or alongside arrangements of conventional government (e.g. 
the national territory, the region, the prefecture, etc...). The AAVB is a salient example 
of such a new state space and demonstrates that state power materializes in diverse 
ways and gives form to variegated entities which are not necessarily congruent with the 
national boundaries. The rationality behind the formation of new state spaces and the 
establishment	of	new	institutional	configurations	fit	within	the	process	of	the	Moroc-
can shift from sovereign city planning (embedded within roll back neoliberalism) to 
forms of “urban entrepreneurialism” in which state agencies are actively involved in 
the direction of market opportunities and developments (this is the essence of roll out 
neoliberalism). New state spaces are an outcome of how neoliberal politics produce the 
urban uneven development. As James Ferguson argued, the capital engaged in these 
mega-projects hops from place to place and, in the course of this process, it bypasses 
huge areas and populations (Ferguson, 2005). Consequently, we have seen that neolib-
eral reform (in whatever form) has not necessarily led to a retreat of the state but more 
specifically	 to	a	 redefinition	of	 its	modes	of	 intervention	and	a	 transformation	of	 its	
institutional character. Based on the presented evidence from these two case studies, I 
also	argued	that	the	Moroccan	political	commitments	to	fight	poverty	and	promote	eco-
nomic growth form an intrinsic part of the neoliberal political project and demonstrate 
how local politics are not just imposed by neoliberal globalization, but are – to follow 
up on Massey (2005) – agents in the production of the neoliberal capitalist global. 
Drawing on Aihwa Ong, the production of these forms of graduated sovereignty are 
rather	ad	hoc	and	practical	attempts	to	think	about	and	act	upon	a	specific	problem	in	a	
particular locale (Ong, 2006).
Three general remarks can be distinguished here. First of all, as mentioned, the state 
plays a crucial role in neoliberal projects. This not only affects the particular project but 
also the constitution of the state itself. As we have seen, the state has altered its modes 
of intervention (towards a privatization of the state) in which modalities of indirect rule 
are	often	privileged	over	direct	 intervention	(e.g.	PPPs,	financial	support	of	associa-
tions, the private sector and NGOs, etc.). Additionally, the state apparatus has also been 
subject to processes of re-regulation, re-institutionalilzation and re-territorialization in 
order to co-determine the geography of capitalist accumulation. The Bouregreg state 
space was one example, but many other cases have been mentioned alongside (e.g. 
Hassan II Fund, TMSA, etc.). This transformation of the Moroccan state has taken 
place within the framework of an urban political project that has assembled strategies to 
establish	social	control	with	strategies	to	maximize	profit	and	capitalist	integration.	
Secondly, besides class power, biopower has been vital to the expansion of capitalism 
in	Morocco.	Whereas	 the	first	may	have	been	particularly	crucial	 for	 the	“extensive	
enlargement” of capitalism worldwide, methods of biopower were, above all, crucial 
for	its	“intensive	enlargement”,	i.e.	a	process	where	the	commodification	of	social	re-
lations	has	been	deepened	significantly	(Robinson,	2004).	Bio-politics	are	implicated	
in the making of a world which neoliberal rationality and discourse suggests actually 
already exists (Lemke, 2002). In general, authoritarian regimes are usually associated 
with sovereign forms of power. Yet, I demonstrated why an understanding of the dif-
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ferent methods of biopower are equally important to understand the functioning of 
“authoritarian governmentality” (Dean, 1999). The intensive enlargement of capitalism 
requires careful techniques to integrate particular populations and their assets into the 
capital circulation process. In the case of the VSBP, the issue of urban poverty was 
taken up as an entry point in order to enhance both bureaucratic control and explore 
new	frontiers	of	capital	accumulation.	If	we	look	beyond	the	specific	ideological	pack-
aging of social development schemes such as VSBP – e.g. with a focus on participatory 
development, the virtues of home-ownership, etc. – a political reality is revealed in 
which not so much poverty alleviation per se really matters, but rather how this political 
objective can be integrated in a neoliberal project. Understanding this reality requires 
not only attention to the class dimension of contemporary globalization but also to its 
underpinning and deeply entrenched rationalities. 
Third, neoliberal urban politics have given rise to new, wider and more open assem-
blages of (state-/class-)power. Foreign investors, architects, urbanists, real estate devel-
opers,	etc.	have	become	new	players	on	the	field	of	the	state.	This	not	necessarily	means	
that traditional state elites are losing their power, but rather that new (capitalist) actors 
are drawn within reach (Panitch, 1998; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). As a consequence, 
the redesign of urban life and the government of the city has become more accountable 
to investors (and other ‘outsiders) over and above the interests of ordinary urban resi-
dents. As such, many of the agents of change (such as global capital) do not even reside 
in the cities they reshape (Parker, 2009; Bayat & Biekart, 2009). 
In general, the post-1980s round of political restructuring in Morocco can be charac-
terized	by	a	reconfiguration	of	government	in	three	ways:	(1)	the	rescaling	of	govern-
ment (e.g. by privileging the urban scale); (2) the reorientation of public policy from 
redistribution (how limited it may have been) to competition (urban entrepreneurial-
ism). After all, neoliberal reform was an attack on the redistribution of wealth and the 
provision of welfare by public policies and entailed the transfer of social services to 
market actors, while at the same time it produced individualized subjects responsible 
for their own well-being (Dikeç, 2006; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010); (3) the displacement 
and renegotiation of state power into new state spaces and new governmental arrange-
ments (i.e. the respatialization and the privatization of the state). As a result of these 
restructurings, urban politics generated an evolution in the way authorities looked upon 
the city. The Moroccan city evolved from being considered predominantly as a politi-
cal and social burden to be perceived as an opportunity, a dynamic place for generating 
economic growth. However, it is unlikely that this turnover will lead to a decrease of 
urban uneven development – although it is often legitimized as such – but rather sustain 
and reproduce the socio-spatial fragmentation of the city, and consequently, more than 
likely also produce new political tensions.
I demonstrated that different expressions of political power are implicated in an urban 
project in which – above all – the city-centre has been reclaimed or brought in as the 
primary space to be consumed (in order to turn it into a space of consumption). The 
urban poor – or more generally, all those who cannot afford the promoted style of living 
– are gradually, and in a way deliberately, pushed out of the city-centre to make place 
for high-rent speculative urban development. I mention here ‘deliberately’ because the 
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strategic redesign of the urban centres in Morocco is the outcome of conscious politi-
cal choices. Yet, the relocation of the poor (either literally with the VSBP or indirectly 
through	processes	of	gentrification)	goes	not	without	exploiting	their	poverty	capital	as	
well.491	Thanks	to	methods	of	biopower	the	poor	are	not	an	unprofitable	market	anymore	
(cf. Erik Hobsbawm’s opening quote in chapter 4), but rather a valid (temporarily?) 
alternative for real estate developers, landlords, capital investors, etc. In the end, the 
different examples I discussed over the course of this project should not so much be de-
scribed as strategies for “economic growth” or “economic development”, as these de-
scriptions almost inevitably evoke illusions of trickle down and general welfare. These 
are the myths of contemporary neoliberal globalization. Instead, we should not fall into 
the trap of just trusting numbers and data of economic growth and poverty reduction 
blindly (cf. Achy 2010), without critically investigating the very mechanisms that pro-
duce them (Ruccio, 2011). As such, we can discern some of the very mechanisms that 
actually install and reproduce uneven development and social inequality. Because in 
the end it is inequality, and not so much poverty, that generates the real trigger behind 
social unrest, revolt, political instability and maybe, eventually, revolutionary politics 
(as we have seen in Tunisia and Egypt just recently). Accordingly, the examples dis-
cussed	in	this	project	should	be	described	and	defined	as	they	really	are:	class	strategies	
of	capital	accumulation,	surplus	appropriation,	profit	maximization	and	accumulation	
by dispossession.
Both the high-end urban development projects (e.g. Bouregreg) and the current social 
development projects (e.g. VSBP) can be viewed as part of the particular neoliberal 
spatial	fix	in	Morocco.	The	spatial	fix	comprises	the	variegated	political	strategies	that	
(re-)claim the inner-city and its coastlines and determine the conditions for urban devel-
opment,	design	and	relocation.	On	the	one	hand,	this	“spatial	fix”	refers	to	the	ways	in	
which	capital	is	fixed	in	the	built	environment	in	order	to	support	capitalist	expansion,	
but also to the ways in which the built environment provides new solutions for capital 
surplus	problems.	On	the	other	hand,	this	fix	refers	to	the	technological,	institutional	
and governmental innovations that are created to assure and promote capitalist expan-
sion.	The	neoliberal	spatial	fix	is	the	particular	contemporary	constellation	that	keeps	
worldwide	capital	flow	in	constant	motion.	Yet,	despite	the	promises	for	a	better	world	
that	 are	 often	 trying	 to	 legitimize	 these	 specific	 growth	 strategies,	 current	 political-
economic restructurings in the urban space disenfranchise urban inhabitants beyond the 
scope of typical imaginations of the nature of political freedoms and political power 
that are ascribed to either authoritarian and liberal democratic systems. Whether it con-
cerns contemporary liberal democratic societies or forms of authoritarianism, neolib-
eral restructurings have decreased the impact of ordinary citizens to co-determine the 
shaping of their own cities in both kind of societies (Purcell, 2002). For example, the 
gradual but uncompromising privatization of public spaces through the promotion of 
high-end urban development projects symbolizes the subtle shift away – everywhere 
in the world – from human rights and political freedoms towards the rights of private 
property (Marsden, 1999). 
491		To	be	correct,	many	of	the	speculative	urban	projects	in	Morocco	have	not	been	finished	yet.	So,	the	
hypothesis	of	gentrification	has	not	been	demonstrated	yet.	Nevertheless,	given	the	evidence	delivered	by	
studies	in	other	countries	and	regions,	the	likeliness	of	gentrification	should	not	be	underestimated	and	even	
be considered highly probable (cf. chapter 5). 
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Projects such as the Royal Avenue, Casa-Marina, and the Bouregreg project do not 
take into account the particular social place and interests of original inhabitants. To 
the contrary, these projects largely ignore “the ways in which residents are both part of 
and live within the city” (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010: 217). According to Berry-Chikhaoui, 
two	opposing	representations	and	perceptions	of	the	city	are	conflicting	here:	the	eco-
nomic status of the city and the stakes and interests that coincide with its integration in 
a global market on the one hand, and the everyday lives of ordinary citizens and their 
social and spatial interests and experiences on the other hand (Ibid.: 218). This is what 
Henri	Lefebvre	called	the	conflicting	difference	between	the	exchange value and the 
use value of urban space (Lefebvre, 1996). The Moroccan urban project participates 
and inscribes itself in the making of a world in which “the right of private property and 
the	profit	rate	trump	all	other	notions	of	rights”	(Harvey,	2008:	33).492 The valorisation 
and consumption of urban space has been a key accumulation strategy for capital and 
property rights have given capitalist developers relatively free reign to produce the ur-
ban space according to their own interests (Purcell, 2002).493 To come back to the case 
of the VSBP, it is an illusion to believe that formal property rights will automatically 
enable poor urban residents to empower themselves and enhance their chances in the 
formal market-economy. Legal property rights not only formalizes and legalizes the 
assets of the urban poor, it also makes these assets visible and attainable for more pow-
erful market actors. The current spatial boundaries that are drawn with the Bouregreg 
project and the emphasis on home-ownership within the VSBP reveal the making of 
a particular kind of political world where consumers (with enough money) instead of 
citizens have the right to the city. It also reveals the making of a political world where 
“the rich have state-help and the poor have self-help” (Roy, 2010: 216). The crucial 
question is: will both the state and the poor be able to continue to pay for the neoliberal 
projects of the rich?
Morocco was my case study, but the discussed political changes and urban transforma-
tions can also be ascribed to the rest of the Arab world. Some scholars have begun to 
direct our focus to these recent regional changes in different ways (amongst others Hi-
bou, 2006; Catusse, 2008; Parker, 2009; Kanna, 2009; Barthel, 2010; Krijnen & Fawaz, 
2010). Of course, the particular political transformations discussed in this study are by 
no means unique to the Arab World. Although there are important regional and country 
492  “Try picketing in a [shopping]mall” (Marsden, 1999: 6).
493  In contrast to the dominant neoliberal urban logic, many critical scholars have defended the Lefebvr-
ian notion of the “right to the city” as an alternative to neoliberal aspirations and the imagination of the city 
from above (e.g. Dikeç, 2002; Purcell, 2002; Harvey, 2008; Fawaz, 2009; see also Lefebvre, 1996). The 
right to the city as a political ideal implicates far more than a limited concept of individual liberty and equal 
access to urban resources. To the contrary, the right to the city advocates a collective right: i.e. the collec-
tive power of all urban residents to design, reshape, appropriate and participate in the processes of urban-
ization and spatial (re)production. It is the right to appropriate urban space and re-think the city in terms of 
its use value and not its exchange value. It is “a right to urban life” (Lefebvre, 1996: 158). This implicates 
that the control over urbanization has to shift away from the neoliberal conceptualization of urban space as 
a commodity that can be exploited (Fawaz, 2009: 831). Challenging property rights also means challenging 
the very foundation of capitalist class relations (Purcell, 2002). Additionally, engaging which such a rights-
based agenda on the urban scale implies a radical critique of the current state practices and the implementa-
tion of neoliberal reforms that goes beyond a narrow focus on good governance standards and the promo-
tion of liberal democracy. It incorporates a more radical critique of the urban economy and will require a 
whole different process of state respatialization and institutional reform then the one currently taking place 
in Morocco. 
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specific	dynamics	(actually	existing	forms	of	neoliberalism),	I	have	tried	to	describe	
an almost universal kind of political transformation that coincided with the continuing 
spread of capitalism and the increasing hegemony of the capitalist system (especially 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall). The examples discussed here open up theoretical and 
empirical space for a comparison of the political transformations in the Arab region 
with	 case	 studies	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.	More	 specifically,	 the	neoliberal	 inspired	
processes of state formation, state respatialization and state intervention are subject to 
the same global trends affecting the rest of the world. These observations, and the po-
litical dimension of mega-projects like the Bouregreg project and social development 
schemes such as VSBP, call into question “the assumption whether the Arab World can 
still	be	considered	a	coherent	regional	subsystem	providing	a	significant	framework	of	
analysis for social sciences” (Aggestam, e.a., 2009: 345). By pinpointing both the uni-
versality	and	the	Moroccan	or	regional	specificity	of	these	changes,	the	Arab	region	can	
be liberated from its exceptionalist straitjacket. To do so, we have to move away from 
explanations of political change that focus only on endogenous political legacies and 
away from state-centred approaches that tend to lose sight of the complexity of contem-
porary assemblages of power in times of neoliberal globalization. Additionally, and to 
conclude, understanding the actual political dynamics of neoliberal globalization con-
cerns less the degree of globalization (and the consequent question whether Casablanca 
is as global as for example Dubai, or even London), but rather, and more importantly, 
the form of globalization and the political construction of that form (Massey, 2005). 
From that perspective we can observe similar and comparable political developments 
in the whole Arab region, and beyond.
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